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SUMMARY 
This analysis of local bargaining is primarily theoretical 
and conceptua 1 in natu re and done in fou r main parts. The 
first part deals with different theriretiqal perspectives on 
industrial relations and the role each perspective assigns 
to collective bargaining and trade unions. The nature and 
various elements of collective bargaining are explored in 
more detail in order to arrive at a definition of local 
barga in i ng .. 
In Part Two, the structures th-rough which local bargaining 
has historically been conducted in South African industrial 
re 1 at ions are discussed. Th is is done aga i nst the backd rop 
of an anal ys is of 1 oca 1 barga in i ng as it has evo 1 ved in the 
industrial relations systems of the following countries: 
Great Britain, Japan, West Germany and the United States of 
America. Tendencies towards more decentralised bargaining 
are also identified in those countries hitherto known for 
their highly centralised bargaining structures. 
In Part Three, the factors underl yi ng the deve 1 opment and 
establ ishment of local bargaining within the South African 
industrial relations context are explored. The role of 
macro-economic factors, government policy and labour 
legislation is analysed within the context of the history of 
labour unions, employer organisations and bargaining 
patterns. It is argued that the 1 ink between these socio-
political and economic factors and the establishment of 
local bargaining is not necessarily simple and direct but 
that these factors more often relate to local bargaining via 
the intervening variables of ·the attitudes and power of 
bargaining parties conditioned by perceptions of vested 
interests. In addition to the abovementioned environmental 
considerations, the conditions pertaining to a specific 
enterprise, plant or shopfloor situation and the manner in 
which these factors relate to the establ ishment of local 
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bargaining are analysed. These variables include labour 
power, labour organisation, leadership, management attitude 
and policy as well as management structure. 
In Part Four, the most important implications of local 
bargaining . for .the power relationship between 
employers/management and workers are assessed. These are 
seen to be the challenge that 1 oca 1 bargaining represents 
for so-called managerial rights and prerogatives and the 
extent to which it presents workers with a means to 
part i c i pate in management dec is i on-mak i ng and to gain some 
measure of control over their work lives. In all oJ this, 
the Industrial Court is seen to playa crucial role in the 
context of 1 oca 1 bargain i ng be i ng conducted between 
especially black workers and employers/management within 
South African establishments. 
In conclusion, the extent to which the establishment and 
extension of local bargaining in South African industrial 
relations corresponds with trends elsewhere while retaining 
·its unique character and role, is assessed. 
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OPSOMMING 
Die tema van plaaslike bedinging word in hoofsaak in 
teoretiese en konseptuele terme aangespreek en die 
bespreking daarvan word in vier br·ee afdelings· ingeklee. In 
Deel Een word die belangrikste teoretiese perspektiewe op 
arbeidsverhoudinge gestel asook die rol van vakunies en 
kollektiewe bedinging vanuit elkeen van hierdie 
perspektiewe. Hierdie uiteensetting word gevolg deur 'n 
ontleding van die verskillende elemente van kollektiewe 
bedinging waarna tot 
bedinging geraak word. 
'n eie tiefinisie vanplaaslike 
Deel· Twee handel· oor die aard van die 
waarvan plaaslike bedinging histories 
Afrikaanse arbeidsbestel plaasgevind het. 
strukture in terme 
binne die Suid-
Hierdie ontleding· 
vind plaas teen die agtergrond van 'n bespreking van die 
ontwikkeling van plaaslike bedinging binne die arbeidsbestel 
van Groot Brittanje, Japan, Wes Duitsland en die Verenigde 
State van Amerika. Die neiging tot toenemende 
gedesentraliseerde bedinging in lande tradisioneel gekenmerk 
deur hoogs gesentraliseerde bedingingstrukture, word 
geidentifiseer. 
In Deel Drie word die faktore wat ten grondslag le van die 
ontwikkeling en vestiging van plaaslike bedinging binne die 
Suid-Afrikaanse arbeidsbestel bespreek. Die rol van makro-
ekonomiese faktore, die staat en veral statutere 
ontwikkeling word uitgespel binne die konteks van die 
historiese ontwikkeling van vakunies, werkgewersorganisasies 
( 
en bedingingstrukture. Daar word geargumenteer dat die 
verband tussen ekonomiese en sosio-politieke faktore en die 
vestiging van plaaslike bedinging nie noodwendig eenvoudig 
en oorsaaklik is nie maar eerder gemedieer word deur 
tussenkomende veranderlikes nl. die houding en mag van die 
onderskeie bedingingspartye soos gestruktureer deur 
persepsies van gevestigde belange. Die vestiging. van 
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~laasl·ike bedinging hou ook verband met veranderlikes binne 
die konteks van 'n bepaalde onderneming of 
. . . 
fabrieksvloeropset .. Voorbeelde van sodanige veranderlikes is 
leierskap, bestuursreaksie e~ -strukture, arbeidsorganisasie 
en die relatiewe mag van die werkers. 
In Deel Vier word die belangrikste konsekwensies van 
plaaslike bedingi,ng vir die magsverhouding tussen w'erkgewers 
en werknemers uitgespel. Die gevol.gtrekking waartoe gekom 
word is dat plaaslike bedinging 'n uitdaging vir bestuur se 
regte en prerogatiewe inhou en 'n meganisme aan werkers bied 
vir deelname aan. besluitnemingsprosesse en' die verkryging 
van 'n mate van kontrole oor hul werksituasie. Die sentrale 
rol van die Nywerheidshof binne die konteks van plaasl ike 
bedi ngi ng tussen vera ~ swart werkers en werkgewers/bestuur 
binne Suid-Afrik~anse ondernemings word beklemtoon. 
Ten slotte, word daar aangetoon dat bedinging op plaaslike 
vlak enersyds vry algemeen besig ;s om 'n belangrike plek in 
te neem, en andersyds word die besondere patroon wat in die 
RSA ontwikkel het - en tans nog ontwikkel - uitgespel. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Local bargaining (also domestic or work place bargaining) 
has come to play an i,ncreasingly significant role in South 
African industrial relations over the past ten to fifteen 
years. This study has been motivated primari ly by a whole 
range of questions arising from this fact and from the need 
to find possible answers to them. 
Examples of questions that have arisen ar:e the following: 
.' 
what is the nature of local bargaining in the South African 
context and how has it evolved over time? More to the point 
-, which structures, function as mechanisms or vehicles for 
conducting bargaining between employer/management and 
employees/labour within an establishment or work 
organisation? To what extent have such structures been 
modified and transformed'over time? 
Given the existence of local bargaining, important,questions 
arise as' to the dynamics underlying th'e' development and 
establishment of such bargaining resulting in the latter 
occupying a relative' prominent if not predominant 
, , 
position within the total bargaining arrangements of South 
Afrjcan industrial relations. Can one actually account for 
the development of local bargaining or can one merely try 
and identify variables that seem to relate to such 
devel~pment? Are these variables located within the 
structure of society or are some of these variables located 
within the parameters of the establishment itself? 
Once local bargaining becomes an established feature of the 
existing bargaining structure, what are the consequences for 
the parties participating in such bargs:ining especially 
the power relations ,between them? 
Finally, to what extent does local bargaining in the South 
African industrial relations context correspond with or 
l' 
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2 
differ from local bargai_ning as it is being. conducted in 
other ~ountries characterised by market-type economies? More 
specifically - how does local bargaining in South African 
indu~trial relations compare with local bargaining being 
conducted elsewhere in terms of its nature, the structures 
and mechanisms through which such bargaining is conducted as 
well as the variables underlying its development and/or 
establishment? While each country's bargaining structure 
rema ins, ina sense, un i que in that each country tends to 
evolve its 'own style of collective bargaining, reflecting 
its particular values and cultural characteristics' (C6rdova 
1978), it remains sociologically meaningful to identify 
corresponding 
arrangements. 
trends between countr i es.' bargaining 
This analysis of local bargaining is primari ly conceptual 
and theoretical in nature and done in four main parts: Part 
One deals with relevant theoretical considerations. In 
Chapter 1, the role assigned to collective bargaining - and 
thus local bargaining in different theoretical 
perspectives on industrial relations, is presented. A 
discussion of industrial relations perspectives is relevant 
for theoretical perspectives and assumptions structure 
bargaining parties' attitudes towards and interpretations of 
bargaining activities and work relations. It similarly 
structures the ideas of those who dete~mine government 
policy and labour legislation. 
The not i on of barga in i ng be i ng conducted between part i es 
within the boundaries of a particular establishment and 
geared to the specific conditions pertaining to such an 
establishment, is implicit in a wide range of terms being 
ap~lied in industrial relations literature. These terms are 
very seldom clearly ·defined leaving the reader somewhat 
confused as to their precise meaning. Thus, an analysis of 
so-called 'local bargaining'necessitates a clear 
understanding of its meaning. In Chapter 2, the nature and 
various aspects of collective bargaining are explored and a 
definition of local bargaining is presented. 
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3 
. The nature of local bargaining and the mechanisms through 
which such bargaining is conducted, are dealt with in Part 
Two. An overview of the nature of local barga{ning in a few 
selected countries is presented in Chapter 3, followed by a 
discussion in Chapter 4, of the nature of local bargaining 
within South African industrial relations and the manner in 
which it has evolved over time. 
In Part Three, an attempt, is made to partly account for the 
development and establishment of local bargaining as a 
relative important feature of South Africa's bargaining 
arrangements. Variables which seem to relate to such a 
deve 1 opment are i dent if i ed. They are then analysed. aga i nst 
the historical development of unions, employer organisations 
and bargaining patterns set out in Chapter 5. While Chapters 
6 and 7 deal with macro-economic factors, government 
policies and labour legislatfon, variables relating to the 
circumstances existing within particular establishments and 
work organisations, are outlined in Chapter 8. The analysis 
of variables underlying the development and/or establishment 
of local bargaining in South African industrial relations, 
takes place aga i nst the backd rop of the ro 1 e that these 
variables have come to play in the development and/or 
establishment of local bargaining in other societal 
contexts. 
Finally, in Part Four, the consequences of local bargaining 
for the power relations between employer/management and 
employees/labour are dealt -with. While Chapter 9 concerns 
the implications of local bargaining for management's rights 
and prerogatives, the consequences of local bargaining for 
workers and unions are set out in Chapter 10. 
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PART ONE 
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS 
While collective barga in i ng. 
institutionalised feature of 
is 
the 
an accepted and 
industrial relations 
systems of most Western industrial societies today, there 
remain markedly different interpretations as to its nature 
and ultimate role. The different meanings and roles ascribed 
to collective bargaining are related to different 
perceptions of the nature of the employment relationship, 
the relationship between capital and labour aryd, ultimately, 
the nature of society notably that of capitalist 
societies. Perceptions of collective bargaining are thus 
grounded in perceptions of societies as either being 
essent i a 11 y confl i ct ridden or characteri sed by order. The 
different views on industrial relations constituting 
different perspectives, or frame of references, need then to 
be explored in an analysis of the role of collective 
bargaining at the so-called local level. 
But, an analysis of local bargaining in terms of its nature, 
deve 1 opment and consequences for emp 1 oyers, management and 
unions also necessitates and presupposes, a clear 
understanding of what exactly is meant by local bargaining. 
Presenting a working definition therefore requires a more. 
substant i ve anal ys is of co 11 ect i ve bargain i ng and elements 
or dimensions of bargaining structures. 
4 
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CHAPTER 1 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS PERSPECTIVES 
1 • 1 Introduction 
Perspectives or 
empirical world 
thus a marked 
frames of references. re 1 ate to the way the 
is perceived or viewed by people. There is 
difference in the way people think about 
social and other quest~ons depending on their basic values 
and value orientations (Goodman 1984). These values and 
beliefs determine what a person selects and how he/she 
constructs reality in a meaningful way and consequently how 
he/she will theorise on certain phenomena. 
This is true also of industrial and employment relations. 
Put differently, the question to be asked is: what are the 
bas-ic assumptions underlying theorising on employment and 
ind,ustrial relations? Perspectives on industr-ial relations 
1 
are of particular importance 
particular 
given the_ practical 
consequences of a t vi ew' . Bluen (1983:442) 
employs the term ideologies when he states: 
Thus by examining ideology, a greater insight into the 
dynamics of the subject can be gained. The way we view 
the various aspects of industrial -relations will 
influence our approach to it. 
The various perspectives or frames of references have been 
extensively documented by writers on industrial or labour 
relatibns and th~ aim of this section is to present a broad 
overview of the literat4re in order to ascertain the role of 
collective bargaining within each of these perspectives. In 
other words, to what extent do these perspect i ves 
accommodate the phenomenon of collective bargaining and how 
is it being done? 
5 
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The ·perspectives to be discussed are the unitary, liberal-
.pluralist and· radical (also termed radical critique of 
pluralism). A. Fox (1966) made an important contribution in 
identifying and demystifying the unitary and pluralist 
ideological assumptions influencing managerial thinking 
about the nature of industrial organisations and social 
r.elations within it. In his later publ ications (1973; 1974), 
'Fox puts forward a radical critique of pluralist 
assumptions. 
/ 
1.2 . Unitary perspective-
1 .2 . 1 basic assumptions underlying the unitary 
perspective 
According to Fox (1966), this perspective is based on the 
assumption that the broader society as well as industrial 
organisations are characterised by harmony and consensus 
wi th regard to interests, aims and object i ves. Gi ven the 
focus on consensus, the unitary perspective is, in the view 
of many writers, strongly associated with Parsonian systems 
theory (Maree 1984b; Jackson 1977; Farnham & Pimlott 1983; 
Hyman 1978). The industrial organisation adopting such a 
frame of reference, ,is analogous to a healthy functioning 
sports-team with one source of authority and loyalty. 
Members of the organisation are to share common goals, all 
working towards shared organisational objectives. In order 
for the organisation to be successful, it requires, as in 
the case of a sports-team, effect i ve 1 eadersh i p to ensure 
coordination and commitment to stated goals. 
Organisations are thus perceived to be integrated, 
. harmonioui wholes. From this follows the view that there is 
no inherent conflict between the two main parties i.e. 
emp 1 oyers and emp 1 oyees or between management and 1 abour 
lthe two being complementary partners in production from 
which flows the income of the organisation and on which both 
re 1 y for the i r f i nanc i a 1 rewards' (Goodman 1984: 61). To the 
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extent. that conflict does occur, it is seen as pathological 
~nd·due to incompatible personalities, misunderstandings due 
to faulty communication, stupidity on the part of employees 
to grasp common interests and/or the activities of agitators 
inciting the majority to discontent (Fox 1966). 
Within this ~erspective, the presence of trade unions in the 
work place as well as collective bargaining is seen as an 
intrusion into what should be a private, unified structure. 
Unions are seen to compete illegitimately for control over, 
and loyalty of the employees (Fox 1966). 
What is especially resented by management, in Fox's view, is 
the hor i zonta 1 1 inks between the emp 1 oyees of a part i cu 1 ar 
organisation with employees of other establishments because 
this would intrude into the 'affairs' of the company. 
Furthermore, unions 
di strust and shoul d 
and· collective bargairiing encourage 
thus be avoided. Indications of the 
functioning of these ideological assumptions are, for 
examp 1 e, abrupt refusal by management to negotiate, sudden 
assertions of managerial prerogative and moral outbursts 
against union or shopfloor claims. 
1 .2.2 trade unions and collective bargaining 
Given that .trade unions 
institutions are very much 
and collective bargaining as 
part of the present i ndustr i a 1 
relations scene world-wide, the very fact of their existence 
has to .be explained by the unitary perspective. This is done 
by viewing these institutions as 'historical carryovers' 
from previous stages of 'unenlightened' management, as 
instruments for undermining the existing order or a function 
of particular sectional interest groups within industry. 
The unitary perspective is for obvious reaso~s very much a 
management or; ented one and 
der Merwe ( 1985) argues 
ina recent art; c 1 e, Roux van 
that given the focus ~pon 
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orderli ness, th is perspect i ve may be expected to appea 1 to 
many mahagers. It may of co~rse ~lso be supported by workers 
at various levels (Goodman 1984). 
Whether this perspective represents the way things are is of 
course highly unl ikely. Rather, one has to see it as a 
description of how things ought to be. With regard to future 
trends, Van der Merwe argues (predicts?) that given the 
world-wide decrease in the proportion of workers belonging 
to trade un ions (due to high rates of unemp 1 oyment and a 
decrease in blue-collar occupations), unions will be more 
vulnerable to unitary based management strategies in the 
future. He lists two possible management strategies, the 
first being what he terms, the authoritarian version of the 
unitary framework leading ultimately to 'union bashing'. 
According to _this scenario, management, claims the position' 
of ultimate authority in a labour market characteris'ed by 
low levels of employment. 
The second strategy refers to management co~opting the role 
of labour unions by fostering loyalty of employees by the 
'humanisation of work' (Hill 1974). Much of the work of E. 
Mayo and the human relations school rests on this particular 
scenario with a focus on the creation of favourable human 
rel~tions in ~ndustry. Examples would be sophisticated 
personnel and labour reJations practices, high wages, 
favourable conditions and fringe benefits, the focus on 
health and safety in the work place, grievance procedure 
etc. (Goodman 1984). 
Whether the above measures really reflect a shift away from 
the unitary perspective, is questioned by various observers 
for exam~le Hill (1983), Kochan (1980) and Fox (1974). It is 
argued that management, in the f ina 1 ana 1 ys is, occupi es the 
position of authority and that the above measures (or style 
of management) should be interpreted as merely cosmetic in 
nature and camouflaging the authoritarian nature of 
management. The following quote from Hill (1983:84) is 
representative of this view: 
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But so long as managers are ~nder pressure to promote 
the economic interests of the board and their own 
pos'itions and .interests remain distinct from those of 
their employees, there is no reason to suggest any 
change' in the relationship between management and 
labour 
There are those who are of the opinion that the ability of 
management. to ma i nta in th is strategy t;las been in steady 
decline over a long period in Western societies (Fox 1974). 
The main reason for this being that subordinates or labour 
are increasingly becoming aware of .their goals being 
different or separate from those of management. Factors 
relating to this trend 'are, for exam'ple, rising expectations 
of labour within societies, growing perceptions of injustice 
and double standards, weakening legitimation of traditional 
expectations and so on. 
1.3 Liberal-pluralist perspective 
By the 1930's many enterprises in Western . societies had 
increased tremendously in size and complexity. This resulted 
in an increased awareness by management of the need for more 
sophisticat~d labour relations practices. By this time too, 
the organisation of labour in formal labour unions was very 
much part of the industrial relations scene. Given this, 
management increasingly began to think of having labour as a 
partner rather than a competitor. This attitude is reflected 
. in the following· quote: 
A cooperative workforce was preferable to one that was 
not cooperative and the way to treat the workforce in 
order that it mi ght cooperate was to be prepared to 
respect its rights as it saw them and negot i ate with 
its legitimate independent representatives (Charles 
1973 as quoted by Fox 1974:256). 
It is against the backdrop of these developments that 
industrial relations pluralism has to be interpreted. 
\ 
ti 
U, s. ~ 
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Different varieties of emphasis exist within the mainstream 
of . liberal pluralism. Furthermore, the literature' on 
pluralism abounds· in different interpretations and versions 
of the term itself (Hyman 1978; Jackson -1977) all of which 
have impl ications for identifying a singular plural'ist 
industrial relations perspective. At the very best, one can 
try to characterise industrial relations pluralism by 
identifying its basic, underlying assumptions. 
1. 3.1 assumptions 
pluralism 
underlying industrial relations 
The pluralist perspective on industrial relations is an 
extension of the so-called pluralist view of contemporary 
capitalist society. This view is based on the premise that 
society contains various interest groups, social groups or 
pressure groups, each having its own disti'nctive values, 
interests and be 1 i efs. Each group is a coal it i on of 
individuals sharing similar 
Potential conflict between 
aspirations. and perceptions. 
these groups leads to the 
development of certain structures which are to regulate and 
control these diverse interests and conflict and which have, 
as a consequence, a relative stable system. 
App 1 i.ed 
implies 
to the sphe re of i ndustr i a 1 
that various groupings can 
relations, this 
be identified 
view 
e.g. 
management, employees, consumers, government etc. of which 
management and labour are the most important. We have to see 
the organisation or enterprise as a 'plural society 
containing many related but separate interests and 
objectives which must be maintained in some kind of 
equilibrium' (Ross 1958 as quoted by Fox 1966:4). 
10 
Given the assertion of diverse interests and values, 
conflict is seen to be inherent in any system of industrial 
relations. This does not have to result .in a complete. 
breakdown of i ndustr i a 1 re 1 at ions but rather, the part i es 
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inv6lved are seen to be mutually dependent and may be said 
to have a common interest in the survival of the whole of 
which they are parts (Fox 1966). On the regulation of 
conflict, Goodman (1984:65) asserts that' it is only by 
acknowledging the plural nature of work organisations (or 
societies) that manifestations of conflict can be regulated 
"and organisations function effectively.' It is bel i"eved by 
proponents of the pluralist perspective that in the event of 
denying or" suppressing the expression of such confl ict, it 
can erupt in a more violent manner. Conflict must be 
resolved in °a constructive and responsible way. 
Thi~ perspective, by allowing the orderly expression of 
conflict, allows for change, adaptation and adjustment 
wi thi n 1 abour re 1 at ions. As noted above, it is assumed that 
certa in structures and processes deve lop whereby 
manifestations of conflict can be articulated and" regulated. 
Within the sphere of industrial relations, the structures 
and processes seen to function in this way are trade unions 
and collective bargaining. 
1 .3.2 role of trade unions and collective bargaining 
Trade unions are seen as legitimate representatives of the 
to challenge and constrain interests of employees 
management's prerogatives. After having identified 'market 
relations' as an important aspect of employer-employee 
relationships (terms and conditions on which labour is hired 
and therefore economic in character), Fox (1966:7) argues as 
follows: 
The legitimacy and justification of trade unions in our 
society rests not upon their protective function in the 
labour markets or upon their success, real or supposed, 
in ra is i ng the share enj oyed by the i r members, but on 
social values which recognise the rights of interest 
groups to combine and have an effective voice in" their 
own destiny. This means having a voice in decision-
making. 
11 
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The·above leads him to ascribe to trade unions the role of 
regulating 'managerial relations' i.e. 'the exercise of 
management authority in deploying, organising and 
disc;pl ining the labour force after it has been hi red'. By 
means of collective bargaining, employees, organised in 
unions, can challenge management prerogatives regarding 
wages and representing 
disciplinary and dispute 
seen as uncha 11 engeab 1 e 
members' interests in grievance, 
procedures - prerogatives which are 
by the unitary school. Intergroup 
conflict in industry is seen, not only as legitimate, but as 
institutionalised through collective bargaining. 
Various writers have pointe~ to the increasing 'moderation' 
of conflict within industry over time contributing this 
trend to the so-called 'institutionalisation of conflict'. 
This term describes 'the development of institutions that 
arise out of conflict, providing the means to regulate it 
without further recourse to violence or coercion' (Hi 11 
1983:124). The emergence of trade unionism, employers 
organisations, collective bargaining, shop· steward 
operations at plant level, mediation, and arbitration are 
all seen as mechanisms whereby confl ict is regulated and 
controlled. Collective bargaining represents the means of 
achieving a compromise between the parties and establishing 
rules. When confl ict is interpreted as uncontrollable, the 
ground rules are seen to be in need of change i.e. 
adjustments are required. 
Fox (1971) correctly points out that countries differ 
markedly in the extent to which the state imposes some legal 
regulation upon this process. Many pluralist writers, 
notably from Britain, argue for a voluntary system whereby 
the state is seen to play a'neutral or marginal role in the 
industrial relations sphere. The state is seen as not 
act; ve 1 y tak; ng sides in disputes between management and 
labour. The function of the state is to protect all parties, 
the weak/powerless as well as the strong. It pursues a 
neutral and mediating role in instances of conflict. In the 
12 
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final analysis, the state must protect and guarantee, what 
has'been termed, ~public' or ~national' interest. The latter 
is seen to 'exist over and above the interests of the various 
sectional groups in industry . 
. In order for collective bargaining to be at least partly 
successful, it is essential that the parties be committed to 
the survival of the system and adhere to the rules 
established by the process of colle~tive bargaining. Charles 
(1973), as quoted by Fox (1S74:265), makes this point: 
1 .3.3 
On the bas is of a shared conf i dence that they both 
subscribe to this phi losophy of mutual survival, the 
parties are able to operate procedures of negotiations 
and dispute sett 1 ements character i sed by' a consensus 
code of ethics and conduct. This includes the principle 
that, provided certain jointly agreed processes of 
consu 1 tat i on and part i c i pat ion in dec is i on-mak i ng are 
followed, culminating in freely, equitable, and 
honourably negotiated agreements,' -the participant 
groups must regard themse 1 ves as mora 11 y commi tted to 
observing the terms of the -resulting decisions. 
power balance between parties 
An important aspect of the regu 1 at i on and contro 11 i ng of 
conflict relates, to the balance of power presumed to exist 
between the relevant parties. For the resolution of conflict 
via collective bargaining, there must ~exist between the 
parties something approximating to a balance of power' (Fox 
1974: 265). I n the absence of such a ba 1 ante, one party's 
interest would dominate any agreement between them leading 
to bargaining under duress. In the event of one party being 
coerced by the other, the weaker one wouid be under no moral 
obligation to observe the resulting agreement. As will be 
seen, this partic~lar assumption has come under considerable 
scrutiny by radical critics. 
Although conflict is seen by pluralists as being inherent in 
industrial relations, the confl ict that does occur is seen 
/ 
13 
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to be over less important and marginal issues. Conflict 
therefore, does not threaten the existing, basic 
relationship between management and labour. This follows 
from the abovementioned, assumed consensus relationship 
between the two parties regarding the survival of the system 
and the rules established by collective bargaining. The two 
parties are aware of their mutual dependence in the process 
of survival. 
1 .3.4 A. Flanders' view of collective bargaining 
The pluralist frame of reference,. with its emphasis on 
collective bargaining as a conflict-resolving and rule-
making process in industrial relations, has been very 
prominent in Britain since the early 1960's. It was strongly 
associated with. a small group of academics at the Oxford 
University and their views had a critical impact on the 
findings and recommendations of the Donovan Commission 
between 1965-·1968. The final report of this Commission is 
generally seen to have had a marked influence on indust~i~l 
relations thinking, especially in Britain. Academics like A. 
Flanders, H. Clegg and A. Fox provided the theoretical basis 
for the abovement i oned recommendations. Wh i 1 e there is no 
single Oxford approach, their work all adhere to a pluralist 
ideology. 
In the paragraphs that follow, it is especially the work of 
Flanders that will be. discussed - albeit in a rather sketchy 
way. This is done in order to illustrate the way collective 
barga in i ng is accommodated ina theoret i ca 1 approach based 
on essent i ally p 1 ura 1 i st assumpt i o"ns. Co 11 ect i ve' bargain i ng 
is viewed by all subscr'ibers of the Oxford School as the 
best form of reach i ng consensus abo'ut ru 1 es govern i ng the 
work place and the relations within it. 
A. Flanders and A. Fox (his earlier work) are generally seen 
as the two most prominent exponents of the Oxford School. As 
14 
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Maree . (1984b) points out in a recent article, two 
~ociological traditions can be identified in the theoretical 
approaches of these two wri ters. On the one hand there is 
Durkheim's concepts of increasing labour specialisation and 
anomie and on the other, Parsonian systems theory as applied 
to industrial relations by Dunlop (1971). Both Fox and 
Flanders apply the idea of labour specialisation (leading to 
increasing interdependence) and anomie to explain and 
analyse what they view as shortcomings in collective 
bargaining in Britain in the 1960's. Following Durkheim, 
anomie is interpreted as postulating a state of normlessness 
due to the breakdown in social regulation. Because Flanders 
is generally seen as a recognised expert on collective 
bargaining, it is to his work that we now turn. 
In order to understand Flanders' view of industrial 
relations and his interpretation of the role of collective 
bargaining in particular, the views and analysis of Dunlop 
is of spec i a 1 sign if i cance. Because of the extens i ve 
coverage that Dun lop's system has· rece i ved in i ndustr i a 1 
relations literature, only a very brief summary will suffice 
here. 
Dun 1 op' s stated purpose is to present a general theory of 
industrial relations and eto provide the tools of 
analysis to interpret and to gain understanding of the 
widest possible range of industrial relations, facts ·and 
practice' (1971:vii). Industrial r~lati6ns constitutes, 
accord i ng to Dun 1 op, a separate and d i st i nct subsystem of 
society. While it partially overlaps with ?ther subsystems -
notably the economic it is not part of the economic 
subsystem. In Dunlop's view, an industrial relations system 
eat any o~e time in its development is regarded as comprised 
of actors, certain contexts, an ideology which binds the 
industrial relations systems together, and a body.of rules 
created to govern the actors at the workplace and work 
community' (Dunlop 1971:7). It is the network of rules which 
is the product or output of the system cons i st i ng of (i) 
procedures for establishing rules (ii) the sUbstantive rules 
15 
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themselves 
.( iii) "the 
(on pay, work i ng cond it ions, hours, etc.) and 
procedure for deciding their application in 
particular situations. 
Accord i ng to Dun 1 op then, it is the estab 1 i shment and 
administration of these rules that is the major concern of 
the industrial relations system of an industrial society. 
These rules are of various kinds. They may be written; oral 
or custom and practice and include collective" agreements, 
managerial decisions, trade union rule books, arbitration 
awards, work place traditions, etc. They not only cover pay 
and employment conditions but also disciplinary matters i.e. 
methods of working rights and duties of the relevant parties 
etc. 
The ru 1 es rep resent the dependent var i ab 1 e and has to be 
explained by the following independent variables: the 
actors, the contexts and the ideology of the system. Dunlop 
identifies three main groups of actors: a hierarchy of 
managers and their representatives;"a hierarchy of employees 
and their spokesmen and" specialised government agencies 
concerned wi th work place and work communi ty \ the state). 
These actors and their interaction are influenced by certain 
environmental factors in the wider society which has 
consequences for the rules that emerge. 
The three environmental contexts are the following: 
(i) the technological characteristics of the work 
place and community 
( i i) market and budgetary constraints that imp i nge on 
the actors and 
(i i i) the locus and distribution of power in the" wider 
society. 
16 
These aspects of the environment can be expected to vary 
within and between companies, industries and countries. 
(Goodman 1984). 
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The final and most controversial element in the model is the 
.ideologyof the industrial relations system. The ideology is 
... 'a body of common ideas that define the role and place of 
each' actor and def i nes the ideas wh i ch each actor ho 1 ds 
towards the place and function of others in the system. The 
ideology or philosophy of a stable system involves a 
congruence or compatibility among these views and the rest 
- of the system' (Dunlop 1971:16-17)." He argues that while 
each of the actors in the system mi ght have h.i s/her own 
ideo logy, it is necessary that these ideo log i es are 
sufficiently congruent to allow the' emergence or development 
of a common set of ideas which recognise an acceptable role 
for each actor. Furthermore,' this common ·ideology must be 
distinguished from the ideology of the larger society but it 
~an be expected to be similar or at least compatible in the 
developed industrial society. Dunlop states that where there 
is no general. consistency between the two ideologies, 
'changes may be expected in the ideologies or in other 
facets of the industrial relations system' (1971:18). 
As indicated above, Dunlop's model has elicited a wide range 
of comments. It has influenced the work of many writers, 
been severely criticised, been acclaimed by some and his 
ideas have been deve loped and ref i ned by many. The main 
points of criticism have been the following: 
By focusing on structural elements, behavioural variables 
have been neglected and the dynamics of the industrial 
relations system is not presented by the model. This relates 
to an accusation of conservatism - an accusation which also 
relates to the role of ideology in Dunlop's model. An 
ideology commonly shared by the various actors implies, 
according to some critics, a 'natural' stability of the 
system and the maintenance of a state of equilibrium. The 
so-called conservatism of his approach is also linked to the 
hand 1 i ng of conf 1 i ct by. Dun lop. By focus i ng on the 
formulation of r .. uJ ... e. .. $.:, he is seen to have not addressed the 
causes or roots of conflict. While the resolution of 
17 
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confliGt (by establishing rules) is obviously important, the 
causes o'f these conf 1 i cts must be/need to be i dent if i ed. 
The way power is handled by Dunlop has also generated 
criticism. As power is located external to the system, the 
power relations between parties, especially management and 
workers, do not constitute part of the analysis. 
An aspect of Dunlop's model which has led to a great deal of 
uncertainty amongst many, has been his neglect to come to an 
acceptable definition of certain key terms i.e. rules, 
ideology and system. It is especially his ambiguous usage of 
the concept system that has generated critical comment (Wood 
et al. " 1975). In Bluen's (1983) view, Dunlop's 
interpretation of the term 
exact 1 y to that of Parsons 
concept. 
fsystem' does not correspond 
from whom Dunlop derives - the 
Despite the various criticisms, the model has been seen to 
have a 
Blain & 
number of strengths 
Gennard 1970; Bluen 
(Goodman 1984; Poole 
1983; Wood et al. 
1984(a) ; 
1975). It 
identifies major variables which affect industrial relations 
and draws attention to the' variety of rules, rule'-making 
methods and contexts wh i ch can be usefu 1 in understand i ng 
i ndustr i a 1 re 1 ati ons pract ice. The sys,tem mode 1 makes it 
possible to examine industrial relations at various levels. 
Quoting from Poole (1984a:20): 
The novel elements of Dunlop's 'paradigm comprised 
mainly the comprehensive range of factors identified, 
the synthes is of propos it ions and schemes of thought 
which had far earli~r origins and the adaptation of 
ideas of the principal analytical sociologist of the 
post-war period, Talcott Parsons to the study of labour 
relations. ' 
In reaction to the criticism regarding the neglect of 
sources of confl i ct and f conservat ism' of Dun lop's mode r, 
Wood et al. (1975) argue that conflict is taken as fgiven' 
in Dunlop's and Parsons' systems models. Both propose a 
framework which tries to explain how conflict is reg'ulated 
18 
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in order to create a state of order rather than explaining 
the· sou~ces of this conflict. 
19 
There have been numerous efforts to develop and adapt 
Dunlop's systems model in order to refine it (Wood et al. 
1975; Eldrige 1971) of which Wood et al. is of particular 
importance. In conclusion, Dunlop's model is seen by many 
(Jack~on 1977; Wood et al. 1975) as offering academic_ 
respectability to the study of industrial relations. 
Following Dunlop, Flanders conceptualises the system of 
industrial relations as a .S.Y..$.t..e.ID-Q.L_cY.1.e..s. According to 
Blain and Ge~nard (1970), while both approaches stress the 
importance of· rules, there is a difference in emphasis. 
Whereas the systems mode 1 exami nes the soc i 01 og i ca 1 , 
economi c and ideo log i ca 1 i nf 1 uences on ru 1 e dete rmi nat ion, 
Fl anders' Oxford approach focuses on the ..i.n.s.t. . tt..y.t. . .tQJ1.S 
responsible for the process of rule-making (a political 
variable). Seeing that both the systems and Oxford approach 
stress stability and consistency, it is argued by some 
wr i ters, notab 1 y B 1 uen (1983), that Flanders' approach may 
be yiewed as a variation of the systems approach. 
The .focus on tinstitutions' follows from the pluralist 
assumpt ion discussed . ear 1 i er· in th is sect i on whereby 
collective bargaining is viewed as the most important 
institution responsible for rule-making. In the work ·of 
Flanders, collective bargaining thus occupies a central 
position in industrial relations and must be examined in 
more detail. 
Following Flanders (1970:86), tthe study of industrial 
relations may be described as the study of the institutions 
of job regulation'. The latter is seen to refer to the 
making and administering of any rules which regulate 
employment relationships. In Flanders' view, industrial 
relations deals only with institutional a~rangements and 
unstructured relations fall outside the scope of industrial 
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relations. 
relevant. 
Therefore, only .employment relations are 
Two kinds of rules are identified i.e. procedural and 
substantive a distinction already noted. The first 
regulates the behaviour of the parties to collective 
agreement and those who act on their behalf. The second type 
regulates the behaviour of the parties as parties to 
individual contracts of employment. ·It is the sUbstantive 
rules of collective bargaining that regulate jobs. Since the 
procedural rules of collective bargaining regulate the 
making, interpretation and enforcement of its substantive 
rules, they provide for Flanders this particular institution 
of job regulation with its form and constitution (Flanders 
1970). While different kinds of rules can be made in various 
ways - a poi nt made by Dun 1 op the most important 9r 
predominant method in mbst democrati~ countries is that of 
collective bargaining. Referring to Britain in particular, 
Flanders states: 
The first leading prjncipleis one that our traditional 
system shares with· many other national systems of 
advanced industrial countries which are pluralistic 
societies. A priority is accorded to collective 
bargaining over other methods of external job 
regulation (1970:94). 
Collective bargaining~is thus seen as a form of industrial 
democracy whereby ftrade unions and employers or their 
associations act as joint authors of rules made to regulate 
employment, contracts and, 
relations' (Flanders 1970:94). 
incidentally, their own 
Given that rules and regulations are formulated jointly by 
means of collective bargaining, he is of the opinion that 
the parties involved will accept and observe these rules to 
a greater extent than in cases where joint decision-making 
is absent. One could also expect these rules to be modified 
and adapted on a continuous basis. This of course will 
depend on the 1 eve 1 on wh i ch co 1 1 ect i ve barga in i\ng takes 
place. 
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. If· rules and regulations are ·viewed as the 'output' of the 
system, what constitutes the input? The answer to this lies 
in the confl ict between the various parties. Following the 
i ndustr i alp 1 ura 1 i st' s arguments, management and emp 1 oyees 
are seen as opposing interest groups which could lead to 
conflict. Because of mutual interests at stake, the .parties 
compromise on their differences to reach an acceptable 
agreement. Collective bargaining provides the social process 
whereby compromises and concessions can be made. Confl ict 
represents the "input" and is converted into rules. This 
.process take~ place in a context of continuous 
re 1 at i onsh ips. I n cases whe re consensus cannot be reached, 
other processes come to the -fore e.g. med'iation and 
arbitration .. If these steps fai 1, the parties move on to 
·some form of industrial action e.g. a strike or a lock-out. 
In -contrast to the unitary approach, Flanders views these 
actions as part of the ongoing collective bargaining 
process. In terms of this analysis, there. is thus always the 
possibility of the relationship being terminated. 
As in the·case of Dunlop, Flanders' work has also come under 
scrutiny by critics and as can be expected, many of the 
criticisms coincide with those raised against Dunlop's 
system model {Blain·& Gennard 1970; Hyman 1975 & 1981; Hyman 
& Brough 1975; Jackson 1977; Fox 1974r. Flanders has been 
criticised for focusing primarily on the process of conflict 
regulation and resolution assuming a state of stability and 
order within industrial Telations thereby neglecting the 
analysis of the sources of conflict, not sufficlently taking 
behavioural variables into account, neglecting ·the dynamics 
of systems and viewing collective bargaining as essentially 
a pol itical process. His framework has been criticised for 
being too restrictive (even more so than that of Dunlop) and 
given 
allow 
a somewhat crude input/output system, it does not 
for the formulation of hypotheses that could be 
subjected to verification. 
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B 1 a i nand Gennard (19 iO) for instance, argue that relevant 
variables like status, tech~ology and ideology are absent in 
Flanders' analysis. Others (Fox 1975) have argued that the 
importance of the economic function of collective bargaining 
has been played down by Flanders. The process of collective 
bargaining has been greatly simplified as a process by the 
Oxford approach" according to some critics. This 
oversimplification also applies to the role of trade unions 
within Flanders' approach. The control by trade unions of 
management prerogatives (what Fox calls managerial 
relations), is but one function of trade unions. This 
challenge has come mainly from some followers of the radical 
perspective who argue that unions within a capitalist 
society" also challenge the basic class structure of these 
societies. This point will be taken up again in the 
following sUbsection on the so-called radical perspective on 
industrial relations. 
1 .4 Radical perspective/radical critique of pluralism 
Of the var i ous types of rad i ca 1 ideo logy, • by far the most 
important alternative to the plural ist-democratic view of 
power remains the Marxist one' (Miliband quoted by Fox 
1S74:274). It is generally recognised that Marx himself did 
not explicitly develop a theory of industrial relations but 
Marx i an anal ys is of class soc i ety has been app 1 i ed to the 
area of industrial relations. As noted by Goodman (1984), 
Marxism has been interpreted by different groups in a 
variety of ways. Common to all these interpretations 
however, is the analysis of capitalist societies as 
essentially class societies. At the risk of overstating the 
obvious and/or oversimplifying Marxist's theorising, the 
following points can be made: 
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1. 4.1 assumptio~s underlying Marxist approach 
The main assumptions underlying Marxists' analyses are that 
soc i a 1 change. is un i versa 1 in soc i et i es and the sou rce of 
thfs change is class conflict. Within a capitalist society 
the class confl ict is that between the owners and 
controllers of the means of production on the one hand and 
those with no means of product i on of the i r own. The wage 
labourer sells his/her labour power to the employer in order 
to survive and make a living. 
The accumulation of 'surplus value' 
based on the exp 1 oi tat i on of the 
by the capital ist is 
wage labourer and the 
resulting difference in the economic power between the two 
classes is reflected in the structures and institutions, for 
instance industriC!-l relations, of the wider society. In the 
process of exploiting the wage labourer, the latter develops 
a state of alienation which leads ultimately to the 
development of a working-class consciousness and the 
resulting overthrow or breakdown of 
This will be followed by a stage 
the capitalist society. 
in the evolution of 
societies i.e. a society without class distinctions . 
. The conflict in industrial or employment relations between 
the sellers and buyers of labour power is seen to be merely 
a reflection of the class relations in the wider society and 
is regarded as part of the class war between cap ita 1 and 
labour. The following quotation is representative of this 
argument: 
Thus the ·conflict that takes place in industrial 
re 1 at ions between those who buy 1 abour and those that 
sell it, is seen as a permanent feature of capital ism 
which merely reflects the predominant power base. of the 
bourgeoisie and the class relations of capitalist 
society generally (Farnham & Pimlott 1983:63). 
Within the Marxian perspective, conflict is thus viewed as 
endemic to the capitalist society and to industrial 
relations within these societies. 
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role of trade unions and collective bargaining 
Within this context, what role is assigned to trade unions? 
In general, it is regarded as defending the interests of the 
working class and seeking to limit or at least control the 
e~ploitation by the capital-owning class. Unions are part of 
the working class struggle against the cap·italist system and 
is nQ.t. merely an industrial relations phenomenon. Workers 
must try and replace the system by workers' control of the 
state as well as industry. 
Thus to Marxists, industrial relations is essentially 
politicized and is part of the class struggle. It 
becomes overtly pol itical when either class seeks to 
influence the state to intervene on its behalf. It 
becomes potent i all y revo 1 ut i onary when work i ng class 
organizations, including trade unions seek to abolish 
the· power of the capitalist class and to establish a 
socialist society (Farnham & Pimlott 1983:64). 
At this point, Marxists seem to differ on the exaQt 
political and economic role unions are seen to playas well 
as the amount of success they are seen to have had in this 
\ 
respect. Espec i all y the I po 1 it ica l' ro 1 e has been met by 
pessimism - a point to be taken up again.· 
Whether the radical/Marxian perspective constitutes a frame 
of reference in its own right, has been debated by various 
writers. Bluen (1983) for example, argues that the radical 
perspective is in fact a critique of the pluralist ideology 
and as such does not constitute a frame of reference in the 
same sense as the others do. If this argument is even 
partially accepted, then it follows that the criticisms 
levelled against especially pluralism, is of' relevance for 
an understanding of the so~called radical. approach. Of 
interest is the fact that Fox (1974), after 'demystifying' 
industrial relations ·ideologies, notably the unitary and 
pluralist perspectives, sets out to criticise pluralism from 
what he terms a I more rad i ca 1 perspect i ve'. Many of these 
criticisms have also been taken up by Hyman (1975; 1978; 
1981); Hyman and Brough (197&); Hill (1983) and others. 
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What is· insightful, is that following an analysis of Fox's 
more recent works (1913;1974), Wood and Elliot (1977) .as 
well as Clegg (1975) conclude that while he develops his 
critique from an essentially Marxist perspective, he is Il.Q.:t-
committ'ing himself to a radical break with the pluralist 
_ t r ad i t ion i n his .P.ce. .. S.G .. d ... R.:t..i .. .QIl an d .. s.:t.ca.:t.e..9.Y. for c han g e . I n 
_.~ ... a..e. .. y' .. QIl.d. ........ C .. Qn:t.c.a_G.:t' ( 1974), Fox exp 1 ores an evo 1 ut i onary route 
to social change making use of the concept of trust. 
relations. He argues for gradual social reforms and in 
formulating a high-trust route to 'radical' change, he 
remains, according to e.g. Wood and Elliot, in favour of a 
more pluralist 'mutual survival' perspective (1977:115-116). 
However, it,is Fox's critique of pluralist· assumptions that 
is the iss~e her~. 
1 .4.3 a radical critique of ~1~ra1ist assumptions 
Various pluralist assumptions noted earlier have been 
subjected to ~erious. queitioning. These refer 'to the 
.' 
p resumed consensus re 1 at i onsh i p and power ba 1 ance between 
management and labour, the role assigned to labour unions, 
collective bargaining and the state in industrial relations, 
the presumed existence of a single 'public' or 'national' 
interest and the assumption that conflict is concerned only 
with relative ma~ginal issues between management and labour. 
It is contended by industrial relations pluralists that, 
despite diverse interests, aims, values, etc., parties are 
seen to be mutually dependent and to have a 'common interest 
in the survival of the whole of which they are part' .. In 
other words, the divergences between the parties are not so 
fundamental or so wide as to be unbridgea~le by compromises, 
concessions or new syntheses (Fox 1974:262). This links wi~h 
the belief that conflict is confined to narrow issues and 
minor de.tai 1s which cannot disrupt the basic 
between the part i es. What is necessary then, 
relationship 
is goodwi 11 
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bet~een parties, so as to enable them to negotiate rules and 
, 
regulations which will in the final analysis, secur~ order 
and stability. Thus, the parties must subscribe to a 
philosophy of mutual survival. 
The implication of this argument is that, in order to 
survive, parties must make claims which are rendered 
acceptable by the other - otherwise the so-called 'consensus 
ethic governing joint regulation would be ruptured ... ' (Fox 
1974:264-265). Such a situation wi 11 result in coercion. By 
recognising their mutual dependence it is believed that the 
parties can resolve most of their differences. 
This assumption leads Fox and Hyman to conclude that 
industrial relations pluralism does not represent any real 
viable alternative to the unitary perspective. It remains a 
conservative approach to conflict within industry because 
the basic antagonism and extreme divergence of interests 
following from class relations, between management and 
labour, are not being recognised. 
Anqther assumptiQn questioned by radical followers, and 
which relates to the preceding one, concerns the presumed 
existence of a balance of power between the relevant parties 
and the view that collective bargaining ensures this 
equality of bargaining power. Fox views this assumption as 
central 'because of its bearing on the degree of moral 
obligation which each party feels towards observing the 
agreement - and equally important, the degree of obligation 
which independent observers consider ought to be manifested 
by the parties' (Fox .. 1974:265). 
writers arguing from within a radical frame of reference 
will experience obvious problems with this assumption. Given 
the unequal distribution of the means of production in the 
wider soc i ety and given that these unequal re 1 at ions of 
economic power are reflected in industrial or employment 
relations, there cannot be a power balance between those who 
buy labour power and those who sell their labour power i-n 
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the market. The labourer cannot be divorced from his labour 
power and the latter assumes a' subordinate position within 
an employment relationship. According to this view, power, 
in the' f ina 1 ana 1 ys is, res ides in the hands. of management. 
This account refutes any notion of a power balance. 
How then, is the myth of a power balance accounted for by 
the rad i ca 1 perspect i ve? Fox offers some' answers to th is 
question. He argues that those who own and control resources 
rarely need to exert publicly and visibly the full scope and 
extent of the power that lies at their disposal. This 
accounts for the fact that the effect of power on behaviour 
often passes unnot iced and lit is in prec i se 1 y those power 
relationships where power disparity is greatest that its 
active exercise is least necessary '. I It is the absence of 
obvious evidence, however, which is likely to shape popular 
impressions on the subject' (1974:276-277). 
Another reason for the perpetuation of the myth is the fact 
that all the institutions are accepted as legitimised in a 
capitalist society. Fol·lowing Marx's· argument, those who 
contro 1 the economi c means ina soc i ety thus also contro 1 
all other institutions as well as mass media and 
communications. What are also seen as legitimate are class 
distinctions, status differentiation, the hierarchical 
organisation of production and work accompanied by 
differential rewards, status, authority and job autonomy. By 
means of ideological justification, people are mad~ to 
believe that those occupying positions of authority or those 
who are more skillful and talented ought to enjoy higher 
rewards compared to the less fortunate; Power is thus used 
in an indirect manner by the ruling class and is 
consequent 1 y 1 ess vis i b 1 e and obv i ous. Says Fox, the 
illusion itself contributes towards acceptance, for by 
concealing gross disparities of power it fosters the belief 
that all the principal interests, at least, of society 
compete fairly for its rewards, thereby helping to 
legitimize the system' (1974:280). 
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Anot~er assumption of the pluralist perspective concerns the 
ex i sterice of a 'pub 1 i c' or 'nat i ona l' interest desp i te a 
plurality of sectional interests and groups. Hyman and 
Brough (1975) po i nt out that these concepts are usua 11 y 
vague and undefined making interpretation difficult. Their 
main objection to these concepts however is the fact that 
interpretations itself are structured by relationships 
prevailing within the existing social and economic system. 
What is postulated as being 'public' or 'national.' is 
nothing more or less than the interests of the ruling class 
. in a capital ist society. They quote Wedderburn (1965) as 
saying that 'national' or 'public' 'has a curious habit of 
coinciding with the interests to which the speaker owes 
allegiance'. They also argue that a particular section of 
society may believe that its own interests reflect the 
general interests of society. At other times, an ideology 
may be used in a manipulative fashion. In the final 
analysis, however, it is not the sincerity of those in a 
position of dominance which is really relevant ... 'it is the 
objective consequences of the acceptance of such values and 
be 1 i efs by those beneath them' (Hyman & Brough 1975: 188-
189). This of course has consequences for what are going to 
be defined as 'problems' by those occupying positions of 
domination in the area of industrial relations. 
Related to this assumption is the notion that in a 
capitalist society, the state protects these interests and 
is seen to play a neutral or mediating role in confl ict 
situations between management and labour~ This follows from 
the voluntary approach in industrial relations followed in 
Britain whereby the procedure of collective bargaining is 
regulated by rules which the parties establ ish themselves. 
Thi s contrasts wi th compu 1 sory procedura 1 ru 1 es for 
co 11 ect i ve barga in i ng whe reby the part i es are regu 1 ated by 
ru 1 es wh i ch they are forced to observe by the state under 
statute or common law. 
Rad i ca 1 obse rve rs 
'mediating' stance 
deny th is' neutra 1 ' , 
of the state assumed 
'impartial' or 
by the pluralist 
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framework. Rather, the· state is viewed in the final 
analysis, as protecting the interests of those wielding 
economic power i.e. management.* 
The characterisation by radical critics of the power 
relationship between management and labour in capitalist 
soc i et i es· as essent i all y unequa 1, has obv i ous consequences 
for their interpretation of the role of unions and 
collective bargaining. Fox's (1974) argument can briefly be 
summarized: 
Disparity of power may ultimately lead to one party (usually 
management) coercing the other into accepting the terms of 
an agreement leading to a situati"on of bargaining uhder 
duress. This in turn (if plural ist as·sumptions regarding a 
power balance are accepted), re 1 i eves the weaker party of 
its obligation to honour such an agreement whereby 
collective bargaining becomes· meaningless. 
Fox has ·however pointed. out that the continuation (for which 
various explanations were offered) of the myth of a power 
balance means that. both parties are held to come fully under 
the obligation to observe these terms. Failure to do so may 
be viewed to justify sanctions against the defaulting party. 
The be 1 i efs and assumpt ions of the p 1 ura 1 i st perspect i ve 
can, according to Fox, promote and' legitimise certain. social 
attitudes and public policy. The radical perspective 
challenges this interpretation and the moral basis of most 
collective bargaining in capitalist societies. Not only is 
the moral val idity of collective bargaining challenged on 
the above gro~nds but also on the grounds that the 
."negotiation of. 'order' an order negotiated with 
representatives of participant interests - takes place only 
at the marg.i ns. I Management and the interests do not joi nt 1 y 
* The role of the state i.n capitalist .societies has been 
subjected to debate by traditional as well as 
contemporary Marxist scholars. I am well' aware that the 
comp 1 ex i ty of thi s hi gh 1 Y theoret i ca 1 debate is not 
repres¢nted here. 
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build their collaborative structure from the ground floor 
up. "Po~er and social conditioning cause the employee 
interests to accept management's shaping of the main 
str~cture long before they reach the negotiating table' (Fox 
1981a:318). Thus, negotiations are nQ"~ about the principle~ 
of hierarchic rewards, extreme sub-divisions of labour" the 
possibility of other types of rewards than financial 
rewards, the benef its and costs of company expans i on and 
growth and the basic nature of management objectives. These 
issues are deemed by management as not fit for discussions 
and negot i at ions. Those issues that are def i ned by 
management as 'problems' and qualify for negotiations, are 
issues that do not relate to the basic reward structure of a 
capitalist economy and the control of management over 
labour. This links with, what has earlier been termed, the 
'acceptability of claims' made by the parties involv~d. 
The 11 i mi tat i on of object i ves' has been an" important theme 
in radical and Marxists' debate on trade unions and 
collective bargaining. Maree (1984b) for example, provides 
an account of Marxist theory of the goals and role of trade 
unions differentiating between a Marxist-Leninist and 
contemporary Br it ish Marx i st theory. In the case of the 
former, the political objective of unions was the main 
focus. Initially unions were viewed to have" an economic role 
- combining workers and resisting a lowering of wages. They 
were functioning as essentially defensive organisations. 
Once workers become aware that they are fighting as a class 
against a united capitalist class, the economic role becomes 
a pol itical one. In other words, class consciousness 
develops. 
Both Marx and Len in became i ncreas i ng 1 y aware that trade" 
un ions on its own, can not real i se the po 1 it i ca 1 obj ect i ve 
of creating a working class consciousness in order to 
dismantle capitalism. Marx pointed to a need for a political 
party which could use the economic struggl~ of unions in 
their drive for political power. Lenin mainta;ne~ that while 
the working class is able to develop a 'trade union 
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cons-c·i ousness'· it had d iff i cu 1 ty creat i ng a revo 1 ut i onary 
socia11st consciousness. Workers were being diverted from 
political objectives by focusing strictly on economic issues 
economic reforms being merely 'trade union politics'. 
Intellectuals from the capital ist class had to pol itica11y 
educate the working class. In the final analysis however, as 
Maree correctly points out, Lenin gave great emphasis to the 
potential of trade union struggle in raising a working class 
consciousness. 
This rather pessimist~c view of the political role of unions 
are echoed by those who write from within a traditional 
Marxist perspective, for example, Anderson (1977). He argues 
that unions are very much part of a capital ist society in 
that they express the divisions of classes and do not 
challenge a society based on these divisions. They are being 
incorporated into a cap ita 1i st soc i ety and are ut i 1 i sed as 
'managers of labour' by those in positions of power. Many 
Marxist writers view the fragmentation of union organisation 
and workers int~ work groups to undermine the unity of the 
working class (Goodman 1984:69). 
1 .4.4 R. Hyman and the role of trad~ unions and 
collective bargaining 
Pessimism concerning trade unions do not of course reflect 
the views of all Marxist writers. Amongst contemporary 
British' writers, R. Hyman for example, is more optimistic 
regarding the role of unions in the work place and in 
fostering a class consciousness amongst workers. In 
concluding the discussion on the radical perspective or 
radical critique of plural ism in industrial relations, the 
approach of Hyman can be briefly looked at. 
Hyman professes to use an essent i all y Marx i st approach in 
his analysis of industrial relations leading him to focus on 
the sources of conflict rather than the regulation thereof. 
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He identifies the nature of labour transactions and the 
contro'l over workers as the main sources of conflict in 
industrial relations. While the labour transaction 
represents the basic confl ict of interests between labour 
and capital, the sell ing of labour power puts labour under 
control of management. This subordinate position ,is 
re i nforced by soc i ali sat i on processes, 'and the funct ion i ng 
of the dominant ideology in various institutions of society 
- thereby creating a false consciousness. This results in 
cultural and ideological hegemony which is seen by Miliband 
( 1969) as t the resu 1 t of a permanent and pervas i ve effort 
conducted through a multitude of agencies' (as quoted by 
Hyman & Broush 1975:199). 
There are, however, limits to cultural and ideological 
hegemony opening up the possibility of developing a radical 
consciousness. In the sphere of industry, workers' normative 
i nteg rat i on into an i nega 1 i tar ian hierarchy of rewards and 
deprivations is equally limited and problematic. The 
everyday concrete experiences and actions of workers may 
lead to the questioning and reinterpretation of the 
genera 1i sed va 1 ue system in the 1 i ght of these obj ect i ve 
situations and experiences leading to a radicalisation of 
ideology (Hyman & Brough 1975). 
Within this context, what is Hyman's interpretation of the 
role of institutions e.g. trade unions and collective 
bargaining? Are trade unions (and collective bargaining) 
1 i mi ted to an economi c ro 1 e (trade un ion consc i ousness) or 
can these institutions successfully help in creating a 
working class consciousness? 
He concludes that there is no general theory available to 
relate the struggle for material reforms to the development 
of a revolutionary consciousness. He warns however against a 
focus and one-sided accentuation of the economic role and 
the integration of unions into a capital ist structure. The 
dialectical relationship between unions and capitalism must 
be explored in a historically specific context. Furthermore, 
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unions do represent a sUbstantial threat. to the stability of 
the ·capitalist economy. But in the final analysis, the 
potential of unions to create a revolutionary consciousness, 
lies' in the power and control that unions can exercise 
through collective bargaining at the work place itself 
thereby challenging managerial control. 
The extent to which unions will be successful in this, will 
depend on prevailing historical conditions. The limits of 
trade union consciousness, Hyman says, 
can vary markedly between different historical contexts 
·and can shift radically with only a brief passage of 
time. Under specific objective conditions the educative 
potent i a 1 of co 11 ect i ve i ndustr i a 1 act i on may be 
'i mmense; in other, perhaps more typ i ca 1, circumstances 
the spontaneous deve 1 opment of workers' consc i ousness 
may fail absolutely to transcend the confines of 
bourgeois ideology (1971 :52-53). 
Compared to more traditional Marxi~t writers, Hyman foresee~ 
for unions and collective bargaining a greater role (if a 
qualified one) regarding the development of a revolutionary 
consciousness. 
Therefore, despite the absence. of a coherent analysis by 
radical writers of the role of trade unions, the essence of 
the radical perspective/radical cri~ique is the focus on the 
socio-economic structure which underlies inequality in 
industrial relations. Hyman and Brough (1975:183) formulate 
as follows: 
The structure of power and ideology which forms the 
context of collective bargaining is not explicitly 
scrutinised (by pluralists) as a crucial influence on' 
job regulation; and this narrow focus encourages the 
wi,despread but illegitimate assumption that the 
pluralist ideal actually deserves the reality of 
industrial relations 
There is however one thing that the pluralist and radical 
perspectives are seen to agree on and that is the degree of 
success that trade unions and collective bargaining have had 
in containing and regulating industrial confl ict in most 
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West.ern soc i et i es -
conf 1 i ct . has been 
societies. 
in other .words·, the degree 
successfully institutional.ised 
1. 4.5 criticism of ·the radical perspective 
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to which 
in most 
Criticism ! has also been raised against the radical 
perspective. It has been criticised as overly structural and 
deterministic~ it has been argued that man~ Or most workers 
may be q~ite content with trade unions having mainly 
f economi c' obj ect i ves as opposed to • po 1 it i ca.l' obj ect i ves 
posing a questioning of the existence of false consciousness 
and neglect of the success that unions and collective 
bargaining have had in securing greater economic advantages 
for the worker has been raised. The applicability of a 
Marx i st ana lys is to modern we 1 fare states and mi xed 
economi es has been quest i oned as we 11 as the ro 1 e of the 
state in industrial relations. For example, Zeitlin (1985) 
argues that a growing body of. empirical studies of 
industrial relations in Britain and elsewhere suggest that 
at certain moments the state has played a key role in 
eroding managerial prerogatives in the work place and 
overcoming employar opposition to trade unionism. 
1 .5 Conclusion 
When compar i ng the pe rspect i ves cove red in th is sect ion, it 
i~ clear that these frames of references do not only differ 
in terms of their basic assumptions or ideologies, but also 
with regard to the level they may be applied to as well as 
i ncons i stenc i es in the i r app 1 i cat ion. Both the un i tary and 
plural ist frames of references can be appl ied to either 
organisational or societal levels whereas in the radical 
perspect i ve, the .G . .ont..:i..nldj ... t.y. between organ i sat i ona 1 and 
soc; eta 1 factors is, stressed. In the case of the former two 
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perspectives, there is a discrepancy between what is and 
what ought to be whereas the latter is characterised by a 
discrepancy between what is the case and what ought nQ.t. to 
be the case (Watson 1980:227). This relates to the view that 
the radical .perspective is nothing more than a radical 
critique of the pluralist perspective .. 
The answer to the quest i on set at the beg inn i ng of th is 
section i.e. to what extent do the perspectives accommodate 
collective bargaining and how is this done should 
hopefully be clear at this point. 
The unitary perspective does not view collective bargaining· 
as central to industrial relations. To the extent that 
collective bargaining is a feature of contemporary. 
industrial relations, it is seen as unnecessary in the 
context of fenlightened management' but welcomed if it is to 
assist management in their function. 
Collective bargaining occupies a central position in the 
plural ist perspective. It represents .t.he.. way whereby 
conf 1 i ct between management and 1 abou r is regu 1 ated , 
controlled and contained. Through collective bargaining, 
rules and regulations which govern the relationship between 
management and labour, are established. It is viewed as one 
·of the most important processes whereby compromises and 
concessions are made and whereby conflict is 
institutionalised in contemporary Western societies. 
The radical perspective/radical critique views collective 
bargaining in capitalist societies as essentially a sham and 
challenges the moral basis of most collective bargaining in 
contemporary societies. The mOI-al basis is challenged on the 
grounds that the perpetuation of the myth of a power balance 
makes it extremely difficult for labour .D..QJ,. to observe the 
terms of an agreement. Furthermore, negotiations are seen to 
take place over marginal issues - marginal in that the basic 
power structu re with in industry - and consequent 1 y with in 
the broade r soc i ety _. is not in any . way cha 11 enged. Shou 1 d 
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1 abo.ur . succeed in deve 1 op i ng a revo 1 ut i onary consc i ousness 
( by. means of co 11 ect i ve barga i ni ng in the work place?) and 
overthrowing capitalism, it is not clear what role, if any, 
is going to be assigned to trade unions and collective 
bargaining in a society devoid of any class divisions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF LOCAL BARGAINING . 
2. 1 Introduction 
From the preceding discussion it is clear that proponents of 
both the pluralist and. raoical perspectives ascribe 
credibility or at least something approximating 
credibil ity - to the 
bargaining. This is 
industrial pluralists 
institution and process of collective 
concluded on the .grounds that whi le 
view . co 11 ect i ve barga in i ng as .t.he.. 
process/lnstitution by means of which employment relations 
are to be regulated and conflict to be contained within 
industrial relations, proponents of the radical perspective 
have at 1 east had to acknow 1 edge the re 1 at i ve success that 
collective bargaining has had in not only regulating class 
related confl ict between management and employers but also 
in securing important gains for employees 'in most 
industrialised societies. Proponents of both sides have thus 
concluded that the institutionalisation of conflict through 
collective bargaining has met .with a relative amount of 
success in contemporary·societies. 
In the following paragraphs .an effort will be made to define 
collective bargaining more accurately and to explicate 
various aspects thereof e.g. the origin and nature of 
collective bargaining, the conditions necessary or at least 
conducive to its development and the meaning and 
significance of bargaining stru6tures. Following this, a 
definition of local bargaining wi 11 be presented. At this 
stage however, an important qual ification has to be made. 
Following from o~r discussion in Chapter 1, material on and 
analysis of collective bargaining are very' much the fruits 
of writers' labour working from within a pluralist 
perspective on industrial relations. This follows from the 
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central position ascribed to collective bargaining in thi.s 
frame of reference. 
2.2 The origin of collective bargaining 
The relationship between employer and employees within 
industrial capitalism centres on, what Watson (1980:237) 
terms, and 'implicit contract'. This contract is depicted as 
... an agreement between unequal parties in which the 
employee, in the light of his or her particular 
motives, expectations and interests, attempts to make 
the best deal possible, given his or her personal 
resources (ski 11, knowledge, physique, wealth, etc.). 
The bargain wh i ch is struck i nvo 1 ves a certain 
relationship (in part explicit but largely, owing to 
its indeterminacy, implicit) between the employee 
j.nP. .. !"j .. t. .. $.. of effort, i mpa i rment and surrender of autonomy 
and emp 1 oyee ..r._e..WJ;j, .. CQ.§, of cash payment and f r i nge 
.benefits, job satisfaction, social rewards, security, 
power status, career potential etc. 
This bargain is thus essentially unstable for employers 
introduce various changes - organisational and technological 
to increase efficiency or market viability thereby 
inviting opposition from employees. The transformation of 
the traditional employment relationship to one characterised 
by or centred on an 'implicit contract', as depicted above, 
followed from radical changes of p·roduction methods, the 
loss of traditional skills and competition in the labour 
market. Not only has the production process become more 
capital intensive but business concerns have become larger 
and consequently more complex. Joint stock companies have 
been substituted by the development of conglomerates 
leaving the individual employees 'more remote and isolated 
from their employer' (Jenkins & Sherman 1977:1). 
Under these circumstances and, given the acute imbalance of 
the employer-employee relationship characterised by 
confl icting interests, it was to be expected that employees 
would try to protect their interests vis-a-vis the employer 
33 
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and· the state. Thus, unions became the vehicle to most 
manual' workers for defending' and improving their life 
standards and work i ng cond it ions. They therefore rejec·ted, 
i f imp 1 i cit 1 y 
critical of 
only, 
unions, 
the basic premise 
i . e . ' that the 
of most economi sts 
life chances of 
individuals are most appropriately determined .by supply-and-
demand conditions' . (Burkitt 1985:380). As it were, the 
employer had the right to hire and fire and to determine 
wages, working hours and practices. Employees organised 
themse 1 ves on a co 11 ect i ve bas is, and it was· genera 11 y the 
craft or skilled 'workers who had some initia'l success. in 
forming organisations and subsequently, engage in colle~tive 
bargaining. The craftsmen had the 'material and 
administrative resources and the leadership talents required 
to build solidly founded institutions' (Windmuller 1987:4). 
The central i ty of power in th is mod if i ed emp 1 oyer-emp 1 oyee 
relationship is accentuated by Herman and Kuhn (1981:295): 
Power is' the main thing unions and collective 
bargaining are all about. Workers' loss of power in the 
transition from a feudal to an industrial society two 
centuries ago sparked the formation of unions, and the 
relative power of employees and unionised workers has 
been a central concern of their relationship ever 
sinGe. 
Windmuller (1987) reminds us that collective bargaining has 
had no single uniform origin in, the various countries in 
which collective bargaining has become an established 
feature of the industrial relations scene. Whi le it was 
rna in 1 y the emp 1 oyees who strugg.l ed for' the acceptance of 
unions and collective bargaining, there were also instances 
where the employer took the initiative in establishing 
collective bargaining as an institutional ised form of the 
employment relationship. 
Various writers have commented on the resistance that 
employees experienced from employers and the ·state in 
establishing these formal institutions. Employer resistance 
is seen to be related to public policies deriying from the 
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individual and 1 iassez-fai re ideologies. It was especially 
the growing collectiv.e organisation of unski lled and semi-
skilled workers constituting a body of life~long wage-
earne rs, free to se 11 the i r 1 abou r , who 11 y dependent on 
wages and aware of the benef its of co 11 ect i ve bargain i ng 
(Webster 1983:112) which met with considerable antagonism. 
An interesting observation by Windmuller is that I ••• viable 
organizations for less-skilled and unskilled employees 
lagged behind everywhere, but especially in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, a fact that helps to account for the continuing 
relative importance of craft-based bargaining structures in 
Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand and the United 
States' (1987:4) 
From a study of the history of trade unionism, it appears 
that public policy ,egarding unionism began to swing around 
before the 20th century .which also meant that collective 
bargaining was being tolerated to a greater degree by the 
employers and .the state. Again, there was no uniform 
reaction by respective parties to these developments in the 
various countries. 
2.3 Defining collective bargaining 
Turning to the origin of the term collective bargaining 
i tse 1 f , it is genera 11 y acknowl edged that the term 
ori g i nated in the work of the Webbs (1894) on· trade un ions 
at the end of the 19th century. In spi te of the fact that 
they never formally defined the term, they viewed collective 
bargaining as an essentially economic transaction a 
transaction which employees turned to in order to enhance 
·their economic position vis-a-vis the employer. 
While the economic aspect of collectiv~ bargaining is still 
being seen by some contemporary writers as the crucial 
40 
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element of co 11 ect i ve bargain i ng , the more popu 1 ar view is 
to .interpret it as a political rather than an economic 
. , 
process.or institution. This view is supported, inter alia, 
by Goodman (1984:148) when he argues that collective 
bargaining be viewed as a pol,itical process which takes 
place within an economic and social context. This is so, he 
says, because co 1 1 ect i ve barga in i ng rests, u 1 t i mate 1 y , on 
'the (usually implicit) availability to the parties of 
sanctions of various kinds'. What he has in mind for 
example, is the withdrawal ·of co-operation, restrictions of 
output, bans on overtime, strikes etc. on the part of the 
employee or lock-outs on the part of the employer. 
Apart from 
i mpo rtance of 
these differences regarding the relative· 
economic vs. pol itical nature of collective 
bargaining, an overview of some definitions indicates that, 
in general, th~y share a common notion of its meaning. A few 
examples will suffice here: 
Collective bargaining may be defined as negotiations 
about working conditions and terms of employment 
between an emp 1 oyer, a group of emp·loyers or one or 
more'employer organizations on the· one hand and one or 
more representative workers organizations o~ the other, 
with a view of reaching an agreement (International 
Labour Office, Geneva as Quoted by Far.nham & Pimlott 
1983:217). 
Windmuller (1987:3) offers the following definition: 
Collective bargaining is a process of decision-making 
between parties representing employers and employee 
interests. Its overriding purpose is the negotiation 
and continuous application of an agreed set of rules to I . 
govern the substantive and procedural terms of the 
employment relationship, as well as to define the 
relationship between the parties to the process. As 
used here, therefore, collective bargaining ~hould be 
understood to refer not only to the negotiations or· 
formal collective' agreements but also to other aspects 
of the collective dealings between the parties. 
Finally, Goodman (1984:145) presents collective bargaining 
as 
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... a process through which representatives of employers 
and employee organizations act as the joint creators of 
the substantive and procedural rules regulating 
employment. In addition they frequently accept the main 
responsibility for interpreting, applying and enforcing 
these rules. . 
An important qualification added by Goodman and which 
co inc ides with Wi ndmu 11 e r' s def in it i on as quoted above, is 
that while collective bargaining is associated with an 
institutional relationship (meeting formally to negotiate 
written agreements) - it is not confined to such bodies. One 
must, he says, regard collective bargaining tas 
i ncorporat i ng most attempts by groups of emp 1 oyees (at any 
level) to affect the terms and conditions of their work 
through interactions with management' (1984:148). 
In reviewing these conceptions of collective bargaining, 
espec i all y those deve loped by Wi ndmu 1 1 e r and Goodman, the 
following observations can be made: 
('1) by using or employing the term tparties' to denote 
those who represent the varioui interest groups 
(Windmuller), numerous possibilities are· left open 
regarding what form this representation may take on. As 
wi 11 be poi nted out at a 1 ater stage, the form that 
representation takes on relates to the level at which 
negotiations and bargaining is conducted; 
(2) accommodated in these definitions is the notion of 
joint determination of work rules rather than acting in 
a unilateral way a point well demonstrated by 
Flanders' suggestion that the term j .. o.tnt ......... ..r..e..9.Y1.9...t .. tO.JJ. 
rather than collective bargaining be used; 
(3) the distinction between procedural and sUbstantive 
rules or terms of employment is accommodated; 
(4) not only is collective bargaining about negotiations or 
terms of employment but these terms or rules have to be 
applied. From the definit~ons it would appear that the 
part i es i nvo 1 ved in the estab 1 i shment of these terms 
have in general the responsibility of interpreting and 
applying these rules and terms and 
( 5 ) co 11 ect i ve bargain i ng must be regarded as to inc 1 ude 
not only fo~mal ~egotiations resulting in formal 
wri tten agreements but to i ncJ ude .9.. .. 1 .. 1 ........ o.t.h.e...r. ........ 9...s,.P.e..c..t.S ....... .Q.f 
.G . .Q . .l .. ..l ... e. .. G .. t."i,.,V .. e. ........... d. .. e. .. 9.. . .l .. ..i ... n.g.$. ........... .Q .. r. ........... t .. n.t .. e. .. r .. 9...G .. t . .i .. .Q.D. .......... b.e. .. t..'rl .. e. .. e. .. n ........... e..mp. .. l.Qy..e. .. e. .. $. . 
. 9..nd. .......... m.9...D..9...g.e...m.e. . .n.t. .......... 9...t ........... a.D.y .......... ..l .. e.,V .. e. .. l ............. ,Er .. Qm ......... t .. h...i ... $. .......... f..o .. l..l .. Oi'Y..$. .......... t..h .. a.t. 
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.§..g.r. .. e. .. e.m.e..n .. t..Q ............ .D..e. .. e. .. d ............. .n.Q.t .......... P..e. ............. .n.e. .. G.e. .. Q .. Q ..§..r.jJ .. Y.. .......... f..Qrm.§..l ........ §..n.d ...... _ ..... iD. 
w..r...i ... t.t. .. e. .. D. ...... .f .. Q.COl§,.t.. This aspect is of crucial relevance for 
bargaining at the so-called local levels. In more 
concrete terms, Goodman (1984:148) makes this point 
when he says that i nforma 1 discuss ions between 
shop stewards and managers about.day-to-day operations 
can equally be seen as collective bargaining, with each 
side deploying arguments against a background of 
relative power'. 
Retu rn i ng to the d i st i nct i on between co 11 ect i ve barga in i ng 
as an economic vs. a political process, Farnham and Pimlott 
(1983) argue that this theoreti.cal distinction is not 
considered by them to be either a conceptually or 
empirically valid one. They justify this position by 
referring to three, by now classic, perspectives from which 
collective bargaining may be viewed. These perspectives were 
initially suggested by Chamberlain and Kuhn (1965) and 
deemed by many writers as of importance and heuristic value 
.in debating the nature and essence of collective bargaining. 
They are 1 abe 11 ed as the market i ng, . gove rnmenta 1 and 
managerial/industrial relations concepts of collective 
bargaining. 
The marketing concept views collective bargaining as the 
means by which labour is bought and sold in the marketplace~ 
It is a method for determining the standard terms and 
conditions of employment by which labour is suppl ied to an· 
employer either by its present employees or by its newly 
hi red workers. It focuses on the sUbstantive content of 
co 11 ect i ve agreements i. e. pay, f r i nge benef its, hou rs of 
work, etc. This concept is very simi lar to that of the 
Webbs' view of collective bargaining. This view is based on 
the bel ief that collective bargaining represents a useful 
means by which the basic bargaining inequalities which exist 
between strong emp 1 oye rs and weak emp 1 oyees in the buy i ng 
and selling of labour can be eliminated or remedied. Whether 
collective bargaining' in fact establ ishes a more equitable 
ba 1 ance depends, as we have seen from Chapte r 1, on one's 
own ideological position. But at the very least, collective 
bargaining can be seen to mitigate the imbalance of power 
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seen-t9 exist between the two parties. In the light of the 
fact that 'free collective bargaining' is in general 
fiercely" defended by trade unionists, it can be concluded 
t~at collective bargaining _is seen as contributing to their 
po"wer vis-a.-vis the employer. 
The governmental concept of collective bargaining interpret~ 
it as a rule-making process which determines the rights of 
the relevant parties - a view that coincides with that of 
Flanders. Collective bargaining is seen to be a political 
and power relationship. Unions for example, as 
representatives of employees, use bargaining -to encroach on 
the sovereignty of management. Power is used in order to 
realise the members' aspirations and interests. -According to 
this view, collective bargaining is more than just 
regulating th~ price of work or the rewards attached to it. 
Jointly agreed terms cover other topics as well e.g. 
discipline, dismissal, training, allocation of work, etc. 
(Goodman 1984). 
The management or industrial relations concept 'of collective 
bargaining follows logically from the immediate above 
concept. It views it as a means -by wh i ch emp 1 oyees -can 
actually participate with management in decision-making 
processes on matters concerning both parties. Thus 
representatives or workers may to some extent be drawn into 
joint management for they contribute in securing adherence 
to agreements by employees. Management's freedom to act in a 
unilateral way is thereby curbed to a substantial degree. 
Management ,i n the longrun, usually accepts th i s 
development because, as was shown previously, management 
needs and obviously prefers a co-operative workforce in 
seeking to realise their objectives. 
In a sense, one 
employees - gain 
can interpret 
control over 
this 
their 
as to 
work 
imply 
place 
that 
and 
environment. As the area of joint control expands, 'so too 
does the participation of trade unions in the management of 
the enterprise' (Farnham & Pimlott 1983:220). Collective 
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bargaining in'ter~s of this view, becomes amean~ by which 
ind~strtal democraciy is established 'at the work place. 
Chamberlain and Kuhn do not view' these concepts of 
collective! bargaining as contradictory or mutually 
eXclusive.' Instead, they can be simultaneously maintained as 
each represents a different .emphasis regarding the. same 
phenomenon. Furthermore, it is suggested that they be viewed 
as represe~ting different stages in the development and 
maturisation of the bargaining. process. 
2.4 The nature and properties of collective bargaining 
As to the nature and properties of collective bargaining, 
the essence thereof rema ins its representat i ve nature, its 
power basis and its adaptability to changed circumstances 
(Farnham & Pimlott 1983). This is supported by Windmuller's 
discussion" of the attributes of and functions fulfi lled by 
collective bargaining of which a brief summary is given here 
(1987:8-10): Collective bargaining' is seen to be a highly 
flexible method of decision-making in contrast to 
legislative, judicial br public administrati~e processes and 
adapts to a diversity of ~ircumstances. This flexibility is 
J 
reflected in a wide range of possible agreements resulting 
from bargaining and negotiations ranging from. purely oral 
understand i ngs and simp 1 e documents to high 1 y forma 1 and 
complex documents covering a wide spectrum of issues. Some 
even allow for so-called supplementary agreements which are 
usually of a highly specialised nature. 
Furthermore, collective bargaining in contemporary 
industrial societies is viewed as a 'means of applying 
widely shared notions of equity and social justice to the 
industrial setting and the labour market'. The contribution 
that co 11 ect i ve barga in i ng makes as a channe 1 for workers' 
participation. is also listed by Windmuller as an important 
attribute, one that relates to the managerial and 
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governmental concepts discussed above. The barga in i ng 
process is also seen to cont~ibute to the exchange of 
information which could lead to greater understanding of the 
parties for one another's position and objectives. It 
consequently provides an 'orderly procedure by which each 
side can present to the other the best possible case for the 
satisfaction of its particular demands' (1987:9). Collective 
bargaining is also seen to elicit the consent of those who 
have to 1 ive under the terms of the 'agreement which results 
from the negotiation process and to be useful for the 
exercise of problem solving. 
In conclusion, Windmuller refers to the genera1ly accepted 
distinction between bargaining as a distributive and as a 
integrative process. The former is a more traditional view 
arguing that collective bargaining is a means for resolving 
conflict of interest in situations characterised by a 
scarcity of resources. In such a bargaining situation, 
whatever one party gains, the· other is seen to lose. The 
integrative view, by contrast, poses collective bargaining 
as a process by which all parties derive benefit from it. He 
quotes Healy (1965) as not i ng that '( c) reat i ve bargain i ng 
is practiced when the parties adapt the bargaining process 
to their particular needs in order to attack, in a 
/ meaningful way, the problems that face the~, hopefully 
finding solutions that are to their mutual benefit and 
satisfaction' (1987:9-10). Needless to say, many of these 
views on the nature and properties of collective bargaining 
stem from an ideological position which could only be 
described as plural ist and even unitary in some instances 
and, would for obvious reasons, not be supported by 
'radical' observers. 
The approach or view of collective bargaining to be taken 
here, supports that of Farnham and Pimlott (1983) i.e. 
collective bargaining, while contributing a rule making 
process and institutional ising conflict, inv?lves processes 
of power and control over wor·k relations. Collective 
bargaining involves economic relations as well as a struggle 
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overpower between management and labour whereby labour 
oft~n succeeds in encroaching upon traditional prerogatives 
and control of management. 
2.5 Conditions conducive to the establishment of 
collective bargaining 
If the nature of collective bargaining and the functions it 
fulfil.ls, approxim~te anything close to those being ascribed 
to it above, another question has to be considered: What 
conditions have to be met in order for collective bargaining 
to function effectively in this manner? It follows that in 
order for collective bargaining to be a viable option, the 
parties to the process must be sufficiently organised.\rhe 
freedom of assoc i at i on and organ i sat ion (not necessar i 1 y a 
union) amongst employees especially, is ah indispensable 
condition to be met - in absence of which employees' have a 
rather limited chance in establishing any power base. The 
part i es i nvo 1 ved in barga in i ng thus have to deve lop 
'appropriate structures' - not only develop them but also 
adapt them to an ever-changing environment (Windmuller 
1987). But not only must structures be developed, and 
adapted, but the parties to the process must recognise these 
structures for bargaining purposes. 
The circumstances unde r wh i ch these cond it ions can be met 
may differ dramatically in terms of the means applied e.g. 
1 ega 1 means as opposed to vo 1 untary means. I n the case of 
, 
the 1 atter, the interference of the state and the 1 aw ; n 
industrial relations and particularly in the regulation of 
employment relations, is not deemed as acceptable. Rather, 
the view is held that the various parties must organise, 
negotiate and bargain in good faith and observe the-terms of 
agreement according to the principles of voluntarism - an 
observation made in Chapter 1. 
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The· industria; relations system of Britain for example, is 
gen~rally depicted as· the prjme instance of a system 
upholding and embodying the notion of voluntarism. This is 
especially relevant for the period prior to the 1960's. In 
the already mentioned evidence before the Donovan Commission 
in Britain, Flanders examined the voluntary principle as a 
t compl ex pattern of be 1 i efs' and subsequent 1 y suggested at 
least three different principles underlying or associated 
with the notion of voiuntarism (Flanders 1970). Firstly, 
preference is given to collective bargaining over state 
regu 1 at i on as a method for regu 1 at i ng wages and work i ng 
conditions. The second principle favours keeping industrial 
conflict and disputes out of the courts by maintaining non-
legalistic bargaining. And thirdly, the insistence by 
relevant parties on complete autonomy (so-called tfree 
collective bargaining') leading them . to find outside 
interference totally unacceptable. In other words, in its 
purest form it means that the state plays no part whatsoever 
in industrial relations. Flanders argued however that 
volunt~rism understood in ·this sense had to be discarded. In 
his words t ••• it is only the third (principle) that truly 
belongs in the rubbish bin of history' (1970:289). If 
voluntarism is to be understood in terms of this principle, 
then the British system of industrial relations could or can 
hardly be explained as one of true voluntarism. This point 
is ilso argued by Jackson (1977) when he reviews some 
examples of state intervention in British industrial 
relations even prior to the 1960's. 
In contrast to voluntarism, legal means can also be applied 
to establish the necessary .conditions for collective 
bargaining. As an example of this type, reference is usually 
made to the United States. As Jackson and many others have 
observed, the legal regulation of industrial relations is 
one of the most outstanding features of the American 
society. Legislation covers a wide range of issues and 
talthough it would be an exaggeration to claim that 
industrial negotiations are solely the province of lawyers, 
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(19?7:229). 
2.6 Bargaining structure 
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A term often encountered in the' 1 iterature on collective 
bargaining is that of 'bargaining structure'. But despite 
its general usage, there is little' consensus regarding the 
exact mean i ng the reof . Thus, no common 1 y ag reed on 
definition can be presented and to use Windmuller's 
(1987:81) formulation, '(b)argaining structures are not 
easily portrayed in an orderly way even if the term 
"structure" seeming,ly impl ies certain qual ities of symmet'ry, 
hi erarchy and neatness'. He then proceeds to clefi ne it as 
follows: 
Whenever collective bargaining becomes established as 
the process by which decisions of considerable 
importance to those affected are made about the terms 
and conditions of empl'oyment, there develops a network 
of institutiorial relationships which is referred to as 
the bargaining structure. The, term applies in 
particular to the often highly complex horizontal and 
vertical segmentations whjch divide and subdivide 
industrial relations systems into hierarchical layers 
and compartments, and to the relations that exist 
between them. 
A similar conception and one which 
idea of permanency and stability, is 
Hawes and Lumb (1971) as quoted 
places emphas is 
that offered by 
by Farnham and 
on the 
Parker, 
Pimlott 
(1983:222). According to this definition, the term 
'bargaining structure' is used to describe collectively 
'the more stable or permanent features that distinguish the 
bargaining process in any particular system'. 
The difficulty e,xperienced in trying to define bargaining 
structures in a precise fashion, leads many writers to 
identify, what they term, elements, dimensions or features 
of bargaining structures of which numerous examples can be 
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cit~d.· Weber (1967), for example, differentiates between 
informal work group, the election district, the negotiation 
unit and the unit of direct impact; Clegg (1976) between 
extent, level, depth of bargaining and the degree of control 
of co 1 1 ect i ve ag reements; Kochan (.1980: 84-85 ) def i nes 
barga in i ng structure as t the scope of the emp 1 oyees and 
employers covered or affected by the bargaining agreement' 
and proceeds to differentiate between the formal and the 
informal bargaining structure. Whi le the former refers to 
the negotiating unit, i.e. the employees and employers that 
are legally bound by the terms of an agreement, the latter 
is defined as the employees and employers that are affected 
by the results of a negotiating settlement through pattern 
bargajning or s6~e other nonbinding process. It must be kept 
in mind though that Kochan defines these terms strictly in 
terms of the American industrial relations system. Two 
principal but closely related concepts are identified by 
Windmul'er (1987) i.e. bargaining level and bargaining unit. 
The classification by Farnham and Pimlott (1983) and that by 
Goodman (1984) however, seems to be par~icularly helpful for 
our purpose. These distinctions originate from Parker et al 
(1971) and the various dimensions of the bargaining 
structure to be discussed here are the levels, units, scope, 
form and principles of bargaining. 
2.6. 1 level 
.L.e. .. v..e.J.. is seen to refer to the points at which bargaining is 
conducted. In other words, it refers to the thierarchical 
and horizontal layers which are characteristic of the 
bargaining structure in virtually all countries' (Windmuller 
1987:82). There are many such layers - especially in multi-
plant companies or enterprises (Goodman 1984). These layers 
could include the economy as a whole, industry, region or 
district, company or enterprise, plant or establishment, 
department or section in descending order of 
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comprehensiveness. Not only can numerous layers be 
identified, but bargaining may take. place at different 
levels at the same time. A company for. example, which is a 
member of an employer association may negotiate aspects such 
as minimum wages and the length of a normal working week at 
the industry 1 eve 1 , 
company level and 
individual plant or 
sick pay and redundancy ag reements at 
bonus schemes at the level of the 
department (Farnham & Pimlott 1983). 
Terms of employment are generally seen to be established by 
two or even more agreements concluded at different levels. 
2.6.2 unit 
Bargaining .!.J.n.Lt,· or in Clegg's (1976) terms, extent of 
bargaining, on the other hand, refers to specific groups or 
categories covered by a particular agreement. It thus 
t comp rehends the group i ngs of emp 1 oyees and emp 1 oye rs who 
are represented in collective negotiations and who are 
subject to the terms embodied in the agreemeht' (Windmuller 
1987: 83) . The poss i bi 1 i ty to extend the terms of a 
collective agreement to employers and employees not 
represented in the negotiations usually by administrative 
action, is a feature of many countries' industrial relations 
systems. The composition of the relevant 
depending on particular circumstances. 
broad, for example when a unit covers all 
a sing 1 e plant, company, industry or much 
separate units can exist for skilled 
workers, supervisors or technicians 
enterprise or plant. On the employer 
parties can vary 
The units may be 
manual workers in 
narrower, as when 
workers, process 
within a single 
side, a un i t can 
organ i se them in small groups or 
enterprise, company and still smaller, 
as 
such 
an individual 
as a plant or 
even a department, 
establishment. These 
section or 
units could of 
workshop within an 
course be also. quite 
large for example groups of employers in a large enterprise 
( m u 1 t i - e m p loy e r ), at reg ion a lor nat ion all eve 1. Ac cor din g 
to Goodman (1984), .b..cQ.a.d barga in i ng un i .ts norma 11 y cluster 
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diverse occupational groups together under 
though -the agreements may define different 
one ag reement 
rates of pay. 
N_g.r. . .r. . .Q.~. bargaining units allow for separate negotiations by 
different groups. Most large companies or enterprises have 
more than two units who conduct negotiations. It is 
maintained that some large multi-plant and multi-product 
companies which adopt narrowly defined units at plant level-, 
may have up to 50 units. Bargaining units are primarily 
determined by a community of interests which are strong 
enough to create- such a unit. Such community of interests 
'can be determined by a variety of factors e.g. employment in 
the -same industry or enterprise or plant. It could even be 
de~ermined by similar occupation or skills or dependence on 
the same market. Units on employers' side, are similarly 
determined by a community of interest e.g. common ownership 
of establishments and attachment to the same industrial 
sector. 
2.6.3 scope 
.S.C.Q'p'.e. refers to the numbe r of emp 1 oyment aspects cove red by 
agreements concluded. Put differently, it refers to the 
range of subj ects regu 1 ated by co 11 ect i ve barga in i ng , as 
opposed to those topics decided by other means. It follows 
logically that the scope of bargaining will differ between 
enterpr i ses and i ndustr i es. The issues usua 11 y covered in 
agreements are those related to what may be termed the 
(market' issues e.g. hours, wages, shift work, overtime 
rates, etc. The scope could also include a whole variety of 
othe r issues wh i ch are characte r i sed by a great deg ree of 
detail or precision e.g. issues relating to discipline, 
dismissals, training of employees, recruitment of workers, 
manning levels, job descriptions, etc. 
These above issues or topics are not always -established as 
negot i ab 1 e as some of them may be seen to be subj ected to 
consultation rather than negotiation. Others may be 
52 
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acknowledged to fall under management !prerogatives' and not 
sub~ect to either negotiation or even consultation. Again, 
this will differ ,according to enterprise and industry. The 
'abovement i oned processes is termed by him as the so-ca 11 ed 
!frontiers of collective bargaining' and lines between them, 
he argues, are'difficult to define in practice because the 
different parties may differ regarding the position of these 
topics on a continuum ranging from negotiability to that of 
unilateral decision-making. Another factor contributing to 
the difficulty in defining lines, is the nature of 
discus~ions and interaction between employees (or shop, 
stewards who normally represent them) and the supervisors or 
managers. These discuss ions or interact ions are not always 
formal resulting in formal agreements. They can be, as was 
pointed out in the definition of collective bargaining, 
informal in nature. It is therefore, as Goodman correctly 
points out, very difficult to ascertain the scope of 
co 11 ect i ve bargain i ng ina part i cu 1 ar country, industry or 
enterprise by merely referring to written collective 
ag~eements. This leads us to the following feature or 
d i mens i on i '. e . 
2.6.4 forms 
Barga in i ng .f.Q.ems. refer to the ways in wh i ch an ag reement or 
set of agreements are recorded i.e. written and formally 
signed or unwri tten and ; nforma 11 y understood or it rna)' be 
simply acknowledged practices. It may be the case that the 
parties prefer to have formal, written agreements on certain 
topics. On other issues, they may prefer to be less formal 
for some reason (Goodman suggests tact i ca 1 reasons) . 
Furthermore, agreements ·may be very prescriptive and 
specific in their formulation and wording br they may be 
nothing more than just broad guidelines. 
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2.6 .. 5 principles 
F; na 11 y. the re are barga; n; ng .p .. r...i. . .n.G. .. tpJ .. e..$. wh; ch is 1 ess 
clearly an element of bargaining structures than the above 
mentioned ones. If however, they are strongly held and slow 
, 
to change, they wi 11 i nev i tab 1 y have an i nf 1 uence on the 
bargaining arrangements. The term is seen to refer to the 
basic tenets or beliefs that influence the function;'ng of 
the relevant parties. Management, for example, may be very 
much committed to membership of an employers' association or 
may on the.other hand, prefer or favour total autonomy in 
negotia~iuns with unions. A union again, may prefer to 
barga in at a part i cu 1 ar 1 eve 1, for instance plant 1 eve 1 or 
enterprise level. They may have certain attitudes regarding 
mediation and arbitration and all these bel iefs or 
principles must be seen to have a significant influence on 
the bargaini~g structure and processes between the parties. 
54 
These elements or features must for obvious reasons not be 
seen in isolation from the other. Not only are they related 
to one another but Clegg (1976) proceeds to argue that these' 
elements or d i mens ions of the barga in i ng structu re may be 
seen to relate to various aspects of union behaviour e.g. 
density, union structure, union government, work place 
organisation and collective action in the form, for example, 
of strikes. Regarding the nature of the relationship ,between 
bargaining structure and union behaviour, it is clear from 
the following' quotation that collective bargaining is seen 
to have more than just an influence upon union beha~iour. 
Co 11 ect i ve bar'ga in i ng is put forward not on 1 y as an 
influence on other aspects of union behavior, not just 
an important influence, but as the. tmain', tmajor', 
tforemost' or tprincipal' influence. These adjectives 
imply that when collective bargaining is the 
predominant method of regulation, its dimensions 
account for un ion behav i ou r more adequate 1 y than ~lny 
other set of explanatory variables can do ( 1976:11). 
By attributing to these dimensions the status of ind~pendent 
or intervening variables, an effort is made to account for 
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variations in ·union behaviour. This exercise leads Clegg to 
formu 1 ate. a who 1 e range of propos i t ions. These are . then 
tested against empirical data on industrial relations in 
various c,ountries resulting in a comparative analysis which 
has made a noteworthy contribution to· the study of 
industrial relations in general and collective bargaining 
and trade unionism in particular. Some of these points will 
be taken up in subsequent chapters. 
2.7 Bargaining levels 
Of crucial 
bargaining 
bargaining, 
relevance here however, is the concept of 
1 eve 1 because, in order to def i ne 1 oca 1 
this dimension or element requires· closer 
examination. As was noted above, bargaining level refers to 
or describes the points· at which collective bargaining (in 
its various forms) is conducted between the representatives 
of the respective interest groups. What was also noted, was 
the general tendency for collective bargaining to be 
conducted at various levels within a part.icular industry, 
enterprise or plant. This trend is generally recognised to 
be related to the development of large, complex 
organisations. Jenkins and Sherman (1977:26), in discussing 
collective bargaining a~d agreements in Britain, argue that 
industry in contemporary Britain fdoes not revolve around a 
single-plant entrepreneurial employer so beloved of Adam 
Smith and subsequently the neo-classicist economists and 
politi'cians'. Rather, what characterises British industry 
for example, is the growth and increasing complexity of 
business enterprises. 
An important development has been the establishment of 
oligopolies and conglomerates with large multi-plant, multi-
product or service companies dominating the scene. This 
observation is of course valid for what has been happening 
in most contemporary industrialised societies world-wide. An 
important aspect of thes~ big corporations is the fact that 
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they. often have more than one site for their business 
oper.at ions and emp 1 oyees can. thus be represented at 
different levels for example site level or national level. 
Regarding the various points at which bargaining can take 
place, the following levels are usually distinguished: 
( 1 ) 
(2 ) 
( 3 ) 
(4) 
( 5 ) 
(6 ) 
2.7. 1 
national, economic or confederate 
industry (multi-employer bargaining) 
regional or district (as subdivision of industry) 
enterprise or undertaking (single-employer bargaining) 
plant or factory (also site) 
shopfloor (departments, sections and work groups within 
plants or factories) 
National/economy/confederate level: 
Under conditions of plural unionism, unions can group 
together and form one or more trade union confederations. 
The prime. goals of these confederations are usually the 
maintenance of top-level relations with governmental 
agencies or politic~l parties and the articulation of views 
on public issues. Although collective bargaining is normally 
not to be seen as the central activity of confederations, 
they .can become involved in bargaining activities under 
certain circumstances. For examp 1 e , the effort by a 
government to harmonise national economic policy goals with 
the outcome of collective bargaining; 
encourage the central bodies on employer 
to help shape social policy in areas 
when governments 
and employee side 
relevant to their 
concerns; when central organisations of employers and 
emp 1 oyees have dec i ded to estab 1 ish, by mutual ag reements, 
certa in bas i c terms 'to govern the re 1 ati onsh i p between the 
respective parties and finally, when an agreement is reached 
among trade unions to co-ordinate their bargaining strength 
in pursuit of a common goal (Windmuller 1987). 
"-
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
/ 
5.7 
A rel~te~ form of direct confederal participation in 
collective bargaining is also mentioned by' Windmuller, that 
being the negotiation of so-called basic agreements which 
are ··of special significance in certain countries e.g. 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, West Germany, Norway and Sweden. 
These agreements contain certain fundamental prlnciples that 
are to govern the relations between the organisations of the 
respective parties. They are thus very similar to basic 
national legislation or constitutional provisions except 
that the former 'have been shaped by the parties themselves 
through their representatives at peak confederal levels 
instead of by national legislature or constituent assembly' 
( 1987 : 22). The extent to wh i ch central bod i es 1 ike trade 
union confederations can acquire authority over collective 
bargaining, is closely related ·to two factors i.e. 
government i ntervent ion .i n the economy and the size .of the 
country. As noted by Windmuller, '(n)ot only do 
interventionist governments want to deal with representative 
agenc ie,s on. the trade un i on and emp 1 oye sides,' but 
converse 1 y trade un ions a 1 so find that they can i nf 1 uence 
po 1 i,cy-makersi n government more effec.t i ve 1 y, through a' 
single designated leading body' (1987:22-23). There is also 
. a general tendency for confederations to get actively 
involved in bargaining in countries which are relatively 
small due mainly to administrative factors and the 
constraints of the economy. Central ised authority in all 
. institutions is more easi ly achieved in small countries, 
other things being equal. Pressure to lower costs tends to 
promote centralisation of author~ty. 
2.7.2 Industry (multi-emplqyer) level: 
Bargaining at the point of industry· refers to bargaining 
between the representat i ves of workers and emp 1 oyers away 
from the individual enterprise 'or plant. In other words, 
individual employers do not bargain with workers within the 
boundaries of particular establishments. Normally, employees 
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are" represented by unions who then negotiate with employers 
as a group - usually an employers' association within a 
particular industry. It is normally minimum wages and 
conditions of employment which are negotiated at this level 
and the terms of agreement are then binding on the relevant 
parties concerned. 
2. 7.3 Regional or district level: 
In this case, collective bargaining is conducted between the 
representatives of the employers and employees of a specific 
industry within a specific region or district. Bargaining 
between the district or regional committee of a union and a 
local employers'" association of a particular industry would 
be ah example of bargaining at regional (or district) level. 
2.7.4 Enterprise or undertaking (single-employer 
bargaining) level: 
At this level bargaining takes place for example between the 
union headquarters and the headquarters of a multi-plant 
company or enterprise. Employees thus bargain as a unit with 
the representatives of the employers - negotiations thus are 
not conducted outside the "enterprise as is the case with 
industry-wide bargaining. This has also been termed single-
employer bargaining. 
However, given that an enterprise/company/undertaking often 
has more than one plant and the possibility exists for 
plants to differ in terms of managerial methods, styles and 
organisation, enterprise bargaining usually implies that 
these managerial methods and forms of organisation are 
standardi sed at the vari ous plants. Enterpr i se or company 
agreements can thus exercise control over a. wide range of 
issues which would otherwise have to be regarded as domestic 
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to 9.ach individual plant. It is also important to note that 
when an enterprise does not comprise more than one plant, 
bargainihg can be said to be conducted at enterprise 1evel, 
the· circumstances then corresponding to those at plant 
1 eve 1 • 
2.7.5 Plant or factory/site level: 
Here emp 1 oyees, usua 11 y represented by offi cers of a 1 oca 1 
union or shop stewards, negotiate with the local manager or 
managers of a plant. This makes it .possible to bargain over 
issues which are not covered by an enterprise or company 
agreement. These issues can thus be delegated down the line 
to the level of ~he individual plant or factory. 
2.7.6 Shopfloor or intra-plant level: 
Within a particular plant or factory numerous work groups 
tend to deve lop. These work groups may be seen to share 
common prob 1 ems, techno logy and other exper i ences and may 
want to negotiate with, for example,· a foreman through a 
shop steward. These negot i at ions or. other forms of 
interaction can be formal or i~formal in nature resulting in 
formal written agreements or informal understandings, custom 
and practice - all are seen to regulate employment and work 
relations once it is established. 
2.8 Towards defi~ing local bargaining 
I n the 1 i gh.t of the above d i st i nct ions (wl1 i ch may not be· 
genera 11 y accepted), 1 oca 1 barga in i ng (or domest i c/ work 
place bargaining) will in subsequent analysis be seen to 
refer to: 
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all forms o~ formal and informal negotiations and 
interact ions between emp 1 oyee (s) or representat i ve (s) 
of employee(s) and employers or representative(s) of 
employers . or management conducted at the single-
enterprise and/or subsidiary level's (i .e. plant or 
shopfloor) resulting in either formal or informal, 
written or tacit agreements and understandings between 
the relevant parties. Local bargaining is thus seen to 
include all forms of negotiations and interactions at 
the single-enterprise (assuming uniform methods of 
management and organisation in cases of multi-plant 
enterprises i.e. single-employer), plant, shopfloor or 
any other additional subsidiary levels. 
Wi th reference to agreements' and understand i ngs reached at 
subsidiary levels, Windmuller (1987) argues that these 
agreements and/or understandi ngs have as thei r purpose 9ne 
or more of the following: 
(1) they may contain improvements over minimum conditions; 
(2) the imp 1 ementat i on of a 1 ready ag reed upon ru 1 es and 
terms of employment and 
( 3 ) they may deal with issues 
agreement or understandings 
certa inc i rcumstances, cou 1 d 
nature. 
not yet covered by the 
issues which, under 
be of an extreme 1 y w·i de 
To conc 1 ude: the re 1 at i onsh i p wh i.ch connects the var i ous 
1 eve 1 s const i tutes an important aspect· of the barga in i ng 
structure. As new or additional levels are added, or the 
re 1 at i ve we i ght and sign if i cance of any 1 eve 1 changes ~ for 
example when national-wide bargaining is removed~ the 
relationship between the levels of the bargaining structure 
'will obviously also change. Any significant change regarding 
the relative weight of the various levels will point to a 
trend of either centralisation or decentralisation of the 
bargaining structure. If, for example, enterprise bargaining 
is largely subordinate to plant-level bargaining or if, 
economy-wide bargaining should become less significant than 
industry-wide bargaining, this will all point in the 
direction of greater decentralisation of ~he bargaining 
structure. 
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Over time, ,this structure of a particular country can be 
seen to show trends towards greater centralisation or 
decentralisation depending on the particular circumstances. 
In depicting trends however, certain problems can arise, the 
identification of which will be referred to in the following 
chap~er . 
It is important to note that bargaining conducted at a 
particular level does not have to be supplementary to 
bargaining conducted at a higher level. For example 
negot i at ions at the 
supplementary to 
particular industrial 
does not necessar i 1 y 
bargaining .. As will 
enterprise level are not 
industry-wide bargaining 
necessarily 
within a 
relations context or plant bargaining 
have to supplement enterprise level 
be po i nted out in the next sect ion, 
enterprise and plant level bargaining can constitute - and 
often do - I independent' and I autonomous' 1 eve 1 s as is the 
case with Japan and the United States. In ·these cases, 
negotiations will cover ,§,J.l issues pertaining to the 
employees of the particular enterprise or plant. 
Finally, as noted previously, there eKists a close 
relationship between the level at which bargaining takes 
place on the one hand and the un it, scope and form of 
bargaining structure on the other. At the local level, the 
units of bargaining tend not only to be' smaller than those 
at for example industry and national levels, but tend to get 
smaller as bargaining moves downward~ through plant' and 
additional subsidiary levels. At local level, bargaining is 
usually conducted over issues pertaining to a single 
enterprise, plant or s.hopfloor situation and while 
agreements can take on many forms, the tendency is towards a 
greater degree of informality as negotiations and 
interaction move from single-enterprise level through to the 
level of the shopfloor. At the latter point, agreements 
frequently take 'on the form of oral and informal agreements 
or understandings as well as custom and practice. 
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2.9. Informa; shopf 1 oor barga in i ng; custom an,d pract ice 
In· terms of the definition of local bargaining presented 
above, informal bargaining refers to, or encompasses all 
instances of informal negotiations and interactions between 
management (or its representatives) and employees (or their 
representatives) at single enterprise, plant or shopfloor 
level. It is often at the latter level that most informal 
bargaining and interaction take place resulting in informal 
and tacit agreements, understandings, custom and practice. 
Informal rules generated by these practices are normally not 
codified. Brown (1972) distinguishes between informal rules 
negot i ated between work groups and foremen and viewed as 
legitimate because management accepts them and so-called 
customs which are merely the result of management oversight. 
His view of custom and practice differs from those of 
Flanders (1967) and Fox (1971) in that he does not 'view 
custom and practice as unilaterally worker regulated. 
Management, by accept i ng i nforma 1 ru 1 es or by sheer 
overs i ght, contr i butes in the estab 1 i shment of custom and 
practice. Clegg's conception of custom and practice comes 
closer to that of Brown's in that Clegg sees it as 'implicit 
in a whole range of working practices'; that the custom and 
practice status of some practices only arises when 
challenged, questioned or broken; that management can playa 
'key part in establishing and maintaining it although 
workers wi 11, be guardi ng i nfri ngement upon it' and 'the fact 
that custom and practice can emerge without any conscious 
decision or intention' (Brown 1972:42-44). 
Brown thus defines custom and practice tentatively as a 
'transactional rule of job regulation that arises from 
informal processes' more specifically from a 'process 
whereby management error or omission establishes a practice 
that workers see as legitimate to defend (1972:48 & 61). He 
concludes that custom and practice does not only represent a 
type of job regulation rule in much of industry, but it is 
used as a 'claim and an excuse in certain instances where 
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powerful work-f6rces interact with uncoordinated 
management'. In this sense, custom and practice does not 
originate from formal bargaining activities but is 
essent i all y the resu1 t or consequence of worker power and 
management error. 
Some of these views are qua 1 if i ed by Batstone (1984). For 
examp 1 e, custom and pract ice need not be so 1 ely or even 
primarily biased in" favour of workers and managerial tsins' 
of omi ssi on may ref 1 ect efforts by management to ach i eve 
ends in the face of possible employer non-participation. 
Given the usually uncodified nature of custom and practice, 
it can be expected of course to be highly fluid in nature. 
Brown's reference to informal rules and custom and practice 
as a type of job ,-egu1ation "rule, points to an important 
aspect of informal bargaining i.e. that informal bargaining 
and interaction, 
essent i a 11 y means 
as in the case of formal bargaining, 
the estab r; shment of the normat i ve 
regulation and control of the employment relationship. This 
view is also held by Hill (1974) when he argues for" a 
central position to be attributed to the normative 
regulation of the employment relationship in analysing 
info~ma1 bargaining. As pointed out by him, rules governing 
employment relationships have often, notably by pluralists, 
been viewed as being generated solely by formal institutions 
of collective bargaining. This often results in the view of 
informal negotiations to be in tconflict' with the formal 
institutional system. The generation of rules at the bottom 
levels of the firm, i.e. work group bargaining with 
management or the interaction of individuals with 
management/employer, is thus of utmost importance in 
interpreting shop floor behaviour (1974: 231). 
~The formalisation of informal bargaining and agreements 
through the establishment of formal plant bargaining do not 
always do away with shopfloor negotiations and 
understand i n g s . T hi s seem to poi n t to what Terry (1 9 7 7 ) 
calls, the t inevitabi 1 ity of informal ity'. These" sentiments 
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are' shared by Batstone ( 1984) i . e. that the expansion of 
I for:ma 1', procedural and substantial rules do not lead to an 
inevitable increase in management's freedom over the use of 
1 abour. Some of the reasons ~uggested by him are the 
following: rules and agreements often encourage work place 
unionisation thereby building up expectations on the part of 
workers and shop stewards to gain more influence; the 
explicit statement of rules leads io greater visibility and 
thereby making it easier to challenge them; rules are 
general by ~ature and the application thereof provides 
greater scope for negotiations; new rules often embody 
part i cu 1 ar, concept ions of workers and of the wage-effort 
bargaining leading to increased 'bargaining awareness' among 
workers and a 1 so increases expectat ions of pay increases 
given the new industrial relations Ideals'. 
Efforts to forma 1 i se i nforma 1 negot i at ions and bargain i ng 
are often based on certain implicit assumptions. The basic 
tenet is that 'changes in the form of agreement (unwritten 
or written), or in the locus of their authorship or 
guard i ansh i p, do not great 1 y affect the way in wh i ch the 
contents of those ag reements are perce i ved, acted upon or 
en for c ed' ( T err y 1 9 7 7 : 7 8 ). T err y 's res ea r c h on t his i s sue 
leads him to conclude that workers may choose not to abide 
by a formalised system or negotiations and agreements for 
the fo 11 ow i ng reasons: ( 1) workers may not 1 ike the new 
rules or feel that they can be improved upon, (2) 'workers 
may be more prepared to challenge formal rules because of a 
lower degree of commitment to the new rules because 
authorship has been removed from them and may feel a loss of 
control over their work lives,(3) given power and ability 
to exercise pressure, it can be expected that workers wi 11 
in fact act accordingly and (4) the logical outcome of this 
resistance, pressure and lower level negotiations, wi 11 be 
informal rules and tacit understandings. 
Admitting to the fact that this does not really answer the 
quest i on as to .why workers prefer i nforma 1 to forma.l rul es 
and why they do not apply their power and' 'strength in 
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insisting that concessions made by foremen be formalised, he 
ventur~s some answers: workers can expect strong resistance 
from senior management which might jeopardise de facto 
coneess ions and second 1 y, i nforma 1 r.u 1 es imp 1 y ce rta in 
advantages for workers. Informa 1 ru 1 es and understand i ngs 
al low the stronger party to behave in an unpredictable way 
thereby enhancing that party's power position relative to 
the other. The party which benefits in this way is unlikely 
to have the s i tuat i on mod if i ed. Gi ven these circumstances, 
Terry suggests the' poss i bi 1 i ty of the 'i nev i :tab i 1 tty of 
w'ork-rel ated informal i ty '( 1977: 88). 
In the final analysis, the shopfloor constitutea the source 
of inf9rmal practices which extend worker control .over their 
work situation and lives. The viewpoint that informality in 
the work place is in some way 'inevitable' links with Hill's 
(1974) argument that informality and informal bargaining is 
no 'new' phenomenon although renewed interest may be 
interpreted <:is to imply this. It is' rather a matter of 
informal bargaining being more visible in recent years due 
mainly to the development of 'greater managerial 
sophistication' since the early 1950's which exposed more 
clearly the workings of the informal system. punctional 
specialiaation of management, especially the development of 
) . . 
the personne 1 
visibility of 
funct ion, has also resu 1 ted 
shopfloor activities and 
managerial reassertion of control. 
in the greater 
may lead to 
That 'custom' or 'informality' has always characterised 
industrial relations is a view shared by Clegg (1979:24-28) 
as well. In fact, he questions the unilateral power ascribed 
to employers of the past arguing that they were restricted 
by custom. Pay rates and work hours were primarily settled 
by custom and unions, the latter of which had 'come into 
b~ing as protectors of custom'. 
Given the' distinctions made above and the definition of 
local bargaining proposed, the nature of local bargaining 
within the bargaining structures of a few selected countries 
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~ including South Africa - will b~ assessed in the following 
two chapters. 
/ 
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PART TWO 
THE NATURE OF LOCAL BARGAINING: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 
The industrial relations systems and consequently the 
r-----.. ____ .. 
bargaining structures of different cou~tr,es' are-n-~t~lY 
.".- -- ._-_. - -- --~----- -----
extreme 1 y comp 1 ex but vary marked l)! f rom one country_~<? 
~~-, <----- - -- _._----_.-
another due to a whole spectrum of variables. This diversity 
-~~~- - -.---~. - ~ ~ ~ . 
is recognised when C6rdova (1978:423) says: anyone 
attempting to systematise the methods and practices of 
collective bargaining in industrial ised coun-tries cannot 
fail to be impressed by their diversity. Each country has 
evolve9_i,ts own style of collective bargaining, reflecting 
its particular values and cultural characteristics'. This 
, .--. --~-'-----'*---'-'~'-.-- -,-------~-
fact leads many writers to comment that any effort to 
compare countries' industrial relations systems or aspects 
thereof, involves a formidable task on the part 6f the 
researcher or ana 1 yst frequent 1 y resu 1 t i ng ina mass of 
unrelated facts and detail. 
Writing on the pitfalls and potential of comparative 
industrial relations, Schregle (1981) points to some of 
these problem areas, for example, the importance of 
acknowledging the ever-changing character of industrial 
re 1 at ions, the need to adopt a funct i ona 1 rather than a 
institutional approach, the problem of terminology laden 
with values, emotions, past experiences and future 
expectations etc. Industrial relations can only be 
understood if the way in wh i ch ru 1 es are estab 1 i shed and 
imp 1 emented and dec is ions are made ina soc i ety is 
understood. 
In spite of these potential problems associated with 
comparative analysis, most writers would agree that the 
identification of general trends concerning industrial 
relations and collective bargaining in different countries 
is not only possible but a meaningful exercise. Focusing on 
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collective bargaining in industrial ised countries, C6rdova 
(1978:424) concludes 
Gi ven the fact that i ndustr i ali sed countr i es have a 
similar level of development and that collective 
bargaining has been practised in some of them for more 
than a century, it should be feasible to provide an 
over-all view of their experience, to discern some 
genera 1 trends and to discuss in g 1 oba 1 terms some of 
the more important problems. 
He then proceeds to identify the following trends ': (1) the 
'remarkable' qualities of resilience, adaptability and 
strength ch~racterising collective bargaining everywhere and 
enduring through all stages and circumstances - collective 
bargaining is seen to be well entrenched in countries with a 
market e6onomy and where the economy is centrally planned; 
(2) the development of new and more sophisticated forms of 
bargaining; . (3) an 
collective bargaining 
increase 
becomes 
in bargaining' levels 
more diversified in 
as 
its 
funct ions and content; (4) the gradua 1 deve 1 opment of a set 
of ground rules and procedures 'to provide for the orderly 
development of negotiations, to regulate certain pre-
negot i at ion probl ems and to guarantee due process to all 
concerned'; (5) changes concerning the content of agreements 
given that barga in i ng has extended from wage and effort 
bargaining into work org.an i sat ion, social welfare 
arrangements and other areas of management and (6) changes 
regard i ng the conduct of co 11 ect i ve barga in i ng unde r 
conditions of inflation and recession resulting in greater 
i ntervent i on by the government wi th consequences for the 
voluntary character of negotiations (1987:424-437). 
The identifications of' .1.e..v.e.J...$. at which bargaining is 
conducted in'selected countries, is the rather modest aim of 
th is sect ion. To be more spec if i c - the extent to wh i ch 
local bargaining (as defined in the previous section) 
receives prominence in various countries' bargaining 
machinery, will be identified. Focusing on levels of 
bargaining enables one to identify certain p'atterns of and 
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trends towards . increasing centralisation or 
decerit~alisation.* 
The identification·of trends is of cour.se complicated by the 
.D..gJ; .. y .. r:.e.. __ ..... _Q..f.._ ......... t..h .. e. ... __ .. _J .. § .. $...Y .. e..§. be i n g bar g a i ned 0 v e r . The y are 
normally, as a group, quite varied and thus contain 
centralising and decentralising elements which makes it 
particularly difficult to estimate the direction towards 
which particular industrial relations systems are moving. 
However, these patterns and trends can be of heuristic value 
when ahalysing the bargaining structure within ones own 
country. Schr~gle (1981:28-29) reaches a similar'conclu~ion 
when he argues that I international comparison of industrial 
relations makes us aware of the fact that the industrial 
relations system in our own country does not evolve in 
isolation but is in a way part of a worldwide evolution'. It 
also shows that I industrial relations phenomena are' a very 
faithful expression of the society in which they operate, of 
its characteristic features and' of the power relationships 
between different interest groups'. 
It follows from the above quote that the bargaining 
structures and the levels of. bargaining of different 
countr i es shou 1 d not be seen as i so 1 ated phenomena but as 
related to the specific circumstances pertaining to the 
'country in question. Although this is recognised and 
acknowledged, the variables relating to the development of 
particular bargaining machinery in the respective countries 
will not be the main focus of 'attention in this section but 
will be taken up in subsequent chapters. 
* As C6rdova points out however, these terms may mean 
different things in different countries - a fact to keep in 
mind when evaluating trends in various societal contexts. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LOCAL BARGAINING IN FOUR SELECTED COUNTRIES 
3. 1 Introduction 
In the light of the immediate foregoing comments on 
comparing bargaining structures, there remains the question 
of which countries to select for this purpose. Given that 
local bargaining and its nature is of central concern here, 
countries in which local bargaining is seen to have reached 
considerable prominence seem to be the logical choice. It is 
further argued that it would be more meaningful to select 
those countr,i es wh i G,h are seen to have reached ~omparab 1 e 
1 eve 1 s of i ndustr i ali sat i on and the natu re of whose 
economies may be broadly typified as that of market 
economies. 
In terms of these criteria, the nature of local 'bargaining 
in the following four countries is outl ined i.e. United 
States of America, West Germany, Japan and Britain whi le 
local bargaining in the South African industrial relations 
context is separately discussed in Chapter 4. The increasing 
prominence that local ,bargaining is presently enjoying, is 
reflected in the decentralising tendencies in the bargaining 
arrangements of many countr i es hitherto noted for high 1 y 
centralised bargaining. These tendencies are also briefly 
outlined and commented on. 
3.2 United States of America 
Most commentators seem to agree that the most outstandi ng 
feature of the United States' industrial rela~ions system is 
the role played by the government in determining the 
collective ba~gaining structure. The role of statutory 
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contro 1 or regu 1 at ion is seen to be more important in the 
United. States than in any other country (Windmuller 1987). 
The law regulates not only the bargaining unit, but also the 
choice of union, the scope and content cif agreements and the 
enforcement of these agreements. As Cl egg ( 1976: 109) 
correctly points out, the extent to which the law plays a 
role in regulating bargaining structures in a particular 
country is related to the state of collective bargaining in 
each country at the time of the original legislation. 
Referring to America, he argues that at the time of the New 
Deal in the 1930's, legislatures decided that collective 
bargaining was too little developed and the collective 
regulation of employment should be supported by the law. 
As a consequence of th is dec is ion, a who 1 e range of acts 
fo 11 owed - the Wagner Act of 1935 be i ng one of the most 
important. This act dealt with the parties to and conditions 
for barga in i ng, 1 ay i ng down the procedures for the 
. registration of bargaining units and the recognition of 
bargaining rights (Jackson 1977:126). In 1947 the Taft-
Hart 1 ey Act was passed, concentrat i ng . on! dea 1 i ng with th~ 
consequences of barga in i ng. Through the Wagner Act, 
provision was also made for the establishment of a National 
Labour Relations Board (NLRB) which' controlled the annual 
electiohs. to determine which unions should be granted 
bargaining rights and to compel an employer to bargain 
effectively over a specific range of issues. Trade unions 
win by votes of a majority of their employees and 
recognition is thus achieved by ballot. Since the Wagner Act 
was passed, American employers have had the obligation to 
bargain in tgood faith' with the unions. 
American unions had not been able to establish a firm grip 
outside a relatively small number of craft industries (Clegg 
1976). Referring to the Wagner Act and the establishment of 
the NLRB, Windmuller (1987:111) notes that the role of the 
latter was particularly great in those situations where the 
parties disagreed on defining an appropriate bargaining 
unit. Where the parties however do agree, the NLRB will 
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eventually acc~pt their decision on this issue. Certain 
factors are seen to guide this body in cases where disputes 
exist. Examples of such factors are the wishes of employees, 
the history of the bargaining relationship, the presence Of 
a tcommunity of interest' among the employees in the 
prospective unit and the extent of the union organisation. 
The consequences of the Wagner Act is recognised by Jackson 
(1977:126-127) when he says that talthough it would be 
erroneous to argue that collective bargaining would not have 
been extended at all had it not been for the Wagner Act it 
is worthwhi le noting that collective bargaining covers a 
considerably higher proportion of the workforce than do ·the 
trade unions'. Not only has this particular Act resulted in 
extensive 1 itigation over bargaining rights and bargaining 
units, but. as many observers have pointed out, this Act has 
had an i mportariti mpact on the J ... e..v..e..l at wh i ch barga in i ng has 
traditionally been conducted and centred on in America 
i.e. the level of the firm and enterprise rather than 
industry and national - local bargaining being far more the 
centre of the formal'system than it is in almost any other 
country (1977:127). This is seen to relate to the 
interpr~tation of the bargaining unit used by the NLRB 
resulting in a bargaining structure characterised by a high 
'degree of decentra 1 i sat i on compared to other i ndustr i ali sed 
market economi es. Andrew Thomson ( 1981 ) is quoted by 
Windmuller (1987:111) as concluding that the configuration 
of the United States bargaining structure of 1980 does not 
differ much from the abovementioned structure characterising 
the 1950' s. The ba 1 ance of the i nd i vi dua 1 sectors of the 
economy is seen to have undergone some change however 
notably the public sector. 
In the United States, collective bargaining is predominantly 
plant bargaining. Most agreements concluded at this level is 
between a single trade union (also referred to as a local 
union).and a single employer. Some agreements are concluded 
at a higher level and are mainly company/single-enterprise 
agreements e.g. in the building trade. 
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These tompany agreements are often viewed as very import~nt 
calling on national officers of unions to handle these 
matters; Agreements concluded at plant and single-enterprise 
levels thus constitute local bargaining representing the 
majority of all agreements concluded especially in the 
manufacturing sectors of the economy. 
While multi-employer bargaining is not seen as a major 
factor in the manufactur i ng sector, it represents a 
substant i a 1 amount of barga i,n i ng at the reg i ona 1 1 eve 1 
within the non-manufacturing sector of the economy. There 
is, however, 
representatives 
organisations and 
no economy-wide bargaining 
of peak confederations of 
trade unions, not even, as 
between 
employers' 
Windmu11er 
points out, on occasional basis. Multi-employer bargaining 
is seen to exist primari 1y in industries which have the 
following features (Windmu11er 1987:112): 
,-
(1) where the number of individual enterprises is 
re 1 at i ve 1 y, 1 arge 
( 2 ) the average number of workers per enterprise is 
relatively sma 11 
(3) where enterprises are geographically concentrated 
(4) ri"gorous competition exists among enterprises 
(5) the rate of unionisation is above average. 
It is suggested that in the above instances, multi-employer 
bargaining is likely to be important whether in the 
manufacturing or non-manufacturing sector. 
Local unions are quite powerful given the predominance of 
plant bargaining and the huge, spr~w1ing nature of America's 
geog raph i ca lout 1 ay . These tendenc i es have been re i nforced 
by the very nature of the bargaining structure. It is argued 
by Clegg (1976:48) that while s"ome union tbosses' in the 
United States would have preferred to have power centralised 
in "thei r hands, employers on the other hand have not been 
( 
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prepared to co·ncede to this. They preferred to conclude 
agreements at the plant level. 
The day-to-day administration of agreements takes place in a 
manner that differs from the practice followed in many other 
countries. Given that the local union is the sole 
representative of all employees covered by the contract 
(both unionised and non-uni"onised), it has a decisive role 
in determining which grievances are to be raised as well as 
the terms of· settlement. Given this autonomy, it means that 
there is 1 itt 1 e superv is i on on the part of the nat i ona 1 
union. The high degree of autonomy enjoyed by the local 
unions combined with their sUbstantial resources contribute 
to the most striking feature of American trade unions i.e. 
their factionalism. 
Local agreements ·are tailored to the specific circumstances 
of the individual enterprise or plant. These agreements 
almost always include an 'elaborate dispute. procedure' to 
apply and interpret the clauses contained in the agreement. 
The supervision of the applications of the standards set by 
the agreement .between management and the local union is the 
responsibility of the shop stewards who act as 
representatives of the union in the work place. These shop 
stewards are organised in committees and chairmen or senior 
stewards and constitute an integral part of the plant, 
spending most of the working time attending to union 
bus i ness. 8es i des the admi n i strat i on of the app 1 i cat i on of 
terms of agreement, shop stewards have the important job of 
, ra is i ng g r i evances ' incases of i nfr i ngement of standards 
by means or through the grievance proc.ess (Clegg 1976:61). 
The funct ions of the shop stewards are determi ned in the 
main by procedure agreements under which they operate and 
not so much by the rules of the union. 
Given that agreements run for a fixed period (2 to 3 
years) ,* shop stewards, as work place representat; ves, may 
·*··········-·············C"~··i···l··~·~········-···(···1·-9·8·5··~··3·07) reports that the share of major 
contracts running for less than two years declined from 
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only· supervise the appl ication of agreements and are not 
forf!lally able to change it. However, the grievance process 
plays a significant role in this respect. While the 
grievance process has the main functions of adjudication and 
administration, its functions are often extended by workers 
and their representatives to include informal shopfloor 
negotiations resulting in informal shopfloor agreements. 
This can lead to a situation where workers or their 
representat i ves can succeed in' bend i ng' or mod i fy i ng 
sUbstantive agreements by using the grievance procedure to 
barga in. If successfu 1, they can 
thei r favour and in the process, 
improvement in. the 
interpretation and 
agreement 
application 
, bend' the agreement in 
come very close to an 
rather than just an 
thereof. The American 
employer can negotiate such improvements for, as Clegg 
points out, he is usually operating under his own agreement. 
In the 1 ight of the above, it is clear that a substantial 
amount of shopfloor bargaining' takes place through the 
grievance process. 
The significance of the grievance process in bargaining 
activities is accentuated by Kuhn (1967:263): 
Whi le the grievance process is not unique to American 
industry~ its role in collective qargaining is. In no 
other country are unions as active and vital in the 
1 oca 1 shop or at the place of work as in the Un i ted 
States. Through the various grievance activities 
workers can meaningfully participate in local 
negotiations and administration and also engage in 
ba~gaining. They can exert effective influence Dver 
their .work lives, control their immediate and local 
union representatives, and protect their job rights 
from arbitrary, impersonal demands of management. 
Thus, while grievance work can 'help to solve personal and 
individual grievances or essentially superficial group-
grievance problems growing out of misunderstandings and lack 
of knowledge', it cannot really solve the 'conflict of 
34% in 1956 to 2% in 1980, but increased again to ±25% 
in 1982/1983. The shortening of contra'ct duration is 
seen to ref 1 ect the reaction of negot i at ions to the 
turmoil and uncertainty of the early 1980's. 
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expectancies that ~rise from the appreciation by workers and 
by ~nionand management representa~ives of their position in 
and power over the work process' (Kuhn 1961 :112-113). 
Collective agreements (formal agreements) are often 
incomplete and lack val idity and legitimacy in the eyes of 
those group i ngs whose expectat ions and powe rare ignored 
within the negotiating organisations. Referring to the steel 
and automobile industries in particular, Livernash (1967:44) 
also comments on the limitations of the grievance procedure 
in solving workers' problems. He cites evidence of tgreater 
re 1 uctance to accept the dec is i on of g r i evance and 
arbitration process' and suggests that grievance process has 
become too formal and removed from employees as tnot to be a 
sufficient outlet for employee complaints'. 
The grievance process thus allows both parties - management 
and union - to tcarry on a sort of continuous collective 
bargaining daily to solve mutual problems of work and 
production, and jointly to administer a wide array of plant 
or shop affairs' (Kuhn 1967:252). As Clegg remarks, if the 
grievance procedure is used to settle domestic issues 
outs i de the scope of forma 1. ag reements, 'i t goes beyond the 
scope of a grievance procedure into the realm of plant 
bargaining'. Thus under American plant bargaining, 'there is 
nothing to stop unions and employers signing an agreement on 
any domestic issue which both of them are willing to regard 
as negotiable' (1976:90). 
As to the subjects covered by the formal agreements, Cullen 
(1985:306) states that in unionised factories, the agreement 
usually covers at least the following subjects: the scope of 
the bargaining unit, union security, management rights, 
wages, fringe-benefits, discipline, grievance procedurel 
process, contract duration, strikes during contract, the 
role of seniority in lay-offs, promotion and recall. 
Given that negotiations take place at plant and single 
enterprise le~el between local unions and the employer. and, 
given that shop stewards and workers engage in i nforma 1 
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shopfloor negotiations, most observers conclude that in 
comparison with most other industrialised market economies, 
.the bar~aining structure of the United States has been 
character i sed by a high deg ree of decentra 1 i sat ion in the 
past. It is also suggested that this will continue to·be the 
case for the immediate future. Despite this conclusion, 
there were/are efforts being made to reverse this pattern or 
trend. Cullen for instance, cites example~ of employers who 
have' been seen to push for broader barga in i ng uni ts over 
union opposition 
industry. In this 
especially in 
case, management 
the 
felt 
construction 
at such a 
disadvantage that the major contractors' association urged 
Congress to adopt legislation that would actually require 
coalition bargaining in this particular industry. This would 
enta i 1 a government agency in fact orderi ng a merger of 
existing unjts to cover several trades and cities undet- a 
single contract. He also mentions the printing industry 
where employers have tried but failed to establish multi-
union bargaining in 
foregoi ng are obvi ous 
New York 'City (1972:521-524). 
examples of 
attempts 
pressures 
have been 
towards 
The 
more 
centralisation. These resisted by 
management and 1 abour in some instances. There are, on the 
other hand, also instance~ where tendencies towards greater 
decentralisation can be identified. Here the formal 
bargaining units have remained the same but decentralisation 
of power has occurred within the unit. 
Summary 
Local bargaining is thus firmly institutionalised in the 
united States and characterises most of the bargaining 
taking place. This holds especially for the manufacturing 
sector of the economy. In the non-manufacturing sector, 
multi-employer bargaining (industry-wide) at the regional 
level seems to be substantial. Given the above, one can, 
with'a fair amount of justification, conclude that the 
. barga in, ng structure of the Un i ted States ; s decentra 1 i sed 
77 
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to such an extent that local bargaining represents the most 
prominent level of bargaining. 1b..2.s is in s.p_Lte 0-L 
tendenc i es towards concentrat i on of bus i ness organ i sat ion 
and. concentration in the union structure. Windmuller 
(1987:113) quotes the following statement by Barbash (1984): 
the tendency he re is towards. decentra 1 is i ng 
bargaining structures away from large industry and 
multi-employer units, to bring bargaining closer to the 
circumstances of the individual employer and plant. 
In other words,. the bargaining structure is moving to more 
rather than less fragmentation. Exceptions remain, for 
example, the maintenance of industry-wide bargaining in the 
coal-mining industry. 
The characterisation of the Ame~ican bargaining structure as 
a highly decentralised one, not only follows from the fact 
that formal bargaining is primarily conducted at the level 
of the enterprise and plant but, that informal negotiations 
on the shopfloor take place between workers or shop stewards 
and foremen· or managers within plants. These negotiations 
and bargaining activities are very much part·of the extended 
function of the grievance procedure and process and often 
result in the modifi~ation of formal agreements .. 
3.3 West Germany 
In some ways, Jackson (1977:129) notes, collective 
bargaining in Europe reflects 
American styles. Bargaining, 
national negotiating machinery 
a mixture of British and 
for examp 1 e, is based on 
as in Britain rather than 
local bargaining characterising the United States. This 
trend is espec i all y true for Ge rmany whe re barga in i ng is 
primarily seen to be conducted at industry level. As will be 
shown, however, local bargaining (plant) has become 
increasingly important in recent years. 
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Regarding the legal framework within which industrial 
rel<;:ttions operate, it resembles. clea'rly that of the United 
States. The legislation layi~g down the principles of 
collective bargaining in West Germany has not been modified 
or seriously challenged in recent years (FUrstenberg 1987). 
Germany's Constitution of 1949 has provided the basic 
democratic principles.to society as a whole and these have 
been extended to the sphere of industrial relations. In 
other words, provisions establishing freedom of association, 
the' right to withhold labour and bargaining autonomy are 
embodied in the Constitution. The basic rights and 
obligations 'of the parties to negotiate are governed by the 
Collective Agreement Acts of 1949, 1952 and 1969. These Acts 
have established that collective agreements are legally 
binding and circumscribe workers' right to strike. The 
barga in i ng autonomy of the re 1 evant part i es has not been 
restricted by Government since World War II and the 
Government has in effect tried to strengthen the bargaining 
autonomy of the relevant parties. This places quite a heavy 
burden of public responsibility on these parties, but 
indications are that they do not obj~ct to this 
responsibility (Reichel 1971). Clegg (1976:16) sUbstantiates 
this remark by pointing to the fact that the German union 
leaders, in contrast to' the French, unquestionably regard 
the negotiations of agreements as their central function and 
take these obligations very seriously. 
Turning to the bargaining structure and the levels of 
------------
bargaining, the general opinion is that these aspects have 
remained relatively unaffected by the economic downturns of 
the 1970's and 1980's (Windmuller 1987:99-101). There remain 
basically two levels at which bargaining takes place i.e. 
industry level bargaining and plant or work place 
bargaining. Bargaining at the level of industry is 
frequently also called regional level bargaining because 
more often than not, industry bargaining is divided by 
r~gion. Legislation covering bargaining at this level is the 
Co 11 ect i ve Ag reements Act of 1949 as conso 1 i dated in 1969. 
A c cor din g tot his 1 a w , the par tie s eli g i b 1 e t·o par tic i pat e 
79 
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in negotiations of the terms of agreement are trade union~ 
(affil iated to one of the four ,workers' organisations) and \ 
individual employers or associations of employers. 
In practice, bargaining takes place, region 
between the regional organisations of employers' 
'''''' by region, \ 
association \. 
for a particular industry and the regional body 
national union for that industry (Windmuller 
of a 
1987; 
, FUrstenberg 1987). Agreements concluded at regional level 
can lead to pattern-setting in that agreE}lTlents reached in 
one region tend to set a pattern for the others, 
particularly if the relevant region entails leading segments 
of the industry. Master-agreements are also signed by 
industries to guide regional settlements. But what is of 
more importance, is the fact that the nat i ona 1 headquarters 
of the two sides determine the lines on which negotiations 
are to be conducted and nat i ona 1 off i cers are present at 
regional negotiations (Slegg~~976:48-49). 
'=. -::::::;> 
However, there are certain deviations from the general norm 
of reg i ona 1 industry barga in i ng: First 1 y , some i ndustr i es 
negotiate agreements on a truly national basis e.g. building 
construction and secondly, bargaining between individual 
enterprises and unions results in about one third of all 
agreements. The parties on the employer side are mostly 
small firms which do not belong to the employers' 
association for the particular sector (v/indmuller 1987:99-
100). An example of enterprise bargaining in very large 
firms, is the Vo 1 kswagen Company wh i ch has negot i ated its 
own agreements for a very long time. 
Regarding future trends, Windmuller suggests that the 
extension of bargaining involving individual enterprises, 
particularly the larger and more profitable onei, by several 
unions, is a realistic possibility. One could, however, 
expect resistance on' the part of some employers and thei r 
respective associations because this will lead to' 
enterpri ses offeri ng terms 
than minimum terms settled 
of emp 1 oyment that are bette r . 
at industry level. Some unions 
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could also be expected to resist such trends fearing the 
effects of enterprise bargai~ing on the workers' solidarity. 
One group (workers) could be successful in extracting more 
favourable terms of employment from profitable enterprises 
while others do not. 
A second and very significant level at which bargaining 
takes place, is the plant or work place level. On the level 
of .the individual plant, relations are handled by managers 
and so-called works council.s the latter being elected by 
employees. In contrast to industry/regional bargaining a 
basic.spirit of co-operation characterises the relationship 
between management and works councils at the individual 
plant level. The relevant Act is the Works Constituti~n Act 
dating from 1952 establishing works cou.ncils in all joint 
stock companies with over 500 employees (Jackson 1977:130). 
This act determined the following. (Windmuller 1987:100): 
(1) mandated the establishment of elected works councils in 
vi rtua 11 y all estab 1 i shments and the extens i ve rights 
to participate in management 
( 2 ) many of the rights are only implemented 
co 11 ect i ve negot i at ions. One of these rights 
the conclusion of so-called (works agreements' 
through 
include 
(3) according to the Works Constitution Act of 1952, there 
are 1 i mi ts in the extent to wh i ch these counc i 1 s, as 
distinct from the trade unions, can negotiate with the 
employer on the conditions of work and the conclusion 
of agreements. In practice, hdwever, these limits have 
been exceeded in that it covers hours of work, breaks, 
time and place of wage payments, the estab 1 i shment of 
the holiday schedule, vocational training, 
administration of welfare facilities at the plant or 
single enterprise level and workers' conduct in the 
plant/enterprise. Other matters have also received 
attention e.g. the fixing of time and piece rates, 
principles and new forms of remuneration, evaluation of 
new jobs etc. Wages are not usually dealt with at this 
level but in so-called collective agreements concluded 
at the industry/region level (Reichel 1971 :478). An 
overlap between these two agreements must of course be 
avoi ded and the 1 aw determi nes that works agreements 
shall not deal with remuneration and other employment 
cond i t ions that have been or are norma 11 y fixed by 
collective .agreement. Unions especially,. have insisted 
on this restriction. 
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I t must be noted that works counc i 1 s are not trade un i on 
I 
bod~esat law, for workers are entitled to vote and to stand 
for election regardless of whether they are members of trade 
unions. While the majority of councillors are normally trade 
unionists, the councils are not integral parts of the trade 
union machinery. Quoting CJeg.g (.1976:58), !their powers come 
from the law, not from the unions' .. Whi le full-time. union 
officers may attend council meetings when invited, they have 
no right to instruct the councilor intervene in any 
dealings with management. 
The re 1 at i onsh i p between works counc i 1 s and un ions becomes 
clearer when note is taken of the presence of trade union 
shop stewards in the plant. The latt~r's main function is to 
represent the union and focus on the recruitment of members 
and' communication between employees and the union. But __ .9..f 
greater significance is the fact that shop' stewards, 
although representing the union, have no official function 
in collective bargaining. If grievances should develop, shop 
-, 
stewards must settle this with the. relevant foreman. If they 
fail ,'to settle the dispute it must be handed over to the 
works council. What is clear from this, is the fact that the 
works council represents the official dispute machinery in 
the plant while· the shops'tewards occupy -~a subordinate 
- -- ~~. ~--~-' 
position within the pla~t. This fact has led many observers 
to conclude that German trade unions are especially weak at 
plant level. 
The co-operation and encouragement that works councils have 
been receiving from managers have led them to avoid strike 
action as this may be seen as to undermine workers' 
interests. 'Counci ls often stand aside when unions call for 
strikes and even make their disapproval kn6wn. Managers also 
often grant councillors privileges over and above legal 
requirements which contribute to greater co-operation and 
fostering the notion of a !works community'. 
82 
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Bargaining in West Germany is predominantly conducted at two 
distinct levels i·.e. industry-regional and pla~t thrOUg~ 
works councils. Negotiations on a regional-industry level 
takes place outside the enterprise or company and is 
genera 11 y seen to be adversari a land characteri sed by a 
collective confrontation of labour/capital interests. Local 
bargaining (within plants) is seen to be essentially 
integrative and co-operative in nature and characterised by \ 
an employer/management orientation. The nature of the 
re 1 at i onsh i p between these two 1 eve lsi s of spec i a 1 
importance' and tone of the continuous questions in the 
industrial relations system of· the Federal Republic of 
Germany' (Windmuller 1987:101). Jackson for example, 
suggests that from the point of view of collective 
bargaining,- the most important implication of the work 
undertaken by the counei 1 s, is the extent to whi ch they can 
lead to a split in collective bargaining between the 
national' and local level. This could very likely occur in 
the German case as unions do not have representation in 
works councils. Works councils could come to be seen as an 
alternative to the union (1977:131). 
While unions and works councils have been seen to complement 
one anothe r in the past and a de 1 i cate ba 1 ance has been 
maintained between the two, it is extremely difficult to 
predict future developments concerning this relationship. 
Unions could, for example, as has also been suggested, come 
to dominate works counci Is resulting in works agreements 
supplementing industry/regional level bargaining rather than 
constituting independent and autonomous agreements. This 
process may, in the view of Windmuller, tbe aided by the 
fact that an increasing number of industry-wide and regional 
ag reements now inc 1 ude a so-ca 11 ed open i ng clause" wh i ch 
explicitly recognises the possibility of adapting the 
collective agreement to the plant level' (Windmuller 
1987:101 quoting GUnter & Leminsky 1978). If such a pattern 
should become the norm, it will result in unions becoming 
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much stronger at the work pl~ce, corresponding to the 
Bri~ish situation, and local bargaining, by means of works 
councils, becoming less autonomous and inde~endent. 
84 
Concluding our remarks .on works counci ls, something may be 
said regarding the idea/notion of industrial democracy. Do 
works counci 1 sand thei r funct i oni ng represent a form of 
industrial democ"racy? Following Clegg (1976:93), works 
councils are probably the most effective mechanisms for 
fulfilling the aims generally ascribed to joint consultative 
committees that is, to increase co-operation between 
managers and workers and to discuss those issues not 
normally ,formally negotiated about. This follows from the 
fact that works councils actually function as agencies of 
bargaining when they negotiate agreements in the plant 
within a context of co-operation and mutual acceptance. 
Thus, says Clegg, t the funct ion i ng of the works counc i 1 s as 
instruments of industrial democracy may be said to reflect 
the West German system of collective bargaining which grants 
wide negotiating rights to the councils' (1976:93). 
In terms of our definition of local bargaining, the 
negot i at ions betwe'en works counc i 1 s and managements at the 
intra-plant level does not represent the only form of local 
bargaining within West Germany. The other form of local 
b~rgaining is represented by the already noted negotiations 
taking place between individual enterprises or companies and 
unions. These negotiations, as pointed out, culminate in an 
estimated one third of all agreements and there seem to be 
indications that this type of local bargainin~ will be 
extended in the future. 
From the above, one cou 1 d therefore conc 1 ude that wh i 1 e 
industry/regional level bargaining may be seen as the 
predominant type of bargaining taking place in Germany, 
local bargaining, (through works councils and single 
enterprise/company) represents a significant and sUbstantial 
, . 
proportion of negotiations being conducted. It might even be 
that local bargaining wi 11 become increasingly important in 
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. the future de~endin~ on a variety of considerations, notably 
the.' future prof i tabi 1 i ty of enterpri ses and the economy at 
large. 
3.4 Japan 
Japan has managed to cope with recessions, inflation, large-
scale unemployment and major industrial action from 1974 
through to 1979 (Shirai 1987:241). Credit is usually given 
to Japan's industrial relations system for facilitating the 
adj ustment of the economy to changed circumstances. It is 
especially contributed to the role of collectiv~ bargaining 
complemented by an effective joint consultation system. 
Collective bargaining, is seen to have not only settled 
disputes but functioning as a channel for communication 
between management and labour as well. Collective bargaining 
ha,s, in the words of Shirai (1987:242), tacted as a powerful. 
pillar of support for the national economy in the past 
cri t i ca 1 decade.' As a procedure for determi n i ng wages and 
other employment conditions in large companies within the 
private sector, collective bargaining is .seen to have been 
firmly established in Japanese society. It is also expected 
. that the pattern of collective bargaining will become even 
more systematic as unions and managements mature. 
In discussing the development of collective bargaining, 
Shirai observes that before World War II, the conc.ept of 
collective bargaining was alien to Japanese cultural values, 
attitudes and the customs regulating employment 
relationships. The employer made' unilateral decisions 
regarding this relationship and conditions of employment 
were regarded as not negotiable. He al~o mentions that even 
now, in smaller and medium-sized companies, there are often 
no formal agreements only so-called gentlemen's 
agreements, the reasons being that many managers sti 11 
resist committing themselves' on paper and unions not being 
quite familiar with the process of negotiating an agreement 
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and' <;:on.tract. There has been a steady increase, however, in 
the .conclusion of su~h agreements (1987:249). 
In terms of agreements concluded and number of workers 
covered by them, the most important level of bargaining in 
Japan is sti 11 that of the individual enterprise. This is 
seen to reflect the stability of the Japanese bargaining 
structure over time. Bargaining thus takes place between an 
enterprise union and the management of an .enterprise. Even 
if these unions are affi 1 iated with national or industrial 
un i on federa:t ions, they funct ion in an autonomous way and 
are self-sufficient bodies. An enterprise union has t~o main 
features (Mitsufuji & Hagisawa 1972:135-136). Firstly, it 
organises all workers, whether white or blue collar, 
professional and technical who are employees of an 
undertaking operated by a single management. There are of 
course, certain exceptions to the rule. Workers may form 
several unions within the same undertaking along job or 
craft lines or several unions co-exist within a single 
undertaking as a result of a merger of two or more 
companies. In large concerns, unions may be organised within 
each establishment (known as 'locals') and forming 
federations for the undertaking as a whole. 
A second feature of the enterprise union concerns 
membership. It is only open to permanent or regular 
employees of the undertaking. Temporary workers are usually 
bar red f rom the un i on and exc 1 uded f rom the app 1 i cat i on of 
the co 1 1 ect i ve ag reement. In 1 i mi ted cases, temporary 
workers . have organ i sed in un ions but more often than not, 
they have nobody to represent thei r particular interests. 
Union officers are normally elected from the regular 
employees of the enterprise and during tenure of office, 
they usua 1 1 y . reta in the i r emp 1 oyee status but are pa i d by 
the union (Shirai 1987:242). 
Enterprise unions thus have succeeded in establishing 
themselves as the key organisations 
structure very much characterised by 
in a bargaining 
decentralisation. 
86 
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,Account i ng for 
'identified: the 
this situation, certain factors can be 
Japanese workers' close attachment to the 
enterprise, especially in larger manufacturing companies, 
the role of the enterprise as a social community and the 
resistance of Japanese management to collective bargaining 
conducted at levels beyond that of the individual enterprise 
or company. As in the case of the local unions in the United 
States, enterprise unions are also characterised by a high 
degree of autonomy, especially regarding the shaping of the 
terms of employment under which workers are employed 
(Windmuller 1987:24). 
Returning again to the formation 
Shirai (1987:242-243) points out 
of union federations, 
that the ro 1 e of these 
union federations has increased in importance over the last 
decade. The national trade union federation functions to co-
ordinate the actions of their affiliates in support of wage 
increases or other demands, the handl i ng of gri evances, to 
determine general policies and ser've as centres of 
information to the unions. These National Union Federations 
do not, however, participate in collective bargaining. A 
similar relationship is seen to characterise the enterprise 
and employers' associations. Most enterprise managements 
engage in bargaining without the participation of their 
respect i ve assoc i at ions (W i ndmu 11 er 1987: 105). Both these 
bodies (National Federation and Employers' Association) 
often meet with government officials in order to exchange 
views, present demands and to criticise economic and social 
policies which are seen to be in conflict with the interests 
of their members. 
There ex i st, 
Federations, 
apart 
so-called 
from the 
Industrial 
National Trade Union 
Federations that is, 
industry-wide federations of enterprise unions. They are not 
allowed to participate in bargaining directly with the 
enterprise either (this also holds for the industrial 
associations of ~mployers). Shirai (1987:243) stipulates the 
role of the officials of industrial federations of unions as 
formulating union demands and policies in enterprise 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
bargaining, synchronising industrial action, checking 
sta~ting/expiry dates of agreements and exchanging 
information with affi 1 iated unions as well as unions in 
other industries. The restricted and vaguely defined role of 
the industrial federations and employers' association is 
seen to be the result of the followi~g: (1) affiliates 
cannot be forced or coerce.d to part with their bargaining 
rights and (2) matte rs that are negot i ated at the industry 
level tend to be very general and limited resulting in the 
need for detail application of principles at the level of a 
particular enterprise (or plant). This has to be negotiated, 
in the final analysis, between the enterprise union and the 
') 
management of the firm concerned. 
While bargaining predominantly takes place at the single 
enterprise level and one can apply the 
decentralised bargaining structure, 
concept or notion of 
there are certa 1 n 
exceptions to be taken note of (Windmuller 1987:106; 
'Mitsufuji & Hagisawa 1972:136-137): 
(1) multi-employer or multi-enterprise bargaining regularly 
occurs in certain sectors of the economy e.g. shipping, 
coalmining, chemicals, textiles and privately owned 
railways; 
88 
(2) .informal bargaining taking place at industry level e.g. 
iron and steel, shipbuilding, automobiles. Thi~, Shirai 
says, has been an· important development since 1973 
(termed de facto bargaining) and is seen to be .a 
further impetus to the nation-wide annual spring wage 
offensive. In th~se negotiations the representatives of· 
industrial federations do not negotiate as bargaining 
agents for th~. affiliated enterprise ~nions, but 
negot i ate annual wage increases j .. o.f.R.r:mg,JJ ... y and direct 1 y 
wi t.h top management of 1 ead i ng corporat ions. Important 
is the fact that any agreements must still be finalised 
and implemented at the enterprise level (1987:243); 
(3) the existence of tripartite and bipartite discussions 
resulting in indirect centralisation. The modifications 
and exceptions listed above are obviously representing 
trends towards greater centra 1 i sat ion. Comment i /1g on 
the increasing importance of de facto industry-wide 
bargaining in the major metal industries, Shirai 
(1987:244) argues that these negotiations have not only 
i nst i tuted a g radua 1 trend towal-ds centra 1 i sat i on of 
collective bargaining in Japan, but it has also 
strengthened the colles i on, author i ty and prest i ge of 
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. the national and industrial trade unions, federations 
:and employers' associations. 
Within the Japanese context, local bargaining is viewed as 
having certain advantages as well as disadvantages. Its 
merits are: (1) it enables the parties to relate conditions 
of work and employment closely to the actual operation of 
the undertak i ng and to dea 1 wi th them ina pragmat i c way; 
(2) all problems arising at the work place can be 
accommodated in a comprehensive way within the industrial 
relations system of the enterprise resulting in discussions 
of all relevant issues; (3) it makes the coping with 
technical changes less of a problem and (4) the power 
re 1 at i onsh i p between 1 abour and management centres on the 
enterprise resulting from the 'propensity' of the Japanese 
. I 
to organise vertically according to traditional social 
relationships (MitsufuJi & Hagisawa 1972:141-142). 
In spite of the above meriis, local bargaining, according to 
the above authors, a 1 so suffers from defects: ( 1) it 
encourages a somewhat blinkered view of wider interests; (2) 
given that union members' inte'rests are closely bound up 
with those of management, emp 1 oyees are un 1 ike 1 y to act 
'militantly' and (3) the restriction of union activity to 
the individual enterprise/undertaking, makes it difficult to 
organise an extensive attack on employers at the industrial 
or national level. 
They conclude, however, by suggesting that enterprise' 
bargaining remains well suited both to Japanese business 
conditions and to Japanese social concepts. 
Regarding the scope of enterprise bargaining, no formal 
definition can be given and the range can be very wide 
covering practically every issue relating to work and 
employment conditions. Wages and bonuses are seen to be the 
obvious or main subjects for collective negotiations .. The 
distribution of benefits of increased' productivity, 
reduct i on of work i ng hou rs, ,1onger ho 1 i days and 1 eave wi th 
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pay· have increasingly become bargaining issues. There is a 
gen~raltendency for issues that. were formally decided on by 
management only, ·to be included now. Personnel issues e.g. 
transfer of employees, dismissal, retrenchment etc. 
constitute important items for collective bargaining 
a 1 though disputes about the negot i ab i 1 i ty of these items 
have arisen. The questions of management policies, 
production plans etc. are also discussed although, as 
Mitsufuji and Hagisawa (1972:137) point out, these are 
normally referred to joint consultat·ion bodies. 
Collective agreements cover a lot of ground and the issues 
for wh i ch prov is ions are made, are: (1) def i n i ng the scope 
of app 1 i cat i on of the ag reement; (2) status of the un i on; 
(3) conditions of work; (4) personnel matters; (5) labour 
disputes; (6) grievance machinery; (7) period of validity of 
agreement and procedures for its renewal. 
As was noted in a paragraph above, certain issues are 
referred to joint consultative bodies. Joint consultation 
machinery has been established in undertakings to handle 
sensitive problems instead of handing it to collective 
barga in i ng direct 1 y . Jo i nt counc i 1 s are estab 1 i shed at the 
level of the undertaking, factory or workshop and consist of 
an equal number of management and officials of the 
enterprise union. There is not always a clear 1 ine drawn 
between collective bargaining and joint consultation and an 
overlap of issues can exist. Where issues relate to 
conditions of. work, joint consultation can be a substitute 
for collective bargaining. This is seen to be especially 
possible in medium and small undertakings/enterprises where 
unionisation is not well developed. In· some cases it can 
undermine unions and collective bargaining whi le in other 
instances, it can and has served as a stepp i ng stone to 
collective bargaining. 
It is suggested by Mitsufuji and Hagisawa (1~72) that, with 
the maturisation of industrial relations in Japan, the role 
of joint consultation vis-a.-vis collective bargaining may 
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come to play an independent and supplementary role. They are 
of the. opinion that this has already happened to a large 
extent. 
Shirai (1987:250-251;1984:316-318) concludes his discussion 
of recent 'trends in collective bargaining in Japan by 
discuss·ing future prospects which, according to him, are 
1 ess br i ght. The fo 11 ow i ng reasons are presented for th is 
rather pessimistic and dim outlook: 
(1) Because of the difficulty of expanding union 
organisation in the future, the coverage of collective 
bargaining is unl ikely to grow. The steady decreasing 
of union organisation in the past year.s is attributed 
to factors of pro longed recess i on, the drop in 
emp 1 oyment, changes in' technology, the compos it i on of 
the. labour force etc. 
(2) Gi ven the above structural changes, the power of th.e 
unions to strike will be increasingly circumscribed. 
Unions in the traditional fstrike prone' sectors of the 
economy are being undermined by the development of new 
service and information industries which are, as a 
rule, poorly organised thereby restricting the role of 
the union. 
(3) The role of Joint consultation machinery has already 
been referred to as well as its impl ications for the 
role of collective bargaining i.e. relegating it to a 
minor role. This could, Ilowever, lead to frustration 
among the rank-and-file because they do not always 
participate directly in decisiohs reached by 
consultation. 
(4) As long as enterprise bargaining remains the prominent 
level of bargaining, wider structural problems will not 
be reso 1 ved. Th is ho 1 ds espec 1 a 11y for the prob 1 ems 
concerning the rapid ageing of the labour force. This 
problem is seen to be beyond the reach of enterprise 
bargaining and only to be successfully handled at the 
level of industry or. so-called nation-wide collective 
bargaining or fby a united political stand on the part 
of the 1 abour movement, the prospect of wh; ch do not 
appear favourable in view of the power structure, 
political divisions and ideological conflicts that 
sti 11 persist in the Japanese union movements' (Shi rai 
1987:251). 
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Summary 
The Japanese bargaining structure is seen ·to be 
decentralised as bargaining is conducted primarily at the 
level of the enterprise. The parties conducting negotiations 
are the enterprise unions who function in an autonomous way 
and the management·of a· particular enterprise. In addition 
to formal enterprise level bargaining, informal negotiations 
also take place resulting in what has been called-
tgentlemen's agreements' - this being the case in smaller 
and medium- sized enterprises. From this, it can be· 
concluded that local bargaining is the predominant type of 
bargaining in the Japanese society. Local bargaining is 
supplemented by the functioning of joint consultative 
councils at the level of the enterprise, plant or workshop -
sometimes resulting in an overlap between collective 
bargaining and consultation. The latter may even come to 
substitute collective bargaining in those cases where unions 
are not especially powerful. 
In spite of the predominance of local bargaining, there are 
certain indications that more centralised bargaining may be 
the trend of the future, especially regarding certain 
sectors of the economy. As multi-enterprise or multi-
employer bargaining has been an established practice in, for 
example, shipping, coalmining, chemicals and texti les etc, 
one can, with a fair amount of certainty, predict that these 
practices will continue. The increasing importance of de 
facto bargaining (or informal bargaining) at industry level 
in the iron and steel industries, shipbuilding and 
automobile industries, also represents a trend towards 
greater centralisation of the bargaining structure. The 
strategic position occupied by iron and steel industries 
within the Japanese economy has for obvious reasons 
contributed towards centralisation tendencies; This trend 
towards centralisation· may also be attributed to the fact 
that local bargaining has not been successful in coping with 
certain structural problems being experienced by the 
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Japanese economy - notab 1 y the rap i d age i ng of the 1 abou r 
force ... 
It can be expected that enterpri se managements as we 11 as 
enterprise unions will resist these trends as they will have 
to relinquish the.ir autonomy and power over the bargaining 
process: For now, however, .local bargaining represents the 
dominant type of bargaining in Japan. 
3.5 Great Britain 
Br·i ta in is usually viewed as the country whose i ndustr i a 1 
relations is less regulated by law I than any other 
industrialised country (Roberts & Rothwell 1972:543). The 
role of government has in the past been that of estab~ishing 
a legal framework within which collective bargaining should 
be carried on as freely as possible. This view is shared by 
Clegg (1979:290), when he quotes Otto Kahn-Freund writing in 
1954: 'There is, perhaps, no major country in the world in 
wh i ch the 1 aw has played a 1 ess sign i f i cant ro 1 e in the 
shaping of (industrial) relations than in Great Britain and 
in which today the law and the legal profession have less to 
do with labour relations.' As Clegg rightly points out, this 
remark remains essentially true today but for reason of the 
second part of the above quote. Since the 1960's, and 
especially with the pasiing of the Industrial Relations .Act 
of 1971, far-reaching changes have taken place not only with 
regard to the 1 ega 1 framework regu 1 at i ng co 1 1 ect i ve 
bargaining but bargaining levels, employment, membership 
and power of unions as well. 
In spi te of all these changes, Roberts (1987) and othet-s 
conc 1 ude that i ndustr i a 1 re 1 at ions may st i 11 be seen as 
primari ly based on collective bargaining arrangements 
voluntarily accepted by parties without extensive state 
intervention. In contrasting the British model of collective 
bargaining with its United States counterpart, Jackson 
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(1977:126), refers to the fact that 'generally unions and 
emp 1 Oyers have been 1 eft to es~ab 1 ish the i r own barga in i ng 
mach i nery' . I n the 1 i ght of inc reas i ng government 
intervention, also through various forms of incomes policy 
which have sought to control market f~rces, some observers 
have given new meaning to the term 'voluntarism'. The latter 
is now interpreted as unions having to exercise their power 
within legal boundaries setting 1 imits to the freedom of 
unions to, for example, strike and picket (Roberts 
1987: 281 ). A 11 of the above, Jackson argues, does not mean 
that government has played no role whatsoever prior to the 
1960's. He, in fact, lists and discusses legislation to 
sUbstantiate his ar~ument. Rather, he says" 'it implies that 
the State has played a restricted role and crucially, has 
tried to keep industrial relations and trade unions away 
from the Courts' (1977:228). 
Intervention by the State is closely related to the 
particular government of the time. Clegg (1979:289-290) 
comments as follows: 
(By contrast), changes in state intervention, which 
have been concentrated in the years since 1960, have 
not fo 11 owed a steady trend. Instead there have been 
violentfluctuatiol1s as one government succeeded 
another, or as a government has revi sed its approach 
halfway thro~gh its term of office. ,No one can be sure 
what will be promised at future general elections by 
way of new approaches or restoration of old practices. 
The I ndustr i a 1 Re 1 ati ons Act of 1971 was introduced by the 
Conservative Government who had come to power in 1970. This 
Act covered a variety of topics and at a number of points 
provided for the, use of legal penalties 'to counter "unfair 
industrial practices", to enforce a "cooling off" period and 
to enforce the call for strike ballot' (Jackson 1977:242). 
With the election of the Labour Government in 1974, the 1971 
Act was repealed. Thereby the total immunity which the 
unions had from legal action by employers, was once again 
restored. The balance: of power was tipped in favour of the 
unions in that they were given support in gaining 
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recognition and securing improvements in minimum pay. 
Individual employee rights were further extended. By that 
time, however, the British economy was experiencing lack of 
growth which meant 
th rough co 11 ect i ve 
that pay-levels achieved by unions 
barga in i ng cou 1 d not be susta i ned. The 
government could not comply with unions' demands for social 
welfare and public services. This resulted in the Government 
securing a social contract with the unions that would 
restrain the latter in their demands (Roberts 1987:281-282). 
Tension, however, mounted between the unions and the 
government leading to the Conservatives winning the 1979 
elections. Between 1979-1983, the Government took drastic 
measures to cope with general recession, rising unemployment 
and increasing inflation by trying to encourage investments, 
improve productivity, etc. By 1982, inflation fell to less 
than 5% and real wages continued to grow. The Conservative 
Government was re-elected in 1983. Given the policy measures 
ment i oned above, one can surmi se tl:1at the ba.l ance of power 
had tipped again in favour of the employers. These policies, 
and those to come, can be' expected to have an i nf 1 uence on 
the evolution of collective bargaining in Britain. 
Turning to the collective bargaining structure of Britain, 
observers seem to agree that the barga in i ng structure has 
become very complex and diversified especially during the 
last decades. Focusing on the choice of bargaining units as 
an indication of the complexity of collective bargaining and 
the mixture of levels at which bargaining takes place, Brown 
(1981:5) argues as follows: 
At various times and places in British industry almost 
eve ry poss i b 1 e form of bargain i ng un it has been used. 
Somet i mes the emp 1 oye rs in an industry have formed an 
association, either on a regional or nationwide basis, 
in order to negoti.ate terms. At other times individual 
employers have gone their way but have differed in the 
extent to which they have dealt uniformly or separately 
with all the establishments in their company. The most 
typ i ca 1 outcome of th is var i ed hi stor i ca 1 deve 1 opment 
is a mixture of bargaining levels. Thus whether an item 
is fixed by an industry-wide agreement at one extreme, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
96 
or by a, workshop one at the other, varies both with the 
i~sue and with the group employees in question: 
Essentially making the same point, Daniel and Millward 
(1983), as quoted by Windmuller (1987:101), formulate as 
follows: 
There are negotiations between employers' associations 
and trade un ions at the nat i ona 1 or industry 1 eve 1 . 
There is bargaining at the company level between a 
particular employer and the trade unions he recognises. 
At lower levels, m~lti-employer bargaining 
sometimes takes place at regional or district levels 
and company bargain i ng at d i vis i ona 1 1 eve 1 s .. Beyond 
that there is often a further stage of negotiations at 
the workplace. ... Frequently there remains a final 
level of'bargaining at the shop floor level. 
The present bargaining structure and levels must be viewed 
aga_inst important developments in Britain's past of which 
the already ment i oned ro 1 e of the government is one. The 
historic development of bargaining structures and levels can 
be briefly summarised: 
It is generally accepted that major growth in collective 
bargaining only took place by the middle of the 19th 
century, being well established by the end of the 19th 
century in two groups of industries and occupations (Jackson 
1977). Firstly,there was the skilled trades e.g. 
shipbuilding, engineering, building, printing, etc. and 
secondly, the group consisting primarily of piece work 
occupations in coalmining, iron and steel, cotton textiles, 
boot and shoe, hosiery and lace industries. Although there 
were some beginnings at extending negotiations, to industry 
and national, bargaining, by 1914 bargaining was still 
predominantly local i . e. town, district' and region based. 
During World War I and immediately after, Britain 
of industry bargaining' and 
for this development is 
suggested: (1)' the rapid increase in the' cost ~of 1 iving 
du ring the war meant the constant adj ustment. of wages. The 
separate settlement of rates (according to town, district, 
increasingly became a country 
ag reements .. Various reasons 
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etc.) was seen-to be unnecessary complicated; (2) given that 
the_ gove"rnment took over many industries during the war, it 
meant one central employer who would prefer to negotiate on 
. 
a national basis; (3) the introduction of legislation in 
1915 (Munitions of War Act) prohibiting strikes and lock-
outs and introducing compulsory arbitration throughout a 
wide range of industries thereby encouraging bargaining on a 
national basis; (4) suggestions were asked of the Wt)itley 
Committee for securing a permanent improvement in the 
relations between "employers and workmen and making 
recommendations for future industrial relations (Jackson 
1977:123-124). 
In the 1 i ght of the above poi nts, it is clear that the---Y 
government had played a "significant part in this shift of 
bargaining levels. This point is also made by Banks 
(1974:31-32) when he refers to the establishment of Whitley 
Counci ls and the promotion of joint industrial counci ls" in 
all sectors of industry. Thus, by 1918, most of the vestiges 
of former regional and district bargaining had disappeared. 
This trend towards centralised bargaining characterised most 
bargaining taking place in the perio~ between the two W6rld 
Wars. But yet another shift was to take place. By the end of 
the Second World War, agreements negotiated at the plant or 
enterprise level were increasingly gaining momentum leading 
to the 'process of eros i on of industry-wi de negot i at ions' 
(Roberts & Rothwell 1972:545). The development of plant and 
enterprise bargaining was especially noted in a large part 
of the manufacturing and processing industries. Britain, 
after World War II, was thus known as a country of two-level 
bargaining. Windmuller (1987:"101-102) states: 'Even before 
the onset of the current economic difficulties in the 
1970's, the importance of industry-wide bargaining had begun 
to diminish considerably and the significance of bargaining 
at "enterprise levels (or sub-enterprise levels) had become 
to increase'. Clegg (1976:50) refers to the development of 
fragmented bargaining at the work place to supplement 
industry agreements leading to the growth of two-level 
bargaining i.e. "industry agreements" setting minimum 
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conditions and the actual standards being .negotiated at the 
work .place. 
In order to fully understand the development of local 
bargaining (plant, enterprise or bargaining at the work 
place) during the post-war era, the circumstances leading up 
to the appointment of the Donovan. Commission and the 
subsequent recommendat ions have to be looked at br i ef 1 y. 
Barga in i ng at 1 oca 1 1 eve 1 s has been seen to have deve loped 
in the ,::ontext of industrial relations procedures based on 
'custom and practice' (Roberts & Rothwell 1972:551) 
procedures which were, as wi" be pointed out, severely 
criticised by the Donovan Commission. The background to the 
appointment of this Commission can be briefly sketched. By 
the 1960's, the virtues of so~called 'free' collective 
bargaining in Britain were increasingly being put to 
question. The increase in the strike rate which was seen as 
damaging the British economy, was attributed to 'free' 
collective bargaining. This growing concern was an important 
impetus to the establishment of the Donovan Commission in 
1965/1966 leading subsequently to the publication of 
recommendations in 1'968. 
As pointed out in Chapter 1, Allan Flanders featured 
prominently in evidence submitted to the ·Commission and his 
·publications during this time were numerous. In the words of 
Jackson (1977:142), the 'discussion of local bargaining in 
Britain owes a great deal to the work of Flanders'. Flanders 
(1970:168-173) focused on the development .of work place 
negotiations during the years after World War II. According 
to him, there were certain shortcomings regarding the 
industrial relations system one being found in the 
prevailing institutions for conducting industrial relations 
at the place of work. There was no orderly method for 
arriving at agreed rules and decisions in mattefs of mutual 
concern at the work place. Negot i at ions at the work place 
between shop stewards and management were in~reasingly seen 
to be fragmented in nature, i nforma 1 and autonomous. It was 
fragmented because negot i at ions were conducted in' such a 
, 
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manner that diff~rent groups in the work situation secured 
different concessions at different times. It was informal in 
that the regulation of the employment relationship was 
~ostly unwritten and uncodified and it was autonomous 
because neither the unions nor employers' associations had 
any control over these negot i at ions. Symptomat i c of these 
features were, accord i ng to Flanders, the increase in the 
rate of unofficial strikes and the wage or earnings drift. 
The development of work place bargaining was seen as a 
haphazard one resulting from pressures operating in the 
existing system of industrial relations. While the autonomy 
of work place barga in i ng was seen to cha 11 enge un ions and 
employers' associations and 'an obstacle in making a 
national· incomes policy y.lork', the informality and 
fragmented nature thereof was mainly seen to be a reflection 
on management's inability to cope with the bargaining power 
of shop stewards at the work place. In the final analysis, 
it was management who had to take the initiative and 
respons i bi 1 i ty to place 1 oca 1 barga in i ng on a more hea 1 thy 
and sat i sfactory foundat ion - a task wh i ch management was 
not, in Flanders' view, especially well equipped to 
undertake due to certain shortcomings.* 
Flanders' evidence on and interpretations of British 
industrial relations were in the main supported by research 
findings obtained by commissioned research at the time. From 
its report, it was clear that the Commi ss i on had accepted 
the evidence submitted by Flanders and the findings of the 
research by stating that· Britain had two systems of 
industrial relations operating simultaneously. The one was 
the formal system which was seent6 be embodied in the 
official institutions and the other being the informal 
* The shortcomings are: (1) inadequate training regarding 
the social aspects of their function; (2) separation of 
personnel management from line management resulting in 
line managers not having skills to negotiate with shop 
stewards and work groups and (3) rejection by 
management to share authority within the firm. 
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system created by·the actual behaviour of unions, employers' 
associations, managers, shop ·stewards and workers. 
. . . 
100 
Jackson (1977:146) compares these two systems in the 
following way: The formal system assumes industry-wide 
organ i sat ions capab 1 e of i mpos i ng dec is ions on the i r 
members, covers all matters appropriate to collective 
bargaining by industry-wide agreements, restricts collective 
bargaining to a narrow range of issues and assumes pay to be 
determined by industry-wide agreements. The informal system, 
on the other hand, rests on the autonomy of all the parties 
concerned i.e. managers in individual companies and 
factor i es as we 11 as wOI-k groups, assumes barga in i ng at 
factory level as of equal or greater importance,· assumes 
bargaining to cover a much wider range of issues and 
important decisions governing pay to be taken at factory 
1 eve 1 . Wh i 1 e the forma 1 system assumes that wr it ten 
agreements wi 11 be concluded, the informal system is based 
on taci t arrangements, i nforma 1 understandi ngs and custom 
and pract ice. Last 1 y , the forma 1 system views i ndustr i a 1 
relations in the factory as joint consultation and the 
interpretation/app1 ication of collective agreements. In the 
informal system, this distinction between joint consultation 
and collective bargaining is less clear. In terms of the· 
informal system, the business of industrial relations in the. 
factory is very much part of co 11 ect i ve barga in i ng at the 
level of the industry. Not only had Britain two systems of 
industrial relations, but the Commission commented that the 
informal was in conflict with the formal and undermining its 
functioning. Donovan noted three changes reflecting the 
underlying collapse of institutional regulation and the 
increasingly overt· expressions. of conf1ict: (1) rising 
number of strikes; (2) wage drift and (3) the restriction of 
managerial prerogatives insisting on overmanning, rigid job 
demarcation, workers' control of rate of production, etc. 
(H ill 1983: 142) . 
The recommendat ions proposed by the Comm iss i on amounted to 
the suggest i on of the i ntroduct i on of formal plant 
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agreements coveri"hg all issues negotiated withi'n the plant 
at th~time. As· Banks notes, employers were urged to 
negotiate • forma·l, comp,-ellens i veand authoritative company 
or .factory agreements' to cover the number and 
constituencies of shop stewards, provide for faci'lities for 
them to consult their members and to negotiate with 
management (1974:27). It must be noted that whi 1 e the 
Donovan Commission was not against negotiations conducted at 
the work place, it was highly critical of the fact that 
these negot i at ions were bas i ca 11 y • i nforma 1 ' and 
·unstructured'. 
Also commenting in the 1970's, Clegg suggests that the 
recommendations meant greater authorisation and 
participation of fulltime union officers in matters within 
the plant. It also meant that unions would be able, to 
exercise greater control within the plant. 
that plant level bargaining had greatly 
Clegg cone 1 udes 
increased but 
qua 1 i {i es til is by not i ng that the estab 1 i shment of forma 1 
plant agreements had not altered the relationship' between 
unions and work' place organisations~ He conclud~s as 
fo 11 ows: • There is thus plenty of ev i dence here to suggest 
that the British method of collective bargaining produces a 
large number of independent c~ntres of trade ~nion power in 
workplace organizations and that many workplace 
organisations in private industry possess wide powers' 
(1976:57). 
Shopf 1 oor ba'rga in i ng between shop stewards and, management 
has thus resulted in the powerful workshop organisations of 
British private indu~try and evidence seem to suggest that 
many work place organisations still control the negotiations 
and implementation of plant agreements as they operated in 
, \ '
fragmented barga in i ng before that is, wi thout the 
i nte rvent i on from the un i 011 outs ide' ·even though powe r was 
now centra 1 i sed in the hands of sen i or stewards and plant 
committees (Clegg 1976:63).* 
* In contrast, the local union in the United States plays 
a greater part in negotiating plant agreements even if 
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Gi ve·n . that most of the above comments were made in the 
1966's and 1970's and given that this period is generally 
seen to have witnessed the development and growth of local 
bargaining in Britain, what is the current position as to 
the importance of 1 oca 1 barga in i ng as opposed to industry 
level bargaining within industrial relations? 
Relying almost exclusively on trends identified by 
Windmuller (1987) and Roberts (1987), the following 
generalisations can be put forward: as noted at the 
beginning, there is great diversity in the structure of 
collective bargainin,g. This makes it extremely difficult to 
identify dominant trends. Although local bargaining was 
shown to have increased in importance, especially in the 
private sector, industry-wide negotiations still take place 
in a substantiai number of industries. In most cases, 
bargaining at the local level is also conducted resulting in 
bargaining conducted simultaneously at various levels. 
Industry and national-wide bargaining seem to dominate the 
public sector although, as Roberts points out, certain 
issues are also handled ~t local levels. 
Returning to the private sector, by the beginning of 1980's, 
two thirds of manual and three quarters of non-manual 
employers in private manufacturing companies employing more 
than 50 full-time workers were covered by single-employer 
agreements. If, however, the whole economy is the reference 
point, the picture changes i.e. 46% of firms in the private 
sector and 75% in the publ ic sector report multi-employer 
( i ndustry-w ide) bargain i ng as the most important for pay 
increases. Forces, pushing bargaining in the direction of 
more centra 1 i sed as we 11 as decentra 1 i sed direct ions, seem 
to be operating continuously and even simultaneously. 
The development of ·plant bargaining as discussed above, was 
seen to have resu 1 ted in the esca 1 at i on of the number of 
the application thereof is left mainly in the hands of 
the shop stewards. 
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full-time sh6p ~tewards employed by the unions. This 
development tended to isolate plant bargaining from the 
unions outside the plant - a point noted by Clegg. This 
tendency was evident from the number of 
in the period up to the beginning of the 
Since 1979, the unofficial strike 
unofficial strikes 
recession in 1979. 
rate has fallen 
significantly - a trend which is attributed to a variety of 
factors e.g. ri,sing unemployment, the formalisation of 
(1 oca 1) plant agreements, * improvements of pay structures, 
the growth of local bargaining etc. (Roberts 1987:296). This 
brings us 
suggestion 
to a 
that 
point 
the 
raised previously 
formalisation of 
i.e. Clegg's 
plant/local 
negotiations was seen as a way of enhancing the power of the 
un ions in the work place. The conc 1 us i on he had come to, 
i .e~ that the establ ishment of formal plant agreements had 
,I1Q.:t altered the relationship between unions and work place 
negotiations, seem to be still valid at this point in time. 
The following statements seem to sUbstantiate this: 
and 
A 1 though the authors of one of the su rveys recogn i zed 
that there had been some increases in the number of 
formal agreements at the local level they conclude that 
informal relations were still of prime importance 
(Jackson 1977:148 quoting Wilders and Parker 1975) 
(d)uring the recession it might have been expected that 
shop stewards placed in a weak bargaining position 
would have become more dependent up'on full-time union 
officials. This has not proved to be the case; in fact, 
union officials seem to be playing a less important 
role than before, owing to a number of factors (Roberts 
1987:290). 
Some of the factors listed by Roberts are (1) due to falling 
incomes, unions are pressed to economise on staff and 
services, weakening the links between national and regional 
officials and stewards and plant organisations; (2) 
advancement in techno logy has undermi neo the power of the 
craft un i on and contro 1 has even shown a tendency to pass 
* The formalisation of 'plant agreements was recommended 
by the Donovan Commission and seen as a 'solution' to 
the high unofficial strike rate. 
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back to management and (3) initiative taken by management to 
harmonise work relations etc. Roberts concludes hi~ comments 
with the remark that the development of work place centred 
industrial relations has resulted in collective bargaining 
becoming 'a more complex activity in terms of the roles of 
the two parties, of its structural characteristics, and of 
its relationship to other forms of representation and the 
evolving pattern of collective and .individual legal 
regulation' (1987:291). 
A few brief comments on unions, employers' associations, 
scope of agreements, and industrial democracy can be made. 
Due to the recession and the rise of unemployment, the 
-growth of unions, which had risen during the 1970's and had 
reached a peak in 1979, has been checked in the 1980's. The 
bi ggest drop has been in the pr i vate sector but a 1 so in 
nationalised iron and steel industries and civil aviation. 
The fast growing technology sector has also posed problems 
for union organisation as workers show little interest in 
joining unions. Although the number of employees covered by 
collective bargaining agreements wi 11 have fallen the past 
five years, the percentage workers in employment covered by 
collective ~greements has declined very little (Roberts 
1987:284). The shift to local bargaining in Britain has had 
consequences for the role of employers' associations but 
little change seem to have occurred ~egarding membership of 
employers' associations. This is explained by the fact that 
these organisations are still seen to provide important 
services regarding negotiating and administrative procedures 
in dealing 'with disputes by providing information and 
advice. Roberts suggests that these organisations are likely 
to play an even more important role in the future if they 
can succeed in taking initiative and enhancing their statu~. 
~ 
Regarding collective agreements, the expansion of local 
barga in i ng has had cons i derab 1 e i nf 1 uence on the scope of 
these ag reements. Unt i 1 Wor 1 d War I I, with i ndustry-w ide 
bargaining still the dominant type of bargaining, agreements 
have had a considerable narrow scope focusing on basic 
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emp.loyment cond i ti ons e. g" pay, work hours, job content and 
holida~s~ Agreements concluded through local bargaining have 
expanded in scope inc 1 ud i ng a who 1 e range of items e . g. 
physical working conditions, manning levels, redJndancy, 
changes in product i on methods, techno log i ca 1 changes, 
recruitment, pensions, and' capital investments although 
·bargaining on the last two items is much less frequent 
(Roberts 1987:284). 
Consultative structures exist in most British industries and 
during the Second- World War it was generally bel ieved that 
these structures should function separately from the 
bargaining process. The division between collective 
bargaining and joint consultation has become less clear with 
the growth of local bargaining (especially formal plant 
bargaining) after the War. During the 1960's there has been 
a decline in the number of separate co~sultative committe~s. 
Clegg supports this argument when he notes that the 
re 1 at i onsh i p between the 1 eve 1 of barga in i ng and the need 
for alternative methods of trade union action in the plant, 
must be seen to explain the declin~ of interest in joint 
consultative bodies on the part of the British unions over 
post-war years. These alternative methods are seen to refer 
to shop stewards bargaining within the plant giving ... 
. British trade unionists another and more authoritative 
method' of deal i ng wi th domest i c issues. They have 
chosen to use it and to let consultative committees 
dec 1 i ne, except where the i r shop stewards have 
bargained through consultative committees. Either way, 
consultation as it was originally intended to function 
has given way to plant bargaining (1976:91). 
Consultative structures, however, never entirely disappeared 
from the scene and there was an increase noted again since 
1977. Roberts (1987:295) 'refers to research done by Daniel 
and Millward (1983;1985) on work place relations and 
concludes that the relationship between joint consultative 
and collective bargaining is strongly related to the power 
of the unions within the work place, ve~ifying Clegg's 
point. Where unions are strong, these committees function as 
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an adjunct to collective bargaining. Where the unions are 
wea~, ·the committees present an alternative channel for 
commun i cat ion.· Accord i ng to Roberts, a new trend, based on 
recent research findings, seems to be developing. This trend 
may a 1 so he 1 p account i ng for an inc rease in the popu 1 ar i ty 
of consu 1 tat i ve commi ttees in recent years i. e. although 
unions are still concerned with securing improvements in pay 
and reducing work hours through collective bargaining, 
employees are exerting pressure on management for more 
consultation and the exchange of information outside formal 
bargaining structures at local level. Not only do committees 
playa role in this respect but other consultative machinery 
and procedures have also been establ ished for this purpose 
e.g. briefing groups, departmental meetings, quality circles 
etc. 
Summary 
The most outstandi ng feature of barga in i ng structures in 
Britain is their complexity. Bargaining takes place at all 
levels ranging from national level right down to the level 
of the shopfloor. Although local bargaining (from enterprise 
downwards) has become increasingly important since the 
second World War, it is extremely difficult .to estimate the 
extent to which local bargaining has become .the dominant 
form of bargaining. Not only is there a difference between 
the private and public sector as to the popularity of plant 
bargaining, but private industries also differ in the extent 
to which they stress local level bargaining. British Leyland 
is an example of annual pay bargaining being removed from 
plant to co-operative level under pressure from management, 
pointing to a trend towards central isation. On the other 
hand again, Br it ish Stee 1 Corporat i on refused in 1981 and 
1982 to negot i ate pay agreements at the nat i ona 1 1 eve 1 . 
Although modifying their position somewhat in 1983, they 'by 
no means abandoned the view that pay at plant level should 
be determined by reference to local labour markets and 
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productivity standards' (Hoberts 1987:289). In this case a 
trend :t6wards decentralisation can be identified. These 
examples indicate forces that are pushing towards 
centra 1 i sat i on as we 11 as decentra 1 i sat ion contr i but i ng to 
the difficulty in identifying an overall general trend. 
The fact that bargain i ng is conducted at a wide range of 
levels and often even simultaneously, 
industry for example, can be seen to 
in one particular 
contribute to the 
significance of work place bargaining in Britain as compared 
to the other countries covered in this section. Local 
bargaining, therefore, does not only in this case, refer to 
plant level.; but includes work place bar-gaining right down 
to the shopfloor level. The significance of the role of the 
shop steward compared to those in other countri es, is 
indicative of the importance of bargaining at this highly 
decentra 1 i sed 1 eve 1. -These shop stewards are often seen to 
exercise independent power in their negotiations with 
management, differing significantly from United States shop 
stewards as well as those in West Germany and Japan who are 
seen to funct i on as forma 1 extens ions of the un i on. Shop 
stewards in Britain are thus seen as quite powerful. 
It must be poi nted out that not a 11 commentators agree on 
the continued significance and suggested growth of _ local 
bargaining in Britain. An important example is Lindop's 
(1979:12-21) discussion of work place bargaining and the 
factors relating to its development concluding that evidence 
all - point to a reduction in the importance of local 
bargaining. Although careful to make future predictions he 
suggests that tthere seems no reason to assume that ~he move 
towards 1 arger barga in i ng un its wi 11 not gathe r strength' 
and tthe survival of workplace and plant bargaining as a 
major factor in British industrial relations in the future 
must at least be open to doubt' (1979:20). 
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3.6. T rends towards 1 oca 1 barga in i ng in countr i es 
t~aditionally characterised by highly centralised 
bargaining levels 
Trends towards more decentralised collective bargaining can 
also be noted with regard to those countries historically 
known for their highly centralised bargaining structure e.g. 
France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Sweden (Windmuller 
1987:92-116). Historically, employers in these countries 
have not expe r 1 enced p ressu re as regards wo rk place 
industrial relations (Anstey 1989). 
In many of these instances, bargaining has even shifted to 
the level of individual enterprises and plants i.e. local 
1 eve 1. The trend towards 1 oca 1 bargain i ng does not always 
pertain to all industrial sectors within a particular 
country as unions are often ambivalent regarding such a 
development, for example in Belgium. As showri by 
developments in France since the late 1960's, the increasing 
importance of individual enterprise level does .not 
necessarily imply an abandonment of existing more 
centralised bargaining - in this particular case - industry 
level bargaining. This is also borne out by developments in 
the Netherlands and Sweden. 
As pointed out by Windmuller, how\ever, the consequences of 
more recent developments for deeply entrenched practices of 
the past is difficult to ascertain and future developments 
wi 1 1 have to be awaited. The impact of the state of the 
economy on decentralised and local bargaining in particular, 
has also been varied to some extent. In Italy for example, 
indications are that central bargaining or interconfederal 
bargaining has again become prominent during the recession 
of the 1980's. The sustained viability of central agreements 
is however being questioned which may lead to company 
bargaining ~gain becoming more prominent in the future. 
In the Netherlands enterprise and plant level bargaining 
have achieved considerable importance during the past ten to 
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10':1 
fifteen yea/-so 'Hi"storically, plant level organisation and 
barg~i~i~g have beeri seriously neglected conforming to 
bargaining patterns in other continental European countries. 
Workers, similar to those in Germany, have traditionally 
accepted emp 1 oyers' res i stance to 1 oca 1 1 eve 1 organ i sat ion. 
Instead, they have come to rely on statutory wor~s councils 
to represent their work-related interests. Not only have \ 
works councils gained more ,rights and therefore greater 
status, but, union structures have been created at the 
enterprise level'. These structures have gained recognition 
rights as well as faci 1 ities. They have also gained the 
right to protection. of their representatives against 
disciplinary action (Windmuller 1987:108). Of particular 
"relevancy is the right of these structures to participate in 
the deter.mination of working conditions at plant level. The 
unions must still decide whether they are 'going' to employ 
statutory works6ouncils or their own new plant structures 
as their main instrument to participate in enterprise level 
decision-making. 
In some cas,es, for e'xamp 1 e Sweden, the concern for an overl y 
rig i.d centra 1 i sed bargain i ng structu re has been the ma in 
drive behind the move towards more local bargaining being 
initiated by employers. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LOCAL BARGAINING WITHIN SOUTH AFRICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
4. 1 Introduction 
The i ndustr i a 1 re 1 at ions scene, and more spec if i ca 1 1 y the 
barga i ni ng structure of South Afri ca, has undergone 
important and even rad i ca 1 changes since the inception of 
industrial isation, the formation of an industrial labour 
force and the creation of the first trade unions during the 
late 19th century. 
Although the bargaining structures of particular societies 
tend to exhibit a degree of stability, most of these 
structures undergo some changes, modifications and 
adjustments over time. The general trend towards· increasing 
decentra 1 i sat i on referred to in the previ ous chapter, has 
illustrated just this point. However, the degree of changes 
and modifications that the South African bargaining 
structure has exhibited seems to be of a more radical 
nature. This has been particularly the case with bargaining 
levels. 
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It is by now generally accepted that the appointment of the· 
Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry into labour legislation in 
1977, the recommendations and subsequent labour legislation 
fo 1 low i ng these recommendat ions, const i tuted an important 
watershed in the hist"ory of South African labour relations 
and bargaining structure. Due mainly to certain historical 
events and circumstances, the South African labour force as 
well as the collective bargaining structure that has 
subsequent 1 y deve lOped, have always been characteri sed by 
some form of dualism predominantly structured along racial 
lines. Thus, not only have the various racial groupings been 
different i a' , y incorporated into the South Afr i can econo,my, 
but the official institutional structures ~overning and 
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regulating labour relations have come to reflect these 
divisions to a significant degree. The dualistic nature of· 
the South African labour relations scene becomes 
·particularly evident in an analysis of the dominant 
barga in i ng 1 eve 1 s as it ex i sted and funct i oned not on 1 y 
prior to, but especially after the late 1970's. 
Although industrialisation proper only commenced in South 
Africa with the discovery of diamonds and gold during the 
latter part of the 19th century, certain measures for 
regulating the employment relationship already existed prior 
to these discoveries. The Masters and Servants Act of 1841 
and 1856 for example, regulated the individual employment 
relationship for breaches of terms of their contract as ·well 
as for . certain offences. More specifically, this Act 
stipulated the· worker's obl igations and provided for harsh 
punishments of the worker (usually non-white) who disobeyed 
these regulations (S Bendix 1989:286). 
It was, however, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 
that was to introduce co 11 ect i ve bargain i ng as an 
institutionalised feature of South African industrial 
relations and was to lay the foundation for the development 
of . a very typically South African system. The act involved a 
t government- imposed compromi se' between two groups: 
organised business and organised labour, both of whom could 
count on the support of political representatives to 
articulate their interests (Lever 1983a:103). Greenberg 
( 1980: 155) essent i all y makes the same poi nt when he 
interprets the Act an t historic accommodation between white 
labour and management ... ' It was also to mark the fi rst 
occasion of direct government intervention into an area 
hitherto left to develop in a manner relatively free from 
constraining measures, thereby constituting collective 
labour legislative and law proper. 
Given the significant changes in South Africa's collective 
bargaining structure following the Wiehahn Commission's 
report, it seems appropriate to discuss the .nature of local 
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bargaining, and the extent of its prominence, by considering 
developments prior to and after 1979. 
4.2 Local bargaining prior to 1979 
4.2.1 institutional ising industry level bargaining 
By ·1977, with the appointment of the Wiehahn Commission, the 
South African collective bargaining structure was regulated 
mainly in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 
originating in the above mentioned Industrial Conciliation 
Act of 1924 and the Black Labour Relations (Settlement of 
Disputes) Act of 1953. The latter was subsequently amended 
as the. Black Labour Relations Regulations Act in 1973 and 
1977. 
One of the outstand i ng, if .not .t.he. outstand i ng ·features of 
the 1924 (and amended 1937 and 1956) Act, relates to its 
scope i.e. the exclusion of the African worker from its 
parameters. The Act only provided machinery for the 
regulation of· industrial relations between white, coloured 
and As ian emp 1 oyees and the i r emp 1 oyers and rested on a 
cbasic ethnic foundation' (Lever 1983a:104). In terms of the 
definition of employee embodied in the Acts, African* 
workers were prohibited from establishing legally recognised 
unions and making use of the official bargaining machinery 
provided for by official legislation. Certain categories of 
operations were similarly excluded i.e. farming, domestic 
service in private households, officers of Parliament, State 
employees, charitable institutions and education (Jones & 
Griffith 1980:108-109). 
* Throughout this chapter and those to ·follow the four 
main population groups into which the state has divided 
the country's peop 1 e are referred to as the Afri can, 
coloured, Indian (also Asian) and white groups. The 
term 'black' is used to refer collectively to Africans, 
coloureds and Indians, except when using official 
terminology when it refers only to Africans~ (Maree 
1987: x) 
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The· 1924, 1937 and 1956 Act had as an objective the 
provision of formal. institutions to be uti 1 ised for the 
purpose of collective bargaining and settlement of djsputes. 
This it did by providing for the registration and regulation 
of trade unions and employer associations; the regulation of 
emp 1 oyment cond it ions th rough ag reements conc 1 uded in 
industrial councils and conciliation boards and the 
settlement of disputes through conciliation, mediation and 
arbitration. 
The most significant feature of the 1924 Act which 
specifically related to the level of bargaining, were· the 
provisions made for industrial council bargaining. The 1956 
Act retained the industrial council system as the main forum 
of collective bargaining between employers' and trade 
unions' representatives. Industrial councils were to be 
permanent structures composed of registered trade unions and 
employer associations~ The main functions of these councils 
as listed by Piron (1983) are to (,1) settle disputes that 
have arisen or may arise between, the two parties; (2) 
negotiate agreements or to prevent disputes from arising and 
(3) take the appro~riate steps necessary tobririg about the 
regulation or settlement of matters of mutual interest to 
, 
employers and workers and their respective organisation. 
A 1 though the process of co 11 ect i ve parga in i ng was _ 1 eft to 
the discretion of the individual industrial councils, the 
state gave statutory effect to agreements concluded between 
the parties to the council., Membership of industrial 
councils was not automatic and parties had to apply in order 
to participate in the system. Bargaining was conducted over 
all· subjects of mutual interest in the employment context 
i.e. predominantly over wages and employment conditions. In 
the absence of counci 1s, either party could approach the 
Minister to request the establishment of conciliation 
boards. These boards were ad hoc bodies and were discharged 
as soon as the dispute was settled, or otherwise (Jones 
1984:71). 
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Thus,· in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act, statutory 
co 11 ect i ve barga in i ng was to be cond~cted at industry and 
reg{ona1 levels through industrial councils and, in their 
absence, through· ad hoc appointed conciliation boards. In 
terms of who were to participate in these bodies, the Act 
was equally clear: councils and boards were open to all but 
black African workers and their representatives. However, 
not all centralised bargaining was restricted to industrial 
councils. Centralised bargaining outside the counc~l system 
has and still does characterise the mining industry in which 
case the The Chamber of Mines acts as the employers' 
association/organisation as different minehouses belong to 
this association. In the mining industry terms and 
employment conditions are set and dispute~ are settled 
outside the auspices of councils and the tintermittent 
recourse to ad hoc conci 1 iation boards· has constituted the 
sum of the parties' involvement in statuary negotiating 
bodies' (Cameron, Cheadle & Thompson 1989). 
4.2.2 the creation of commi~tees at local level 
The Nationalist Party who had come to power in 1948, 
appointed th~ Industrial Legislation Commission (known as 
the Botha Commission). It had to report and make 
recommendations on, inter al ia, the feasibil ity of having 
separate trade unions for whites, coloureds and Asians, the 
desi·rabi1it~ of giving official recognition to African 
unions and tsetting up machinery for the prevention and 
settlement of industrial disputes involving Natives 
(Horner 1987: 124-125). The first recommendat ion (separate 
unions for different racial groups) was accepted and 
subsequently accommodated in the 1956 Act. The second 
recommendation that African trade unions be recognised in 
terms of separate legislation was rejected. Instead, 
alternative machinery was to be created by the legislator to 
accommodate Africans in the form of the Native (later Bantu) 
Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Bill presented in Parliament 
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in .1953 .. This piece of legislation made provision for so-
call~d.in-company .committees whereby a works committee could 
be elected .by African employees of an establishment 
employing 20 or more workers (1987:126). 
The initiative to establish such committees could come from 
either worker's or employer's side. The main function of 
this body was to communicate the wishes, aspirations and 
requirements of black African workers to the employer or 
management (Jones & Griffith 1980:93). In addition to 
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committees at the enterprise level, provision was also made-
for a second tier, i.e. Regional Native Labour Committees 
appointed by the Minister of Labour from Africans (not 
necessarily workers) from the local community with a white 
chairman· as well as a third tier, i.e. a Central Native 
Board. The latter was to consist of white officials also 
appointed by the· Minister. 
the 1953 Act !allowed a 
Thus, the machinery created by 
very limited measure of direct 
representation to African workers and a larger measure of 
indirect bureaucratic representation' (Horner 1987:126). 
Although works committees had restricting negotiation 
rights, they were never allowed to negotiate wages as 
industrial councils and the Wage Board were seen to do this 
(Friedman 1987:53). 
It is doubtful whether these committees were ever 
!successful' given their stated aims and functions. By the 
beginning of 1957 only seven such statutory committees were 
in existence; by 1961 nineteen and by 1969 twenty- four. The 
works committees, established for the first time in 1953, 
continued to exist for the next 20 years proving itself to 
be totally ineffective as a channel for communicatiqn 
between black employees and their employers within 
establ ishments. By 1973 only twenty-four had been formally 
registered under the Act and another ten were said to exist 
(S Bendix 1989:296). 
The fail ure of these commi ttees as an a 1 ternat i ve 1 abour 
relations system for Africans is· indicated by Horner 
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(1987:129) when he says that 'African workers eschewed it, 
empl~y~rs showed a marked reluctance to use it in a 
mean i ngfu 1 way, and even the State imp 1 emented it wi thout 
vitality'. This failure has been ascribed to various 
factors. Amongst such were the fact that, due to 1 ack of 
experience and necessary training, African employees seldom 
took the initiative in forming such bodies. The committees 
were usually established after a dispute had arisen and did 
not function on a preventative basis. But of crucial 
significance was the fact that authority and power still 
res i ded in the hands of management renderi ng these 
committees virtually impotent as instruments of worker 
power. Referring to the fact that works committees were 
denied the right to n~gotiate and bargain over wages, 
Friedman (1987:53) for example notes that leven if they had 
been granted this power, they would not have been equipped 
to' use it' renderi ng them I harml ess .. safety va 1 ves" for 
worker frustration and most were not even that'. 
4.2.3 1973 and 1977 amendments to the 1953 Act 
The relative Ipeace' characterising the industrial relations 
sphere during the 1950's and 1960's, largely if not wholly, 
attributed to repressive government legislation, was 
shattered by the labour unrest of 1973 and 1974. The 
government, real ising that the existing system had somehow 
failed to satisfy black African employees and their need to 
establish recognised unions, amended the existing Native 
Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act and introduced the Black 
Labour Relations Regulation Act (No. 70 of 1973). In terms 
of this act, African workers and their employers could now 
establish different types of committees to regulate conflict' 
and to present African employees' interests. So-called 
liaison-committees were introduced at plant level as an 
alternative to existing works committees and the latter were 
to be upgraded. 
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The liaison ~bmmittee in an establishment was to consist of 
appoi nted and elected members. Ha 1 f was to be elected by 
Afri'can . employeeswhi le the remaining members were to be 
appointed by the management/employer. Its function was 'to 
consider matters which are of mutual interest to the 
employer and his employees and to make to the employer such 
recommendations concerning conditions of employment of such 
employees, or any other matter affecting their 'interests' 
(Horner 1987:130). The works committee was, however, to be 
whol'ly' elected by African workers in establishments 
employing more than 20 African workers and where no liaison 
committee existed. Its main function was to communicate the 
wishes, aspirations and requirements of employees to their 
employer and to 'represent the said employees in any 
negotiations with their employer concerning their conditions 
of employment or any other matter affecting their interests' 
(Horner 1987: 131). 
Thus, works committees clearly had in-plant negotiation 
rights whereas liaison committees acted more as consultative 
structures within establishments (Friedman 1987:54). By May 
1975, 1 751 liaison committees were registered compared to 
239 statutory-constituted works committees (Horner 131 :133). 
These numbers indicate to some extent the popularity of 
1 i a i son commi ttees compared to works' commi ttees wi th 
management and employers. This disparity was illustrated 
again by 1977 in that 2 503 liaison and 301 works committees 
were in existence at the time (Maree & Budlender 1987:117-
118). With the 1977 amendment of the Black Labour Relations 
Regulations Act, factory committees (including liaison 
commi ttees) were given the ri ght to negot i ate and conc 1 ude 
binding agreements with employers within establishments on 
wages and other employment conditions. 
Prior to these negotiation concessions, the wages and 
employment conditions were covered by the Wage Act no 27 of 
1925 repealed and replaced in 1937 and again by Act no 5 of 
1957. As Lever (1983a:99) notes, the Wage Act of 1925 was 
seen as the complement to the machinery of the Industrial 
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Conciliation Act of 1924 in the determination of wages and 
employment conditions. The Act applied to the 'unorganised' 
labour forces i.e. workers who were by law denied a say in 
the collective bargaining system. These workers were of 
course mainly black although unorganised 'non-black' workers 
were also included (Jones & Griffith 1980:26-27). The Act 
made provision for the establishment of a Wage Board which 
had, inter alia, the power to investigate conditions in 
particular indus~ries excluding, amongst others, agriculture 
and domestic service and issue minimum wage determinations. 
The Wage Act thus pr6vided for 'the establishment of a 
situation whereby, if wages and working conditions could not 
be negotiated through collective bargaining, they would be 
laid down unilaterally by the Minister acting on the 
recommendations of the Wage Board' (Jones & Griffith 
1980:28) . 
In practice and immediately prior to 1979, different types 
of committees were co-existing within a single establishment 
or plant. The functions of the various committees and 
hierarchical ordering in terms of status are outlined below 
(Jones & Griffith 1980; Albertyn 1979): 
works committees 
( 1 ) the communication of the wishes, aspirations and 
requi rements of bl ack workers wh i ch was of concern to 
the employer; 
(2) to make recommendations to a liaison committee where it 
existed regarding wages and other employment conditions. 
and 
(3) to negot i ate and enter into agreements wi th emp 1 oyers 
regard i ng wages and other emp 1 oyment cond it ions on 1 y 
where no liaison committee is in existence. 
In establishments accommodating more than one works 
committee, 
ordinating 
functions: 
, 
such commi ttees may organ i se to estab 1 ish a co-
works committee and fulfill . the following 
I 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
(1) to' co-ordinate the activities of the works committees 
( 2 ) to make 
committees 
employment 
, 
recommendat ions to co-ord i nat i ng 1 i a i son 
where they exist, regarding wages and other 
conditions 
(3)' to negot i ate on wages and cond it ions of emp l'oyment in 
the absence of a co-ordinating committee. 
liaison committees 
At least half of the members would be elected by black 
workers and the remaining half appointed by management. The 
functions were to be as follows: 
(1) to consider matters which are of mutual interest to 
employer and black workers 
( 2 ) to make recommendat ions to 
committees where they exist 
conditions and 
-co-ordinating liaison 
on wages and emp 1 oyment 
(3) to negotiate and enter into agreements with employers 
on these issues where a co-ordinating liaison committee 
did not operate. 
The main function of the co-ordinating liaison committee was 
to negotiate and enter into agreements with employers on 
wages and employment conditions. 
To summarise then, the statutory bargaining system 
. immediately prior to 1979 was predominantly characterised by 
centra 1 bargain i ng at industry and reg i ona 1 1 eve 1 through 
industrial councils or where they were not in existence, 
conciliation boards. Given that only registered unions were 
allowed by law to participate in this system, only non-
.Africans qualified for such participation. Industry level 
b9rgaining was not however restricted to the industrial 
councils system as centralised bargaining jn 
industry was conducted outside the statutory 
provided by the Industrial Conciliati'on Act. 
the mining 
machinery 
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Local level b~rgai~ing (i .e. plant and establishment levels) 
was. the predominant level of tbargaining' for Africans given 
their exclusion from the industrial council system. In-plant 
negotiations were introduced with the establishment of works 
commi ttees after· passage of the 1953 Nat i ve Labour 
(Settlement of Disputes) Bill. Negotiation powers were 
however limited as wage bargaining was not allowed. In 
practice these works committees mainly acted as a 
communication channel between the parties. Local bargaining 
was not really extended by the 1973 Black Labour Relations 
Regulations Act and the introduction of a new type of 
committee i.e. liaison committees. The latter had no 
statutory negotiation rights, only being allowed to tmake 
recommendations' to employers resulting in such bodies being 
labelled· as ttea and toilet' committees (Friedman 1987:54). 
Potential local bargaining was built into the 1977 
amendments in that factory committees (works and 1 iaison) 
were now granted rights to negotiate binding agreements on 
wages and other employment conditions. Bargaining is here 
referred to as being potential in the sense that, even 
though local bargaining was made possible by the structures 
created by the legislator, it did not significantly 
materialise in practice. In the final analysis, these bodies 
acted as consultati~e rather than bargaining bodies - one of 
the main reasons for this being management's attitude 
towards the concept of tbargaining' with African employees 
within the establishment. These committees were from its 
very inception dominated by managers and employers. 
4.3 Local bargaining after 1979 
The particular circumstances and events leading to the 
appointment of the Wiehahn Commission in 1977, have been 
extensively noted by observers of the South African 
industrial relations scene. Jubber (1979:131) for example, 
1 i sts some of the events necess; tat; ng fundamental changes 
in the South African industrial relations system. Instead of 
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interpreting the 6hanges (and those to come) in terms of the 
ideo10gic;a'l reasons advanced by the authorities for such 
changes, h~ correctly argues for an interpretation in terms 
of the crises and contradictions characterising the pre-1979 
industrial relations system. Thus, the proposed move towards 
(liberating' the' industria.1 relations system should be 
viewed as bein9- motivated by (material and political 
expediency' rather than being based on (morality' and 
(reason' . 
4.3. 1 Labour Relations Act of 1979 and 1981 
process of deracia1~sing 1abour'legis1ation 
the 
Fo 11 owi ng the acceptance by the Government of the major 
recommendat ions, put forward by the Wi ehahn Commi ss i on, it 
amended the Industrial Conciliation Act changing the title 
to the Labour Relations Act in '1979 and 1981. The Labour 
Relations Act provides three statutory forums for collective 
bargaining: industrial councils, conciliation boards and 
works councils. The Act acknowledges non~statutory 
arrangement and regu 1 ates it p r i mar i 1 y th rough the unfair 
labour practice jurisdiction (Cameron, Cheadle & Thompson 
1989:7). In terms of this Act, labour relations legislation 
was to be deracialised and black unions were to be finally 
recognised. Although certain categories of employees were 
initially excluded, the Act finally removed all these 
exc 1 us ions and extens ions. An emp 1 oyee was now def i ned as 
(any person in work and receiving remuneration' thereby 
opening up the official bargaining system to all workers* 
(Benjamin, Cheadle & Khoza 1987:164-165). The Black Labour 
Relations Regulations Act was repealed and all references to 
race were finally removed. ·Provision was also made for an 
i ndustr i a 1 cou rt. Var i ous funct ions were ass i gned to the 
industrial court including arbitration, industrial 
demarcations arid hearing appeals from registered trade 
* Certain sections e.g. farm workers and domestic workers 
were however still excluded. 
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unions denied admission to an industrial council. The 
introduction of the 
'philosophical break 
Thompson 1989: 21) in 
court represented a 
(Cameron, Cheadle & 
industrial 
with the past' 
that it had to make dec is ions ove r 
unfair labour practices. The latter was the legislative 
response to the demand for a statutory formula by the newer 
un ions' conc 1 us i on of recogn i t ion ag reements and' disputes 
arising ·from it. Amendments to the Act 'were again made in 
the pe r i od 1981-1984, but none of these represented 
fundamental changes (Maree & Budlender 1987:121). The power 
of the industrial court, however, was increased during 1982.' 
Befor~ 1982 few disputes were referred to the court mainly 
because it lacked the power to develop a satisfactory code 
of sound employment practice (Benjamin 1987:255). The 1982 
amendments gave the court status quo powers which allowed it 
to reverse unilateral action in disputes. In 1983 
unregistered unions were granted access to conciliation 
boards .. 
In terms of the 1981 Labour Relations Act, collective 
bargaining at industry and regional level through industrial 
councils, and through conciliation boards in the absence of 
the former, was to remain the core level at which bargaining 
is conducted. By 1980, Swart (1988:504) reports, there were 
approximately 100 industrial councils and 250 agreements in 
operation of which less than 10% of these councils accounted 
for more than 80% of workers covered by the councils. This 
illustrates clearly the degree of centralisation at the 
time. 
Given that African unions were now receiving full legal 
recognition, they could, if so wished, register and 
part i c i pate th rough counc i 1 s at industry 1 eve 1 . 
Theoretically then, all employees, irrespective of race, 
could now participate in official centralised bargaining. In 
practice, however, this did not immediately happen. 
Obstacles to full participation remained culminating in the 
so-ca 11 ed ' reg i strat i on debate'. As poi nted out, for 
examp 1 e, independent un ions opt i ng to ope rate outs i de the 
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industrial council system, could only gain access to the 
industrial court via conci 1 iationboards. The Minister of 
Manpowef 60uld refuse to appoint conciliation boards thereby 
blocking access to the industrial court. 
4.3.' 2 local bargaining through committees and works 
councils 
Of greater significance is the implication of the new Labour 
Relations Act for local bargaining. An important feature of 
the Act is the provision made, for plant bargaining through 
sections 34(A) and 34(B) of the Act (Piron 1983:470). 
Section 34(A) governs the establ ishment of a new type of 
committee known as the works council. An employer and all or 
some of his employ~es may se~ up such a works council for a 
section of a factory, a whole factory or two or more 
factories belonging to a single employer (Benjamin, Cheadle 
& Khoza 1987:'163). At least half of the council members must 
be elected by the relevant workers as representatives while 
the remaining half are to represent management. Section 
34(B) regulates the old 1 iaison committee establ ished in 
1973. These are now to function as works councils as well. 
All works councils established by either section 34(A) or 
34(B) are to be multi-racial in composition in contrast to 
,previous committees. As management has no representation on 
the old works committees, they cannot be regarded as works 
councils. 
As to the functions of these councils, the law is not 
prescri pt i ve. The funct ions can therefore be structured in 
such a way as to suit the needs of the parties within the 
enterprise leaving the parties free to decide on the powers 
of these bodies (Nel & Van Rooyen 1985:73). In the main, 
however, the works councils were seen to settle grievances 
between emp 1 oyees and management and obtain the right to 
negotiate and bargain with management on wages and working 
conditions. The works council was established to accommodate 
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employee needs at· the level of the work place. Black workers 
are 'genera 11 y 1 ess ski 1 led ,less mobile and therefore more 
open to victimisation by management. A multitude of 
grievances characterise their position and works councils 
are seen as possible mechanisms to help the black employee 
, 
cope with these grievances. 
Works councils are set up on a voluntary basis or by mutual 
agreement and are in no way compulsory. Employers need not 
register their existence or even inform the authorities that 
they exist in the enterprise or plant. Agreements reached 
between the parties are not legally binding and the Act does 
not provide an enforcing mechanism (Jones 1984). Thus, while 
the law makes provision for the establishment of works 
counci 1 s, agreements are not statutory collective 
agreements. 
4.3.3. local bargaining and recognition agreements 
After amendments' were promulgated following the Wiehahn 
recommendations, African unions, as mentioned above, did not 
rush to register or join estab1 ished unions in order to 
participate in the official system. As correctly noted by 
the Manpower Commission (RP/1986 par 7.1 chp 1 :8), the 
opposition to the official machinery ~nd industrial council 
system was quite clear even prior to these recommendations 
and amendments. A substantial number of these independent 
un ions had opted for the estab 1 i shment of -so-ca 11 ed 
recogn it ion ag reements at plant and ente rp rise 1 eve 1. The 
rejection of the industrial council system by the tne.wer' 
unions was primarily grounded in the bureaucratic structure 
and funct ion i ng of these counc i 1 sand, even to a g reate r 
extent, the possibility of sacrificing their power base 
(Swart 1988:509). 
The origin of recognition agreements in the South African 
context is located in the barga in i ng system of the pre-
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Wiehahn era i.e. the exclusion of trade unions .from the work 
~ 
place .. While the industrial council system kept unions out 
in the case of whites, coloureds and Asians, the committee 
system similarly succeeded in keeping African unions, 
especially the new independents, out of the plant or 
factory. But, while wages and working conditions were 
negotiated at industry level for the former, no comparable 
representation was allowed for African employees at this 
level. 
The independent unions dould offer their members very little 
as far as wages and emp 1 oyment cond it ions were concerned. 
They experienced financial difficulties as they could not 
rely on employers to collect dues on their behalf as 
registered unions could. They· were, given their inability to 
build a power base inside factories, forced to rely on 
members. Tactics wer~ modified and many unions abandoned 
mass organ i sat ion devot i ng the i r resou rces to a few 
tcarefully selected factories '( Friedman 1987:93-94). The 
burden of organising and decision -making, as Friedman 
notes, now shifted to elected shop stewards and union 
membership was now no longer the dominant issue. Training, 
discussion and organising would now precede membership. 
These efforts were directed at obtaining, through 
negotiations, formal recognition by employers within 
individual plants and ·ente·rprises. The first formal 
recognition agreement was signed in July, 1974 between NUTW 
(National Union of Textile Workers) and Smith and Nephew at 
its plant in P{netown. 
The negotiation and the conclusion of the above and numerous 
other such agreements, constitutes a significant instance of 
local level barga.ining within present day South Africa and 
has become an institutionalised feature of the local 
industrial relations scene despite its non-statuary nature. 
The basis of any recognition agreement is, according to 
P i ron (1 986 : 5 ), the nee d f e 1 t by w 0 r k e r s to be i n vol v e d ·i"n 
decision- making and the need to be treated with respect at 
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the .p1ace of work .. Its true nature is to be found in the 
cre@tion of a relationship between management and employees 
• founded on d i gn i ty' and the estab 1 i shment of a contract. 
This agreement creates both legal and behavioural 
ob1 igations in that it constitutes a legal framework that 
describes the parameters within which a permanent or semi-
permanent relationship is to operate. He thus concludes that 
the relationship aspect is the crucial element in this type 
of agreement. 
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Recognition in the South African context essentially imp1ies~ 
the recognition of a trade union by an employer andJ 
secondly, it involves a union-employer relationship 
exc 1 ud i ng the state. It is essent i all y, says Swart 
(1988:506), nothing more than an employer's written 
acceptance of the representativity of a union in a 
particular estab1 ishment as well as the right to negotiate 
on certain matters. Furthermore, the recogn it i on agreement 
is essentially ~ procedural agreement and not a substantive 
agreement as its objective is to regulate the conduct of a 
re1ationshi~ between parties at a particular place or work. 
It differs from industrial council agreements in that the 
latter is mainly concerned with more substantial issues e.g. 
wages (S Bendix 1989:430-431). A full procedural agreement! 
is the most extensive form of the recognition agreement and~ 
" considers a variety of matters such as the preamble,: 
definitions, terms of re.cognition, access to information,: 
use of notice boards, check-off facilities, position of shop; 
~ 
stewards, disciplinary and grievance procedures, 
and negotiation procedures, mediation, retrenchment 
arbitration, hea 1 th and safety and 
! 
so on (Piron 1986). The 
negot i at i on procedure conta i ned in the agreement, sets out 
the way in which negotiations must be conducted in order to 
conclude a substantive agreement or how to re-negotiate the 
recognition agreement. Substantive agreements 
wages and are usually re-negotiated more 
similar to practices adopted by the industrial 
cover rna in 1 y 
frequently 
councils. The 
negot i at i on procedure thus represents the • forma 1 i sat i:on of 
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the. co 11 ect i ve bargain i ng process between the part i es at 
plant level' (1986:77). 
The multi-layered nature of the recognition process is thus 
clearly illustrated as it may evolve from recognition proper 
to a full bargaining relationship· and bargaining proper. 
This has even been further extended in some countries to 
include a co-determinative role by workers in the operation 
of the enterprise (Cameron, Cheadle & Thompson 1989:27). 
The tbroad' characteristjcs of recognition agreements are 
according to the Commission of Manpower (RP 115/1986 par 1.2 
I 
chp 2:14) the following: 
1 . they are usua 11 y negot i ated and· conc 1 uded at factory 
and plant 1 eve 1 i. e. 1 oca 1 1 eve 1 
2. it is usually initiated by the tnewer' black unions 
a 1 though more estab 1 i shed un ions have a 1 so i nd i cated 
interest in establishing such agreements or formal ising 
existing agreements 
3. it usually covers the semi- and unskilled black worker 
or category but is in the process of covering the 
interests of a broader category given black workers' 
movement into more skilled, administrative and 
supervisory occupations. The established unions 
covering ski lled workers are also entering into such 
agreements as pointed out in 2 above and 
4. arrangements 
circumstances 
plant/factory. 
and procedures 
existing in a 
are geared 
particular 
to the 
company/ 
Trends· towards local bargaining in different industries 
since 1979 up to April 1986, are also evident from the 
Commission's report on agreements in different industries 
(par 7.2 chp 8) e.g. metal, motor service and repair, 
automobile manufacturing, sugar 
paper, printing, gold and coal 
. cgnc 1 udes that the importance of 
and refining, pulp and 
mining. The Commission 
i ndustr i a 1 counc i 1 s has 
declined in some industries and has even been dissolved e.g. 
in pulp and paper as well as baking industry in the Western 
, 
Cape. Where newer unions have in fact joined industrial 
counc i 1 s, they have pressed for 1 oca 1 barga in i ng ove rand 
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above industrial council agreements e.g. the metal industry. 
In aredent article, Horwitz (1987a) comments on the 
escalation in the number of recognition agreements being 
concluded during ·the post-Wiehahn period putting the number 
at 800 .. 
Apart from negotiating recognition and substantive 
agreements at local level, negotiations on other matters are 
also conducted especially where.a union has strong presence 
in a particular plant or enterprise~ Issues like health and 
safety, retrenchments, technology and productivity ~re, like 
elsewhere in the world, becoming more crucial to the worker 
at his place of work (S Bendix 1989:445-449). 
The post-Wiehahn years have thus witnessed the extension of 
local bargaining through multi-racial works councils and 
especially through the conclusion of recognition agreements, 
sUbstantive agreements (e.g. wages) as well as agreements on 
work re.l ated issues (e. g. hea 1 th and safety, techno logy, 
etc.) between black unions and their employers. 
Little. mention is made of informal shopfloor bargaining 
between workers and their supervisors in South African 
industrial relations literature but one can, with a fair 
amount of certainty, assume such- bargaining to be taking 
place inmost estab 1 ~ shments and work places. Th is wou 1 d 
conform to practices in existence· at work places throughout 
the . world especially where collective bargaining is 
institutionalised. 
The most significant development in local bargaining after 
1979 has been agreements negot i ated and concl uded at the 
plant and enterprise level. While bargaining is also 
conducted through works councils, the latter is only a 
slight modification on the older committee system in that it 
is now multi-racial in its composition. These councils are 
not functioning as bargaining bodies in any significant way. 
The ·historical context in which these more. representative 
structures have developed, coupled with the tendency of 
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management to dominate and control them, as well as the fact 
th~t .they are established on a voluntary basis, partly 
acco~nt for their relative failure as successful local 
bargaining mechanisms. They do not successfully accommodate 
th~ aspirations and democratic heeds cif especially'the black 
worker .in his/her place of work. While local ·bargaining 
through works counc i 1 s thus may, and probab 1 y does, extend 
the power-of the white worker at work·place level, this does 
not seem to apply to the black worker to the same extent. 
The increasing rate at which recognition and other 
agreements are being negotiated at local level by 'newer' 
black unions, is indicative of the growth of black 
industrial workers' power. It also reflects an important 
feature of the emerging unions i.e. buildin,g shop steward 
structures in work places in order to further build union 
strength. 
Dua 1 ism in the South Afri can 
been retained after 1979 
labour 
in that 
re 1 at i ons ~ystem has 
established unions 
primarily conduct bargaining within the centralised council 
system whlle the ·'newer' unions conclude agreements at the 
level of the enterprise and plant. Local bargaining is thus 
at present very clearly associated with a particular section 
of the workforce. 
4.4 South Africa in world context 
4.4.1 trends towards decentralisation 
Identifying a trend towards more centralised or 
decentralised bargaining in any country's bargaining 
structure is, as has been shown in Chapter 3, a hazardous 
task. This is· even. more so in the case of South Africa's 
bargaining structure for in no other country is, or was, the 
1 abou r force in any way different i all y i I1corporated into 
statutory and non-statutory barga in i ng structures in terms 
) 
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of race to the degree that ; t had been the case ; n South 
Afrtca. One is therefore tempted to general ise, ·in South 
Africi's case, along similar racial lines. As to non-African 
employees, bargaining has up to very recently been highly 
centralised with bargaining conducted through industrial 
councils. It is only after 1979 that multi-racial works 
councils have provided the structural opportunity for 
especially the white worker to conduct bargaining at the 
plant or enterprise 1 eve 1 . The nature of bargaining and 
negotiations through multi-racial councils resembles to some 
extent that which takes . place in the West German works 
councils in that these structures could be typified as being 
more co-operative than confl icting in nature. This means 
that works 'councils constitute primarily' representative 
rather than collective bargaining bodies. 
Local bargaining .has always been the most significant level 
of bargaining for Africans in terms of the avai labi 1 ity of 
structures, i.e. committee system, during the pre-Wiehahn 
years. The fact remains, however, that these structures 
never really succeeded in facilitating 
bargaining. Meaningful local bargaining 
come to the fore with the negotiation 
substant i all oca 1 
has on 1 y recent 1 y 
and signing of 
recognition, substantive and other agreements by the newer, 
independent unions at plant and factory level. The desire of 
these unions to establish for themselves a power base at the 
establishment level has been the prime force behind this 
trend- towards increasing decentral isation - simultaneously 
of course, being symptomatic of the growing power of the 
black worker. 
Hav i ng succeeded in estab 1 ish i ng themse 1 ves at the 1 oca 1 
level, it can be expected that black unions will become more 
involved with industry level bargaining in coming years. 
There are already several unions which have chosen to do so. 
A 1 though Pi ron (1986: 146) remi nds us that f the maj or i ty of 
black workers do not see the industrial council as the 
panacea for industrial relations problems', a 'trend towards 
i ncreas i ng centra 1 i sed barga in i ng by black un ions may be 
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postulated especially in the light of deregulation measures 
presently advocated by the state. 
Overall, however, local bargaining has become a prominent 
level in South Africa's industrial relations system and will 
probably continue to remain so. The central role of in-plant 
recognition agreements is indicated by the numbers of such 
agreements havi ng been signed. Between 1979 and 1983 the 
number increased from 5 to 406 of which FOSATU (Federation 
of South African Trade Unions) unions accounted for 285 or 
.75% of the agreements ( Maree 1987:7). As shown, by 1987 
this number had increased to 800. 
4.4.2 the nature of local bargaining 
Even if developments in the collective bargaining structure 
wi th in the South Afr i can context suggests a correspondence 
with a world-wide shift towards local bargaining, 
generalisations of this sort remain problematic. For 
examp 1 e, not ori 1 y do the countr i es rev i ewed d i ffe r in the 
extent to which local bargaining (as defined in Chapter 2) 
constitutes a dominant component in their respective labour 
re 1 at ions systems, but a 1 so are not all instances of such 
barga in i ng necessar i 1 y of a simi 1 ar type or form. Stated 
otherwise, the mechanisms and structures through which such 
bargaining is presently conducted vary - not only within a 
particular industrial relations system, but also amongst 
different countries' systems. In South Africa's case, the 
differential participation in these structures according to 
race, represents an additional dimension to those above. To 
summarise briefly: 
. In West Germany, 
which essent~ally 
local bargaining involves works counci ls 
qualify as consultative structures or 
mechanisms. Another instance of local bargaining takes place 
between unions and the individual enterprise 
a 1 though it does. not seem to be the. norm at 
or company 
present. In 
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Japan local bargaining takes place between the enterprise 
union and the individual enterprise management. In some of 
these· enterprises, usually the small and medium-sized, 
informal negotiations take place resulting in informal 
'gentlemen's agreements'. 
The manner in which local bargaining is structured in 
Britain is of a particularly varied nature. Here bargaining 
can be conducted at single enterprise or company, plant and 
shopfloor levels. Much of the bargaining taking place 
between shop stewards in the plant/factory and management is 
st ill 'i nforma 1 " 'f ragmented ' and ' autonomous' in that it 
n~ed not result in formal written agreements. It is based on 
informal understanding, ·cus~om and practice resulting in 
tacit and unwritten agreements. It was these negotiations 
that the Donovan Commission wanted 'formalised' and 
'structured' in order to, according to Clegg, strengthen the 
! power of uni ons in the work place. However, the growth of 
formal plant negotiations and agreements has been identified 
as a growing feature of the present industrial relations 
scene in Britain. 
Local bargaining in the United States refers to formal 
bargaining conducted at the level of the plant or single-
enterprise, but mostly plant. It also involves informal 
shopfloor negotiations res01ting in informal agreements 
whereby the formal plant ag reements are often changed and 
modified. These informal bargaining activities are seen to 
be a function of the grievance process. 
-v Currently, local bargaining in South Africa is conducted 
through multi-racial works councils and by concluding 
recognition agreements at plant and enterprise level. Before 
1979, works and liaison committees were developed for 
African workers in the establishment. While white employers 
now, for the first time, have the opportunity to negotiate 
and bargain within the work place, these councils are for 
hi~torical and other reasons no real viable'option for the 
black employee. All in all, these in-plant structures have, 
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where in exi'sterice, p~imarily functioned as consultative 
mec~an~sms in the past and this will probably remain so for 
the foreseeable future. What has become the norm for many 
black workers, is the negotiation of recognition and other 
plant-based agreements with management.· This, development 
corresponds with the plant agreements being negotiated in 
British private industry. Recognition agreements are of 
course not pecul i'ar ·to South African labour relations. In 
Britain, 'there has been a proliferation of plant-level 
recognition agreements over the past decades' (Swart 
1988:506). The correspondence between recognition agreements 
in South African industrial relations and plant bargaining 
in the United States (and Canada) is simi larly argued by 
Cameron, Cheadle and Thompson (1989:27-28). Furthermore, the 
quest i on of recogn it i on has neve r rea 11 y been an issue in 
Europe, given that it 'seldom features very prominently at 
industry 1 eve 1 ' . 
4.4.3 the'rela~ive power of work placie representatives 
The relative power and autonomy of shop floor 
representatives i.e. shop stewards, vary from country to 
country - British shop stewards, as previously been noted,_ 
often being singled out as considerably powerful in the wor~ 
place. The reasons for. th is are not part i cu 1 ar 1 y clear, 
although. the long union 'history, the importance of 
democratic principles in the work place ani! the relative 
absence of government i ntervent ion in trade uni on affa irs 
until the 1960's and 1970's have been noted as con~ributing 
to this situation. 
Anothe r facto r a 1 so noted, was the i nab i 1 i ty of off i cia 1 
trade union machinery to provide solutions for problems 
experienced by workers in the work place (Hyman 1975; 
Littler 1983). Union security or the maintenance of the 
union has always been the prime concern of Wes·tern and 
Japanese unions resulting in British unions not picking l:IP 
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and 'resonate' th'e fears and resentments of the shopfloor. 
The shop steward movement was thus a symptom of growing 
tension between the need for general and domestic 
representation although, at least in its initial stages, 
motivated by radical and cyndicalist sentiments. Other 
considerations involved the spreading of payment-by-results 
schemes, labour demand and the declining role of employers' 
associations. 
The increasing involvement by stewards in work place 
bargaining must not be taken to imply that they never 
fulfilled significant functions in the past. In the British 
case, work place representatives enrolled new 
inspected membership cards, collected dues 
general rules and agreements. Eventually, 
(1981:197) poi~ts out, they 'outgrew the 
framework' within which they developed 
union members, 
and enforced 
as Hirszowicz 
institutional 
and started 
participating in unofficial bargaining with management. This 
power position was held even when formal plant bargaining 
became entrenched. The funct ions of Br it ish shop stewards 
had thus been dramatically transformed (Topham 1967:154; 
Banks 1974:34). As noted in Chapter 3, American shop 
stewards have always been part of the official union 
structure and subsequent 1 y enjoy 1 ess power and autonomy 
than their British counterparts. 
In the South African industrial relations context, labour 
leadership in work places - at least up till the 1970's -
was virtually non-existent due to the prominence that 
industry 1 eve 1 barga in i ng enjoyed as we 11 as efforts by 
employers to keep unions. out of the work place. Some unions 
did appoint shop stewards and their functions corresponded 
with those of British shop stewards before the 1960's. They 
acted as guard i ans of the i ndustr i a 1 counc i 1 ag reement, a 
grievance outlet and a communication mechanism between the 
union branch and the grass roots (Jones 1984:62). The 
upsurge of work place organisation and bargaining and 
accompanying growth of the shop steward's role have been 
sine qua non with the development and establishment of the 
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newer of more' tp~ogressive' unions since the 1970's (Webster 
1984 O'Neill 1988). 
The main strategy of the emerging black unions has been the 
concentration of work place organisation and the building of 
shop steward structures in se 1 ected work places (Webster 
1984:79-89). Shop stewards and their committees have become 
in Webster's words, 'the pivot of the organisational 
structures of these new·unions' (1984:81). Furthermore, shop 
steward structures have been formally incorporated in these 
unions' constitutions. The central role played by shop 
stewards in building union power in the work place has thus 
much in common with the powerful role assigned to British 
shop stewards in work places. The irma in funct ions are: 
representing the interests of union members in their 
department, protecting workers' rights against management, 
bargaining for the. whole plant on wages and working 
conditions, ensuring that concluded agreements are followed, 
constitu:ting a link between full-time union officials and 
members, establishing stable relationships between workers 
and management, resolving grievances within the work place, 
accounting to the shop floor - thereby ensuring a form of 
democracy, ensuring and maintaining worker control through 
shop steward representation on central· decision-making 
bodies or unions and combining in shop steward councils 
(Webster 1984:82-83). 
The centrality of the shop steward's role within the more 
'progressive' 
circumstances. 
preference 
involves 
unions is due to a variety of pressures and 
Of crucial relevance is these unions' 
factory or plant level bargaining which 
fosters higher levels of shop-floor 
for 
and 
involvement. Conversely, the focus of unions on shop steward 
structu res has aga in resu 1 ted in an increased emphas is on 
factory level bargaining; The strong commitment of the newer 
unions to worker democracy which demands direct 
communication between union officialdom and rank-and-file 
members obviously strengthens the role of shop stewards 
. . 
(O'Neill 1988). 
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4.4.4 local bargaining through alternative structures 
Local b·argaining does not necessarily imply a strong union 
presence in the plant or enterprise. Local bargaining can be 
conducted through structures that function independently of 
unions. The development of alternative structures tends to 
occu r whe re un ions are weak or even absent at the 1 oca 1 
level e.g. Germany's works councils and the committee system 
and works councils in South Africa. It can be argued of 
course, that the presence of these structures may result in 
unions not having the opportunity to gain and exercise power 
at the place of work. For, where unions are strong in the 
work place, the chances of alternative structures 
developing, are limited. In Britain, no alternative 
structures comparabl e to German works counci 1 shave 
developed although shop stewards have gained independent 
powers to negotiate and bargain. 
In the South African context .. , alternative structures (i .e. 
committees before 1979 and multi-racial councils after 1979) 
were developed with the very specific· aim of keeping African 
unions out of the work place. For example, before the 1977 
amendments, some companies suggested 'beefing up liaison 
committees so that they would fulfil, in theory, all the 
functions of a union'. Companies were to set up their own 
tunions' and bargain with them in preference to those formed 
by toutsiders' (Friedman 1987:133). Thus, while the 
industrial council system achieved this for white, coloured 
and Asian employees, the in-plant or factory committees kept 
African unions out. The existence of multi-racial councils 
after 1979, can similarly be interpreted as fostering 
central ised bargaining and constraining the development of 
strong unionism at the local level. Although representing 
a 1 ternat i ve structures, these commi ttees and counci 1 s were 
never comparable to the German councils in terms of 
·acceptance and barga in i ng status. The works counc i 1 shave 
remained internal organs of management and deny the 
presence of trade unions in the work place (Jones 1984:64). 
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The. development o~ bargaining mechanisms other than unions, 
highlights the view of Blumberg (1968:163) i.e. that unions 
are not necessari ly the sole representative structures for 
worl<ers' interests in industry - therein oPPoslng Clegg's 
view - b~t rather that, where councils function to promote 
and protect .the interests of workers as producers, un ions 
aim to protect workers as employees. Real industrial 
pluralism exists 'when workers acquire a rich diversity of 
organisations to represent their industrial in:terests 
When unions succeed in establishing themselves at the local 
level, the chances. of establ ishing alternative structures 
through which local bargaining could be conducted, are 
remote. This is illust~ated in the case of the United St~tes 
and Bri ta in. where un ions are. strong 1 y represented at the 
work place as well as South Africa regar~ing African 
,employees and' the newer'independent unions. The relative 
failure of works~ councils at present must be partly 
interpreted against the growth of the new unions within 
establishments. 
Of course, as observers have noted, these alter-native and 
essentially con~ultative ~achinery, have provided black 
un ions an entry into plants and factor i es (Maree 1987). 
Un ions have gained a footho 1 d with i n estab 1 ishments wh i ch 
otherwise would have been extremely difficult. Once 
established, the shop' steward .is the central figure in 
bu{lding a powerful work place organisation. 
4.4.5 t~e presence of dual structures at local level 
The presence of works councils or other alternative 
mechanisms could, and often do, create a dual structure 
within an enterprise or plant - thereby creating competition 
for worker loyalty and the possible weakening of the union 
presence. This is seen by Blumberg (1968) to be the case in 
Germany where works counci 1 soften dri ve a wedge between 
.workers and unions depriving unions of considerable power 
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and. grassroots influence. Unions often react by penetrating 
councils and trying to take over these councils. In Chapter 
3, 'menti on is made of the poss i b i 1 i ty of works ag reements 
supp 1..ement i ng industry/reg i ona 1 ag reements rathe r than 
const i tut i ng autonomous ag reements. Th is trend is aided by 
the inclusion of 'opening clauses' in an increasing number 
of industry/regional agreements. Hereby, the adaptation of 
collective. agreements to the plant level is recognised. 
In countries where industry-wide structures predominate e.g. 
Germany and other Western European countries (and also South 
Africa, at least up to 1979), unions normally do not 
actively feature at plant or enterprise level. This follows 
from quasi-bargaining functions being assigned to works 
counci ls, shop stewards and simi lar institutions regulated 
by statute or agreements. The genera 1 sh i ft to more 
decentralised ba~gaining now means that unions are becoming 
more visible in the work place and often seek to strengthen 
relationships with rank-and-file e.g. black unions in South 
Africa. Overlapping of functions' often result in this 
process. In spite of differences existing between unions and 
other forms of employee representation, works councils often 
act more and more as 'vi gorous representat i ves' of 
employees' i,nterests vis-a-vis the employer. In other words, 
councils are acting increasingly more like unions. The 
historical function of chiefly promoting labour and 
management co-operation, is thus de-emphasised (Windmuller 
1987:151-152). 
Works councils as examples of alternative structures can, in 
the absence of a unified trade union movement, play. a 
unifying role· within an establishment. If they ara to 
funct ion in th is way, Blumberg ( 1986) suggests that 
councils' plant representations must, to some extent, be and 
remain independent of unions. 
In the. fi na 1 anal ys is however, the nature of the 
relationship between unions and alternative structures 
where they co-ex i st wi 1 1 depend not on 1 y on the 
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circumstances ~r~vailing in a particular plant or enterprise 
but'also on the history and tradition of worker organisation 
'and representative structures within a particular country. 
Given the historical legacy of ~orks councils in South 
Africa, the chances of the latter ,seriously competing with 
especially black unions within an establishment, is rem6te. 
Equally remote at this stage, > is the possibi 1 ity of such 
councils succeeding in fulfilling a unifying role within 
plants. Black unionism, rather than works counci ls, is the 
unifying mechanism operating in establishments at present. 
Where 1 oca 1 barga i ni ng is we 11 estab 1 i shed in the 
enterprise, plant or factory andc'O-exists with consultative 
structu res/bod i es prope r, the :d'ist i nct i on between the 
bargaining process and consultation proper could become less 
clear cut (Windmuller 1987). The separation between the two 
in, for example, Britain and Japan, will however not 
60mpletely disappear for as Windmuller notes, both 
management and employees may be seen to benefit from such 
!pure' consultative machinery. 
Trade unions in South Africa, especially the newer black 
unions, as Horwitz (1988) shows, prefer to advance their 
interests through the distributive process of collective 
bargaining very much like in the Britain. Co-operative 
relationships between management and labour is no viable 
option for the immediate future given the absence of 
participation by blacks in the pol itical system and the 
pressures brought to bear on black unionism through security 
and other legislation. Unionism remains the only mechanism 
,through which grievances, fostering conflict or distributive 
orientated bargaining, can be channelled. 
4.4.6 
Finally, 
implies 
bargaining skills of management and workers 
the 
an 
establishment of 
active bargaining 
viable local bargaining 
role being assigned to 
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management and tequires 
sk ills· to negot i ate and 
the latter having the necessary 
ba rg·a in with the emp 1 oyees of a 
particular establishment. The need for specialised human 
resou rces management sk i 11 s and know-how has also come to 
light in the South African context with the g~owth of 
recognition and other local agreements. For many years, as 
argued, virtually no bargaining was conducted at local level 
resulting in management exercising virtually unilateral 
power over their workforce. The establishment of quasi-
bargaining committees and works councils did not in any way 
alter this situation for management, most of the times, 
succeeded in manipulating these structures. The growth of 
shop floor· committees and 
drastically modified this 
bargaining has from 
the independent un ions have now 
state of affairs. Where local 
the beginning been strongly 
institutionalised e.g. in the United States or even Japan, 
managers are genera 11 y more equ i pped wi th the· necessary 
skills and competence in local negotiations. When 
consultation proper takes place within an establishment, 
management skills have become equally relevant. 
South African managers have been developing their bargaining 
skills through programmes and courses devised and presented 
by, for examp 1 e, bus i ness schoo 1 s and the I nst i tute for 
Industrial Relations. While the Industrial Court provides 
written guidelines for negotiating and bargaining purposes, 
its determinations in disputes have also been useful. 
With regard to black workers, shop stewards mainly acquire 
bargaining skills through training within union structures. 
Uni ons are often faced, however, wi th inadequate manpower 
facilities and funds to always provide the necessary 
training. In the final analysis, bargaining experience 
rema ins cruc i a 1 for successfu 1 and construct i ve barga in i ng 
on the part of managers and worker representatives. 
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PART THREE 
THE' DEV'ELOPMENT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL BARGAINING IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
In any country the collective bargaining structure develops 
as an integra 1 part of that country's i ndustr i a 1 re 1 at ions 
system. This happens tnot so much as the result of a series 
of coincidences or historical accidents as.of the cumulative 
effect of identifiable factors' (Windmuller 1987:83). It is 
argued here that in the final analysis, the bargaining 
structure and levels that develop and become established are 
a function of the attitudes and preferences of the parties 
involved i.e. employers and employees. These attitudes are 
ultimately connected with the parties' 'view as to how their 
respective interests and needs are to be served given 
particular circumstances at a spec,ific point in time. The 
decisions that are finally taken, can be seen as the outcome 
of an agreement between the parties, by the superior power 
of one party relative to the other or taken by an 
appropriate government agency who has been given the 
authority to make such a decision. 
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Evidence seem to suggest that neither employers nor labour 
are bound to·a particular predetermined ideal level of 
bargaining. Their attitudes must be interpreted within a 
much wider context of perceived interests, needs and' 
ultimately bargaining power. The latter ;s crucial in that 
the ability of either party to get their preferred level 
established, depends in the final analysis on their power 
and strength vis-a.-vis the other. In a recent article on 
industrial relations trends in the Eastern Cape, Anstey 
(1989:40) reaches a similar conclusion: 
In effect barga in; ng systems advocated by the part i es 
reflect their specific needs and pressures, and are 
efforts to ach i eve pos it ions of increased' contro 1 or to 
neutra 1 i se other party's attempts to do so - as such 
they are issues of interest rather than right. Viable 
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systems . erne rge as the part i es engage, conf ront, 
. pressure and accommodate one another ina process of 
ev~lving power relations. 
The attitudes and preferences of the respective parties for 
a particular level may of course coincide, but it may be so 
for di fferent reasons and cons i derat ions. Furthermore, the 
bargaining structure, once it has been established, persists 
for a long time and has in turn significant consequences for 
the relevant parties" notably 'their power relative to one 
another and the outcome of negotiations between them. 
Any attempt to account or even partly account for the 
development/establishment of a particular bargaining level 
must take the historical context within which a particular 
bargaining structure develops, into consideration. Jowell 
(1988:64) confirms this when she argues that bargaining 
level is ta product of history, of managements' perceived 
best interests, of their bargaining partners' perceived best 
interests and,finally, the relative bargaining strength 
that either of the two main parties can use to secure their 
interests at any point in their history.' This, of course, 
is not to say that t history' can fu 11 y account for 
bargaining structures, but it may be viewed as to at least 
partly account for the development of the current structure 
(Windmuller 1987). 
Within the context of 
factors come to bear 
historical developments, important 
on the development of bargaining 
structures within 
relations system 
a particular society's industrial 
t some towards centralisation other 
towards decentralisation, while still others might oscillate 
in either direction' (Windmuller 1987). The identification 
and ro 1 e of such factors not on 1 y requ ire an anal ys is of 
countries where local bargaining has always been the 
predominant level but also necessitates an analysis of 
decentra 1 is i ng tl-ends in those countr i es whose barga in i ng 
structures have always been essentially. ce~tralised. The 
latter's relevancy follows from the fact that many of these 
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bargaining structures', as was shown, are exhibiting trends 
towards increasing decentralisation and'a move towards local 
lev'el bargaining. 
Accounting for the development of local bargaining 
necessitates the identification of forces operating in this 
trend. Of particular significance is the socio-economic and 
political factors that come to bear on the industrial 
relations of a country and aspects thereof. This is 
essentially the point Douwes Dekker (1986:41-42) makes when 
he notes: 
The reward i ng, frustrat i ng and cha 11 eng i ng aspects of 
industrial relations stem from its location in the 
socio-economic reality of' a society and the 
requ i rements that it be bu i 1 t on the hi stor i ca 1 and 
cultural specifics of that society. 
These socio-economic and political considerations constitute 
the environmental context within which a particular 
country's bargaining patterns develop. In Chapters 6 and 7 
of this section, the lnfluence of these environmental 
factors on the deve 1 opment and estab 1 i shment of 1 oca 1 1 eve 1 
bar g a i n i n g w i 11 be ex p lor e d . I n par tic u 1 a r , the f 0 c u s w i 11 
be on macro-economic considerations, government policy and 
labour legislation. 
The distinction between these factors is primarily an 
analytical one and accounting for local bargaining in terms 
of these variables, is problematic. The following comments 
highlight some of the more salient problem areas: 
1 . The so-call ed env i ronmenta 1 factors cannot be seen or 
interpreted as to fully explain the development of 
local bargaining. At the very most, they must be seen 
as to relate to such development. In a sense they 
represent necessary but not sufficient conditions. Put 
d i ffe rent 1 y , they may ,be viewed as const i tut i ng a 
conducive structure of some sort for suqh development. 
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'.2. The development of 1 oca 1 bargain i ng and the re 1 at i ve 
prominence it enjoys within the industrial relations 
sy~tem of a particular cou~try, is the function of the 
.complex interaction between different factors at a 
3. 
particular point in time. 
political factors do not 
Thus, economi c and soc i 0-
function independently or 
autonomous 1 y but are i nterre 1 ated and interconnected 
the nature of which will vary from time to time within 
a specific society. 
The relative significance or weight 
factor for such deve 1 opment vari es 
of a particular 
between different 
countries' bargaining arrangements as well as within a 
particular country. The relative significance or weight 
of a specific factor may also vary over time and within 
specific historical configurations. 
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4. As argued .in Chapter 2, local bargaining is defined as 
to encompass enterp r i se!company , plant and shopf 1 oor 
bargaining conducted. formally or informally. It is to' 
be expected that some of these factors tend to re 1 ate 
more to certain manifestations of local bargaining than 
to others. 
5. As implied in the above paragraphs, there is no simple 
one-to-one relationship between a particular 
environmental factor and local bargaining. Rather, the 
latter must be seen as the outcome of the complex 
interaction between various factors. This complex 
network of interrelationships between a whole range of 
factors complicates any attempt to systematically 
account for the development of local bargaining. 
Furthermore - and this is a crucial point - factors may 
be seen to relate. to bargaining levels not necessarily 
i n an y .$..t.m.P . .J .. e. ... _. __ .. ?UQ ...... _...!;;U ... .r..e..Q..:t way, but rat her v i a the 
intervening variables of 'the attitudes, and more 
pertinently, power of the bargaining parties 
conditioned by perceptions of vested interests. Equally 
important is the fact that· the attitudes, power and 
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interests 6fthe par~iei invariably feed back into some 
of these factors. I~ i~thus suggested here, and 
hopefully to be substantiated, that socio-political and 
. economi c factors more often pe rta into the bargain i ng 
power of the re 1 evant part i es than they re 1 ate to· the 
development of local bargaining in any simple and 
direct way. Aga in, broad soc i eta 1 factors also do not 
!tell the whole story'. For, in addition to socio-
pol itical and economic considerations, cond,itions 
pertaining to a specific establishment (plant or 
enterprise) may also foster (or discourage) the 
development and establishment of local bargaining. In 
Chapter 8, these factors are outlined and discussed. 
/ 
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CHAPTER 5 
HISTORICAL 
PATTERNS 
5.1 
CONTEXT: 
Introduction 
UNIONS, EMPLOYERS AND BARGAINING 
The historical developments of trade unions, employers' 
organisations and bargaining patterns, and the relevancy for 
bargaining levels, are particularly well demonstrated in 
those countries discussed in Chapter 3. 
In the case of Britain, fo~ example, early trade unionism or 
'new model'unionism was mainly characterised by craft unions 
or organising workers with specific trade ski 1 ls. By 1914, 
however, this type of unionism was already showing signs of 
declining in relative prominence. While artisan or craft 
unions remained dominant in certain industries e.g. building 
and printing and some parts of iron and steel, they wer:e 
increasingly being- seen as inappropriate in the light of 
mechanisation and the growing numbers of unsl~illed and semi-
skilled workers in the workforce. (Greenberg 1980:279). 
Historically then, artisan unions were followed by the 
establ ishment of industrial unions which led some artisan 
unions to dilute their craft and accommodate lesser skilled 
workers. Industrial unions combined all worl<ers within a 
particular industry irrespective of trade or occupation and 
were already enjoying some popularity by the end of the 19th 
century (Jackson 1977). Generally speaking, unionism was 
centrally met with fierce resistance from the side of 
employers who saw the collective organisation of labour as a 
threat to the relative uncontested power they exercised over 
the labour force. 
Multi-employer or industry-wide bargaining was from the 
beginning most acceptable to both unions and employers but 
especially to the latter. They (employers) viewed industry-
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wide bargaining as advantageous to their vested interests 
for· the following considerations: (1) it reinforced the 
bargaining power of the employer if solidarity between 
employers .could be established and maintained; (2) it 
minimised competition between individual employers because 
wages cou 1 d be estab 1 i shed at 1 eve 1 s that were seen to be 
acceptable to the marginal firms (Gladstone 1984:37-38); (3) 
unions could be successfully kept out of the work place and 
at·the point of production and (4) unions would be 
restricted in their encroachment on managerial authority and 
prerogatives (Windmuller 1987:85). 
On the side of labour, industrial and so-called general 
unions preferred industry level bargaining as it was 
pe rce i ved to be advantageous to the i r i nte rests as we 11 . 
Gi ven that wages were kept out of compet it i on and 
tundercutting' eliminated, a tstandard rate' was guaranteed 
to workers. 
British unions' link especially the socialist element 
thereof - with the Labour Party and broader po 1 it i ca 1 aims 
has always been less than clear-cut. Unions in Britain not 
on 1 y. focus on economi c and i ndustr i ali ssues , but they are 
also concerned with the tgood' of society .in general and 
wider aims and aspirations mak,ing them a pressu~e group and 
tcause' movement. Poole (1984b:55), in a similar vein, 
refers to a t range of egal itarian-democratic ideas' which 
have influenced the labour movement since the late 1960's. 
The role of the Labour government and its tsympathetic' 
att i tude towards 1 abou r and un ions can of cou rse not be 
denied. This 'was obvious when the pre,sent Conservative 
government came into power and tshattered the post-war 
i nst i tut i ona 1 structure'. As poi nted out by Grundberg 
(1986:521), one of the strongest shopfloor labour movements 
has been dea 1 t t repea ted blows and has been fragmented and 
demoralised'. Thus, while unions in Britain have preceded 
the development of political parties, there does exist a 
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link between unions and parties although not to the extent 
found in Europe. 
The development of American unionism bears certain 
resemblances with that of its British counterpart. Unions 
were also initially craft-based and similarly remained 
dominant in certain sectors while eventually opening up 
thei r ranks to 1 esser sk ill ed workers in other sectors, it 
also encountered strong employer opposition and it was not 
initially inspired by ~ particular political ~hilosophy but 
instead had strictly economic aims and objectives although 
not exclusively so' (Frenkel 1986:80; Jackson 1977:55-56). 
Like Br it ish un ions, they had preceded the deve 1 opment of 
political parties sympathetic to their aims. Thi~ meant, and 
still means, that unions have not had any overly strong link 
with a political philosophy which has the reconstruction of 
the society. as its objective. Unions therefore, do not 
really function or operate as a political pressure power 
group. When they do act as a pressure group,' they do so on 
industrial rather than general social matters' (Jackson 
1977:73). 
The role of the social and political 'environment in 
discouraging broader pol itical aims of unions is argued by 
Kochan (1980:165-166) as well. ~he American society, he 
says, 'has historically been unreceptive and often 
repressive to any radical social movement that threatened or 
challenged the basic premises of the free enterprise 
capitalistic system'. Referring to the fact that communists 
and socialists provided leadership for union organisation in 
the 1930's and 1940's, he concludes that efforts to implant 
communist and social ist pol itical ideology among the rank-
and-fi le members met with very 1 ittle success. The main 
reason for this was that the envi ronmental pressures were 
reinforced by American workers' 'lack of class 
consciousness' which 'precluded the formation or growth of a 
radical labour movement'. 
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A comparison be'tween American and British unions also 
, \ 
highli~hts important differences. For example, American 
unions did not develop and expand at the same rate as those 
in Britain and remained craft-based for a much longer 
period. The opposition 
fierce' - unions often 
it exper i enced was a 1 so much more 
being labelled as 'un-American'. 
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Although unions in both countries were represented by a 
single central organisation i.e. TUC and AFL-CIO, these, 
organisations differed in their history, coverage and 
general acceptance (Jackson 1977:57). 
The establishment of single-enterprise and plant bargaining 
was much favoured by American employers because they were 
extremely competitive in their relationship to one another. 
With the increase in the size of firms, employers developed 
a high degree of autonomy and se 1 f-suff i c i ency in the i r 
dealings with the employees in their organisations 
(Windmuller:85-86). The American society is often seen as to 
embody the principles of democracy and a free~market system 
to a greater extent than Britain and most other Western 
societies. The principles of 1 iberal ism and democracy are 
seen as deeply rooted in the societal structure with a 
strong emphasis on individual achievement. This strong 
competitive element is generally seen as an important 
consideration as to why employers on the whole refrained 
from organising themselves in employers' associations as in 
Britain and ,Western Europe and not co-operate with one 
another for the common benef it. Ment ion is also made by 
Windmuller (1987) of the American public's hostility towards 
mergers by corporations and cartelisation which can be seen 
as reflected in a whole range of anti-trust laws especially 
since the 1930's. When legislation was introduced in the 
1930's, it favoured the attitudes and preferences of 
employers - given· their economic power at that particular 
stage (Hyman 1975). 
Unions were also seen to prefer' dealings with management 
within the local boundaries of the plant and' enterprise. As 
Windmuller 'points out, unions found it easier to organise 
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and win barga in i ng rights by concentrat i ng the i r resources 
on the.mostpromising enterprise or parts thereof instead of 
taking on the entire industry (1987:86). 
Somewhat different historical circumstances existed in 
Western Europe. There unions did not have such a long 
history as those in Britain and the United States and formal 
bargaining structures in most instances developed only 
during the 'post-World War II reconstruction period. 
Employers organised collectively for very much the same 
reasons as those ·in Britain did resulting in the 
neutral isation of the work place from trade union activity 
(Anstey 1989). On 1 abou r side, the overa 11 structu re of 
Western European un ions played an important ro 1 e in 
establishing industry and national level bargaining. Jackson 
(1977:59) illustrates this by referring to West German 
unions which ~xhibit a much simpler structure compared to, 
for example, British unions. They are predominantly 
structured on the basis of industrial unionism. Of course, 
not all European unions conform to the German model but 
their structure is, comparatively speaking, still less 
complicated than those of Britain. 
Two add it i ona 1 factors are seen by Hi 11 (1983: 154-155) to 
have contributed to European unions not being divided to the 
same extent as those in the United'States and Britain. The 
first is patterns of industrial development· and structure 
and the consequences for creati~g and establishing different 
un i on movements. I n the case of Sweden, rap i d 
industrial·isation during the end of the 19th century did not 
create the type of craft-sector found in America and Britain 
but instead contributed to an 'undivided manual union 
movement'. In France, occupational and skill-differences did 
exist but labour market conditions) especially labour 
shortages during the 19th century, raised the rewards of the 
unski lled labourers. This minimised the gap between ski lled 
and unskilled 
important and 
develop. 
workers, sectional interests became 
an undivided manual union movement 
less 
could 
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The second factor that influenced occupational sectionalism 
was . th~ role of socialism as ideology and philosophy. 
European unions have been closely linked with socialism in 
the past, mainly as a result of socialist oriented political 
parties preceding the development of unions. (Kassalow 
1982). The significance of socialism has meant that labour 
had political aims directed at the reconstruction of the 
capitalist structure through an essentially socialist 
revolution. Unions were always seen to be important 
instruments in the creation of a socialist consciousness 
amongst the working classes although, as pointed out in 
Chapter 1 , pessimism has set in as to the extent to which 
unions can fulfill this task. Although divisions, especially 
along .religious lines, existed between unions, political 
un i ty was deemed as of g reate r importance than sect i ona 1 
interests leading to the amalgamation of unions in those 
co u n t r i e s w her e the y were 0 rig ina 11 y 0 r g ani sed a 1 0 n g c r aft 
1 i nes e. g. Ge rmany. These deve 1 opments meant that 1 abou r 
most probably preferred bargaining at more centralised 
levels because they were bargaining collectively' as manual 
workers or as a ccl ass '. Bargaining on jndustry and national 
wide basis created the potential for solidifying a 
collective labour movement. 
Unions and employers in Japan have a long and somewhat 
unique history and tradition. The first labour unions, 
similar to those in the West, developed at the turn of th~ 
last century. These were American-type craft unions similar 
in organisation and aims. They suffered, however, from 
internal weaknesses as well as opposition from employers and 
police being perceived as a threat to stability and 
order (Okoch i 1974). By 1901 th is movement came to an end 
only to be succeeded by a secon~ labour movement after World 
War I. Two types of unions were organised. One was the craft 
or industrial union (sometimes mixed) organised within a 
local labour market and based in many cases on radical 
socialist ideologies. Within the context of tradi~ional 
status relationships, these unions were not considered by 
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emp 1 oyers or ,g'overnment as equal barga in i ng part i es. These 
uni6nsunit~d with the socialist movement in order to change 
working, conditions and social relationships by 
revoluti6nising the economic and political system. 
The second type of union was the by now well-known 
enterprise union organised within single enterprises by 
employees and initially called 'vertical' unions. Such 
unions, according to Okochi (1974:46) were 'established 
within companies where lifetime employment relations had 
emerged and where, therefore, no contract ex i sted through 
the labour market between employees of different 
enterprises'. Lifetime employment relations were to be 
established mainly in large-scale firms. In very small 
businesses, master-servant relations based on the 
authorative family system, prevailed (Hill 1983). 
Thus, when collective bargaining was firmly established 
after World War II, it was the enterprise level that 
predominated in most large firms in Japan. There are certain 
similarities between Japanese and Americ~n decentralised 
bargaining in that' national negotiations were not deemed 
feasible. This is so because in both these countries, the 
upper level national union and management organisations have 
much less authority over their affiliates compared to the 
central union and employer federations in most other 
industrial democracies with the possible exception of 
Britain. The similarity between these two countries however 
ends in the decentra 1 i sed bargain i ng structu re i tse 1 f for 
the roots of these structures differ significantly. While 
factors e.g. size of country, the competitive nature of the 
economy and organisational patterns among unions and 
employers. play an' important role in the American context, 
other factors operate in the case of Japan's enterprise 
level bargaining notably the 'absence of social 
distinctions drawn from occupational differentiation' and 
the 'relative particularism that characterises Japanese life 
in general' (Okochi 1974: 503). It must also be kept in mind 
that American representatives' presence in Japan following 
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World War 11, .had a marked influence on the nature of 
Japan's labour relations system. 
This historical account does not exhaust the complex factors 
underlying the development of enterprise bargaining within 
I . the Japanese context, especlally the changes that have 
occurred in the nature. of the Japanese workforce. The 
shortage of labour during crucial periods in Japanese 
economic development led to the practice, followed by large 
firms, to recruit young workers that had just completed 
schopl education. These employees were trained according to 
the specific skill requirements of a particular firm which 
made mobility between firms extremely difficult. This 
mechanism of recruitment ensured employers of a relative 
stable workforce. We can safely conclude that Japanese 
, 
employers and employees favoured enterprise bargaining for a 
variety of reasons - some traditional, some economic - but 
in the final analysis, enterprise bargaining best sui.ted 
their respec~ive needs and interests. 
5.2 The hi stor i ca 1 context of barg·a in i ng structu res in 
South Africa 
The history of South African trade unions, employers' 
associations and bargaining patterns ~specially its 
dualistic nature - is intrinsically bound to the history of 
co 1 on i a 1 conquest of the reg i on and the natu re o'f 
industrialisation commencing in the late 19th century. 
The period of colonial conquest (1652-1870) was 
characterised by territorial expansion and the subsequent 
loss by the indigenous peoples of the exclusive control· and 
use of land (Browett 1982:10-14). In some instances, e.g. 
Cape and Natal, labour shortage resulted in the importation 
of Indians and slaves. In the two Boer Republics, labour was 
ensured by various systems e.g. servitude, squatter tenant 
systems and sharecropp i ng . A 11 these' ar rangements 
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consolidated in the incorporation of the indigenous peoples 
wit~in· the so-called 'white' economy in a subordinate 
position. 
5.2.1 the significance of the mining industry 
The discovery of minerals introduced industrialisation 
proper to an essentially agrarian society. It was however, 
the experiences of the goldmining.industry which was to have 
a profound effect on the South African society and its 
political, social and economic structures. The dominant 
influence of the mining industry on the whole socio-economic 
fabric of South Africa during the years that were to follow, 
has been substantively documented by all prominent observers 
of trade union development. In the words of Stadler 
(1987:37): 
The social and economic order established· with its 
centre on the gold fields of the Witwatersrand produced 
an effective absolutism over the pastoral and ~grarian 
communities of Southern Africa which by the turn of the 
century had coerced hundreds of thousands of labourers 
into employment on the mines. 
From the beginning a shortage of skilled labour developed in 
the mining industry only to be relieved by the employment of 
skilled immigrants from Europe and especially from Britain 
and Austra 1 i a. High wages were pa i d to these workers in 
ord.er to attract and retain them. They also brought with 
them the i r own trad it i on and brand of i ndustr i a 1 re 1 at ions 
\ 
based primarily on a conflict orientation and ideas of trade 
unions modelled on the British gui ld system. Given thei r 
monopo 1 y of sk i 11 sand expe r i ence, they came to const i tute 
from the very beginning the 'aristocracy' of the local 
labour market on the Witwatersrand. 
Due to certain features of the South African goldmining 
industry, the profitability of the industry -became largely 
dependent on the avail ab i 1 i ty of a cheap and contro 11 ed 
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1 abour force. Because of the depth of the ore, product ion 
wasriighly capital intensive and costly. Furthermore, as the 
gold p~ice was internationally fixed, mi"ning companies were 
unable to pass increases in production costs to consumers. 
The average gold content of the ore was also low (Johnstone 
1976). Thus, both 'control over the process of recruitment 
and control over the conditions of l"iving as well as working 
became vita 1 to the prof i tab i 1 i ty of the who 1 eel aborate 
enterprise' (Stadler 1987:38) 
Faced with these dilemmas, small mining companies 
, 
amalgamated into big corporations and devised arrangements 
to reduce labour costs and increase output. These 
arrangements consolidated trends towards the jncraasing 
subordination of blacks, resulting in the destruction of the 
indigenous economy and the consolidation of white supremacy. 
The increasing "mechanisation of production, accompanied by 
deskilling of tasks, contributed even further to the growing 
dependency on cheap unskilled labour (Lewis 1984). Given 
that Afr i cans represented the core of the unsk ill ed 1 abour 
pool, they came to constitute the greatest threat to skilled 
European workers. The substitution of white skilled labour 
by cheaper unsk ill ed bl ack 1 abour had become a very rea 1 
possibility. This contributed greatly to white workers 
viewing themselves, first and foremost, not as industrial 
workers but as white (and thus privileged) industrial 
workers with obvious implications for a potential unified 
worker movement in South Africa. 
The potential employment of cheap black labour was not the 
only threat bei~g posed at the skilled immigrant worker. The 
end of the Ang 10- Boe r War du ring the first years of the 
prese~t century, left a vast number of white farmers 
homeless and destitute many of whom migrated "to theu rban 
industrial areas in the hope of securing viable jobs. These 
poor and unskilled white workers similarly constituted a 
pool of cheap labour for the mine owners.' However, both 
groups of white workers - skilled and unskilled - possessed 
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political and trade union rights which they could use to 
res ist' reduct ion ,i n the i r' wages (N'cube 1987: 11 ) . They 
constituted, in Greenberg's terms, the tdominant' wage-
earning'population or tbounded wor!<in'g class' being composed 
of or including in various proportions, an taristocracy' and 
a tlower stratum'. Both of these groupings were 
differentiated from the tsubordinate' wage-earning 
population of the tproletariat' proper (1980:277). 
Lewis (1984) points out, however, ,that unskilled Africans 
were preferred by employers to 'poor white' Afrikaners 
because they could be paid even lower wages and were subject 
to extra-economic controls. Africans were compelled into the 
labour market by poll tax and, once at the- mines, Master and 
Servants. 1 aws, pass 1 aws and the compound system made it 
difficult to leave. 
White European workers had already started to organise 
themse 1 ves into un ions in order to secu re the,i r i nte rests 
against mine-owners and, from the 1890's, employed militant 
tactics (Lewis 1984). Most of these unions were of the 
sk ill ed or ar't 'j san types close 1 y resemb 1 ; ng those of the 
British. The beginning of the ,20th century witnessed various 
strikes by white and black workers on the mines and railways 
- a feature that was of great concern to the authorities. 
Various legislation was introduced to curtail violence and 
commissions of inquiry into labour relations were set up. 
World War I partly stabilised the situation - a situation 
that was to last up till the 1920's. Secondary and service 
industries had developed by then, employing mainly unskilled 
and especially semi-ski 1 led workers from all race groups. 
These employees subsequently came to organise themselves 
into unions as well. 
Despite various legislative measures such as the 1911 
Mines and Works Act - to secure positions for white workers 
on the mines, the potential threat posed by available black 
labour, remained. The falling gold price" the increasing 
strike rate and increasing mechanisation combined to 
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~xacerbate the situatibni eventually culminating in the 1922 
Rand Rebellion'and the crushing thereof by the government of 
the' day. This occurrence is c'rucial for the analysis of 
collective bargaining in that it tesulted in government 
intervention proper in the sphere of labour relations. 
5.2.2 craft unions 
Artisan unions emerged' at critical points in industry 
where groups of workers in skilled or strategic 
positions were able to formalise by organization their 
scarcity or importance. They made a special claim to 
status in the industry and to protection from the 
competition of unorganized and unskilled operatives 
(Greenberg 1980:278). 
Given the crucial role played by the British immigrants 
during the initial stages of industrialisation in the mining 
industry, it comes as no surprise that the history of 
unionism, 
in South 
employers' 
Africa 
organisations 
have much in 
and bargaining. patterns 
common with British 
developments. Trade unions first emerged among the highly 
skilled and paid workers following the British, and to some 
extent, American example of craft organisation (Williams 
. . 
1979; Lewis 1983). This followed from the fact that as late 
as 1913, unions and their leadership in South Africa had 
remained largely in the hands of British immigrants on the 
Witwatersrand (Williams 1979:63-64). 
The. assoc'iation of race with possession of skills, already 
entrenched in the traditional South African way of 1 ife, 
combined with Australian racial protectionism (Lewis 1984; 
Williams 1979), the threat of cheap African and Chinese 
labour - the latter being introduced in 1903.and 1904 in the 
Transvaal and the Chamber of Mines' threat to lower 
production costs by employing African labour, result'ed in, 
what Williams calls, 'a form of highly race conscious craft 
unionism' in the mining industry (1979:68)~ Two forms or 
types of racial discrimination characterised the mining-
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industry i. e. 'wage _ co lour bars' enforced by emp 1 oyers in 
order to reduce 1 abou r costs and 'j ob co lou r bars" enforced 
by 'government and white miners and unions to secure 
,important jobs for whites, Cape coloureds and Mauritian 
Creoles (Johnstone 1976). Both these 'bars' entrenched 
racial discrimination at the work place. 
str i kes by wh i te craft un ions aga i nst the intent i on of the 
Chamber of Mines to change the status quo agreement which 
regulated the ratio of whites to black workers and dismiss 
unskilled and semi-skilled white 
Rand Rebellion. This action by 
miners, resulted in the 
the unions is generally 
interpreted as the final mi 1 itant expression of the closed 
craft unions in trying to protect itself from the existing 
availability of cheaper labour. 
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Craft uniQnism of course, was not restricted to the mining 
industry and as Lewi s (1984) and others have shown, craft 
and artisan unions soon came to characterise other 
i ndustr i es as we 11 e. g. ra i1 ways and i ron and stee 1 in the, 
late 1920's. These unions also in time came to adopt the 
principle of racial exclus'iveness characterising the mine 
unions. However, important, differences as to the 
organ i sat i on and strateg i es emp 1 oyed, ex i sted between them 
and the mine unions during the early years. 
Whi le the correspondence between organising workers along 
craft lines with developments in the United States and 
Britain is usually recognised, the racial exclusiveness of 
South African artisan unions is often viewed as somewhat 
unique although not exclusively so as pointed out by 
Greenberg's comparative analysis of unionism (1980). 
Caution, however, must prevai 1 in interpreting early trade 
unionism in South Africa exclusively in terms of the racial 
dimension. 
Following Lewis', approach which is based on Braverman's 
(1974) work, trade unionism is essentially ,'a response to 
the way in wh i ch work is organ i sed' and 'changes in trade 
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union forms and strategies take place within the limits set 
by the .development of the particular labour process'. This 
approach, as Lewis warns, must not be interpreted as being 
overly technically deterministic for it does not negate or 
exclude the influence of. pol itical and ideological 
considerations. As noted by him ... 'The same political and 
ideological considerations which bear on society as a whole 
also influence ·trade unionists and their 
organisation'(1984:3). 
In accordance with Hyman's (1975) conceptualisation, Lewis 
defines craft unions very specifically as being founded on 
the principle of unilateral control. Thus the union has the 
exclusive right to determine the rules of the trade, rates 
of pay and enforce these measures. The key to the South 
African craft unions thus lay, as O'Meara (1983b) notes, in 
the fact that the unions, and not management, determined the 
criteria for, and control admission to, the craft. This was 
made possible by unions through rigorous' apprenticeship 
rules and could only exiit where skilled workers 'retained a 
strategic position within the production process' (Lewis 
1984:19). The craft ·union is thus a very potent weapon where 
the need for skilled labour is especially stl-ong and is by 
its very nature, elitist and exclusivist (O'Meara 
1983b:168). 
In terms of the above criteria, 
African context did not or could 
mine unions in the 
hardly qual ify as 
South 
craft 
unions for the traditional miner was particularly vulnerable 
to sUbstitution and deskilling. This left the mine union 
impotent to unilaterally control or determine rules of the 
trade. The very real threat experienced by white mineworkers 
of being substituted by alternative labour, resulted in mine 
unions resorting to strategies of racial exclusion from the 
very beginning. For example, white miners were subsequently 
to fill supervisory positions in the mining industry. 
The nature of the labour process characterising artisan or 
craft workers in industries other than mining, was somewhat 
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different. During the earlier years of their existence, 
these 'unions, in trying to protect their skills and 
the apprenticeship systems, privileged position, applied 
closed shop agreements and a strict code or demarcation in 
accordance with practices upheld' by craft unions in all 
countries. Thus, skilled workers could resist the 
capitalists' attempt to gain formal control over the labour 
process. But these skills were still transformable by 
employers and in the words of Lewis, for those skilled 
workers that remained, 'it was not so much their privileged 
position as the vulnerability of that position which was 
important and determined trade union strategy' (1984:18). 
Some unions, of course, did' in fact use the mechanism of 
,racial exclusiveness to protect their skills and the 
relevancy of the Australian example of implementing a white 
labour policy in influencing trade union development in 
South Africa should not be underestimated. Although the 
craft ,unions were somewhat ambiguous ;n their approach on 
th is issue, they did not, 1 ike the i r counte rparts in the 
mining sector, demand rigid colour bars. 
Referring to the metal and engineering industries, Lewis 
shows that there was no wide-ranging reorganisation of 
labour processes in these i ndust'ri es during the first 
quarter of the 20th century. For this reason then, no 
serious and s,usta i ned effort were made by the unions to 
establish 'colour bars'. Efforts were put into slow;~g down 
the rate of deskilling and fragmentation. Thus, where 
mineworkers increasingly came to rely on the state to 
protect their vested interests, craft unions to a much 
greater extent, rel ied on apprenticeship quotas and other 
techniques in order to maintain control over the labour 
process. 
By the 1920' s however, attempts by emp 1 oyers to introduce 
mechanisation and deskilling 
were often aimed at opposing 
strateg i es adopted by un ions 
increased significantly and 
or restricting the mi 1 itant 
before 1922. Notwithstanding 
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these efforts, techniques of militant trad~ unionism did 
survive these attempts. The crucial point, however, is that 
wher-e craft unions were immediately threatened by a changing 
labour process and di lution, one possible response was for 
'racial attitudes to harden' depending on the rate of 
deskilling being enforced' by employers e.g. steel and 
railways. Thus, when deskilling became inevitable, craft 
~nions created a 'new hierarchy within the work-place which 
was no longer based on skills, but simply on race'(Lewis 
1984:45) 0 This was especially to happen during and after 
World War II with the introduction of mass production 
techn i ques 0- Th i s was fac i 1 i tated by state in it i ated and 
sponsored dilution- and wartime control and the regulation of 
labou~ in the building and engineering industries. 
Mechanisation and new ,production technology thus may only 
displace skilled -workers if management has the option of 
substituting them by lesser ~killed workers. Where artisan 
unions are forced to dilute- their skills and crafts, 'they 
may be in a better position to impose limits on the 
downgrading, particularly where the downgrading comes up 
against the boundaries of the bounded working class' 
(Greenberg 1980:280). 
The response of the South African artisans in establ ishing 
themse 1 ves as 'pseudo-craft un ions' was markedl y different 
from responses by British artisans, the latter of whom 
experienced similar developments during World War I in these 
industries. The· Amalgamated Society of Engineers following 
the amal~amation of the smaller craft - unions with the 
British Amalgamated Society of Engineers, opened its ranks 
to all male engineering workers (Lewis 1984:88). 
5.2.3 early black trade unionism: the leu 
Ncube (1987) notes that different factors contributed to the 
formation of black unions than those applying to white 
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workers. Black unionism was first established after World 
War.1 and prior to it, blacks did not actively pursue union 
organi~ation. Noting the relevance of politically motivated 
white members of the International Socialist League in 
organising black wotkers, Ncube identifies some of the 
reasons why the League found it reasonably easy to attract 
black workers e.g. economic circumstances 6f the war 
exacerbated the harsh socio-economic lifestyle of black 
workers. Being excluded from craft unions, black workers 
were attracted to the influence of white pol itical interest 
groups and strikes by black workers demonstrated their 
potential power and need for organising themselves. 
From 1918 onwards, black workers were active in organising 
industrial action and participated in a wide range of 
strikes and protests and in 1919 the Industri'al and 
Commercial Workers Union (ICU) was established. The history 
of the I.C.U. has been documented by writers like Bonner 
(1983) and demonstrates the success and ultimate failure to 
develop into a viable union organisation.· The ultimate 
demise of the I.C.·U. is commonly attributed to its failure 
to organise the urbanised African worker and concentrating 
rather on the dispersed rural African population (Webster 
1983, Ncube 1987; Bonner 1983) . Thus, there was an 
underlying weakness of analysis and strategy. While the 
obj ect i ve of a fundamenta 1 red i str i but i on of economi c and 
pol itical power was clear, the means to achieve this was 
less clear (Bonner 1983:115). Other factors also contributed 
to the t fa i 1 u re' of the ICU to const i tute a strong and 
viable union e.g. the opposition of the white population and 
government and the subsequent exclusion from statutory 
bargaining arrangements in 1924 as well as opposition from 
the establ ished white unions and employers' associations. 
Ncube (1987:44) quotes Johns II (1970) in demonstrating the 
nature of ICU opposition: 
At the time of the ICU white trade unions were 
aggressively asserting their protectionists interests. 
The Chamber of Mines and other key white employers 
including white farmers, displayed open hostility to 
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the efforts of. ~he ICU to organize In a few 
i nstanceswhenthe ICUattempted to call str-i kes, the 
po1ice··ahd military power of the government was applied 
to cripple and crush them. 
The opposition of employers to the lCU and especially their 
6pposition to negotiate with its representatives, is 
similarly raised by Greenberg (1980:156-157). For example, 
the state reg i strar rna i nta i ned that the ICU was no 
'statutory trade union' ·and the South African Trade Union 
Congress also did not permit its affiliation. But of crucial 
re 1 evance is the fact that the lCU, given its tact i cs and 
unwillingness to participate in strikes, could not actually 
penetrate the work place. 
The conditions necessary for effective black trade unionism 
to develop, arose in the newly developing manufacturing 
sector duri ng and after Wor1 d War I and especi all y after 
World War II. During the 1940's, the African Mine Workers 
Union (AMWU) was to have some measure of success, especially 
given its involvement in ·the African mine workers strike 
during 1946. The focus of this labour organisation was not 
only on ·wages but essentially African trade unionism and 
control of the work place. The attitude of the employer 
(Chamber of Mines) was predictably hostile towards the aims 
of the strikers: it opposed the demands for wage increases, 
it succeeded in gett i ng the state to crush the stri ke and 
confirmed its position that Africans were not yet ready to 
bargain collectively and that they. were vulnerable to 
communist influences (Greenberg 1980:170). 
5.2.4 industrial unionism in South Africa 
As in Britain and the United States, industrial unions in 
South Africa followed craft organisation and was closely 
linked to the expansion of the manufacturing industry during 
and after World War I. It also marked the establ ishment of 
the 'new' multi-racial industrial unions (Lewis 1983:123). 
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These unions we~e primarily structured in terms of the 
·1 abou r. processes and 1 abou r compos it i on of the i ndustr i es 
i nvc 1 ved. Secondary i ndustr i ali sat i on created a demand for 
an enlarged labour force and workers were recruited mainly 
from the ranks of blacks and whites forced off the land by, 
inter alia, the Land Act of 1913 and later 1936, economic 
hardsh ips fo 11 owi ng the Ang 1 o-Boer War and the deve 1 opment 
of a large capitalist agrlculture. In the urban areas, these 
workers provided a potential labour market for the new 
industries. 
Factory work was mostly semi~skilled rather than skilled in 
an artisan sense and given increased rates of mechanisation 
with accompanying fragmentation of tasks and deskilling of 
jobs, workers were in no position to protect their existing 
skills. With little training, Africans, coloureds and 
Indians could with ease replace these workers. Williams 
( 1979: 72) notes that under these cond it ions, 'wages 
threatened to be determined by the weakest, and most 
vulnerable workers in industry' leaving whites with the 
realisation that 'there could be no question of any form of 
racially. exclusive or protecti.ve craft unions developing in 
the ma~ufacturing industry'. 
Rapid mechanisation, job fragmentation and deskilling were 
sweeping away the basis of craft unionism for the labour 
processes were reorganised on the basis of 'semi-ski lled' 
operative labour (Lewis 1984:48). In order to maximise their 
relative bargainin~ power and also to establish trade union 
discipline, industrial unions were to enroll all workers and 
were 'forced to embrace the logic of open industrial 
unionism' thereby creating the potential for a 'non-racial 
class alliance in the work place' (1984:46). Where craft 
unionism focused on the principle of 'entry', industrial 
unions' concern lay in preventing lay-offs and dismissals 
and ensuring job security. The effectiveness of these unions 
thus depended predominantly on fixing labour price, 
establish a rate for the job and to protect undercutting of 
wages by employers. 
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Industri'al unions have two options open to them within a 
raci.al"y structured society i.e. to organise as 'open' or 
. 'exclusive' unions. Within the SOLjth African context both 
forms of industrial unionism develpped. Generalising. on the 
difficulty of organising 'open' industrial unions within a 
racially divided context, Greenberg comments: 
Multiracial industrial unions are organized against the 
tenor of society: often against the inclinations of the 
dominant workers directly involved, and almost always 
against the prevailing sentiments in the dominant 
section and' the general d'i rection of .state. pol icy 
,(1980:284-285). 
The above stated problems explain the marginal ity of these 
unions with.in the trade union movement in South Africa. 
Exclusive industrial unions were mainly organised in the 
state sector as we 11 as in the i ron and stee 1 industry. 
Various options were open to them to guarantee their racial 
exclusivity. Firstly) barriers could be set 'around areas of 
dominant employment', '1 imiting entry of subordinate 
J. I I 
workers' thus preventing undercuttlng. Secondly, unlons may 
demand segregation or setting up parallel unions for 
subordi nate workers. In both these cases, state ass i stance 
and machinery is required to provide mechanisms for 
controlling the labour market. The state in South Affica did 
,not disappoint these unions in that they provided more than 
ample control measures in this regard. 
From the 1920's onwards, a number of African industrial 
unions became establ ished again with the help of white 
pol itical groups growing parallel with sympathetic 
registered unions e.g. the South African Trade Union 
Counc i 1. The black un ions establ i shed themse 1 yes rna; n 1 yin 
the laundry, clothing 
subsequent 1 y formed the 
European Trade Unions. 
and furniture ind\.Jstries· 
South African Federation of 
and 
Non-
Considerable militancy evolved' from African wo\kers and 
their unions. creating a pattern of strikes' in response to 
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-vi ct i mi sat i on and. str i kes des i gned to enforce payment of 
1 egal wage rates as st i pu 1 cited by the Wage Board (Lewi s 
1983: 133-135) . 
5.2.5 1924 legislation and the attitudes of employers, 
craft and industrial unions 
Correspondi~g with developments. in most other countries, 
trade union organisation in South Africa was met with 
resistance from employers and state alike. The crushing of 
( 
the 1922 Rebellion illustrates the fierceness of opposition 
very simi lar to experiences . .of trade \.mions in the United 
States and Japan for example. 
As noted earl ier, the' Industrial Conci 1 iation Act of 1924 
was primarily intend~d to curb.such union militancy on the 
part of white as well as bla6k workers. While strongly 
influenced by already .existing exclusionist practices, its 
very existence strengthened and entrenched these practices 
in that Africans were excluded from the official industrial 
council system (Lever 1983a:104). White workers on the other 
hand, we re represented by hi gil 1 y organ i sed and centra 1 i sed 
craft unions. This arrangement included not only artisans 
but also public sector and white collar employees (Lewis 
1983: 122) . 
Both employers and craft unions viewed industry level 
bargaining as advantageous to their respective interests. 
Employers, like those in some other countries, viewed 
centralised bargaining as reinforcing their bargaining power 
if sol idarity could be establ ished, minimising competition 
between employers by keeping wages out of competition, a way 
of keeping unions out of the work place and a mechanism 
whereby unions' encroachment on managerial authority would 
be restricted. 
Employers in the bui lding, printing and other .industries 
were, as Lever shows, ! eager to take out wages as a factor 
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in compet it i on' and in th is' found common cause with the i r 
union ·counterparts ... ' (1983a:94). Employers saw other 
advantages in the newly created system as well. Being a 
highly formal and centralised system, power within the 
unions shifted inevitably to permanent officials and 
structures became highly bureaucratised. Decision-making was 
left in the hands of these officials leading to the 
alienation of the ordinary rank-and-file trade union member 
(Davies 1983:77-78). 
The upshot of th i s att i t.ude 1 ed many emp 1 oyers to act i ve 1 y 
assist in the organisation and establishment of unions 
predominantly by signing closed shop agreements and 
providing the necessary facilities for collecting dues. 
Davies also cites the example of employers becoming directly 
involved with the maintenance of union discipline by sitting 
on a committee of the industrial counci 1 which was hearing 
final appeals of members in default against union rules 
(1983:78). 
For especially the artisan type unions e.g. Amalgamated 
Engineering Union and the South African Typographical Union, 
industry bargain i ng meant the enjoyment of protected job 
security by law and effective organisation and participation 
in the formal structures provided for by the legislator. 
These unions were rather conservative seldom being 
involved in strikes and disputes (Wi 11 iams 1979). The fact 
that unions were kept out of the work place did not 
seriously pose a problem for the more skilled white worker. 
Given thei r traditional monopoly of ski lls and the demand 
for such ski lls, they were ensured of high wages within 
their respective establishments often in excess of standard 
wages be i ng negot i ated at industry 1 eve 1. There was thus 
limited need for fragmented bargaining at the place of work 
(Piron 1986). Employers were willing to pay these high wages 
for it could be financed at the expense of African wages 
given Africans' 'additional means of rural subsistence'. 
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The 'new' industrial unions, like the artisan unions, came 
to participate in the industrial council system. The benefit 
of indu~try level bargaining f~r employers was noted by the 
,1935 Industrial Legislation Commission as quoted by Lewis 
(1983:123): 
The trend of industrial development during the past few 
decades has been such that it is much more conven i ent 
for employers to negotiate with ·one large union 
representing all classes of workers in their industry, 
rather than with a number of separate craft unions 
representing only sections of their workers. 
Industrial unions, being composed of mainly sem~-skilled and 
unskilled labour, preferred centralised bargaining. The 
estab 1 i shment of a standard wage rat~ meant that emp 1 oyers 
could not easily undercut rates within. their particular 
establishments. Being less skilled, the security of the 
multi-racial industrial unions lay in a unified OJ::" united 
labour organisation which was viewed by these- unions 
th~mselves as to include African workers. 
It goes without saying that tha state benefitted to a very 
important degree from the 1924 legislation. The Act, by 
providing the unions of a 'network of regulations and 
institutions' largely minimised militancy within existing 
labour relations (Lever 1983a:104). Conflict was now firmly 
institutionalised in accordance with pluralist principles at 
least where white, coloured and Asian workers were 
concerned. 
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Centralised bargaining thus seems to have benefitted all the. 
parties concerned although probably not always to the same 
extent. For employers and the state, it meant that 
industrial conflict was being curbed a development 
welcomed after the strikes and violence of the pre-1924 
years. Unions ~nd labour relations were now structured,' 
regulated and essentially controlled. Wages were kept out of 
competition thus excluding or minimising the practice of 
leap-frogging associated with more decentrali·sed bargaining. 
The privileged position. of skilled labour functioned to 
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protect white. workers ensuring them of high wages while the 
l~ss skill~d ind~s~rial worker~ were to gain from a standard 
wage rate especially during periods of economic downturn and 
. recess i on. 
While the parties who were legally entitled to participate 
in the formal machinery were all seen to benefit from 
industry 1 eve 1 bargain i ng, a very substant i a 1 component of 
the work force was exc 1 uded f rom these arrangements. Given 
their exclusion, African ~nions were mainly parallel unions 
set up by established unions on racial lines. Existing 
industrial unions were prepared to admit them openly into 
their· ranks. The artisan unions however, preferred these 
not get involyed wfth - their and unions to grow at own pace 
their organisation and development. A small number of 
urbanised Afrikaners, 
wanted African unions outlawed for. twhi le the latter were 
excluded from registration and formal participation, their 
existence were not" unlawful'. World WaG II, increasing 
industrialisation and employment of African workers resulted 
"in the state clamping down on these unions especial-ly during 
the 1950's and 1960's (Friedman 1987). 
unions, mostly comprising of newly 
During the 1970's there was to be a tremendous upsurge in 
the estab 1 i shment of so-ca 1 1 ed t independent.', • new' un ions 
as well as an escalation in the rate of industrial action by 
these unions. Circumstances contributing to this development 
and which were to reflect the growth ;n black labour power 
culminating ;n an upsurge of local bargaining proper from 
the 1970's onwards, will be the focus of the following 
chapters. 
5.3 Historical developments ;n comparative perspective 
From the above account of the hi stor i Cel 1 "deve 1 opment of 
trade unions, employers' attitudes and bargaining patterns, 
it is clear that unions in the United States, but especially 
16"~ 
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in Britain and .South Africa, have a relatively long history 
com~ared to their counterparts in many of the West European 
countries. They are also more complicated in both structure, 
'organisation and development. Part of the explanation can be 
found in the patterns and rates of industrialisation with 
accompanying changes in the way that work is organised i.e. 
the nature of the production processes involved. The 
changing nature ·of labour processes not only presents a 
meaningful way for interpreting union organisation and 
development within a particular societal context but also 
for comparing developments between societal contexts. 
The white craft unions in South Africa, like those in the 
United states and especially Britain, experienced di lution 
through the process~s of mechanisation and deskilling. Their 
response to changing labour processes and the strategies 
employed in order to protect their craft skills, were very 
similar during the initial stages e.g.· the militancy of 
union behaviour and the application of the' apprenticeship 
system, closed shop arrangements and strict demarcation 
codes. In the British and South African examples, similar 
forces contributed to an increased rate of mechanisation and 
deski1ling processes i.e. wartime conditions and efforts by 
employers and the state to speed up mechanisation and 
contro 1 of the 1 abour process. Confronted wi th the 
inevitable di lution of ski 11s, South African craft unions 
did not however, like their British and American 
counterparts, open the i r ranks to 
workers within a particular trade. 
racial exclusiveness to protect 
i ncorporate all d i 1 uted 
Instead they opted for 
their interests and 
constituted themselves as so-called pseudo-craft unions 
(Lewis' term). This was especially to be the case in the 
engineering industries. It is difficult, says Greenberg, to 
imagine that 
artisan unions would not find the racial order 
enormously congenial. Unions that ordinarily focus upon 
entry barriers to jobs and union membership, should 
have 1 ittle difficulty working. within a labour 
framework that insists on ·privi lege and 'barriers in the 
labour market. Where artisan unions encounter 
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unskilled, physically distinctiye, and socially 
stigmatized workers, they will almost certainly develop 
policies that discriminate against them (1980:280). 
In most countries industrial unions were to follow craft 
unions. Usually organising workers within a particular 
industry irrespective of skills and .trade, these unions are 
centra 1 to the manufactu ring industry. Jobs are norma 11 y 
highly fragmented and less skilled relative to craft work 
due to a high degree of mechanisation. Under these 
circumstances, job security becomes a central issue with 
workers and their unions. Open unionism and large numbers 
are crucial to bargaining power - facts which were seen as 
underlying the multi-racial nature of these unions during 
the first years of their existence in South Africa. In this, 
industrial unions, at least up till the late 1940's, 
corresponded with the nature and organisation of industri·al 
uhions elsewhere: 
Industry unions, from the relative beginning, were central 
to trade un ion deve 1 opment in many of the West European 
countries. In the latter, bargaining ·structures were 
, 
established relatively late - mostly after World War·II. Not 
only have unions in these countries a much shorter history 
but they were from the beginning much more simple in 
structure and organisation, fostering the establ ishment of 
industry and national level barg·aining as the predominant 
level. Many of these countries experienced rapid 
·industrialisation resulting, in the Swedish case, in an 
tundivided union movement'. Where skill differences did 
exist e.g. France, rapid industrialisation and labour market 
conditions contributed significantly in closing the gap 
between skilled and unskilled labour. In Japan, on the other 
hand, the demand for labour during industrialisation was 
accommodated by other means i.e. employment of new· school 
leavers within specific enterprises. 
The role played by race and state in the South African case 
and the unique way in which the Japanese ha~e responded in 
11'1 
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coping with indu$trialisation and changing labour processes, 
demonstrate - as Lew ish i mse 1 f warns - that the ways. in 
which work is organised and structured cannot provide a 
complete. answer to how trade unions organise and develop and 
. how s·pecific bargaining patterns come to be establ ished in 
different societal contexts at specific historical moments. 
Factors other than the nature of the labour process have a 
significant influence on these matters. 
5.4 barga in i ng part i es ' prefe rences and commun i ty of 
interests 
A historical outline as presented here, highlights two very 
important conside~ations the first of which relates to 
relevant bargaining parties' attitude towards and 
preferences for a part i cu 1 ar barga i ni ng 1 eve 1 at a 
particular point in time. Although in general terms, 
labour's preferences seem to have corresponded with those of 
employers, it was the latter who had the economic power to 
in fact realise their preferences. In many cases, 
particularly in· South Africa, the state has supported 
employers' interests where it had been practically involved, 
not only~where union organisation was c6ncerned but also in 
formally establishing a particular structure and level. The 
state, as was shown, as well as employers and white 
employees, benefitted from industry level bargaining in 
South Africa. In particular, the state gained a high degree 
of contro 1 . 
Secondly, the significance of a community of interest 
amongst employers and employees respectively, is likewise 
demonstrated. In the United States and Japan, employers did 
not develop the necessary community of interest with-other 
emp 1 oyers and instead preferred to act independent 1 y and 
autonomously within their respective firms. Employers of 
particular firms or plants within these countries shared 
common interests to the extent that they came to Javour 
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bargaining at the, enterprise and plant level. In most other 
couritries, community of interest developed within a 
part.icuTar industry. In combination with the development of 
; ndustria 1 un; ons dur; ng secondary ; ndustr; ali sat ion, th; s 
contr.i buted to the central i ty of industry 1 eve 1 barga in i ng 
in many countries of whi'ch South Africa is a prime case in 
point. 
Emp 1 oyers, however, do not a 1 ways have the power and thus 
the ·abi 1 ity to determine or influence bargaining levels. 
Neither have they always had this power in the past. The 
relative power of parties is subject to many considerations 
and influences, some of which will be considered in the 
following chapters. 
1 ~'7 /v 
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CHAPTER 6 
MACRO-ECONOMIC FACTORS 
6. 1 Introduction 
In most countries, macro-economic considerations have a very 
cru~ial influence on bargaining structures and levels. 
Genera 11 y however, the i nfl uence of such factors on 1 eve 1 s 
is. seldom direct. Rather is it more a case of these factors 
i nf 1 uenc i ng the power of barga in i ng part i es and thus the i r 
ability to establish bargaining at a particular preferred 
level. The· most significant of these economic factors are 
the economic growth rate of a particular country, the level 
of emp 1 oyment, the scope of 1 abour and product markets and 
the rate of i nfl at ion (Kochan 1980). These factors do not 
function autonomously and are very much a function of 
certain economic policies. formulated by the state or 
government of the day e. g .. f i sca ~, monetary and somet i mes 
incomes policies (Grundberg 1986:506). 
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Historically and other considerations being equal, the 
nature and scope of labour ~nd product markets have always 
been signiflcant in that bargaining tends to be local when 
these markets are restricted. Bargaining eventually tends to 
move towards industry-wide level as the nature and scope of 
these markets expand. Unions have in general reacted by 
.trying to protect their positions and interests as these 
markets have extended. They accomplish this by taking wages 
out of competition so as to eliminate 'undercutting' and to 
establish some sort of wage equalisation. In very general 
terms, employers, as noted, also prefer to negotiate at, 
higher levels so as to undermine or temper cut-throat 
compet it i on amongst themse 1 ves, re i nforce the i r co 1 1 ect i ve 
power, keep unions out of the work place and restrict 
encroachment on their authority. Generalising·on the origins 
and development of employers' associations, Windmuller 
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(1984:3) refers .tQ the fact that in an era of local markets, 
most. of these association were initially formed at local.and 
somet i rries reg i ona 1 1 eve 1 s. In· th i s they cor responded to 
similar developments among unions, 'their formation being 
1 inked to advances in communication and transportation and 
to the expansion of markets that were enabling unions, too, 
to enlarge their organizational structur~s'. 
The growth rate of the overa 11 economy of a country and 
particularly the level of employment, have a direct bearing 
on the ability of unions and employers to ·get bargaining 
established at a particular level. Generally, it follows 
that under conditions of high economic growth and a 
subsequent increase in labour demand, the relatlve power of 
labour increases, enabling unions to withhold labour. for 
better wages and working conditions and to determine at 
which level bargaining is to be conducted (Rigby 1985; 
Kochan 1980; Grundberg 1986) . 
Given these generalisations~ the influence of .economic 
factors on the power of labour and employers and ultimately 
the development and establishment of local bargaining within 
the South African context may be considered. 
6.2 
6.2.1 
Economic growth, labour power and local bargaining 
in the South African context 
labour markets 
Black labour's weak position relative to employers as well 
as wh{te labour, especially prior to the 1960's, was very 
much rooted in the nature of industrialisation being imposed 
on the socio-economic and political fabric during the period 
of colonial expansion in the 17th and 18th centuries. As 
argued, the division of labour, ~ithin especially the 
go 1 dmi n i ng industry, resu 1 ted from efforts to obta in cheap 
labour to cut production costs and thereby laying the 
175 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
foundations of a highly stratified and segmented labour 
market" in other sectors of the economy. 
On the demand side of the .1abour market, segmentation occurs 
primarily on the basis of race, followed by sex, occupation, 
skills, geographical location, etc. On the supply side, 
certain facto~s" reinforce this segmentation e.g. educational 
profi 1es of the race groups, the differentiation" between 
urban and rural blacks "and the migrant labour system 
(Nattrass 1988:227). As argued ~n the previous chapter, the 
relative lack of power, however, did not preclude the 
organisation of black workers and mi 1 itant action di rected 
at differential wages and the colour bar on the mines during 
the early years of industrialisation. 
6.2.2 economic growth and labour power 
The development of the manufacturing industry commencing in 
the 1920's, rapidly expanded during the following decades. 
Stadler shows that whereas in the 1920's capital investment 
in manufacturing stood at R48 million compared with R138 
million invested in mining, this had" grown to R80 million by 
the 1930's and R152 million by 1940. During the 50's, 
investment in manufactur i ng amounted to R823 mi 11 ion wh i 1 e 
in mining it only amounted to R293 mi 11 ion. This trend was 
accompanied by an equally dramatic rise in the number of 
Africans employed in manufacturing from 35 065 in 1916 to 69 
895 in 1930 with the most substantial increase in the period 
1936 to 1945. By the 1980's, 780 200 Africans were employed 
in this sector resulting in an ever growing urban African 
population (1987: 58-59). 
The" development of the manufacturing sector did not 
el iminate wage differentials as" it existed in the mining 
industry for such differentials and other features were 
transferred to the newly estab1 ished sector .. The latter was 
to benefit from an already established labour market. 
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However, it has been shown that. wages of workers in 
manufacturing were not only considerably higher than those 
paid to'mineworkers (and agricultural workers), but that in 
general~ there was at that time, a much less marked radical 
demarcation of jobs despite efforts by government to 
secure differential access to employment -:: in this sector 
(Stadler 1987; Davis 1983). Lewis (1983) also points out 
that 1 arge-sca 1 e factory product i on was not yet domi nant 
during the early years, resulting in employers providing 
jobs to' female labour and juveni les in order to cut wages 
and accumulate capital. 
As in the mining industry, black labour in the manufacturing 
industry often, and at various stages, mi 1 itated against 
this exploitation and, as poi'!ted out in Chapter 5, joined 
white workers in establishing industrial unions and 
participated in strike action. 
White labour's position within the economy has always been 
much stronger given their access to political . power through 
voting strength - a source of power denied to black workers. 
Apart from this salient' point, their privileged position 
within the labour market also has its roots in the 
hi stor i ca 1 deve 1 opments of the po 1 it i ca 1 economy of South 
Africa. While the immigrant workers had industrial power by 
virtue of their skills during a period of high demands, the 
unski lled white workers, originating from the rural areas, 
benefitted to an important degree fro~ the racial privileges 
already enjoyed by the skilled white worker on the mines. 
The rapid expansion of the manufacturing and tert'iary 
industries after Wot-ld War II, and especially during the 
1960's, contributing to the high economic growth rate during 
the 60's and early years of the 1970's, had significant 
impl ications for the position of especially black labour. 
These changes shou 1 d howeve r , accord i ng to Nat trass (1989) 
not be asc r i bed to so-ca 11 ed • i nd i genous i nf 1 uences ' in the 
economy on 1 y. The exact nature and direct ion 'of the 
.relationship between economic growth and socio-political 
l ...,~ I I 
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change, at any particular time, will be a reflection of that 
between the changing economic forces, the existing social 
and'poiitical structures and th~ aspirations of the current 
power majority. 
A variety of socio~political and economic factors 
contr ibuted to the rap i d deve 1 opment of the manufacturi ng 
industry: 
(1) the expansion of the mining industry provided not only 
an expanding market for manufacturers but lay the basis 
for the growth of national capital making 
diversifi~ation by mining-houses possible; 
(2) the stat.e··'s intervention from the 1920's onwards 
through ·tariff protection, encouragement of import-
substitution; the creation of a cheap supply of labour 
and. in the 1960's, the crushing of working-class 
struggles and resistance restoring investor confidence 
\ (Cassim 1987) and 
(3) the inflow of foreign capital and technology in order 
to sustain developments, given a growing domestic 
market .(Black & Stanwix 1987:47-59). Foreign capital 
investment was encouraged by stabi 1 i ty in the 1960' s 
following state repression. Direct foreign investment 
rose between 1960 and 1970 from R1 819 million to R3 
943 mi 11 ion. In' addition, national capital also took 
advantage of newl y created opportun it i es to increase 
investment levels (Wolpe 1988:85). 
These factors demonstrate that economic growth in any 
capi ta 1 i st economy, represents a change in the ba 1 ance of 
economi c forces wh i ch. in Nattrass' words, 'often generates 
or is generated by, concomi tant changes in the soc i a 1 and 
political structures of that society' (1989:281). 
Since World War II, growth in manufacturing has been 
accompanied by increasing monopolisation i.e. the increasing 
pre-eminence of large firms in a particular industry and the 
contro 1 by a handfu 1 of firms ove r the economy ( Black & 
Stanwix 1987; Savage 1987; Gelb& Innes 1985). Before World 
War II, monopolies were to be found in the mining and 
finance sectors, the remaining sectors being relatively free 
of monopolising tendencies (Innes. 1983). This situation 
changed drastically d~ring the boom period of the 1960's as 
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the ownership of. industrial capital became increasingly 
concentrated. 
In accordance with overseas trends, the transition to 
monopoly capitalism has had some positive consequences for 
. . 
the power of industrial workers in South Africa. It has, in 
fact, increased black 'worker power in at least two ways. 
First 1 y, the concentrat i on of 1 arge numbers of workers on 
the shopfloor has been providing the material basis for the 
organisation of workers on a much wider' scale than before. 
Secondly, as previously noted, industrial workers' position 
within the labour process itself has undergone important 
changes. Traditionally unskilled, black workers have greatly 
improved their position and power. by occupying the semi-
skilled categories within industry at an increasing rate 
(Wolpe 1988:86). 
In spite of sti 11 being excluded from official bargaining 
structures and prohibited from organising in legally 
recogn i sed un ions at th is stage, the i r entry into 
manufacturing, backed by extensive industrial action during 
the 1970's, have provided African workers with a significant 
and'" 'growing power base. The quality of the black urban 
working class in the 1970's is shown by Wolpe (1988) to be 
qua 1 i tat i ve 1 y different from the 1950' sand everi 1960' sin 
that they were more ski 1 led, more educated, less' easi ly 
rep 1 aceab 1 e and, the deve 1 opment of oppos it i ona 1 ideo log i es 
contributed to a more defiant work force.* In general, this 
is supported by Nattrass' conclusion that the major source 
of increased labour power stems from the labour market. 
While the position of black labour has greatly improved 
during this phase of economic growth, a similar, although 
not identical situation existed in Britain and many European 
countries during this period of w.orld-wide growth. In these 
.......................................... ~ ......... M................................................................. \ 
* The history of black resistance' to apartheid. and the 
development of counter- or opposing ideologies have 
been substantively documented elsewhere e.g. Loge T 
(1983), Motlhabi M (1984) and Gerhard" G (1979). 
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countrie~, .g6v~rhments had committed themselves to the 
principle of full employment extending from World War II to 
the. 1970's. Commitment to high employment resulted in 
t greater market strength for near1 y all grades of workers' 
(Hi 11 1983: 142-143). In most Western European countries, 
1 abou r estab 1 i shed and conso 1 i dated more central i sed 
bargaining i"n order for labour as a whole to benefit from 
buoyant economic conditions. 
But, full or high employment levels may also result in 
increased local bargaining - Britain being the prime example 
during the 1950's and 1960's. During this period shopfloor 
bargaining developed extensively. Banks (1974), for example, 
argues that under conditions of high employment levels, 
British employers, especially in the manufacturing 
industries, 
bargaining 
resulted in 
were anxious to recruit new members. The greater 
stren~th of particular groups in the plant 
informal bargaining activities between local 
managers or foremen and shop stewards. 
Under favourable economic conditions, the British employers 
agreed to wage increases within enterprises and plants 
because they were dependent on labour for increased 
production rates. The wage increases were above those b~ing 
negotiated at industry and· national levels. High 
inflationary rates partly resulted from these higher wages 
as the latter were usually channeled back to increased 
consumer prices which again perpetuated high rates of 
inflation. 
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It was the enhanced power of shop stewards, their increasing 
bargaining activities in· the work place,· the rate of 
unofficial strikes and the wage drift after World War II 
that in the Br it ish examp 1 e , eventua 11 y 1 ed to . the 
appointment of the Donovan Commission. Thus, in Britain's 
case, the lengthening experience of high employment levels 
has resulted in the reliance of the individual employer on. 
his work group and power of the shop steward'as well as the 
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deve 1 opment. of i nforma 1 barga in i ng (Phe 1 ps Brown 1981: 120-
128). 
In Britain, the effect of full employment on work place 
re 1 at ions was not conf i ned to the upsu rge of i ntra-p 1 ant 
collective bargaining, but it has,. according to Brown 
(1972:43), resulted fn the growth of 'unilateral regulation 
by workers on the shopfloor which is expressed in employment 
or working practfces acquiring the force of institutions'. 
The 'unilateral' regulation by worker:s has however, been 
seriously questioned by some observers. 
These developments correspond with much of what has evolved 
in the South African labour relations context since the 
.1970's. The bargaining of black employees at plant level 
through recognition and other agreements owes much to, as in 
the British case, the exceptional power of shop stewards and 
their organisation at this 1Bve1 (Maree 1987; Friedman 
1987). 
6.2.3 recession, labour power and local bargaining 
The buoyant economic conditions characterising countries 
during the 1960's and the early years of the 1970's was 
followed by recessionary tendencies which in some cases have 
1 asted we 11 into the 1980' s. Most countr i es' economi es have 
been experiencing a low economic growth rate, high inflation 
rates and high unemployment levels. 
Given th is economi c . downtu rn , 1 abou r can be expected to 
prefer national or industry-wide bargaining especially where 
wages is conce rned. Th is they will be expected to do in 
order to at -1 east secure a standard wage rate for all 
relevant employees. But under conditions of low growth rates 
and high unemployment levels, their reduced bargaining power 
wi 11 be a significant obstacle in estab1 ishing more 
central ised bargaining. The power of unions in most 
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ind~strialised 's6cieties has been greatly undermined by 
i ncreas i ng rates of unemp 1 oyment, the i ntroduct i on of new 
technology aimed at higher productivity levels and a marked 
change in the composition of the work force given the shift 
from manufacturing to service industries - the latter which 
employ a qual itatively different type of worker (Maller 
1987a) . 
On the other hand, employers' power has generally increased 
relative to that of employees (Poole 1984b). Given the 
additional circumstances of increasing competitive pressures 
from product and labour markets, one can expect employers to 
prefer greater decentrarisation and local bargaining 
(Windmuller 1987:87-88). In Britain for example, managers 
have experienced strong pressures in recent years 'to hold 
down wage costs, improve productivity and "shake out" 
unwanted 1 abour' . (Hawk ins 1981: 1 ). There is on management's 
and employers' side an overall effort to 1 ink employees' 
compensation more closely to individual performance 
(Windmuller 1987:115) .. The preference of employers for 
fragmented bargaini.ng units in order to gain independent 
contro 1 has met with res i stance from worke rs and un ions 
alike for the latter is demanding higher real incomes, 
greater employment security and more influence and 
participation in decision-making processes (Hawkins 1981:1). 
Thus, in order to maintain a viable and competi!-ive market 
position, most employers and managements prefer negotiating 
within their own firms and plants. This leads Banks 
(1974:34) to conclude that even if unemployment .in Britain 
for example, continues to rise, it is 'unlikely' that there 
will be a reversal to the type of nation-wide bargaining of 
the inter-war period as plant bargaining has been firmly 
institutionalised. 
It has been an acceptable practice in many countries 
experiencing severe economic difficulties e.g. high 
unemployment levels, high inflation rates, trade balance 
difficulties etc. for governments to formulate and devise 
incomes policies. These policies were introduced during 
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1973/1974 and have also followed from governments' more 
attive"tole in the management of many countries' economies. 
Incomes policies may be defined as an attempt to alter the 
nationa"l level of" wages and salaries, or to alter the rate 
at which they change, and one of these objectives cannot be 
achieved without affecting the other (Clegg 1979:345). 
Incomes policies 
bargaining levels 
especially"labour. 
have significant consequences for 
as well as the relative power of 
The most efficient way of obtaining the co-operation of 
employers and unions for such a policy "to succeed has 
usually been through national confederations of employers' 
associations and trade unions and sometimes through 
tripartite bodies. This has an obvious centralising affect 
on the bargaining structures in most societies (Windmuller 
1987:114). In this sense, it has been a constraint on 
conducting local bargaining. Up ti 11 now, incomes pol icies 
have not been a feature of the South African economic scene 
and have not influenced bargaining levels in any way. 
Incomes policies place direct constraints on the power of 
labour in that it limits the size of the wage increase being 
negotiated by the parties. The acceptability of such a 
policy is thus Questionable to trade unions as the following 
words of a British trade union leader seem to suggest: 
Clearly, this kind of legislation can only be 
restrictive. It is not designed to make employers pay 
us more. It can only seek to reject, reduce or delay 
what has been won by shop stewards through the normal 
process of collective bargaining (Lambert 1970:376). 
Perry Anderson (1967) similarly criticises the British 
Labour Party in formulating an incomes policy, for blocking 
the action of trade unionists and shattering their autonomy. 
Incomes pol icies have, in the words of Davies and Freedland 
( 1983: 6-7) t gone to the heart of 1 abour 1 aw by encroachi ng 
very directly upon the autonomy of collective bargaining ... ' 
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Sou.th Africa has'experienced similar recessionary tendencies 
in its.economy as from the mid-1970's up until the 1980's 
. . . 
(Keenan 1984; Haysom & Webster 1984; Black & Stanw; x 1987). 
The present economic climate has been a long-term downswing 
or crisis rather than just a short-term recession 
characterising economies in general. 
Says Kap 1 an (1987: 525) of the present recess i on in South 
Africa: 
Recess i onary condi t ions have become the South Afri can 
norm and pe r i ods of expans i on on 1 y 1 ; mi ted and 
temporary aberrations. It is these exceptional features 
which justify the term tcrisis'. In contemporary South 
Africa, sustained and meaningful growth no longer 
fo 11 ows from recess i onary phases. Each of the upturns 
experienced since 1974 (i.e. 1975, 1980, 1983 and 1985 
and 1986) has limited growth and has rapidly petered 
out. 
Normally, 
fundamental 
stimulate 
short-term downturns 
restructuring of the 
growth but is usually 
do not 
economy 
resolved 
necessitate 
in order. 
by fiscal 
a 
to 
and 
monetary mechanisms devised by government. Generally it 
involves government spending to raise overall demand thereby 
creating demand and employment or expanding credit in order 
to encourage investment by companies and consumer spending 
through higher purchase (Gelb & Innes 1985). 
Duri ng the past 15 to 20 years, these measures have been 
unsuccessful in restoring growth, indicating the seriousness 
of South Africa's present growth problems. The existing 
tgrowth model' i.e. relative stable pattern of economic 
advance within the specific institutional framework of 
apartheid - is, in Cassim's (1987) view, beginning to break 
down. During the periods 1962-72, 1972-81 and 1981-1986, the 
average annua, 1 growth rates have been 5,5%, 3%, and 1.1 % 
respectively. The recent recession is especially serious 
according to Gelb and Innes because tcyclical downswing 
simultaneously' involves high inflation' resulting in so-
called tstagflation'. The main causes of stagflation is seen 
by the above writers to be high interest rates, the falling 
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/' 
ran~, the falling~old price in dollar terms and the balance 
ofpaym~nt deficit.· In order to 'wipe out' the deficit, the 
government has opted for 'push; ng the economy into 
recession' resulting in economic stagnation (1985:31-32). 
The recess i on has also been i nf 1 uenced by immediate 
international and local causes. The former relates to the 
monetarist policies of the United States and Britis~ 
governments while the latter relates to the government 
raising interest rates which have plunged the economy into 
recession. Certain factors are seen to have influenced the 
decision to raise interest rates of which the borrowing 
level has been very significant. This borrowing has had 
three sources i.e. consumers, companies and the state. The 
latter has especially spent on defence, black education, 
'homeland development', white civil service salaries and 
wages and farmers' subsidies. 
6.2.4 monetarist government policies 
In response to this situation, the South African government 
has chosen fundamental restructuring in the development of a 
new social structure of accumulation. This is manifested in 
a new approach of neo-conservat ism and monetari st economi c 
doctrines. 
While the said objective of the current monetarist policy is 
to bring down the rate of inflation, it has worsened the 
rap i d dec 1 i ne of the economy and man i fested i tse 1 fin the 
following trends:· 
(1) a shift of investment from production to the financial 
and service sector activity (de-industrialisation), 
(2) the fact that capital goods production is lagging 
behind newly industrialised third world.countries and 
( 3 ) capital stock i.e. 
run down having 
machinery and 
a negative 
equip~ent, is being 
impact on future 
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productivity" and competition regarding manufactured 
goods. 
Mon~tarism in its broadest sense, can be understood to 
'achieve a major 
restructuri ng of 
1985:36). Thus, 
change in the ba 1 ance of power and a 
the system of production' (Gelb & Innes 
while the objective of the current 
government-imposed recession is to lower inflation rates, it 
is simultaneously an effort, or at least in its 
consequences), to restore the power balance between capital 
and labour. Increased unemployment rates result in weakening 
the bargaining power of trade unions in the hope 'that real 
wages will decline further and domestic profitability be 
restored' (Cassim 1987:544). 
The long-term goal of .-:amonetar i st- i nducedrecess i oni s , in 
the view of Gelb and Innes (1985:37), consistent with the 
original aim of the post-Wie,hahn .labour dispensation i.e. 
'to restore capital's power oyer labour'. This has to be 
restored on the shopfloor and the labour market. A 
monetarist policy~objective is, i~ the above authors' view, 
to draw the unions' teeth, forcing them into the 
defens i ve in the face of mass i ve retrenchments. Th is 
wou 1 d both reduce the i r futu re ab i 1 i ty to win wage 
increases and weaken their power to resist 
'productivity improvements' on the shop floor (in the 
form of greater discipline, speedups, reorganisation of 
work, etc.). If successful, the balance of power would 
be shifted back to capital's side while unions would 
rema in, but ina weakened form. The po 1 it i ca 1 costs 
(domestic and international) of crude repression of 
worker organisations would be avoided. 
In genera~, business leaders have responded in two ways to 
the increased power of black labour in the 1970's i.e. by 
opposing high wages seen to be inflationary and 
demanding higher productivity levels. While high wages have 
undoubtedly contributed to high inflation rates, this has 
not been its only or even origin,al cause. The rising wages 
of black workers in the 'early 1970's was also a response to 
existing inflation at that stage. An inflationary spiral 
resulted from companies further increasing wages to secure 
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their _ profit ma,::'gins. With inflation rates soaring in the 
1980'-s,- unions have responded by demanding higher wages. 
Duri~g 1~86 wage bargaining came very much to the fore and 
- wages- were the most common cause of reported strikes in 1986 
(Maller 1987b). 
The growing concern about high wage levels in the 1980's, 
has resulted in government's and management's increasing 
focus on so-called productivity improvements. The declining 
amount of capital invested in technology, machinery and 
-
- equipment referred to, has strongly influenced this focus on 
labour productivity and the development and implementation 
of various strategies to improve productivity e.g. work 
study methods, i ncent i ve bonus schemes, part i c i patory 
management schemes, etc. 
The present economi c recess ion (and cr is is) has not in any 
way restricted the development of monopoly capitalism - iOn 
fact, monopolising tendencies have increased during the 
1970's and 1980's. As Gelb and Innes show, this- is 
especially the Case when recession is monetarist-induced. By 
the- end of the 1970's, the Monopolies Commission (Mouton 
Commission) . supplied the following information (Innes 
1983:175-176; Savage 1987:5): 
5% of total number of firms in manufacturing accounted 
for 63% of turnover 
only 5% of firms in wholesale and retail accounted for 
69% of turnover 
5% in construction accounted for 63% of turnover and 
5% in transport accounted for 73% of turnover 
After reviewing the most recent avai lable data on South 
Africa, Savage (1987:28) concludes that evidence points to a 
'mounting concentration of economic resources, a more 
concentrated pattern of ownership of these resources, and a 
growing centralisation of significant economic decision 
making in fewer hands' 
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Two" phenomena have accompanied these monopolisation 
tenden~ies and together with the general crisis of the 
econ"omy,. have greatly influenced the position of the black 
work"ing class regarding their economic, social and political 
pos it ion. The impact of these forces has been ser i ous 1 y 
damaging to the power of black workers. These phenomena are: 
the increasing inflation rate and the evergrowing 
unemployment rates. 
Many causes of i nf 1 at i on are direct 1 y 1 inked to monopo 1 y 
tendencies i.e. (1) lack of open competition due to price-
fixing among big conglomerates, tends to raise consumer 
prices; (2) in order to increase productivity and raise 
productivity levels (as pointed out above), large monopolies 
modify their labour processes along highly mechanised lines 
necessitating the importa_tion of capital equipment at very 
high prices and (3) high interest rates due to the fact that 
large companies tend to be heavy borrowers and, as was 
argued, together with consumers and the state, the main 
sources of borrowing (Innes "1983:179). 
Unemp 1 oyment rates, a 1 though soar i ng in the past few years 
to new heights, have always been a cronic ill of the South 
African economy especially since the mid 1960's (Nattrass 
1988: 230). At present the rate ; s estimated fo be in the 
order of 20% (Black & Stanwix 1987; Thomas 1987) while 
unofficial estimates have put this rate even closer to 30%. 
Many reasons have been suggested for the cont i nua 1 increase 
in unemployment e.g. the slowdown in the real economic" 
growth rate below that of population growth and new entrants 
into the labour market (De Vries 1988:322-326). This is seen 
to be partly the result of a move towards a capital 
i ntens i ve economy ina 1 abou r su rp 1 us economy in the 1 i ght 
of factors such as sharp rise in wages despite the 
oversupply of unskilled labour and shortage of skilled 
labour. 'As output expands under the impact of mechanisation 
so the proportion of the labour-force employed in production 
decreases while concomitantly the proportion of the labour-
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"force whic,h "is" unemployed rises' (Innes 1983:180). High 
unemp loyment 1 eve 1 s" have also been exace rbated by the high 
population growth rates of blacks rendering the economy 
unab 1 e to accommodate these numbers adequate 1 y. Th is poi nt 
"is well illustrated by Roux van der Merwe's (1986) report on 
conflict and unrest in the Eastern Cape during 1985 where 
estimates of unemployment in Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage range 
from 35% to 56%. Population pressure is also illustrated in 
this area where the de facto black population has nearly 
doubled since 1980, to over 500 000 in 1985. 
Following trends else~here, the power of South African 
employers and management has increased substantially giving 
employers a 'greater staying power' in disputes and strikes 
(Innes 1-983). Commenting on developments in South Africa 
during 1983, Haysom and Webster (1984) argue that the 
~verall economic recession had deepe~ed leaving many workers 
jobless and allowing management to be more aggressive 
primarily by disposing of surplus" labour durihg work 
stoppages and using job insecurity to oppose ~orker demands. 
This has had a significarit impact on the wage increases that 
unions are now more prepared to accept. The Financial Mai 1 
(5 May 1979:27) makes this point when it says that given the 
general economic constraints, 'it is not: surprising that the 
unions have begun to raise matters of job security in 
current negot i at ions'. Un ions are at present prepared to 
accept pay settlements far lower than their opening demands 
and with less frequent resort to industrial action. 
Referring to Levy and Piron's wage survey, pay settlement 
1 eve 1 s reported at the end of 1988 has cont i nued wi th an 
average of 16, 7% for the peri od October 1988 to February 
"1989. It is also estimated that the 1989 settlement level 
will be lowe~ than the average of 17~9% duri"ng 1988. 
Unions have in general responded by focusing on work place 
issues and conditions of service e.g. reduced working week 
of 40 hours instead of 45, work place safety and health, 
maternity and paternity leave, etc. The concentration of 
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unions on issues' other than wages, is simi larly pointed out 
by ?b~ry and Singh (1988:40) in the following passage: 
With hardening management and government attitudes, 
unions' weakened financial resources after 1987 
strikes, lowered standards of living for many workers, 
and an unwillingness to head each wage negotiation 
towards a strike, unions are often concentrating 
ene rg i es around p rov i dent funds, hous i ng , hea 1 th and 
safety and parental rights in negotiations. 
Employers have in general resisted these demands e.g. 
reduced working hours being linked to loss of pay and have 
preferred to deal with these issues separately to the main 
pay claims. They have also, as pointed out, made counter-
demands 1 inked to increased product i vi ty and blamed high 
wages for high inflation rates. 
The economi c recess i on has al so had consequences for black 
unions on another level i.e. maintaining and stabi 1 ising 
organisation in already organised factories. Drawing on his 
experience of organising workers in the transport/trade 
sector in the Western Cape, Lewis (1983) identifies certain 
factors which render the stabilisation of worker 
organisations extremely problematic. Firstly, and one which 
follows from comments made immediately above, the difficulty 
to win satisfactory improvements in wages (and also working 
conditions) and secondly, the responses of employers whereby 
efforts are made to reverse gains that unions have made e.g. 
the rigid application of disciplinary procedures, the 
intensification of work ·loads, efforts to change shift 
patterns etc. and thirdly, retrenchments which do not always 
result from declining work volume but rather deminishing 
.profit rates. All these circumstances have a direct bearing 
on the stabi 1 isation of union organisation and membership 
and ultimately, relative power of workers within 
establishments. 
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6.2;5 privatisation and deregulation 
In addition to the impact of the present economic recession 
on the position of black labour in South Africa as well as 
government's monetarist oriented response to this situation, 
other economic policies are increasingly coming to the fore. 
Amongst these, measures pertaining to privatisation, 
deregulation and industrial decentralisation seem to be of 
special significance. 
To an important degre'e" privatisation and deregulation 
represent the core dimensions of a monetarist and free 
market policy. These measures, while being strongly 
supported by the business community, have been severely 
criticised from within academic circles. Regarding 
privatisation for instance, Innes (1987:566) has shown that 
transferri ng assets current 1 y owned by the state to the 
private, sector, will not necessarily modify the existing 
distribution of wealth amongst the broader population of 
South Africa. Rather privatisation 'serves the interests of 
powerful elements among the capitalist class and offers very 
1 ittle· in the way of advancement for working people' and 
while it may not be 'explicitly racist, it is elitist' in 
that it 'seeks to promote social inequalities'. 
Often coupled with privatisation, deregulation is aimed at 
'cutting back on the regulation governing the activities of 
pri vate compan i es and entrepreneurs in the market place' 
(Innes 1987:553). By deregulation, state intervention in the 
economy 'is similarly reduced. It is embodied in the 
Temporary Removal of Restrictions on Economic Activities 
Act, No 87, 1986. Deregulation, while entailing the removal 
of 'racially discriminatory measures, and aimed at the 
promotion of and aid of small business, free enterprise, 
employment opportunities, and the informal sector, may 
result in posing major difficulties to the working class' 
(Budlender 1986; Hofmeyr & Nicol 1987). As pointed out by 
the latter (1987:81), the above Act gives ,the government 
wide powers in that it allows the· State President to 
191 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
tsuspend the operation of a wide range of laws if he thinks 
that" the"" part i cu 1 ar 1 aw "undu 1 y" impedes" compet it ion, the 
creation of job opportunities or the "economic progress" of 
people in any industry or occupation'. 
The removal of the regulation of minimum wages for instance, 
may lead to greater exploitation of employees. So will the 
abolition of" safety conditions and health regulations 
seriously impair the less fortunate. A further problem 
concerns central bargaining institutions e.g. industrial 
councils. Hofmeyr and Nicol (1987) for example, identify a 
poss i b 1 e future trend in that central i sed ag reements will 
only be applicable to employers that form part of the 
bargaining process. To the extent that unions may in the 
future -" and this has already been suggested - prefer more 
centralised wage barga in i ng to underp in plant 1 eve 1 
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bargaining while employers may be expected to restrict wage 
bargaining to the local level during economic recessions, 
deregulation may threaten the position of labour. Employers 
may easily withdraw from central level bargaining so as not 
to have to adhere to mi ni mum wage agreements. In August of 
1989, some 15 000 members of Numsa (National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa) went on strike at production 
lines belonging to VW, Toyota and Samcor to back demands for 
centralised wage bargaining in the automobile industry. The 
union had made this demand a priority tin order to counter 
management's tactic of deregulating and trying to exempt as 
many plants as possible from minimum conditions of 
employment' (Weekly Mail 17/8/1989). Mention is also made of 
the way employers topted out' of the industrial council for 
the paper and print industry and attempts to exempt smaller, 
firms from the 1988 wage talks in the metal industry. 
It is especially the unorganised workers who will have great 
difficulty in resisting and opposing deregulation in their 
particular work place and whose conditions will" probably 
worsen in the process. Similarly, deregulation will further 
complicate efforts to organise workers i,n small firms 
situated in outlying areas~ Thus, on a long term basis, the 
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, ' 
strength 
through 
and· power' of' 
a pol icy·' and 
labour can be expected to weaken 
strategy of deregulation for the 
Der~gul~~~on Act attacks the Wa~e Act, Labour Relations Act, 
·Mach i ne'ry and Occupat i ona l' Act and the i ndustr i a 1 counc i 1 
.system (Hofmeyr & Nicol 1987). It is also noted by Budlender 
( 1986) that ve ry often deregu 1 at i on is app 1 i ed to those 
sectors notorious for paying low wages'. 
Thus, the free-marketers assume that by deregu 1 ati on and 
privatisation, market forces wi 11 be freed and government 
intervention curbed. From this will follow a lower inflation 
rate, the extension of the informal sector, a rise in 
employment and productivity levels and economic growth. All 
this is seen to redirect the South African economy on a path 
of recovery. The present economi c cr i si s, exacerbated by 
efforts of' privati'sation and' deregulation, is reflected .in 
the loweri\lg of' wage increases since 1988 and anticipated 
wage increases for 1989 as well as strike data for this 
period. 
The state's· positi,on .on privatisation' and deregulation has 
up till very recently not always been that clear. This has 
been ascribed by Innes (1987) to the fact that the state, by 
conceding to either the demands from the popular movement or 
to demands from the privatisation lobby, is bound to lose 
some of its power. 
6.3 Long-term economic trends, labour power and local 
bargaining 
What ha's been the re 1 evance and 
fluctuations and economic policies 
and employers and ultimately the 
bargaining? 
significance of economic 
for the power of labour 
establishment of local 
Up till the 1960's, white labour's position was relatively 
secure and i nst i tut i ona 11 y protected ~y forma 1 centra 1 i sed 
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.bar~aining .. ~~pe~ially since 1960, the South African economy 
expefiehced growth mainly as a result of the growing 
centrality of the manufacturing sector. The latter, being 
dependent on the supply o"f especially semi-skilled labour, 
had far reaching consequences for the industrial power of 
especially the black workers in South Africa and. ultimately 
the barga in i ng 1 eve li nst i tut i ona 1 i sed by these workers and 
their growing unions. Apart from entrance into semi-skilled 
occupations at an increasing rate, their position was 
markedl y strengthened by the i nabi 1 i ty of the whi te 
workforce to provide a sufficient supply of necessary 
labour, the pressure that multi-nationals have come to bear 
on the position of the black worker in the work organisation 
(Morris 1981) and the educational level of an increasingly 
larger proportion of the black working population. In 
accordance with trends elsewhere, black ,workers' position 
strengthened during this period of high economic growth. 
As from. 1970 onwards, local· bargaining became the accepted 
bargaining level for this section of the workforce - their 
power enabling them to establish such arrangements. Of 
course, their exclusion from ofticial bargaining structures 
made this choice less surprising. Also, the preference for 
plant level bargaining follows from the fact that the newer 
unions rely exclusively on shopfloor support and the power 
of shop stewards. As mentioned earlier on, strong shopfloor 
organisation has similarly been central to work place 
bargaining in Britain. Success of unions at this level is 
dependent on a high degree of involvement and participation 
·throughout negotiation processes - a requirement not being 
able to be met by industrial counci 1 or other forms of 
centralised bargaining. Furthermore, the 'newer' unions rely 
heavily on the withdrawal of labour in order to back up 
negotiations. 
The preference of these unions as well as the rationale 
behind their choice,. is very similar to that of American 
unions in· the establishment of plant and enterprise 
bargaining in the 1930's stated in Chapter 5 i.e. 'unions 
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found it eas ie r' to organ i se and wi n bargain i ng rights by 
concentrating their resources on the most promising 
enterpr'i ses - or parts of them - instead of tack 1 i ng an 
entire industry at one time' (Windmuller 1987:86). In a very 
real sense, the prol iferation of local bargaining since the 
1970's is not only symptomatic of the substantial industrial 
power on the part of' black workers but also reflects very 
clearly the level at which this power is located i.e. place 
of work. 
The increase in black workers' industrial power since the 
1960's due to, inter alia, its changing position within the 
economy and labour market, was similarly manifested in the 
emergence of the independent union movement. The period 1973 
up t i 111979 was characterised by efforts to get the newer 
unions organised and a high strike rate in certain regions 
of the country, riotably Natal. There, union member~hip rose 
rapidly after the 1973/1974 strike wave and signing up mass 
membership was the primary objective (Maree 1987). Despite 
certa in setbacks experi.enced by the independents after the 
Soweto uprising in, 1976 i.e. a low economic growth level 
immediately following this event and repressive measures 
imposed by the state, these unions entered a recovery period 
during 1977-1979. After 1979,· unions and strikes were to 
increase dramatically following the amended Labour Relations 
Act. 
On employer side, local bargaining through recognition and 
othe r plant 1 eve 1 ag reements , has not been met with much 
enthusiasm - at least up till quite recently. This attitude 
contrasts with British employers who have ;n general 
accepted work place bargaining and have even come to prefer 
it during periods of high economic growth. 
The recess i on and low econom i c growth wh i ch have set in 
world-wide during the 1970's, also had (and still have) 
ramifications for labour's position and strength vis-a-vis 
employers. The present economic crisis in· South Africa, 
exacerbated by economic policies of monetarism, 
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privatisatio~· and·deregulatio~, has strengthened emp16yers' 
positi6n. T~e long~term impact on labour is a~ yet not that 
clear. For example, Roux van cier Merwe (1986:15) comments 
that. 
(a)ccording to formal economic theory, trade unions are 
weaker ina downturn and wi 11 moderate thei r demands 
and avoid direct industrial action. Clearly·, with a 
high strike count in 1985 and no sign of reduced 
demands, unions are not reacting as expected. 
A 1 though these comments seem to have been substant i ated by 
events up till the 1987 NUM (National Union· of Mineworkers) 
strike, indications are that since 1988, wage increases, as 
we 11 as ant i c i pated wage increases, have been lower than 
during preceding years. A decl ining strike rate simi larly 
suggests that the economic cl imate is taking its toll on 
industrial workers. 
The consequences of the above for bargain i ng 1 eve 1 s - and 
local bargaining in particular - can only be surmised at 
this stage. In accordance with trends ,elsewhere, labour is 
likely to pursue wage bargaining at a more centralised level 
in the future. As pointed out earlier on, indications are 
that labour is already responding in such a fashion. Efforts 
to get wage bargaining ;elevated to a more centralised level 
are of course crucial in the 1 ight of present deregulation 
efforts. In a recent publication (Indicator SA, Vol 6(3) 
1989:82) this observation is confirmed and various reasons 
are put forward for this shift in bargaining levels: (1) the 
increasing organisation of unions beyond the plant level, at 
g roup and industry 1 eve 1; (2) i nsuff i c i ent resources for 
effective negotiations by union officials at each plant 
whe re they are rep resented and (3) regard i ng certa in issues 
e. g. reducement of ·the work i ng week, the chances of 
achieving success is greater at a more centralised level. It 
is of course difficult to estimate to what extent labour 
will be in a position to get minimum wage levels negotiated 
at higher levels if they should come to seek this. 
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Emp10yers on· the other hand, also in accordance with 
tend~n6i~s in many6ther industrial countries presently, may 
be ~xpected to prefer wage barga~ning at the local level. As 
sugge·sted, deregulation may in fact crucially foster the 
tendency of wage bargain i ng at the work place by 
undercutting previously regulated wage agreements. The focus 
of employers on productivity and profitability levels during 
economi G downturns and the tendency to cut 1 abour costs 
underly employers' efforts in this rega~d. 
Loca 1 ',barga in i ng howeve r , rema ins c roc i a 1 espec i ally to 
black workers in South Africa. Even if wage bargaining is to 
be elevated to more centralised levels, many remaining work 
place issues are covered and bargained over at plant level. 
Some of ··these issues especially retrenchment and job 
security are of crucial significance at present. The 
already mentioned reliance of the newer unions on strong 
shopfloor support and -democrat i c structures also means that 
local bargaining occupies a crucial role in present-day 
l~bour relations thus remaining ',the most viable option open 
to . these unions' (Patel 1988:49). Banks' (1974) remarks 
regarding the unlikely general shift in Britain to more 
centra 1 i sed bargain i ng even if unemp 1 o~ment 1 eve 1 s shou 1 d 
continue to rise, may very well be applicable to plant 
bargaining in the South African context. A more likely 
deve 1 opment wi th in the present economi c context in South 
Africa seems to be the co-existence of industry and local 
bargainlng structured in terms of the nature of the issues 
involved. 
The argument above pertaining to the present and possible 
future role of plan't bargaining also relates to, and 
highlights, another previously stated argument i.e. that 
even if employees' and employers' preferences for local 
bargaining may coincide, it may be so for diffel-ent reasons 
and over different bargaining issues. The bargaining 
parties' ·diversified concerns thus relate strongly to macro-
economic factors, particularly the overall ,growth rate of 
the economy. 
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CHAPTER 7 
GOVERNMENT POLICY AND LABOUR LEGISLATION 
7 • 1 Introduction 
As long as governments perceived their primary 
res pons i b i 1 i ty to be the protect i on of the freedom of 
the market place and the sanctity of the i nd i v i dua 1 
contract of employment, and as long as they considered 
trade unions to be a major threat to both, the purpose 
of intervention by the public authorities was the 
suppression, or at the very least the tight 
containment, of unions (Windmuller 1987:121). 
19th century, or soon During the last quarter of the 
afterwards, important changes 
policies took place regarding 
in public attitude and 
unions in that a limited 
tolerance developed towards unions and therefore collective 
bargaining (1987:122). Public policy and passage of 
legislation bring a crucial set of externa:l conditions to 
bear on the. relevant parties and bargaining structures. 
Following Kochan (1980), the functions of public policy and 
legislation may be seen to be the following: (1) it 
regul ates the power balance between management and 
(2) it interprets and transforms political and 
labour; 
social 
va 1 ues; (3) it represents an add it i ona 1 and direct actor 
i.e. government, with goals of its own and (4) it defines 
the autonomy of collective bargaining. 
Through legislation and statutory law, public policy 
regulates the power balance amongst the various parties, 
i.e. government, employers and unions. The regulation of 
this relationship has its equivalent in those policy 
measures adopted to restore the power balance between so-
called tfree' economic agents within a laissez-fair market 
economy, presumably based on free competition and supply and 
de~and principles. Just as there exists the very real 
possibi 1 ity of sellers in the market for consumer goods 
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abus j ng. the.i r 
the. consumer, 
emp loyers or 
their power. 
power (mainly through monopol ies) vis-a-vis 
a similar possibility exists that either 
1 abour - but most 1 y the former - may abuse 
(or state) 
Although 
acts in 
plural ists maintain that government 
an essentially neutral capacity to 
further so-called tpublic interest', this assumption, as 
pointed out earlier, is not to be taken seriously. There is 
no consensus in society as a whole as to the priorities that 
bargaining parties should observe and it is almost 
impossible for any government to maintain for very long the 
role of an impartial arbitrator or restorer of power 
balances (Hawkins 1972:231-237). 
Policy and legislation partly reflect the existing 
ideologies and social values of the larger society as well 
as the prevailing power balance between dominant groupings 
within a society's political economy (Kochan 1980; Poole 
1984b). Given that the existing distribution of power in 
society is reflected in government's public policy and 
legislation, ihe latter, and laws governing employment 
relations, thus keep collective bargaining ;n tune with the 
values and ideologies of the larger society. 
The so-called tneutral' stance of government is seriously 
quest i oned for it wi 11 be argued here that in general, 
government policies on labour relations more often than not, 
coi nci de wi th the interests of emp 1 oyers and management. 
(Gladstone 1984). This, of course does not imply that 
governments 
Government, 
never make concessions towards labour. 
especially within capitalist 
production, has the important role of keeping 
economy an ongoi ng concern and the fact that 
an active and relative independent role with 
and obj ect i ves, means· that concess ions have 
relations of 
the capitalist 
it represents 
its own goals 
to be made to 
various interest groups comprising civil society (Hill 1983; 
Ze it 1 in 1 985 ) . 
This relates to the third function of government policies 
and regulations spelled out by Kochan. Given that government 
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i tse 1 f is· an act i ve part i c i pant in the economy and 
industria 1 re 1 at ions system, and hav i ng obj ect i ves of its 
own, tits power must also be checked and limited if real 
60ll~ctive bargaining is to survive' (1980:60). 
Finally, public policy and legislation also determine the 
degree of autonomy that collective bargaining enjoys in a 
particular society (Frenkel 1986:S1). With a few exceptions 
i.e. United States, Britain and "SWeden~ most capitalist 
economies in Hill's opinion; did not go through a liberal or 
laissez-faire phase .. In most countries tthe economy was 
politicized from the outset' (1983:237). State intervention 
and close control of all aspects of economic life have 
always characterised capitalist industrialism in Japan, most 
of conti"nental Europe and especially South Africa. Most 
governments however, have historically refrained from 
becoming actively involved in the determination of 
bargaining structures and levels. It may be for this reason 
that the attitudes and preferences of employers have had 
such a significant bearing on the development of particular 
structures and dominant bargaining level (Hyman 1975). Where 
they have become involved, the resu 1 t i ngarrangements have 
suited the employers' interests. The strategy of relative 
non-intervention into labour relations in general, has of 
course been modified in the light of world-wide trends, 
especially since the 1960's, due to problems inherent to 
capitalist and social market economies. 
As suggested by Kochan and others, government pol i c i es and 
legislation are seen t~ have the important function of 
trestoring' the power balance in the employment 
relationship. The principle aim of labour law then, t is to 
regulate, to support and to restrain the power of management 
and the power of organised labour' (Davies & Freedland 
1983:15). But, as the authors point "out, while labour law no 
doubt has imp,ortant functions in labour relations, it cannot 
do much to change the re 1 at i onsh i p between the part i es in 
circumstances where labour is seen to be weak. And as 
suggested by them, it is secondary when compared to the 
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(impact. of the labour market and the spontaneous creation of 
a social power on the workers side to balance that of 
. management'· (1983: 19) . 
7.2 Legislation and bargaining levels 
It is evident that labour l~gislation by government can, and 
does, take on many forms in different countries, depending 
primari lyon the (voluntaristic' nature of collective 
bargaining within a country's industrial relations -system. 
The direct impact it has. had on bargaining structures and 
levels, has, on t~e whole, been rather negligible. Instances 
however, can be cited where legislation has either 
reinforced levels that have historically evolved primarily 
through employers' preferences or where legislation at 
particular moments in time, have at least encouraged a 
specific trend. In Chapter 6, incomes policies was shown for 
example to constrain local bargaining ·and reinforce 
centralised bargaining. 
During the two world wars, governments in Britain became the 
central employer party by taking over some major industries. 
These developments encouraged negotiations ~t national 
level. The prominency of national bargaining after World War 
I equally resu 1 ted from government's estab 1 i shment of the 
Whitley Councils and Joint Industrial Councils (Banks 
1974:31-33). The introduction of the Munitions of War Act in 
1915 and compulsory arbitration also encouraged national 
barga in i ng .. 
A 1 though not const i tut i ng 1 eg is 1 at i on per. se, the Donovan 
Commission's recommendations of formalised collective 
agreements at plant and enterprise level, can also be 
interpreted as encouraging formal negotiations at these 
levels. In these recommendations, the Commission was clearly 
accommodat i ng the interests of some managers in that the 
latter wanted more control over the informal and fragmented 
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activities in their respective work places a view 
supported by Thomson, Mulvey ~nd Farbman (1977-:179). The 
Donovan Commission is seen to have argued that 
~restructuring of bargaining and the reassertion of control 
by the formal parties at plant and company level could 
provide a new and efficient system'. 
This view has not gone unchallenged for it has been 
suggested that management in many cases, preferred dea 1 i ng 
and bargaining with shop stewards on an informal basis. 
Brown (198 r: 24-25), for examp 1 e, warns that tal though th is 
shift to single-employer arrangements has been in accord 
wi th the Donovan's prescr i pt ions, it wc>u 1 d be unwi se to 
ascr i be it to any very consc i ous strategy on the part of 
employers'. The shift must be seen as the tlargely unplanned 
consequences of piecemeal reform' rather than the 
tdeliberate - rejection of established multi-employer 
arrangements' and is likely to result in a mixture of 
bargaining levels in the foreseeable future. These instances 
of direct gove rnment i nte rvent ion ment i oned above are, of 
course, quite revealing in the light of the so-called 
tvoluntaristic' nature of British collective bargaining. For 
as Hyman (1975:137) suggests, tvoluntarism has always been 
more apparent than real'. 
The role of statutory regulation in the American collective 
bargaining system, especially as to the formal regulation 
and establishment of enterprise and plant bargaining, has 
been documented by, for example, Kochan (1980) and Kassalow 
(1982) and outlined in Chapter 3. As in the British case, 
formal local bargaining has traditionally been encouraged by 
employers and government alike. 
Despite the institutionalisation of national and industry 
level bargaining -in many Western European countries, a 
grow i ng tendency towards work place bargain i ng since the 
1960's and 1970's can be identified (see Chapter 3). This 
has in many instances taken place through means other than 
works councils and significantly, with the support and 
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encouragement of government legislation. Jackson (1977) 
sUbstaritiates this in the ~ase of Italy, France and Belgium 
and even Australia with its system of compulsory 
arbitration. In France, for example, the Auroux laws of 1982 
determine new bargaining subjects and the levels at which 
bargaining is to be conducted - notably at the level of the 
enterprise (Grundberg 1986). Swedish employers have also 
become concerned with the rigidities of the centralised 
system especially during the early 1980's. In this, they 
have receiVed. strong support· from the government. 
Many reasons have been suggested for this trend ranging from 
the widening of inter- and intra-industry disparities' in 
wages and work conditions (Windmuller 1987) to a move by 
workers to gain greater control over their work situation -
especially given. the growth in enterprises in general 
(Coates & Topham 1970). The central, and even active role of 
governments in the European context, has been mainly in 
response to the wi shes and interests of emp 1 oyers who deem 
it feasible, within' the present economic climate, to 
establish wage bargaining within the'ir own establishments. 
The warning of Brown on the 'conscious strategies' of 
employers should be kept in mind however. 
·On the other hand, 1 abour has in the past 15 years or so, 
made efforts to gai n greater control over the work 
situation. Referring to such developments, Hill (1983:167) 
predicts that European unions are more likely in the future 
to be more concerned over control issues than strictly 
economi c issues and tend to re 1 y more on off i cia 1 act ion 
than collective bargaining per se. 
The above suggests or demonstrates that governments' 
involvement through legislative measures and support can be 
in response to labour's demands and in accordance with 
labour's interests. It also demonstrates the point made 
earl i er i. e. that the 1 eve 1 bei ng preferred by part i es may 
coincide, but for different reasons and, equally important, 
different issues may be at stake. These considerations make 
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it difficult to cilways eval~ate or interpret in" which 
party's" interests government is act i ng or react i ng through 
labour legislation and r~gulation. 
7.3 Legislation, bargaining levels and power 
bargaining parties in South Africa 
of 
The labour relations system of South Africa is commonly 
viewed as one of voluntarism (Jowell 1986; Bendix 1989; 
Wiehahn 1983). This view is strongly espoused by government 
spokesmen and especially the Manpower Commission. Addressing 
a conference in 1985, Jowell (1986:64) states that the 
'essence of our labour relations system is self-government 
by capital and labour' and with some notable exceptions 'the 
state avoids getting directly involved in labour conflict 
and act largely as scribe and rule"keeper'. In other words, 
government establishes the groundrules for the relevant 
parti~s by providing formal collective bargaining structures 
and mechan isms." Contrary to pract ice in the Un i ted States 
for example, bargaining forums, are created - especially by 
the Labour Relations Acts but no duty to bargain is 
imposed on parties. Thus, the 'philosophical tenet 
underlying the statutory process in South Africa, from 
inception to result, is voluntarism' (Nupen 1988:77). In 
Nupen's view, even where forms have been made availabl"e, no 
legislative duty to bargain exists, resulting, in many 
instances, ina charade. Part i es, he says, have evoked the 
machinery of the Labour Relations Act with no serious intent 
to bargain but merely as a conduit to the Industrial Court 
or to the terrain of legal industrial action. 
While the claim of voluntarism in South African industrial 
relations may have a measure of validity for the post 1979 
period, the government has, especially prior to 1979, played 
a significant role through policy measures and legislation 
in not only providing, encouraging and even establishing a 
particular bargaining level, but more importantly perhaps, 
in determining the relative position and strength of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
205 
\ categories of labour: This "has been especially the position 
sinq~ 1"924. Contrary to trends in democratic societies where 
industrial relations policy and legislation have been 
markedly influenced by labour, parliamentary influence in 
South Africa has been 'exercised historically by the 
representatives of minority racial interests within the 
labour movement' (Nupen 1988:77). The exclusion of black 
workers from full political participatior:l, has meant" that 
black workers have had no influence on lesisl"atory measures 
pertaining to industrial relations matters. 
Government policy and legislation in South Africa has its 
roots in the" pol itical economy of" the country pri"or to the 
onset of industrialisation, the controlling and securing of 
adequate" labour to the mining and other industries, the 
curbi ng of" mi 1 i tancy. on the part of the workforce and the 
fear of a politicised workforce - especially black workers. 
In order to trace government's role in ~etermining or 
encouraging "bargaining levels and/or strengthening or 
weakening the position of employers and Jabour by policy and 
legislative measures pertaining to labo~r markets and 
relations, different historical periods are identified. 
7 .3. 1 1870-1910 
During the first years after the discovery of minerals, as 
Webster" points out, the emergence of a wage-earning class 
through the slow operation of the market forces was 
inadequate given the partiriular needs of the mining industry 
(1983:9-10). This was overcome by legislation in the passing 
of the Glen Grey Act in 1894 by the Cape Parliament and the 
introduction of pass laws. The former made provision for 
individual land "tenure and the imposition of hut and poll 
taxes forcing people to enter the labour" market (Stadler 
1987). Through these tax measures, Afri can peasants were 
bei ng transformed into wage earners and were i ncreas i ng 1 y 
, 
being proletarianised. The pass laws, introduced under the 
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pressure of the Chamber of Mines in 1896, contro 11 ed the 
labC?ur·. supply to the mines. The pass laws, Ncube notes, 
tserved to keep Blacks in their labour contracts by 
sUbjecting them to frequent checks in order to ensure that 
they did not roam about idly or desert the mine' (1987:17). 
Thes·e measures, in combination with various others, 
consol idated trends existing prior to the .1870's resulting 
in the underdevelopment of black economy, the 
'institutionalisation of white .domination and the 
exploitation of the black worker. All this was to be 
entrenched even further by political unification in 1910. 
7.3.2 1910-1948 
This historical period was characterised by segregational 
measures devised by government in the first instance with 
the aim of securing adequate labour. Pertaining to the 
mining industry, these efforts were strengthened by the 
establishment of special recruiting organisations (Stadler 
1987; Webster 1983; Lipton 1986). Secondly, government 
purported to control and counteract the activities of black 
and whi te 
example, 
disruptive 
workers' organisations. Davies (1983) 
how legislation fo·llowed each of 
periods. The 1907-strike, related 
shows for 
the most 
to white 
workers' protest against a proposal by mine-owners to p~rmit 
African and Chinese workers to perform skilled work, was 
followed by the Transvaal Disputes Act. This strike was 
broken by the replacement of strikers with unemployed 
Afrikaners, representing for the latter a breakthrough in 
that 15 years later, three quarters of mine workers were 
Afrikaners. In 1913, white workers went on strike again and 
won recognition for their trade union by the Chamber of 
Mines through ·the Industrial Disputes and Trade Union Bill. 
In 1914 and again in 1922, whites went on strike against 
threats of substitution by cheaper African labour (Webster 
1983:13-14). This was to be followed by the 1924 Industrial 
Conciliation Act. 
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In order to eliminate competition, measures were enacted 
against. particularly black farmers, traders· and workers. 
Simuitaneously, these measures ensured cheap labour for 
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·white farms and mines. Through the 1913 (and later 1936 
Land) Act, 13% of the land was reserved for Africans. This 
act 
had the twin effect of suppressing the emerging African 
peasantry, which was proving an effective counterclass 
to the White farmer, and creating a pool of cheap 
labour in the reserves (Webster 1983:10). 
These black areas or reserves were to occupy a central 
position in the government's policy of Apartheid. 
The 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act ·had significant 
consequences, not on 1 y for potent i all oca 1 barga in i ng, . but 
it weakened the strength of labour in general by curbing and 
extending governme~t's control over unions and militant. 
action. Relative to white workers, the power of black 
workers was dram'atically weakened given their exclusion. 
This act, as Lipton (1986) points out, was not explicitly 
racial, but the ·exclusion of African men (and women in 1952) 
presented to white workers a role in determining the 
occupational structure, access to training and wages while 
denying these to Africans. Vertical movement by Africans on 
the mines were restricted by the Mines and Works Act of 1911. 
and 1926 barring Africans from occupying more skilled 
pos it ions on the mi nes. In terms of the amended 1926 Act, 
all black workers were excluded from listed skilled and 
semi-skilled work, thereby eliminating competition for these 
occupations. 
The power of white workers was strengthened further by 
virtue of their access to political power. As was shown in 
Chapter 5, this fact and the demands of white skilled miners 
resulted in the creation of a white labour aristocracy or 
f bounded work i ng class'. The detail s of the government's 
fcivilised labour policy' are well known. Suffice to point 
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unsk.illed white worker resulting from this pO.licy. Between 
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1924 and 1933 the proportion of unskilled white workers 
emp.loyed on the railways rose from 9.5% to 39.3% while 
Africans fell from 75% to 48.9%. Twenty years later, over 
100 000 mainly unskilled and semi-skilled whites were 
working for the rai lways. Pressure was also put on private 
enterprise to maintain sufficient quotas of civilised labour 
although mining was not to be included. On the mines 
statutory protection of white miners already existed' 
(Giliomee 1983:151-152). 
In the period 1939-1948, due to the introduction of 
personnel management techniques, the job colour bar was 
somewhat eased and train i ng fac i 1 it i es for black workers 
extended in order to alleviate the skilJ shortage. This was 
to be done without seriously challenging white workers' 
position within the racial hierarchy existing. in the work 
place. The urban/reserves ·divide became more crucial as 
influx to urban areas increased and poverty in the reserves 
worsened (Browett 1982). Whi le considerc;ttion was given to 
the notion of ·lifting restrictions on black urbanisation in 
this period (Fagan Commission), this was not to be. 
7.3.3 1948-1960 
After the Nationalist Party gained political control in 
1948, control over black labour by government was tightened 
and extended thus neutral ising trends identified during the 
years immediately prior to 1948~ This was being reflected in 
the work place as co-operation and co-optation in 
management-worker re 1 at i onsh i p was rep 1 aced by str i ct 
control and discipline. 
In the area of labour relations, the most significant 
legislation was the 195~ Natives (Settiement of Disputes) 
Act and the 1956 Industrial Conci-liation Act which amended 
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the '1924 Act. The provision made for the establ ishment of 
work.s bommi ttees for Afri cans by the former act has been 
out 1 i ned' and discussed in Chapter 4. Be i ng consu 1 tat i ve in 
nature, dominated by management and .functioning as a 
substitute for African unions in the work place, they could 
hardly qualify as mechanisms rendering any power to black 
workers - a power which was eroded still further by the 
entrenchment of the 'civilised labour policy'. 
The 1956 Act retained centralised bargaining, excluded all 
Africans from statutory barg~ining, prohibited the 
establishment of new multi-racial unions (whites, Asians and 
coloureds), trade unions and employers' organisations were 
now forbidden to affiliate or support a political party or 
to parti~ipate in politics and job reservation was now 
extended to ma~ufacturing and commerce. The Minister of 
Labour could reserve jobs for a particular racial group in 
any industry, trade or occupat ion (Jones & Gr iff i ths 1980; 
Wiehahn 1983). 
The African unions' also suffered a severe blow from the 
passing of the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950. This 
Act could be used against individuals and organisations who 
were seen to further the aim or objectives of communism and 
uri.der this Act, many prominent union leaders were banned. 
The suppression of these unions were to continue right 
through the 1950's. 
Horizontal movement of African workers was further 
. . 
restricted by the tightening of existing pass laws and the 
establishment of Labour Bureau's. The latter were to 
allocate appropriate and adequate labour to'especially white 
agriculture. The needs of the urban industries were catered 
for by the mi grant 1 abour system controll i ng i nfl ux into 
industrial areas. 
It is thus apparent that'during this period the position of 
Afri~an workers in the economic and political 'structures was 
weakened extensively by measures to preserve white supremacy 
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and· exploit black labour as a means for capital 
accu.mulation. It also illustrates the role of the state in 
providini the necessary control measures in order to 
facilitate the establishment of racially exclusive unionism 
as discussed in Chapter 5. 
7.3.4 1960-1970 
The changing economic conditions during the 1960's and the 
consequences for the power position of black workers were 
out 1 i ned in the previ ous chapter. The shortage of sk ill s 
seriously hampered economic growth and busines·smen came to 
realise theco.sts of job reservation· and barriers to the 
~;, 
training of black workers (Douwes Dekker 1988a). These 
considerations, combined with the greater industrial power 
of black workers, resulted in government developing a more 
'flexible' policy centered around the 'floating' job bar and 
the decentra 1 i sat ion . of industry (L i pton 1986: 33) . In 
essence, the floating bar determined the fragmentation 
and/or reclassification of ski lled jobs traditionally 
occupied by whites. While whites now moved upwards into more 
ski lled jobs the less ski lled parts were to be done by 
blacks. 
Many restrictions and qualifications, however, were to be 
adhered to, espec i ally in so-call ed wh i te areas e. g. no 
white worker could be replaced by a black worker, no white 
should work under a black, there ~as to be proper separation 
between the races on the job, in recess i onary times, jobs 
should revert to whites again, advance should be acceptable 
to unions, etc. Skilled work proper, could only be extended 
to Africans in their 'own' areas. All in all, a ceiling was 
being put on black advancement, especially African 
advancement. To ease the shortage of sk ill s, some 
alternative strategies were also put into practice e.g. 
retraining and upgrading of white workers in'order for them 
to move upwards into more sen i or pos it ions, more use was 
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made of womenesp~cially in jobs traditionally all06ated to 
men, .. immi.gration of whites was encouraged and as a t last 
resort' coloureds and Asians could be used in skilled jobs 
. ·if white unions agreed to this (Lipton 1986). 
A second mechanism/instrument which was devised to 
accommodate business ~omplaints regarding shortage of labour 
in the light of restrictions, was that of the 
decentralisation of manufacturing industries. Growth points 
on Bantustan borders were established and various 
concessions regarding subsidies. tax relief etc. were 
provided to manufacturers. This venture was to prove a 
failure and few new jobs were actually created. 
By the end of the 1960's, government legislatiori and policy 
was being s~riously criticised and challenged and as Douwes 
Dekker demonstrates, this was often done by employers' 
associations e.g. the South African Federated Chamber of 
Industries. Various examples are listed by him illustrating 
tthe propensity on· the part of organised capital to 
challenge the unilateral impositfon by the State of 
Apartheid ideology' (1988a:15). This propensity, however, 
did not culminate in a willingness on the part of individual 
employers to support and endorse the principle of freedom of 
association of workers to form legal unions. 
7.3.5 1970-1978 
The increasing industrial power of black workers, combined 
with more pressure from urban employers and militant action 
on the part of newer unions, contributed to important 
changes in government legislation and policy from 1970 
onwards. 
The 1973 amendment to the Labour (Settlement of Dispute) 
Act, had significant im~lications for the re'ative strength 
of African workers and unions. In Friedman's view, this 
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amendment conta i ned two elements wh i ch meant s 1 i ght 1 y more 
power 'for them i.e. the right to strike and allowing some 
works and liaison committee members to attend industrial 
coun'cil meetings. The right to strike constituted an 
important symbolic change for African workers for they were 
now, for the first time since the war, allowed to withhold 
labour (1987:54). Furthermore, works committees, if their 
members belonged to a union, could be used to force 
management to bargain. Many unions, having gained some 
presence in an estab 1 i shment" preceded to take over such 
committee structures. 
In general however, as -noted earlier, the ability of these 
committees - and works councils after 1979 - to function as 
central instruments of worker interest and power within the 
estab 1 i shment, rema i ned re 1 at i vel y unsuccessfu 1. Even after 
they obtained bargaining rights on wages and working 
conditions, this was essentially still the case. 'They were 
not independent organisations who could recruit members, 
collect dues and build a power base' (Friedman 1987:53). 
Furthermore, as Swart (1988) correctly argues, while blacks 
were granted the freedom to bargain collectively through 
these structures, they did not have adequate means to 
enforce such agreements: 
7.3.6 1979-1980's 
Labour legislation following the recommendations of the 
Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions of Inquiry in 1979 and 1981, 
as well as through' later' amendments, has reflected major 
changes within the economic and political structures of 
South African society as well as the changing position of 
black workers within these structures. At the same time, it 
has further strengthened the position of the black working 
class. Amongst these measures, the removal of job 
reservation on the basis of race and the extension of the 
right of freedom of association to blacks are of particul~r 
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sig~ificance. Black unions were now given legal· recognition 
and. the . right to part i c i pate in statutory bargain i ng and 
dispute. machinery. This included industrial councils and 
multi-racial works councils at establishment level. 
Other stipulations of importance are the extension of the 
, 
system of apprenticeship-training to blacks, the improvement 
of training facilities for this category of·the work force, 
the streamlining ·of regi~tration procedures and improved 
mobility. of blacks in urban areas. Formal abolition of the 
system of influx control took place in 1986 although the 
extent to which free movement is now accepted, is seriously 
questioned. by some commentators. For example, given that the 
Abolition of Influx Control Act has also amended the Slum~ 
Act and the Illegal Squatting Act, the new. section providing 
control of· informal settlements through the designation of 
specific areas, is viewed by some as a mechanism of fOrced 
removals. Others however, view it as a positive measure to 
allow informal settlement (Bernstein 1988:97). 
The legal recognition of black unions has improved the 
bargaining rights and power of black workers as the lack of 
formal -recognition has impaired and undermined black 
workers' bargaining position vis-a-vis employers and 
testablished' unions prior to 1979 (Nattrass 1988). The 
position within the labour market was similarly strengthened 
by the removal of job reservation and better training 
fac; 1 ities although Nattrass warns that the removal of job 
, 
reservation should not be overemphasised. This follows from 
the fact that tclosed shop' agreements have historically 
been the central factor in white workers' dominant position 
within the labour market (1988:289-290). 
213 
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In the South African context, contrary to recent 
developments in European societies, local bargaining through 
in-plant agreements, has not been the direct outcome or 
result of any particular policy or legislation or, for that 
matter, encouragement by government. Rather, it can be 
argued that government's exclusion of Africans from 
statutory bargain i ng structures and the grant i ng of high 1 y 
'qua.lified' bargaining rights to committees had indirec.tly 
contributed to developments not intended by the legislator~s 
basic approach to African and black unions, bargaining 
rights and efforts to control such institutions within a 
context of greater economic power on the part of black 
workers and unions. Swilling (1987:416) makes this very 
point by showing that the intentions of state policy 
markedly differ from the way policies are implemented and 
from the social processes underlying it. State policy thus 
'cannot take account of all the structural forces that 
impinge on a given field of intervention, nor can the 
responses of a range of social actors be predicted'. Black 
workers have responded by devising alternatives and 
strategies of their own choice in order to protect their 
interests. 
This SUbstantiates the view of Davies and Freedland noted 
earlier, i.e. that labour legislation is in general 
secondary when compared to the 'impact of the labour market 
and the spontaneous creation of a social power on the 
workers side to balance that of management' (1983:19). This 
holds particularly true for black workers for, as correctly 
argued by Irons ide (1983: 53), these workers, desp i te the i r 
lack of conventional political power, have a significant 'de 
facto' power base in the South African society today. The 
shift to work place relations are thus due 'more to a 
fundamental shift of power in our wider society than other 
speculative reasons advanced from time to time'. In their 
efforts to. develop alternative strategies, black workers 
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have clearly ~hifted their attention away from government to 
the employer in th~ establishment. 
The changes brought about by the post-W i ehahn 1 eg i slat ion, 
have all played a role in black workers' abil ity to extend 
1 oca 1 barga in i ng even fu rthe r as ill ustrated by the 
escalation of the number of in-plant agreements concluded 
during the 1980's. The state's attempt at institutional ising 
industrial conflict and control of the newer unions, has 
been counteracted in that the latter, especially during the 
1979-1983 economic boom, waged 'protracted shop-floor 
battles to win recognition, wage increases, maternity 
rights, pension pay-outs, and a range of concess ions that 
"management's rights to manage'" .( S\tI i 11 i ng challenged 
1987:417). In this sense, government's labour legislation 
for local bargaining and particularly, has been functional 
the extension thereof. 
7.5 The attitudes of South Afr.ican employers towards 
rec~nt de~elopments in local bargaining 
As argued in Chapter 5, South African employers have always 
resisted unions at the work place and have in the past 
preferred more centralised bargaining. They have clearly 
resisted attempts by workers t6 shift negotiations and 
bargaining to the establ ishment level. This is especially 
true where black workers have been concerned. In reaction to 
developments in the 1970's, companies mostly responded in a 
unitarist fashion towards the rights of workers. Says Douwes 
Dekker on this point: 
When the Black unions (with at that stage only African 
members) which emerged in the 1970 decade demanded 
recognition, companies accepted the Department of 
Labour's disapproval and 'condoned police action to 
suppress unionism. White supervisors ·continued to use 
'hire and fire' practices to maintain control. The 
paterna 1 ism underl y i ng the uni tary approach demanded 
workers' 1 oya 1 ty, and when that was not in ev i dence, 
authoritarianism emerged, particularly against so-
called 'agitators'. Legitimacy and legality were 
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.. equated and any attempts by union representatives to . 
. g~in recognition were refused (1988a:15-16) .. 
Regarding the 1977 amendments, Friedman (1987:134), for 
example, notes that these amendments 'alarmed' employer 
associations for they were seen to undermine industry-wide 
bargaining and perpetuate the process of 'leapfrogging' - a 
process resisted well into the 1980's. This defensive 
attitude of employers' associations can be traced back to 
the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act which has locked them 
into a strategy wh i ch regards '1 ega 1 change as the on 1 y 
route to go to when a crisis appears' (Douwes Dekker 
1988a:20). Employers' assoc·iations have seldom, if ever, 
taken initiative and have always resorted to ways of getting 
government to secure their interests. This is in contrast to 
employers' associations in countries elsewhere with a market 
type of economy where. they have taken a much more pro-active 
role in establishing the 'parameters of social policy' 
(1988:21). The difference lies predominantly with the South 
African state's negative attitude towards employers 
associations' involvement in economic and political issues. 
In a similar vein, Cameron, Cheadle and Thompson (1989:28) 
comment as follows: 
The industry-focus of industrial councils has made 
individual employers feel much less threatened by the 
specter of trade unionism. Both employer and union 
part i es have been ab 1 e to extract benef i ts from the 
system and, because participation therein is a 
vo 1 untary affair, the convent i ona 1 recogn it i.on dispute 
could not arise. 
By way of contrast, plant bargaining means that 
the individual employer is placed in an isolated and 
exposed position and is therefore more inclined to 
resist recognition demands. 
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7.6· ,Union growth and strike rates after 1979 
The growi ng i ndustri a 1 strength of bl ack workers as 
ref 1 ected in the estab 1 i shment and subsequent expans i on of 
1 oca 1 barga in i ng th rough recogn i t ion .and othe r 1 oca 1 ' 
ag reements, iss i mil ar 1 y ref 1 ected in the growth of the 
independent union movement and strike rate after legislation 
was first passed in 1979. C9mmenting on spec'ifically the 
newer unions, Maree (1987) reports that during the period 
1979 up to the end of 1983, signed-up membe rsh i p went up 
from about 70 000 to almost 300 000 while claimed membership 
increased to 298.000 - the former being a more rel iable 
indicator .. Membership of the Federation of South African 
Trade Unions (FOSATU) increased, for example, from 30 000 in 
1979 to 95 000 in 1984. Since 1979, membership of trade 
unions has increased from 0,7 million to 1,9 million at the 
end of 1985 of whom 700 000 black employees belong to 
unregistered unions (Horwitz 1987a:35). According· to the 
Department of Manpower's report for 1987, black membersh i p 
of registered unions tot~ls 835 122 while black and coloured 
membership represents 1 168 951 out of a total of 1 879 400. 
Thes~ figures do not include the membership of non-
registered unions of which ·:there are sti 11 a number. The 
Manpower Commission estimates that 88 known unregistered 
unions organise another 240 000 trade union members, 
bringing total union membership to 2 119 000 of the working 
.popula~ion under the Labour Relations Act (S Bendix 1989:306 
& 332). 
The growth in membership of registered unions is primarily 
accounted for by black and coloured employees and according 
to S Bend i x (1989) . one can saf'e 1 y est imate that most of 
these employees belong to the 'newer' unions. Although 
officially non-racial, these unions organise mostly semi-
and unskilled employees whom are mainly represented by black 
and coloured workers. 
Industrial' action through strikes and wo~kstoppages has 
similarly shown a r.ise since 1979. In 1976 there was a 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
temporaryri~e, 'following the Soweto uprise, with 245 
strikes. and stoppages reported. From 1977 to 1979, this 
number had fallen .to an average of 99. The number for each 
year· since 1980 td 1987 has been as follows: 
1980 207 
1981 342 
1982 394 
1983 336 
1984 469 
1985 389 
1986 793 
1987 1 148 
(Indicator SA 1988:74) 
In terms of man-days lost, the total for 1989 so far is 72 
254 compared to 344 386 ; n the quarter ; mmed; ate 1 y before 
and 243 000 in the first quarter of 1988 (Financial Mail 
5.5.1989). The sectors hit in terms of number of strikes and 
man-days lost are presented below: 
Sector Number of Strikes Man-days lost 
Manufacturing 9 8 080 
Service 8 3 434 
Chemical 4 6 840 
Mining 3 33 700 
Food 3 8 900 
Public 2 4 500 
Metal 2 3 600 
Agriculture 2 3 200 
Wages and work i ng cond it ions is the rna in strike ttrigger t 
representing £1% of all strike triggers in the first quarter 
of 1989. During 1987, this percentage was 41%. Dismissals 
account for 19% while recognition issues account for 5% for 
the 1989 period. Settlements by negotiation continue to rise 
as a proportion of decisive solutions to str~ke action from 
47% in the second quarter of 1988 to 63% ·in the fourth and 
218 
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66% in the· first quarter of 1989 (Financial Mail 5.5 
. . . 
1989.: 27.) .. 
7.7 Comments on 1 oca 1 bargain i ng and 
legislation and policy 
government 
7.7.1 black workers' preference for local bargaining 
As from the 1970's onwards, it has been black workers' 
preferences rather than employers' preferences that have 
determined local bargaining in the South African context - a 
point referred to at the outset of this chapter. From 
employers' side, there was much resistance to black unionism 
especially in the work place. Even after African unions had 
gained formal recognition, this was to be the case. In some 
instances efforts pers i sted in keepi ng them tout in the 
cold' by demanding that these unions register and join 
industrial councils. This was especially true for SEIFSA 
(Steel and Engineering Industries Federation), the latter 
being viewed as providing the leadership and guidelines to 
employers in smaller sectors. Local bargaining through 
recognition agreements in particular, has presented a threat 
to employers' (and management) power - much more so than the 
earlier employer and management-dominated committees and 
more recent works counc i 1 s. I n the . process , many compan i es 
continued to rely on the state security system to counteract 
and suppress black unions (Douwes Dekker 1988a:16). 
7. 7.2 correlation between legislation, collective 
bargaining and nature of labour's power 
The extent and natu re of gove rnment' s ro 1 e in estab 1 ish i ng 
bargaining structures and influencing the relative power of 
emp loyers and 1 abour, re 1 ates to the corre 1 at i on between 
legislation, collective bargaining and the nature of 
labour's power position within a particular societal 
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context. By the~~ own admittance, with substantial caution, 
Davies. and Freedland (1983:52) risk the· following 
general isation ... 'regulatory legislation is apt to prevai 1 
over c~ 11 ect i ve 'bargain i ng where and when the po 1 it i ca 1 
pressure power of workers exceeds their industrial pressure 
power ... ' and t it is sometimes (but not always) the case 
that, as the unions get industrially stronger, the 
significance of collective bargaining grows and that of 
legislation deminishes whilst, as their political influen,ce 
increases, so does the volume and significance of regulatory 
legislation'. 
The recent· wave of legislation in, for example Europe, in 
order to encourage local bargaining over especially control 
issues,may be interpreted in the light of the above 
generalisation e.g. in France and Italy. In Italy, the 
authors observe, twe have seen how growing trade union 
strength can produce a generalisation of principles hitherto 
developed by collective bargaining and their transformation 
in to law'. Developments since 1963, but especially since 
1974, have shown thow quickly the scene of rule making can 
shift, and legislation can come to the forefront' (1983:53) 
In Britain, unions have acted as a countervailing power long 
before constituting a political pressure power through 
strength of votes. Unions, therefore, have greater trust in 
collective bargaining rather than legislation. 
Whi le collective bargaining in South Africa has in general 
been viewed a~ central to the area of labo~r relations, this 
is only true in part. In the past, the white section 6f the 
work force has benefitted from the freedom to associate and 
bargain with employers. But, given their political power 
through voting rights, their position relative to black 
labour has been secured by extensive regulatory legislation 
by the state. These very measures have undermined the black 
workers' position within the labour market and have 
relegated them outside statutory collective bargaining 
structures. 
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However., black workers have increasingly come to constitute 
them.selv.es as an industrial pressure power and since the 
1970.'s, ~ollective bargaining has once again come to prevail 
over government regulative legislation. This is demonstrated 
by the 'opening up' of formal bargaining structures, the 
freedom of blacks to associate and bargain in these 
structu res and the estab 1 i shment of 1 oca 1 barga in i ng by the 
Inewer' unions·. It is also demonstrated by the fact that 
while government may not ·initially have favoured the 
development of plant levei bargaining, it has now come to 
terms with it and has subsequently refrained from becoming 
actively involved in these developments. The Manpower 
Commission·· has conceded to the fact that plant level 
barga in i ng is a I natura 1 phenomenon' and that I comp 1 ete 1 y 
valid· agreements' are being reached at this level (S Bendix 
1984:7--8). Says Jowell (1986:74), plant level bargaining 
Ican secure an ordered, procedural settlement of disputes 
and is a stabilising influence in this period of change' and 
as such should be encouraged by government reforms. The 
imposition of legislation and sanctions on either party 
should thus be avoided. 
7.7.3 interrelationship between government's role, power 
of bargaining parties, economic and political 
structures 
While government policies and legislation have a direct 
bearing on the relative power of employers and employees -
in general reflecting existing power relations the 
strength and power of a particular party can feed back into 
legislation. Increased labour strength can, for example, 
play a decisive role/part in getting government to make 
concessions to labour. This is· particularly well 
demonstrated in the European context where governments have 
often provided labour and unions with power enabling them to 
demand the accommodation of their interests. Governments 
have responded through po li t i ca 1 commi tment to fu 11 
employment until the mid· 1970's, the creation of welfare 
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service$ reducing workers' dependence on wages for providing 
life's'ne~essities (Grundberg 1986) and the establishment of 
1 abour Jaw all of which have substantially increased 
1 abour' s power in dealings with employers and 
Increased 1 abour strength 
management· 
has been (Hi 11 1983: 168) . 
trans 1 ated into act i on to obta in more contro lover work 
issues and getting government t,o support thei r demands by 
legislation and encourage work place bargaining. 
Increased labour strength however, does not have to 
originate in government legislation and policy. It may 
originate in the economic structure - more specifically the 
1 abour market -. or in the spontaneous growth of workers' 
social power. The changing position of black workers in 
South Africa since the 1960's and, at least up to 1987, 
illustrates this ~learly as well as government's reaction to 
these deve 1 opments through chang i ng 1 abour and othe r 
legislation. Equally important, these very legislatory 
changes may again feed back to the power relations between 
employers and workers. Jowell (1989:77) essentially makes 
the same point when she says: 
7.7.4 
The Wiehahn Commission and the (then) Minister of 
Manpower, Fanie Botha, went some way to empowering 
black workers by legitimising their unions and dropping 
job reservation in 1979 - but they were just one step 
ahead of a tide that was already turning. Rising black 
education, an increasing skill shortage ,and the moral 
pressures of international opinion were already giving 
black workers bargaining muscle outside of our formal 
industrial relations system. Employer power to resist 
good faith bargaining was no longer absolute. 
government pol·icies and legislation and the 
preservation of itself and a capitalist economy 
Government policy and legislation may, in the final 
analysis, be circumscribed by its very own preservation. In 
South Africa, government legislation and pol icy since the 
80's reflect such a concern through 'the 'creation of a 
social and economic environment that is favourable for the 
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preservat i on of the economi c system that gave it bi rth' 
(Nattrass 1988:231). This seems to hold true even in the 
1 i ght of short-term concess ions to certa insect ions of the 
electorate i.e. the white or 'bounded' working class in the 
past. Pressure directed at government by certain fract ions 
of capital in recent years, however, demonstrates the 
extreme vulnerability of the free market system (Wolpe 
1988) . 
These comments should. not be interpreted as to imply that 
government has disposed of all discriminatory measures 
devi sed to· 'suppress and curtail worker power. Whi 1 e some 
measures have been forma 11 y di sposed of in recent years, 
regulation under the present state of emergency since 1985, 
has had significant consequences for the power of black 
workers and thelr unions i.e. the detention of union and 
community leaders. 
The state of emergency, says Cooper (1987: 89) has tall owed 
the authorities to act outside the rule of law' and COSATU 
has especially been hard hit. The removal of union officials 
either through detentions or their restriction to certain 
magisterial districts, has· disrupted not only union 
organisation but especially wage negotiations. This has been 
especially the case in the retail and mining industries and 
. many str i kes and workstoppages fo 11 owed in resppnse to the 
state's emergency regulations. Employers' response to the 
state of emergency has also been criticised by unions mainly 
along the following lines: 
( 1 ) employer attitudes 
condemnation of the 
there were except ions 
AEcr 
1 acked bo 1 dness in the i r 
emergency regulations although 
e.g. Premier Milling, Fcr and 
(2) employers did not exert enough pressure on government 
and when they did, it .was covert and a reaction to 
unions' pressure to this effect and 
( 3 ) the existence of discrepancies between 
business leaders and their management 
place. A similar discrepancy exists' 
attitudes of 
in the work 
between what 
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employe rs say and what actua 11 y happens at the work 
p1ace (1987:89-92). 
The new Labour Relations Amendment Act (September 
1988) and local bargaining 
In Chapter 6, for example, in support of arguments advanced 
by Gelb and Innes that monetarist-induced recession by 
government is essentially aimed at shifting the power 
balance between capital and labour, it was shown that black 
workers are at present willing to accept pay settlements far 
lower than their opening demands. Total man-days lost due to 
strike action also seem to be considerably lower since 1988. 
Even so,' and despite certain setbacks, union and federation 
spokesmen remain optimistic regarding the position of black 
labour during 1988. Meintjies of COSATU (Council of South 
African Trade Unions) is quoted by Obery and Singh (1988:42) 
as saying: 
and 
On the shopfloor we have made great advances with 
hundreds of thousands of workers taking. strike action. 
Employer resistance to the living wage and' attempts to 
impose the wage freeze have generally not succeed~d 
(t)here have also been important gains and concessions 
on .. benef its" demanded as part of the 1 i v i ng wage 
campaign. Politically the labour movement continues to 
play a crucial role in putting forward demands for 
democracy and an end to apartheid. 
A 1 so, Camay of NACTU (Nat i ona 1 Counc i 1 of Trade· Un ions) , 
says that this federation was going into 1989 'more 
determi ned than ever to cont i nue the protect i on of members 
in the wor:-k place and the wider community' and that while 
the deepening recession has not allowed unions to improve 
wages in the same way as before, the federation has 
negot i ated wage increases above the consumer pr ice. index 
(1988:42) . 
224 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
225 
In :addition to the present economic climate, the amended 
Labqur·· He 1 at ions Act (No 83 of September 1988) has been 
viewed by many commentators and un i on spokesmen as be i ng 
highly detrimental to black labours' power - thus providing 
support for Gelb and Innes' ,view on shifting power balances 
in South African industrial relations and society. 
Particularly the unions have come out strongly against the 
new Labour Relations Act which has been seen as a major 
reason for the drop in the number of workers i nvo 1 ved in 
industrial and strike action. The Act is viewed as an 
i nd i cat i on of a renewed and aggress i ve act by state and 
employers Ito regain ground lost to the union movement since 
1979' (WIP 54 1-988:29). The new Bill has come to the fore, 
says Ruiters and Niddrie (WIP 52 1988:16), because 'the pure 
power o{ organised workers .has, in .space of just one ye,ar, 
exploded out of its threatened potential ·into the beginnings 
of a real threat'. 
It cou 1 d even be argued, as A 1 be rtyn (1989: 82) does, that 
black unions' gains in the 1980's have not been that 
spectacular when viewed in internation&l ter~s. He says: 
The 1988 Labour Relations Act amendments do not reverse 
an imbalance. They halt a process in which unions were 
beginning to acquire the attribute of equal partners 
with employers in the regulation of labour relations. 
The imbalance which characterised our labour relations 
for the century before 1981 was in the process of being 
remedied. That process has now been truncated, and the 
traditional inequality in the soci~l powers of 
employers and unions is being re-asserted. 
Following the National Manpower Commission's investigation 
into dispute settl ing machinery, the following significant 
amendments were proposed (Albertyn 1987:78): 
to expand the definition of an unfair labour practice; 
to introduce the notion of an unfair dismissal as 
separate from unfair labour practice; 
to establish a special labour Court to sit as an appeal 
court over the Industrial Court; 
to streamline conciliation board procedures 
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To ~vbid. an overly technical discussion of the amended 
LabourRe 1 at i ons Act, the imp 1 i cations of the Act can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. any strike, lock-out or stoppage of work, if the 
employer is not· directly involved in the dispute which 
gives rise to the strike, lock-out or stoppage of work 
amounts to an unfair labour practice 
2. workers cannot str ike more than once ove r an issue 
which had already been the subject of a strike in the 
preceding twelve months 
3. the procedure for going on a legal strike is made more 
complicated 
4. both 1 ega 1 and i·ll ega 1 str i kes may be dec 1 ared unfair 
in terms of the new definition .. Even legal strikes may 
thus be interdicted 
5. a number of labol,Jr practices are excluded from the 
definition of an unfair labour practice, e.g. selective 
re-employment, provided it takes place in accordance 
with fair criteria and not on the ground of an 
employee's trade union activities; and lesser standards 
of substantive fairness may be applied to probationary 
workers 
6. it may be an unfair labour practice for a majority 
union to demand the right to negotiate for a whole work 
place 
. 7 . un ions in areas where they are not representat i ve of 
all workers can be registered e.g. racial unions 
8. unions are deemed to be responsible for illegal 
strikers and can be sued and their assets confiscated 
to compensate for company losses caused by a strike 
9. unions may not call for a consumer or any other boycott 
as this will be an unfair labour practice 
10. the power of the Industrial Court is restricted by the 
creation of a special labour court which w-ill have 
overriding jurisdiction. 
The 1982 amendments to the Industrl a 1 Re 1 at ions Act have 
been particularly significant for work place relations and 
bargaining between management and" workers for the Industrial 
Court was given power to reverse managerial action. This had 
been especially succesiful regarding unfair labour practices 
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in· the. areas of d i.smi ssa 1 s and retrenchment. Pr i or to the 
.1988 amendments, the definition of unfair labour practice 
had been wide and open-end~d. 
The legislator sought to transfix current interpretations of 
unfair labour practice currently existing (A1be~tyn 
1987: 78). It thus seeks to summar i se what the I ndustr i a 1 
Court has up till now found to be an unfair labour practice 
and to prescri be that a 11 those instances wi 1 1 in future 
constitute unfair labour practices. The Act now codifies 
what has been a broad, flexible framework. Th~ negative 
implications lie in the fact that the Court may be forced to 
rule in a very specific manner given the close definition of 
an unfair labour practice when «social: and historical 
circumstances require that in "fairness" the matter be 
decided otherwise'. 
The Act also establishes that unfair dismissals should be 
treated as a separate 1 ega 1 category from the we 1 1 
established concept of unfair labour practice. The effect is 
to individua1ise dismissals disputes and to separate them 
from their collective context as unfair practices. The Act 
signifies that trade unions need no longer be consulted 
prior to an anticipated retrenchment provided the employees 
are consulted. In A1bertyn's view, this could be subversive 
of sound co 11 ect i ve bargain i ng. The separat i on of unfa i r 
dismissals from unfair. labour practices ultimately relates 
to the issue of job security as workers perceive an unfair 
dismissal to one individual worker as a threat of unfair 
dismissal to all of them. 
As pointed out above, indemnity against damages is also 
covered by the Act. Any trade u~ion or employer organisation 
which interferes in the contractual relationship, leading to 
a breach of contract, will not receive indemnification 
against damages suffered by either employer or union party 
as a result. The act further assumes that union membership, 
office bearers or officials are acting as authorised agents 
of their union. Indemnity is immediately removed in the case 
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of .illegal ~trik~s, lock-outs or the commitment of a 
criminal act (Section 79). The onus, says Nupen (1988: 78), 
is now on unions or employers' organisations to prove that 
individuals are not acting on .their behalf. This could well 
mean that unions and their officials 'will pull back from 
the arena of conflict on the shopfloor in fear of attracting 
civil liability' resulting in a deteriorisation of peaceful 
resolution of conflict qnd relations on the shopfloor. , 
The Deputy Director General of the Department of Manpower, J 
D Fourie, in a recent article, comments on the new Labour 
Relations Act and specifically on the rationale behind the 
new amendments (1988:65-j3). Referring to ULP (unfair labour 
practices), he argues that the new Act actually protects 
uni lateral action in the creation of 'rights' of employers 
and employees. Given that, historically, the pattern has 
been set that government is to regulate the community 
through 1 aws, it was argued by the 1 eg is 1 ator that disputes 
could be prevented if the rights of both parties are spelled 
out in the Labour Relations Act. 
Reference is made to the conclusion 
Commission in this regard (1988:66-67): 
reached by the 
Most witnesses felt, however, that the definition was 
far· too wide. This created legal uncertainty and 
encouraged litigation since a party was free to allege 
that virtually any practice was an unfair labour 
practice. In addition, the use of litigation as a means 
of clarifying the content of the definition, could lead 
to enormous legal cost .... 
The intention of the amendments was not, according to 
Fourie, the codification of the definition of an ULP but to 
present 'guidelines' and to 'facilitate collective 
bargaining' . 
The stipulations concerning strike action e.g. conducting a 
strike ballot after the stage of mediation has been reached, 
is intended, says Fourie, 
towards str ike act i on and 
to facilitate a gradual progress 
to· remove the possi bi 1 i ty of a 
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union, . through a ballot, putting 'unfair pressure' on an 
employer ·to settle a dispute. Furthermore, the stipulation 
that union members, office bearers and officials are acting 
as authorised agents of the union, is justified by the 
legislator as an effort to do away with the possibility of 
people involved in 'unlawful actions' hiding behind 
technicalities in order to avoid liability. as protection is 
provided in instances of 'lawful action'. 
Even if the officially stated motivation and intentions 
beh i nd the new Labou r Re 1 at ions Act are accepted - wh i ch 
depends of course on whose interests are at ~take - these 
considerations must be distinguished from the Act's 
consequences for and impact on the re 1 at i ve strength of 
employers and labour. What is particularly questionable in 
the arguments put forward by Four ie, for examp 1 e, is the 
assumption that the hi~torically established pattern of 
government regulating the community through laws which, to 
his own admittance, can be viewed as right or wrong, is 
justification enough for perpetuating such a pattern. This 
is particularly relevant given the progress that has been 
made. since 1979 in the establishment of employer and 
employee relationship at the work place - a relationship 
structured, inmost cases, accord i ng to the needs of the 
relevant and respective parties. 
In the light of what the amendments represent for unions and 
workers, it comes as no surprise that the unions have put 
wide-spread pressu re on emp 1 oyers to oppose the Act even 
prior to its promu.lgation in September 1988. This has even 
taken priority in. many instances over wage demands. Although 
the main federation i.e. NACTU and COSATU have not always 
employed similar tactics in this regard, they are united in 
their opposition to the Act. This has manifested itself in a 
massive stayaway protest by these federations during 6-8 
June 1988 which has been termed as the most successful in 
South African protest history (Indicator SA Vol 5(4):74) 
with obvious potential for a greater unity' in the black 
labour movement (WIP 58 1989:28). Prior to September, NACTU 
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adopted a str~teg~ of using recognition agreements in order 
to 'protect their relationship with management' by 
negotia:ting specific clauses to be incorporated into 
agreements. This strategy is aimed at protecting their 
strength on the shopf 1 oor. Shou 1 d management ignore such 
agreements, an unfair 1 abour practice case can be brought 
aga i nst management for un i 1 atera 11 y break i ng the agreement 
(SALB 1988:22-23). 
COSATU interprets the Act as 'part of a general assault on 
the democratic movement' and has proposed to unite with 
other organisations e.g. UDF (United Democratic Front) and 
Five Freedoms Forum on the issue (Von Holdt 1988b: 10-11; 
COSATU Pamphlet SALB 1988:12-15). 
Employer groupings and management have stayed clear of 
committing themselves to an outright rejection of the Act, 
even prior to its promulgation. Before September 1988 the 
Chemical Workers' Industrial Union sent out a letter, 
rej ect i ng the Bill, to managers demand i ng it be signed and 
sent to the Department of Manpower. Answers i nd i cated a 
general acceptance by management of the proposed Bill. 
Examples of responses included: 
and 
... management has always applied the principle of 
making representation to the authorities through the 
correct channels of organised commerce and industry -
in short, through Employer Organisations. A decision in 
this regard is due to be taken shortly. Under the 
circumstances we are of the op in i on that any act i on 
from our part at th i s poi nt woul d be premature and 
superfluous 
(;)n analysing the· bill it is our assessment that the 
bill contains both pos it i ve and negat i ve and cannot 
therefore be summarily rejected' (SALB 1988:19-21). 
Even more progressive groupings, for example, ASSOCOM and 
FCI, endorsed the final draft tabled in parliament viewing 
it as necessary to curb 'irresponsible behavior - harmful to 
both employers and workers' (WIP 54 1988:29). 
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As previ6usly rioted, the unpopularity and unacceptability of 
. .. . 
the new· Labour Relations Act to especially the unions, are 
reflected in efforts by the latter to conduct relationships 
and contracts wi th emp 1 oyers outs i de the scope of the new· 
Act. However, the present economic climate has been a 
problem~tic factor in these efforts and many employers have, . 
as was shown in Chapter 6, reacted by push i ng for increased 
productivity and the conclusion of productivity agreements 
with their employees. 
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CHAPT.ER.8 
LOCAL BARGAINING: FACTORS RELATING 
. ENTERPRISE, PLANT AND SHOPFLOOR CONTEXT 
8.1 Introduction 
232 
TO A PARTICULAR 
The establishment of local bargaining is dependent, in the 
final analysis, on the attitudes and preferences for such 
bargaining on the part of the relevant parties and their 
relative power to in fact get such bargaining established. 
The relative power of employers (and management) and tha:t 
of workers is significantly related to t~ose broad~r, 
environmental considerations discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 
against the backdrop of the historical development of 
unions, employer organisations and bargaining patterns as 
outlined in Chapter 5. It was suggested that the most 
crucial of these environmental factors seems to be that of 
the economic factor. Within a given economic environment, 
government plays an important ro 1 e although the economi c 
context is partly created by government itself. It was also 
argued that government can enhance the power of one party 
relative to that of the oth~r. Generally, government 
policies and legislation, to a significant degree, reflect 
not only the existing power relations within a particular 
society but also the social values and ideologies in which 
soci~tal arrangements are imbedded. The choices made by 
government however, are, in the final analysis~ 
circumscribed by the cyclical nature of the capitalist 
economic system and structural economic conditions with its 
immediate consequences for the relative power' of employers 
and employees (Grundberg 1986:522). 
But, wh i 1 e these env i ronmenta 1 factors may const i tute or 
create the potential for getting local bargaining 
established, such bargaining is also dependent on 
circumstances pertaining to a particular enterprise, plant 
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and ·shopfloor situation. Of particular significance is the 
relative power of the parties within a specific work 
organisation. The relations between management and labour is 
concretely manifested within the context of such an 
organisation and it can be expected that the degree of power 
disparity existing between these groupings will be most 
visible within an organisational context partly reflecting 
the re 1 at ions wi th in wi der soc i ety. Equa 11 y s i'gn if i cant . is 
management's att i tude. and wi 11 i ngness to accommodate such 
bargaining especially where local bargaining is not 
entrenched by statutory measures as is the case, for 
example, in the United States and Japan, through works 
councils in Germany and to some extent, the committee system 
in South Africa prior to 1979. Plant bargaining through 
recogniti"on agreements in South Africa since the 1970's, is 
an important case in point as is plant bargaining in Britain 
after World War II. 
Throughout Chapters 6 and 7, frequent ment i on was made of 
I. 
the generally hostile attitude of employers and managers in 
South Africa towards work place bargaining especially'where 
black workers were concerned. Throughout the history of 
industrial relations in South Africa, employers, and 
especially managers, preferred bargaining - even with whiie 
employees - to be removed from the work place. 
In the absence 'of a statutory bargaining system which 
formally provides for and mandates local bargaining or, 
where statutory arrangements are not succe~sfully utilised, 
the probability of local bargaining proper being established 
in a particular establishment (assuming that labour for 
example deems it to be in their interest), depends on 
conducive environmental conditions (relati.ng primarily to 
the parties relative power) combining with certain 
circumstances prevailing in a particular establishment. Of 
course, once such barga i ni ng becomes a genera 1 pattern or 
te'ndency, it may become an institutionalised feature of a 
part i cu 1 ar country's barga in i ng structu re and arrangements 
even if it is to remain outside the formal statutory system. 
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This; is exactly what has happened in, for example, the 
Bri~ishand South African cases for in both these countries, 
plant bargaining has become an accepted norm. Of course, 
some· degree of ongoing informal shopfloor bargaining and 
negotiations. characterises most establishments even where 
plant or enterprise bargaining is statutory mandated or has 
become the norm over time (Webster 1986). 
In the identification of variables pertaining to particular 
work .places, Hill's (1974; 1983) analysis of shopfloor 
activities and the variables underlying all shopfloor 
industrial relations, is of great heuristic value. 
Particularly helpful is the distinction betwe·en variables 
related to management on· the one hand and those related to 
labo.ur w·ithin a particular. work organisation i.e. plant, 
enterprise or shopfloor situation. 
8.2 Variables related to labour 
8.2.1 power of labour 
The extent of labour's power as a critical variable in all 
instances of bargaining has been stressed throughout. In the 
previous chapters, it was argued that labour power (through 
industrial or political power pressure groups) is primarily 
a function of political, social, and especially macro-
economi c factors. At 1 oca 1 1 eve 1, it is of course the 
perceptions that management, as well as labour, have of the 
other party's relative power position at a particular stage 
that constitute the crucial variable in getting local 
bargaining established by either party. As from the 1960's 
and 1970' s, management in South Afri ca was forced to take 
cognisance of the growing strength of especially black 
indust~ial workers within their own respective 
estab 1 i shments. High str ike rates and the grow i ng strength 
I 
of black independent. unions demonstrated the transformed 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
235 
position of .. black workers within the industrial relations 
sph~re"." " 
8.2.2 labour organisation 
Labour power only creates the potential for action within 
the work pl"ace. Workers have to take full advantage of their 
potential power by organising and mobilising primarily in 
terms of work groups. The constitution of work groups must 
be of such a nature that members can participate in and 
conduct bargain i ng act i vi ties wi th management (Kuhn 1961). 
The pressure exerted on group or work representatives by its 
members, differs greatly in terms of type of workers, their 
pos it i on wi th in" the product i on process and chang i ng 
conditions. Referring to fractional bargaining in the United 
States, Kuhn argues that, in spite of such potential 
differences, work groups have mainly two purposes: (1) to 
set a level of output and wage earnings in terms of efforts 
by members within existing conditions and (2) to maintain 
the integrity and prestige of the group. 
Regarding work groups, Hill (1974) warns against the general 
tendency of perceiving them as being universal and 
monolithic and giving them priority over the generation of 
informal rules the latter being still of primary 
importance. Work groups, he states, are merely tone 
particular form of social institution which acts on-the 
normative system' (1974:216). In order to clarify and 
demyst i fy the concept, he suggests key factors underl yi ng 
work group formation and activity which facilitate the 
empirical examination of the work place. The most 
significant variables are structural conditions influencing 
the format i on of· groups, the extent to wh i ch group 
consc i ousness ex i sts as we 11 as the nature thereof and the 
power of the groups which is critical in pursuing goals and 
interests. Some of these factors are also taken up by Sykes 
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(1967) "in his study of the printing chapel, especially the 
creati6n of cohesion within the workshop organisation. 
( i ) group formation 
The most critical structural factors influencing group 
formation are (a) production systems and (b) the nature of 
payment systems. 
(a) production system 
The production system can be seen to result from the nature 
and type of production technique utilised within an 
organisation as well as the organisation of work or division 
of labour which is built into or required for efficient 
operation. Production technology in some industries - and 
thus establishments within those industries - may foster 
amorphous work groups which are easily dominated by unions 
(and management) while in others, technological requirements 
can create 'di st i nct i ve, 
whose members' primary 
union' (Kuhn 1961: 145). 
united, and self-conscious groups 
loyalty is to the group, not the 
In the more traditional industrial relations literature, 
technology is usually interpreted as being deterministic in 
its role and consequences for workers and work organisation. 
Technology functions in this tradition mainly as an 
explanatory variable (Blauner 1964; Woordward 1958; Sayles 
1958). Recent years ""have witnessed a dramatic shift and 
modification in this interpretation. Braverman (1974), for 
example, sees production technology as reflecting basic 
class relations and as an integral "part of management 
contro lover workers. New product i ve techn i ques are 
developed which control and coerce workers, deskill them'and 
reduce thei"r power and control. By removing skills and 
'conception' from the worker, control ;s" built into 
production technique and work organisation. This 
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i nterpretati o·n however, must not be accepted wi thout some 
cauiion. As argued by Thomps~n (1983:107-108), there rem~ins 
a possible confusion between the Cability of workers to 
. ) 
retain skills and job control'. Workers may still retain 
control of working conditions .af_t . .eJ: deski 11 in·g has occurred. 
Th is· 1 eads N i cho 1 s and Beynon to note that C sk ill is not 
essential to control' (1977:108). 
In spite of these warnings, the introduction of new 
technology and its application has been increasingly viewed 
as management-induced. Work organisation and labour division 
is seen as a function of management control efforts rather 
than just being exclusively determined and constrained by 
technology (Hyman 1975). This leads Hill (1983:86) to 
comment that the cdecision to use one technology rather than 
another is a dec is i on taken by managers and. is not the 
consequence of any inevitable or inescapable logic of 
technology'. Division of labour and work organisation is 
thus influenced, but not determined by technology. 
Keeping the inputs by management in mind, production systems 
are seen to facilitate group formation to the extent that it 
relates to the following aspects i.e. the degree of 
interdependence between members, the extent to which members 
share common interests, the degree of control it exerts over 
work processes, the degree of movement that is allowed in 
order to facilitate interaction between workers and the 
degree to which work methods, standard and materials are 
constantly being changed (Kuhn 1961; Hill 1974; Walker 
1981). 
Labour d i vi s i on often creates greater interdependence 
between elements of an organisation which could imply 
great~r solidarity amongst workers. Regarding workers~. 
control over work processes, and using Woodward's (1958) 
classifica·tion, it is suggested that the worker has more 
extensive control in the case of un i t production i.e. the 
craft worker. Situations characterising mass-production 
(conveyer-belt), are seen. to be highly oppressive and 
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workers have·vi~iually no control or autonomy in determining 
speed,.~anning levels and the experience of pressure. In the 
case of process production, workers regain some control over 
machi nes. The automated plant tends to run i tse 1 f and the 
worker has to monitor the machine. Whi le sti 11 tied to his 
or her work, the worker can move "freely around the shopfloor 
(Elliot & Beishon 1977). The loss of power and pressures 
experienced by ·workers involved in mass production~ leads 
Banks (1968) to view mass-production as more prone to 
confl i ct between workers and managers - the reason bei ng 
that the nature of work organisation within this type of 
production situation groups workers together. The latter 
experi~nce pressure and tension due tb close supervision by 
management through foremen. Under these conditions, one can 
expect the formation of groups and the spreading of 
shopfloor negotiations and bargaining. 
Production technology can also facilitate a community of 
interests by fostering collective orientations and behaviour 
(Seear 1968; Kuhn 1961). To the extent that this does 
happen, the group's autonomy increases which may even weaken 
the authority of unions over the work group. This is often 
the case in.American plants. The occupational composition of 
the work force is an obvious factor in creating common 
interests but, the development of communal sentiments is not 
restricted to skilled workers only. It can develop amongst 
less-skilled workers as well, especially if labour 
recruitment is highly localised (Hill 1983). In mass 
production situations, the probability of communal 
sent i ments deve 1 opi ng is far greater than in process-type 
industries because, as was shown, in the latter case workers 
are scattered allover the production floor and do not work 
in close physical proximity (Seear 1968). 
The re 1 evance of freedom of movement and potent i a 1 
interaction have been implicit in some of the above 
arguments. Again, production technology, especially the 
physical lay-out, is of crucial significance: In the absence 
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of movement and . i nte ract ion, the chances of· work groups 
developing are very slim indeed. 
Finally, certain production systems enforce continuous 
change in work methods, standards or material on large 
segments of the work force. Accord i ng to Kuhn, the 
possibi 1 ity of interaction combined with constant. changes 
fosters a willingness to form work groups . 
. Concluding the above generalisations, the role of impeding 
factors must also be re~ognised e.g. the noise of machinery 
and frequent changes in work locations (Elliot & Beishon 
1977; Sayles 1958; Hill 1974). 
(b) payment schemes 
The importance of payment-by-result schemes (piece-work 
systems) for shopfloor bargaining has been clearly 
demonstrated in Britain, especially during the 50's and 60's 
(Jackson 1977; Ross 1966; Hill 1983). Payment-by-result 
schemes are seen to be a major incentive for group 
organisation in the enterprise or plant. By paying bonuses 
for the output of a who 1 e un it, co 11 ect i ve awareness and 
community of interest may develop as a particula~ worker's 
income is dependent on that of the rest of the group. But 
piece-work systems can be based on the individual worker as 
well. This was often introduced in Britain against strong 
union resistance as it was viewed as a mechanism for 
intensifying the pace of work and for forcing workers to 
agree to a rate for the job as individuals rather than 
collectively (Hyman 1975). Individual schemes can of course 
also promote solidarity in that collective action by workers 
may mitigate various negative consequences of this system 
e.g. ·restriction of output on a group basis prevents 
earnings of the individual worker rising so high that 
management may decide to cut the rate for the job. It also 
helps deceiving time-study engineers when assessing jobs, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
rna i nta ina steady' leve 1 of output in order to keep wages 
from,fluctuating and also protects the weaker worker. 
The ; ntroduct; on of ; nd; v; dua 1 pi ece-work systems can thus 
be turned against management and Hyman (1975) argues that it 
stimulated the growth of work place union organisation 
whereby piece-work bargain i ng was brought under the 
collective control of shop stewards. This was to lead to the 
general practice of first line managers making concessions 
to keep production going thereby exacerbating the 'informal 
system' as identified by the Donovan Cornmissipn. The 
consequences of these practices were twofold. Firstly, 
earnings were often in excess of wages formally negotiated 
at industry level and secondly, the power of shop stewards 
increased' significantly for they often achieved outstanding 
bargaining results. 
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At the same time, piece-work bargaining also has potential 
negat i ve consequences for workers e. g. earn i ngs are high 1 Y 
vulnerable to fluctuations in production and the economy and 
differential earnings between groups may create conflict. 
The solution may 1 ie in strong, co-ordinated plant-union, 
organ i sat ion in press i ng for guaranteed earn i ngs. A 11 in 
all, payment-by-result schemes foster worker organisation 
and bargaining awareness on the shopfloor for under such a 
scheme, 'almost any managerial or supervisory interference 
is likely to partly determine the amount earned and 
therefore it will be scrutinised closely if only'for this 
reason'. It is mainly for this reason that management has 
prompted a move towards measured day-work in' the British 
firms (Storey 1981 :154). 
Although production technology and payment schemes have been 
singled out here as important factors in the formation of 
groups, factors external to the work organisation may also 
have a significant influence. Divisions based on ethnicity, 
gender, race and religion may foster a community of interest 
strong enough to lead to the creation' of work groups 
(Thompson 1983). The possible significance, of these 
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"divisions relate to the centrality of valuei, ideologies and 
cultural belief systems embodying these divisions within 
wider society. In other words, it is the environmental 
context which will define the relevancy and significance of 
th,ese divisions. The differentiated nature of the labour 
market, in terms of especially race and ethnicity in the 
South African context, highlights this very point. Race (and 
ethnicity to a lesser extent) represents a crucial factor in 
creating sol idarity and a community of interests amongst 
workers within the work organisation. 
(ii) degree and nature of group consciousness 
Given the formation of work groups, the extent and nature of 
group consciousness 
workers' perceptions 
work situation ( 
is similarly relevant. This relates to 
and subjective definitions of their 
Dan i e 1 1 973 ; Brown 1 973 ) . Man y 
classifications of workers' orientations stress influences 
outs i de the context of the plant and work s i tuat ion wh i ch 
have a b~aring on workers' behaviour iri the work place. But 
it has also been argued that work experiences have an 
equally important influence on attitudes and orientations 
stressing the role of work place socialisation. Orientations 
may also be seen to differ according to different work 
contexts e.g. bargaining contexts as against every day work 
experiences (Daniel 1973). Equally relevant is the objective 
features of the employment situation for example, the 
awareness of the general economi c c 1 i mate or the economi c 
situation of a particular industry i.e. degree of 
competition, fluctuating markets etc. Awareness however, is 
a function of being informed. In traditional South African 
business culture for example," informing workers on these 
issues has hard 1 y been part of management's ideo log i es and 
practices. This has now become the task of unions and, their 
officials. This illustrates the relevancy of management 
attitudes and policies for group consciousness especially > 
the extent to which management deals with workers as 
individuals or collectively (Hill 1974). 
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While a degree of ~roup consciousness ~ay seem to exist, the 
precise nature thereof may be sti 11 far from clear. What 
seems to be important, is the extent to wh i ch it is in 
opposition to management or other groups of workers. The 
important issue then is (how g roup so 1 i dar i ty is def i ned, 
whether it is purely internal to the group or whether it is 
defined by. reference to outsiders' (Hill 1974:221). In other 
words, the fact that group consciousness exists, does not 
ihdicate wh~t specific type of behaviour is likely to follow 
e.g. shopfloor bargaining. The nature of group consciousness 
relates to issues 1 ike (labour ideology', (counter-ideology' 
amo~g workers, tfactory consciousness' etc. All of the above 
have important implications for ~ork groups and their 
participation in bargaining activities with management. The 
relevancy of ideology in work place relations and bargaining 
is· significant. Not only does management legitimise control 
and author i ty th rough ideo log i ca 1 means, but ideo logy is a 
central resource ih efforts to gain control by workers 
(Lumley 1983; Hill 1974). This seems especially true for 
union officials. For example, counter- and contending 
ideologies held by black industrial workers in South Africa 
'as reflected in, inter al ia, the tworkerism' and tpopul ism' 
debate, will find expression within individual work places 
and structure workers' re 1 at ions wi th management as we 11 as 
bargaining objectives. (Heald 1989; Bendix & Verster 1986). 
( iii) power of labour on the shopfloor 
While the power of labour, in generalised terms, is 
influenced by environmental factors, the power of particular 
work groups within a plant or enterprise .is primarily 
determined by the position occupied by them within the total 
production-system. Some workers or groups occupy highly 
strategic positions within the total flow of production 
thereby making management extremely vulnerable to total 
'disruptions in production. This may even lead management to 
initiate technological changes in order to undermine the 
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power of certain groups 
management may. also decide 
and accommodate work place 
production levels. 
(Hyman 1975; Kuhn 1961). But, 
to grant concessions to groups 
bargaining in order to sustain 
Kuhn (1961) and Banks (1968)' suggest that the type of 
te<:hnology most vulnerable to possible disruptions is one 
that requires continuous, segmental processing of materials 
into one final product. The relative power of groups working 
within such a technological context vis-a-vis management 
will be a crucial consideration in the latter's attitude and 
policies towards bargaining in the work -place and the extent 
to which management wi 11 be prepared to accommodate it. 
Again, it is the perceived power of workers by management 
that will determine the latter's attitude. Thus, although 
management may give priority to policies to institutionalise 
conflict .and maximise areas of common interest, management 
can also return to 'blunt instruments of enhanced mariagerial 
power' especially durlng periods of economic recession 
(Purcell 1983:59). One of the 'blunt instruments' is the 
identification of powerful and strategic groups in order to 
minimise their power or the likelihood of this. power being 
utilised to coerce the firm through disruptive action. This 
may involve a reduction of the organisatiQn's dependence on 
specific groups (through changing technology), inhibiting 
the deve 1 opment of so 1 i dar i ty (a 1 so th rough techno log i ca 1 
change) and 'ensuring that if power is tested the outcome 
will weaken rather than affirm the group's perception of its 
power' . 
8.2.3 labour leadership 
Work place representat i ves i . e. shop stewards, off ice 
representatives etc., fulfi 11 a crucial. role in helping to 
create an 'awareness' among workers and mobil is i ng them to 
organise against and bargain with management.'The importance 
of shop stewards is a 1 so 1 inked to the size of the work 
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organisation· for·· not all members can participate in 
bargaining and interactions with management (Walker 1981). 
It is suggested by Watson (1980), that the most useful way 
of interpreting the role of the work place representative is 
that of a group 'spokesman' in the sense that he/she 
articulates the common objectives and interests of the work 
group. As to the constituency of the shop steward, a 'shop' 
is.usually not a single group but normally a combination of 
different groups, leading Clegg (1979) to differentiate 
between shop stewards and a spokesman - the latter of whom 
represents a particular group. 
In general, shop stewards are seen to propagate the values 
of unity, collective interests and organised opposition to 
workers and ultimately provide a framework for interpreting 
the world of work (Hill 1983). Given the strategic position 
occup i ed by the shop stewards, they are we 11 equ i pped to 
.relate these sent.iments to the worker (Topham 1967). They 
constitute an important source of information due to day-to-
day experiences with workers and especially where they 
occupy this position ona full-time basis. They are informed 
about the 'inner' workings of the organisation especially 
concerning management's attitude and policies as well as the 
state of the market. This is a crucial factor if bargaining 
is to have any success wi th regard to workers' interests 
(Banks 1974). The critical role· of labour· leadership is 
confirmed by Lumley's (1983:306) research on work place 
relations in Austral;a when he notes that ... '(a)ct;ve local 
union leaders, ·as generators and disseminators of ideology, 
may foster resort to collective means among workers who are 
ambivalent about their definitions of situations'; 
The circumstances facilitating the development of work place 
representatives are not always easily ascertainable and, 
even if they were identified, they may be expected to vary 
between different industrial relations settings and 
different establishments. The bulk of the literature on shop 
stewards ·for examp 1 e, are extens i ve documentat ions of th.e 
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history and. development of British 'shop stewards originating 
in .the. first shop steward movement during World War I -
especially in engineering and some· other manufacturing 
sectors (Batstone et al 1977; Boraston et al 1975; Clegg 
1979; Brown 1981; Wilders & Parker 1975; Banks 1974; Brown 
et al 1978; Hyman 1979). 
In the light of the above, the need' for 
representation seems to be a crucial factor in 
for the development of labour leadership. 
work' place 
accounting 
Thi sneed 
especially. develops when workers perceive existing unions 
incapable of representing their interests vis-4-vis 
management adequately. Labour leadership of course, requires 
individuals who possess the necessary qualities, skills and 
willingness to fulfill this role and participate in 
bargaining with management (Walker 1981:448). 
8.3 Variables related to management 
The industrial relations conduct of employers and managers 
is' influenced by a whole range of factors i.e. (1) external 
or environmental constraints including politico-economic 
conditions, rationality and culture; (2) managerial 
organisational structures within the, enterprise and the 
institutional structure of industrial relations; (3) the 
attitudes and choices of managers themselves; and (4) the 
relative power of managers vis-a-vis the state and the trade 
unions (Poole 1984b:57). It is especially management's 
att i tude and the nature of management structures that may 
come to facilitate local bargaining. Management in Britain, 
for examp 1 e, has been seen by some to have been 1 arge 1 y 
respons i b 1 e for the move towards sing 1 e company barga in i ng 
in the 1970's. It has also been seen as to have encouraged 
the role of full-time shop stewards and providing the 
facilities for trade union functioning at the local level 
(Poole 1984b:89). Of course, in the final analysis, both 
parties must view such bargaining as serving their own 
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respective interests. Labour may view it as a means for 
gai~ingmore control over wages and their work life, while 
management may perceive it as necessary in order to secure 
~rofits and keep pr6duction going. 
8.3.1 managOement att i tudes and po 1 i c i es towards formal 
local bargaining 
Management's 
bargaining 
attitude and policies 
are structured by 
towards 
a whole 
forma 1 1 oca 1 
series of 
considerations, of which not the least important, is 
management's perception of labour's power position within 
the work place. The latter is of considerable importance in 
those instances where labour is set on establ ishing such 
practices. 
As previously indicated, management's positive attitude 
towards formal enterprise and plant bargaining, is related 
to pressures located in changing product and labour markets 
due to recessionary tendencies and increasing competition. 
Greater autonomy and flexibility have become major concerns 
for any firm wishing to (survive'. Thus, (hard' market 
conditions constitute an important factor in preferring 
local wage bargaining as far as management is concerned. The 
signifjcance of the nature of the product market is 
illustrated by Goodman et al (1977) in an investigation into 
°the 'footwear industry quoted by Marchington and Loveridge 
(1983:74-75): 
The major feature of the product market are the 
relatively slow growth in total demand, the intensity 
of competition, the recent dramatic increase in import 
penetration of the home market, the enhanced importance 
of fashion, and marked seasonal ity in the nature and 
level of demand. All these factors have important 
implications for industrial relations, perhaps most 
notably in the frequent changes in both volume and type 
of production. 
0'0 
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The relevantyof another consideration structuring 
management's attit·ude and bargaining awareness is implicit 
in the above quotation. Under highly competitive conditions, 
the community of interests between employers under more 
centralised bargaining structures has generally been 
severely restricted. The continuing decline in recent years 
of the role of employers' associations has been indicative 
of the move by management and employers towards formal local 
bargaining - especially plant - suited to the needs of their 
respective firms (Poole 1984b:58). 
The role of technology has also been implicit in some of the 
above arguments. It is suggested that technological progress 
can increase di fferent i a 1 sin wage 1 eve 1 s between firms. 
Those firms characterised by high capital investment, are 
usually more incl ined to 5u·pplement industry and national 
agreed wages based on local enterprise and plant conditions 
(Stettner 1981 :168-169). Because of the high costs of 
prod\.Jction machinery, .continuity of output is critical and 
management, concerned to .retain high worker efficiency, is 
usually willing to pay these high wages established through 
bargaining (Banks 1974:33). The pressure experienced by the 
capital-labour ratio thus facilitates formal wage bargaining 
at local levels. 
The introduction of productivity bargaining due to 
adversarial economic conditions, has fostered a willingness 
by management to engage in 1 oca 1 barga in i ng. Th is has been 
especially true for British firms. While it was mainly 
encouraged by government in the 1970' s, it was managers who 
had to implement such practices within their respective 
firms. 
Productivity bargaining is a form of 'co-operative' 
bargaining. The essence of this practice is the 
'productivity package deal' whereby the union agrees to 
accept changes in working practices in return for pay 
increases (Jackson 1977). It is based on the 'assumption that 
I both managements and trade un ions are prepared to commi t 
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themse lves . to the ach i evement of a more eff i c i ent 
util.jzation of all the firm's resources' (Hawkins 1972:158). 
The main reason for management's willingness to accept such 
deals, stems primarily from a need to improve the efficiency 
of the firm. Under conditions of 'normal' bargaining, the 
latter usually results in higher labour costs without 
changes in productivity levels. The distinctive feature of 
productivity bargaining is thus its specificity regarding 
the nature of achievements and rewards and the fime/perioq 
during which rewards and achievements are coupled (McKersie 
1967:188). 
As noted by Banks (1968:37), productivity agreements are 
mainly designed to alleviate the 'particular problems with 
which individual firms or industries have been confronted'. 
Its emergence in. British industry 'has been difficult to 
reconcile with the traditional British pattern of industry~ 
wide bargaining'. Most of the changes required from the 
agreement are unique to a specific company or plant and the 
acceptance of changes 'must be obtained at plant level from 
employees directly affected'. Productivity bargaining (and 
resulting agreements) clearly f~cilitates local plant and 
enterprise bargaining for the essence of this agreement is 
to solve problems which are unique to a specific 
firm/establishment. It is, in Hawkins' words, 'a plant-based 
exercise in self-help designed to overcome certain 
deficiencies in the practice of collective bargaining within 
a particular establishment' (1972:157-158). The negotiation 
and implementation of such agreements have important 
consequences for the structure and style of work place 
bargaining. In the case of Britain for example, procedures 
were formal ised, the role and status of shop stewards were 
enhanced, more information was disclosed, the substantive 
scope of bargaining was increased and issues normally 
subjected to unilateral decision by management, were brou~ht 
within the ambit of joint regulation (Hawkins 1981:13-14). 
The focus on labour productivity and the resultant 
willingness - if not eagerness - of management to engage in 
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local. level productivity bargaining with workers stems, in 
the final analysis, from adverse economic conditions and a 
concern over thigh' wage levels. Productivity agreements may 
also· be the only way in which trade unions can secure a 
substantial wage increase for their members within the 
context of an incomes policy. \."hile incomes policies were 
seen in Chapter 6 as having a centrali~ing effect on 
bargaining levels, it may encourage managers to in fact 
ttake an initiative in the conduct of workplace industrial 
relations' (Gottschalk 1975:122). 
Productivity bargaining and incentive schemes are currently 
contentious issues for especially black workers and their 
unions in South Africa. It is argued for example, that given 
a low basic wage rate, management can impose tstringent work 
study schemes which boost output considerably whi le paying 
Clnly small production bonuses' (Lewis 1987:71). COSATU has 
, 
reacted by stating that unions. are proceeding with their 
campaign f~r higher basic wages regardless of the fact that 
some unions have decided to engage in these schemes to 
r varyi ng degrees'. The director of SAMCOR, SLemmer 
(1985: 18-25), has argued that productivity bargaining and 
ag reements have been high 1 y successfu 1 in th is part i cu 1 ar 
group of co~panies and that all parties have benefitted from 
the arrangement. 
It is interesting to note that in Britain, productivity 
deals had implications for shop stewards acting 
tindependently' on the shopfloor level. These agreements did 
not, in Topham's view, undermine the shop steward's role. but 
resulted .in shop S'tewards seeking to control the application 
of the agreement, as well as basic wage changes. In this 
way, t they and th rough them, the who 1 e workforce, came to 
share in the hand 1 i ng of the ma in negot i at ions wi th the 
officials, so the officials came to depend more fully on 
them' (1967:155-156). The viability of this argument is 
difficult to estimate given that productivity bargaining in 
Britain has lost some of its popularity in recent years: 
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Plant andenterp'rise bar~aining have also been facilitated 
in those firms characterised by a labour force collectively 
organised in more than one union. It is suggested that a 
"manager may find it problematic to deal with full-time 
senior union officials from two or more unions when a 
part i cu 1 ar issue has consequences for several work groups 
within the plant. Instead of negotiating with several 
stewards, management finds it clearly to its own advantage 
to negotiate and deal with" a Joint Shop Steward Committee at 
the level of the plant (Clegg 1979). The formalisation of 
the shop steward structure and organ i sat i on and its formal 
incorporation into union structure, have thus faci 1 itated 
plant and enterprise bargaining in the British case (Hyman 
1979). 
Finally, the degree of shopfloor militancy and funofficial 
action' may under certain circumstances be interpreted by 
management as being threatening to its rights, power and 
traditional prerogatives. To the extent that it does, 
management may enforce formal plant bargain i ng espec i all y 
where it" concerns" issues of contro 1 and where management 
perceives its position to be more powerful. 
8.3.2 management attitudes and policies towards informal 
shopfloor bargaining 
In spite of management's efforts to retain its control 
functions over labour and erode the latter's autonomy, most 
writers confirm the widespread acceptance and accommodation 
by management of informal shopfloor bargaining in their 
establishments. Not only the generation of informal rules 
are accepted, but also custom and pract ice and i nforma 1 
understandings (Brown 1972). 
In his analysis of fractional bargaining, Kuhn (1961) argues 
that because th is type of 1 oca 1 bargain i n~ may resu 1 tin 
interruption of production and confuse company policy, 
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mariagement may of course resort to suppressing such 
practices. Various options are open to management, for 
example, the development of close supervision, insistence 
upon forma 1, detail ed ag reements wh i ch 1 eaves 1 itt 1 e scope 
for 'informal bargaining and the modification of production 
techno logy in order. to break up powerfu 1 work groups - a 
point referred to earlier on. However, these steps may 
result in 'more comprehensive and perhaps even more 
expens i ve act ion'. I n the 1 i ght of these p'otent i a 1 'costs', 
management may perceive fractional bargaining as having 
advantages e.g. greater flexibility during unexpected 
production and labour problems. This is especially the case 
in large organisations which find it 'hard to adapt to 
unpredictable local irregularities in the production 
process' 'and lower managers who are 'forbi dden to dev i se 
special arrangements with some freedom and clarity' in order 
to take advantage of local opportunities (1961 :181). 
The matters successfully handled by fractional bargaining 
are worker rotation, overtime assignments, seniority in job 
placement and local variation in matters such as starting 
and quitting times, rates and job content. In such a 
process, fractional bargaining may devise new approaches and 
solutions to hitherto unresolved problems. 
But, such bargaining can be advantageous i,n anothe~ way i.e. 
the granting of greater autonomy and initiative to foremen. 
By regaining greater autonomy through fractional bargaining, 
he or she can fulfil tasks within the organisation with more 
success. 
Management's attitude towards informal shopfloor bargaining, 
as with formal local bargaining, is conditioned by the 
nature of the fi rm' s product markets. In s i tuat ions where 
these markets are stab 1 e and compet it i on between firms not 
that c ruc i a 1, management is more 1 ike 1 y to accommodate the 
presence of informal bargaining in order to maintain 
productivity levels. Acceptance is likely to be less under 
'hard' market conditions characterised by competition. This 
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was' especially the' case in Britain around the 1940' and 
1950's.,' 
the 'accommodation of informal shopfloor bargaining also 
means that management must accept or recognise work groups 
as legitimate groupings within the establishment. The 
acceptance of fractional bargaining and the legitimacy of 
work groups can contribute to minimising the degree and 
extent of disruptive action (Kuhn 1961). Given a powerful 
labour force, the suppression thereof can result in great 
costs'to managements and the realisation of set objectives. 
Management has in general accepted these developments 
although often in a highly defensive manner (Hawkins 1972). 
8.3.3 the role of management structure 
The function of management structure is to provide a 
mechanism for establishing and implementing organisational 
strategies, goals and policies (Kochan 1980:190-191) or more 
accurately, the goals, strategies and policies of those 'who 
manage (Salaman 1979). 
Certa in features of moder:n management structure re 1 ate to 
formal as well as' informal local bargaining. The first 
feature concerns the heterogeneous composition of modern 
management. The error in depi ct i ng· management as a 
homogeneous group has been noted by various observers (Kuhn 
1961;' Hill 1983; Child 1977; Smelser 1976; Chamberlain & 
Kuhn 1981 and so on). Management is tmade up of a number of 
differing and sometimes contending groups who may understand 
and emphas i ze corporate obj ect i ves in d i ffe rent ways and 
u~ge conflicting priorities in the pursuit of company goals' 
(Chamberlain & Kuhn 1981 :88). The diversity of intra-
management groupings follows logically from increasing 
rationalisation and functional specialisation within 
management. Th is divers i ty is 1 inked to forma 1 1 oca 1 
bargaining in that the personnel ma~ager has been central to 
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the ·developme~t· of. this type of local bargaining .. Poole has 
link~dthe increasi~g importance of the personnel manager to 
the overall priorities of the enterprise or plant 
( 1984b: 59). The creat i on of the personne 1 manager has also 
been a response to the increasing size of the fir~, a 
preference for management division of labour and a 
preference to conduct bargaining at company and plant levels 
(Brown 1981). 
The hete rogeneous compos it i on of management is 1 inked to 
informal shopfloor bargaining in that it is usually managers 
occupying the middle and lower positions within the overall 
structure who experience potential and real conflict with 
workers i . e. product i on managers and foremen. To an 
important degree, these positions represent the barrier 
between sen i or management and the work force. Foremen are 
often labelled by socio199ists as the 'men in the middle' -
\ 
this often being the case in medium to large organisations 
(Hirszowicz 1981 :99-101). In small, non-unionised firms, 
foremen often still have considerable clout especially when 
a surp 1 us of 1 abou r ex i sts. They are seen to have marked 
influence over bargaining activities regarding wages and 
working conditions. 
In general, however, ·their position is characterised by 
conflicting expectations and little discretion and power. 
J 
Men outside the foremen's control sphere influence the scope 
of their' work and their freedom of action. They are often 
bypassed in that work~rs take grievances to the shop steward 
who, when unresolved, takes the matter up directly with 
higher management (Seear 1968:153-181 commenting on 
fractional bargaining in the United States). Under these 
circumstances, 'foremen often make i nforma 1 deals with 
workers in order to reduce stress. associated with their 
ranking within management hierarchy. This verifies Kuhn's 
assessment that fractional bargaining increases formen's 
autonomy and control - a point referred to .above. 
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Piron (1986:131-134), reflecting on the role of the 
supervis6r in the context of recognition agreements in South 
Af~ica,also refers to workers bypassing the supervisor and 
their tendency to attract the attention of middle and top 
management with their grievances. Their next recourse is 
often to the shop steward committee, in which case meetings 
set up with higher managers often exclude the supervisor. 
A 1 though Pi ron does not in fact say so, one can log i ca 11 y 
conc 1 ude that superv i sors may, under these circumstances, 
resort to informal bargaining with workers for reasons 
suggested above. 
Informal bargaining may also be acceptable to individual 
managers because the acceptance of informal rules may 
actually allow them to perform their task more effectively. 
The production manager may for example, participate in 
informal negotiations and make concessions to workers in 
order to 'meet production deadlines. Industrial relations 
managers are usua 11 y against such concess ions and conf 1 i ct 
between staff and line may result. This raises the issue of 
goals and interests for managers often interpret 
t organ i sat i ona l' goals in terms of the i r own sect i ona 1 or 
departmental interests (Hill 1974; Hyman 1975). It is also 
claimed that senior management, if informed of these 
practices, may choose to ignore it but it is more likely a 
case of management being ignorant of shop floor practices of 
this nature (Brown 1972:58-59). An extreme disjunction 
between higher management and the shopfloor may, for obvious 
reasons, exacerbate these, informal activities. This leads 
Hill (1974) to conclude that managers does not react to 
informal bargaining in any unified way. 
The nature of the i nterna 1 contro 1 and i nformat i on systems 
of management structure is also relevant when discussing the 
establishment of local bargaining formal as well as 
informal. As suggested by Brown (1972), informal bargaining, 
especially custom and practi¢e, cannot develop within a 
t comp 1ete1y comprehensive bureaucratic system'. The worse 
management ; nformat; on systems operate and the contro 1 ; s 
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, centra 1 i sed ,the 'greater the opportunity of lower managers 
to exe,rcise discretion in the administration of rules. The 
probabiiity that new precedents' will be set, will also be 
greater: If it remains unobserved for some time, custom and 
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,practice rules may be established. 
Conversely, a high degree of bureaucratisation, and tight 
control and information systems can facilitate formal local 
bargaining by discouraging more independent informal 
negotiations. Management may use its formal systems 
(information and control) as a way of defecting and 
inhibiting the informal adaptations to the extent that 
management perceives it ,to be 'deviations' (Purcell 1983). 
Thi s, of course, wi 1 1 be determi ned by management's 
attitudes, policies and ultimately, ideological orientations 
towards management authority and rights. 
8.4 Conclusion 
1. The factors discussed under the headings of management 
attitudes, policies and structure as well as labour 
power, organisation and leadership, must be interpreted 
as var i ab 1 es wh i ch may reasonab 1 y be expected to have 
some measurable influence on establ ishing local 
bargaining - be it formal or informal - in a particular 
enterprise, plant or shopfloor context. Local 
barga in i ng is the outcome of the camp 1 ex interact ion, 
not on 1 y between these more organ i sat i ona 11 y or i ented 
factors, but al~o between the latter and 'the political 
and socio-economic parameters in which it is located. 
2. While broader environmental conditions will influence 
overall tendencies regarding local bargaining, they 
cannot discriminate between individual establ ishments. 
The extent to which conducive organisationally oriented 
conditions actually prevai 1 within' a particular 
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establishm~nt" is only to be ascertained by a detailed 
empirical 'analysis of such contexts. 
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3. 'Some of the factors out 1 i ned in th is chapte r, notab 1 y 
the nature of the production system, as well as product 
and labour markets, are closely related to type of 
industry. In other words, plants and factories withi~ a 
particular industry tend to experience si~ilar product 
and labour market conditions and pressures and employ 
similar production technology all of which have 
implications for relations' and bargaining at the work 
place. 
'4. Finally, at the risk of overstating the point, a 
consideration of how managers and workers (and 
espec i all y shop stewards) subj ect i ve 1 y interpret and 
give meaning to the work place situation, remains 
crucial. Bargaining awareness is a function of the way 
managers and workers ultimately experience and 
interpret these contextua 1 factors . Where contextual 
and environmental variables relate to the potential for 
local bargaining, management's and workers' attitude 
towards and awareness of barga in i ng in the work place 
relates to the propensity to bargain and remains the 
crucial variable. 
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PART FOUR 
THE MEANING AND IMPLICATIONS OF LOCAL BARGAINING FOR 
BARGAINING PARTIES 
The main concern in Part Three has been the development and 
establishment of local level bargaining .as a relative 
permanent and/or prominent feature of a particular country's 
bargaining structure - especially as it has evolved within 
the South African context.· The perceptions that bargaining 
part i es have of one another's re 1 at i ve strength and power 
was found to be one of the crucial forces and considerations 
in suchan analysis. However, it was also argued that Qnce a 
particular bargaining structure (and level) has become 
established, it has significant implications for the 
position of the parties vis~4-vis the other parties 
involved~ Thus,· the establishment of local (or 
decentralised) bargaining dO!3s have ramifications for the 
power relationship between management and workers within 
establishments. This is especially. so where traditionally, 
bargaining has been predominantly at industry or national 
level, as has been the case in South African· industrial 
relations up till the 1970's. A significant break with 
institutionalised industry level bargaining has put extreme 
pressure on local managers - the latter of whom have decried 
the encroachment on their managerial rights, prerogatives 
and unitary vision of their respective establishments. 
Converse 1 y, 1 oca 1 barga; n i ng has meant that workers have 
made sUbstantial gains within the work place which implies a 
re-evaluation of the relationship between workers and 
, 
management as well as workers and their unions. 
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'CHAPTER 9 
LOCAL BARGAINING: A CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT CONTROL, RIGHTS 
AND PREROGATIVES 
9. 1 Introduction 
The employment relationship has been depicted as essentially 
conflicting. and oppositional i~ nature and reflecting power 
relations within the broader societal context. It wi 11 be 
argued here that although a power d i spar i ty characteri ses 
the relationship between these parties, management as agents 
of employer interests, by no means has uncontested and 
uni1ater~1 power and rights within a work organisation. 
Workers, through various institutiona1i~ed and non-
institutionalised means, resist and oppose the power, rights 
and prerogat i ves of management. To use Storey's (1981: 163) 
words, there is a 'dialectical relationship between 
managerial control and worker resistance; between managerial 
prerogatives and workers' rights; between sophisticated and 
integrated control systems and workplace shop steward 
organisation; between an inexorable production logic and the 
revolt from below'. 
One way of counteracting arbitrary management decision-
making is to sUbstitute joint regulation for unilateral 
determination by management. In this sense, local bargaining 
represents an important route for counteract i ng un i 1 atera 1 
management control and decision-making. 
9.2 Management as systems of control 
9.2.1 control and the exercise of power 
The focus on management as a contro 1 system is just if i ed, 
given that management cannot rely on voluntary compliance by 
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·the workforce· ir:the light of oppositional and conflicting 
interests. Furthe.rmore, local bargaining as defined, 
sss~nti~lly involves bargainin~ and interaction between 
emp 1 oyees or the i r representati ves and management and not 
between employees and employers' associations. Management 
thus constitutes a critical element in local bargaining. 
In recent years, 
management as a 
seen to involve 
functions (Hill 
there has been a substantial interest in 
'system of contro l' in that management is 
technical as well as labour control 
1983; Hyman 1980; Watson 1980; Batstone 
1984; Brave rman 1974 etc.). Put d i ffe rent 1 y, management is 
seen as controlling work processes and people within 
industrial work organisations. 
From an industrial relations point of view, the importance 
of management's role emerges from its focus as a system of 
power, author i ty and contro 1. Every work organ i sat i on is 
ultimately a 'hierarchically structural system of social 
control, with management as the focal point of 
organiz~tional power and decision-making' (Farnh~m & Pimlott 
1983: 141-142). This view is shared by Hyman when he states 
that the key feature of capitalist's management is that it 
constitutes an 'authoritarian hierarchy' and that workers 
experience this hierarchy as a 'hostile' environment 
(1980:306-307). The 'inescapable interface between managers 
and their employees is the control process' and 'workers 
entering organisations are exposed to control: and direction' 
(Storey 1983:83& 65). 
For the purpose of ana 1 ys is, contro 1 wi 11 be understood or 
interpreted as a process and, following Poole's (1975) 
suggestion, as an important manifestation or signifier of 
the exercise of power. The main dimensions of power are 
manifest power, latent power and the values and ideologies 
as principle components of the legitimation of particular 
power distributions. Interpretations of power in terms of 
its obvious manifestations in given social relationships and 
structures are numerous. In Poole's view, Weber's classic 
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definition of power as the 'probability that one actor 
within a 'so6ial relationship will be in a position to carry 
out his··w~ll despite resistance, regardless of the basis on 
which this probability rests', is basic to .interpretations 
of power in terms of its concrete manifestations. Examples 
of the latter are the distribution of income and wealth, the 
concentration of ownership of pro~erty and relevant for this 
analysis, the ability of unions (and 'work groups) to gain,' 
for example, economic rewards. Latent power entails the 
power bases or power sources at the disposal of particular 
parties, Marx being the most obvious exponent of this view 
or interpretation in his depict.ion of social classes as 
grounded in ownership of material forces of production. 
A focus on values and ideologies relates to an interest in 
the processes by which domination is legitimised. Not only 
are the values and ideologies justifying power positions 
relevant but equally salient are those values and ideologies 
·leading to challenges by subordinates to the rule of 
dominant groups. Lumley (1983:305), in his analysis of 
Austra 1 i an work places, quotes Armstong et a 1 ( 1981) as 
depicting the work place as a 'stage on which cross-currents 
of interests, supported by varying degrees of power, are 
mediated by appeals to value systems and moral perspectives 
and expressed in the debate between workers, their 
representat i ves and management'. Th is re 1 ates to the 
'content' of group consciousness referred to in the 
discussion on the formation of work groups in the work place 
in the previous chapter. 
The exercise of control (and therefore management control) 
as a process, is a manifestation of latent power usually 
justified in terms of particular values and ideologies. The 
close alignment of control to power is argued by Purcell and 
Earl (1977:41) as well, control 'being either the process or 
mechanism by which power is used to achieve certain ends or 
being the end product of the application of power'. In 
subsequent de 1 i berat ions, contro 1 will refer then to • any 
process through which a person or a group of persons 
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determines (i.e; int~ntionally effects) what another person 
or group of persons wil 1 do' (Guest & Fatchett 1974: 10 
quoting 'Tannenbaum 1966). 
9.2.2 the evolution of management as control systems 
When reviewing the evolution of modern management, 
,.. 
historical evidence reveals that, with the development of the 
factory system during the 18th and. 19th centuries, 
management responsibilities were mainly delegated to other 
groups, creating so-called tsystems of indirect control' 
(Hill 1983:17). This constituted th~ practice of sub-
contracting. The basic principle underlying sub-contracting 
was the fact that owners did not necessarily employ and 
control their workforce directly but came to rely on systems 
of internal sub-contracting to manage employed labour.' Both 
employers and managers were mainly left to attend to other 
matters, notably finance and marketing. Raw materials, 
machinery and other resources were usually provided by 
owners and the latter were also responsible for the selling 
of those commodities being produced. The presence of workers 
on the owner's premises did not imply that they were direct 
emp 1 oyees of the owner. They were more often t under the 
control of one or more sub-contractors who hired the labour 
force, supervised the work process, and received a rate from 
the entrepreneur for the finished goods' (Gospel 1983:94). 
Sub-contracting took on a variety of forms and managers, as 
well as foremen, also undertook sub-contracting for the 
owner (H ill 1983: 17). The system of sub-contract i ng enab 1 ed 
the entrepreneur tto evade the exercise of direct control' 
thereby suggesting' that the early industrial managers were 
not primarily interested in the tmetaphysics of direct 
control per se' (Storey 1983;89-90). A similar conclusion is 
reached by A 1 d ridge (1976) based on research unde rtaken by 
( 
Chandler (1964). The latter found that present day sub-
contracting in industrial engineering, exhibits a double-
edge in that it const i tutes a means or way by wh i ch some 
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managements'~h~ffled off their responsibilities' but at the 
same. time coul.d use this practice to strengthen their 
control and"prerogatives 'by ~ro~y' (197~:79). Management of 
the p 1 arit was seen to control· the most important areas of 
planning while those areas which posed a potential threat to 
managerial rights, ·were referred or al located to others. 
However, in view of subsequent developments in managerial 
contro 1 and structures, sub-contract i ng, at 1 east as was 
practiced in the 18th and 19th ·centuries, did leave some 
degree of control in the hands of the workers. 
262 
A 1 though sub-contract i ng const i tuted an important phase in 
the deve 1 opment of 1 abou r management both in Arne rica and 
Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries, it did not 
characterise all industries in for example, Britain, nor did 
it come to an abrupt end at the turn of the last. century. It 
had, in Storey's words, 'remarkable persistence' and it is 
only during the last 100 years that the phenomenon of di"rect 
employment and direct management control has been the 
dominant trend (1983:88-89). Even well into the present 
century, sub-contract i ng was seen to have co-ex i sted wi th 
the more direct methods of management a 1 be it in var i ous 
modified forms~ By the end of the 19th century, the foreman, 
often sub-contract i ng hi mse 1 f , started to occupy an 
essential position. This was mainly due to the rapid spread 
of the factory system and the problem of 'managing' the 
growing workforce employed in factories. With the increase· 
in the importance of the foreman's role, sub-contracting and 
related helper-systems started to decline in importance. 
Workers were brought under the direct control of the 
foreman, the latter 'almost the only level of supervision' 
between the worker and the employer. He had to make 
decisions regarding flow of work, job methods, tools and 
materials to be used, etc. He also controlled personnel 
matters i.e. the hiring, firing, supervision, monitoring and 
disciplining of the workforce, thereby exercising virtually 
all control. Persistent sub-contracting and th~ presence of 
foremen were often 
methods of control 
supp 1 emented by other, more i mpersona 1 
i . e. payment- by- resu 1 t schemes: The tu rn 
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of the century 
dev~ 1 opment of· 
represented an important watershed in the 
modern management as there wa~ already 
evidence of the declining importance of the foreman. But it 
was. after World War I that this role was sub~tantially 
eroded. A whole range of factors was to contribute to this 
development, the most important being (the pressure on 
management organisation' (Gospel 1983:99). 
Increasing pressure was resulting from the growth in size of 
firms, technological changes with consequences for labour 
division and employment and ideas introduced into the work 
place by especially engineers. The development of (modern' 
management was further enhanced with the development of 
devices e.g. record keeping, costing and planning (Storey 
1983:90-91). Under these modified ci rcumstances, it was to 
be expected that traditional systems could no longer 
successfu 11 y contro 1 the techn i ca 1 aspects of work and the 
workforce and it had to make way for more centralised 
systems of contro 1. The funct ions performed by the foreman 
I • 
were seen as to be essentlal for the organisation of 
production and came· to be transferred to (centra~ized staff 
departments' (Gospe 1 1983: 99). The foreman's pos it i on was 
eventually structurally accommodated within the lower levels 
of managerial hierarchy and was subjected to a complex body 
of rules and directions handed down from above (Clegg 1979). 
By this ·time, unions were already firmly established and 
employers were organised into employers' associations. These 
organisations were to perform three functions: 
1 ) protection of employers' interests and 
prerogatives thereby restricting union 
especially at the work place level· and 
bargaining at higher levels; 
managerial 
activities 
fostering 
2) the establishment of relations with trade union 
machinery at the industry and national levels and 
bringing stability to industrial relations and 
3) the development of substantive agreements on wages and 
working conditions. 
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All ·these fun6tio~s resulted in industrial relations issues 
par~lY'being effectively handled. outside of the context of a 
particular firm or enterprise (Gospel 1983). 
Regarding employers' interests and the supposed 'divorce of 
ownership from control', the extent to which management 
pursues goals differing from those of owners, has been 
debated within academic literature. However, there seems to 
be no substantive evidence that modern management is 
pursuing markedly different objectives from those of the 
traditional industrial entrepreneur who owned the means of 
production. As agents of employers or owners, managers are 
seen to protect and mediate the interests of such owners and 
employers (Weir 1976:324). The 'pursuit of profit remains an 
undiminished guiding force' (Storey 1983:77). This view is 
also held by Chamberlain and Kuhn (1981:86) as illustrated 
by the following quote: 
In law and by tradition we place first among 
managements' obligations the protection of stockholder 
interests. The profit-making ability of the firms 
remains a primary objective, even if prtifit 
.maximization can no longer 'be assumed to be the sole 
motivation and despite the lack of effective, 
independent stockho 1 ders'- organ i zat ion. 
In any. case, as Storey reminds us, ·the debate on the 
'divorce of ownership from control', does not 'detract from 
the cruc i ali mportance of the contro 11 i ng function i tse 1 f' 
(1983:77). 
Two important elements of modern management as control 
systems justify brief comment i.e. functional specialisation 
within management and the introduction of Scientific 
Management or Taylorism. Managers are seen to specialise in 
particular functions be it production, marketing, finance or 
personnel. The accommodation of foremen in the formal 
management structure and the allocation of functions 
previously associated with this role to personnel managers, 
have all been part of the process of the increasing 
rationalisation of the personnel function of management 
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-(Batstone 1984:38~42 & 196-202). Decisions formerly taken by 
the _-foreman or supervisor now fall within the province of 
the so-called specialist~ Selection, discipline ~nd 
dismissals are now handled by the personnel department and 
the work study department decides th~ time in which a job or 
task is to be done. It also determines standards of manning 
and applies - job-evaluation schemes to name but a few 
examples. The foreman, while responsible for a section's 
performance, has no freedom 'to choose workers to suit 
\ 
himself, to organize their work as he sees fit, and to offer 
them incentives and rewards' (Clegg 1979:157). 
The Ameri can shop management movement 1 ead to the 
transformat i on of work organ i sat i on and its contro 1. Th is 
movement; associated with F. Taylor, involved attempts to 
apply scientific methods of working to industrial work 
processes. This resulted in job fragmentation, the dramatic 
reduction of sl,il1 requirements and the separation of 
'conception' and fexecution' functions. All of this was seen 
. to increase efficiency and profitabt1ity. By fixing standard 
. . 
times and the estab 1 i shment of payment- by-:- resu 1 ts schemes, 
managers could exercise greater control over costs - thus 
establishing more efficient cost-accounting systems. The 
fragmentation of tasks and increased labour division created 
potential problem9 for integration and co-ordination 
(representing a control function in itself) and these 
funct ions were a 1 so to res i de wi th management. The 
rationalisation of work organisation, through fragmentation 
and i nt-eg rat ion, meant that 1 abou r contro 1 was now des i gned 
into work organisation itself. Thu~, Taylorism enabled 
management to gain effective control over labour and the 
labour process. 
Labour division was not 
performed by the -wo_rker. 
roles of management had 
restr i cted to. the tasks and jobs 
Similarly, -as Littler notes, the 
to be subdivided and deskilled 
according to Taylorist principles and according to his view, 
fTay10rism and functional organization had a historical 
significance in relation to "over-powerful" foremen and 
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·internal contr~ctors as much as to craft deskilling) 
(1983:5:3). Analysing the work of Taylor in terms of labour 
division or work design, the structure of control over task 
perform~nce and the employment relationship as implicit 
minimum interaction and a low degree of employment security, 
he concludes that Taylorism can be defined as the 
tbureaucratization of the structure of control, but not the 
employment relationship' (1983:62-63). 
The focus on management as a control system has been greatly 
stimulated by the \1ork of Braverman (1974) and the 
subsequent labour process debate. Braverman views Taylorism 
as representing a fundamental break with traditional control 
systems and the tculmination and codification of pre-
existing· trends towards the detail division of labour' 
(Lever 1983b:6). For Braverman, Taylorism represented the 
defining feature of the capitalist labour process. 
Management contro 1 however, is not un i form and exc 1 us i ve 1 y 
shaped by Taylorist principles. Studies of modern management 
structures, especi a.ll yin the post-Braverman era, have 1 ed 
to important insights regarding management's choice as to 
the type of contro 1 strategy be i ng app 1 i ed in work 
organisations. This is especially the case in contemporary 
capitalist societies characterised by imperfect competition. 
Industrial concentration, it is argued, implies that the 
character of economic activities are determined more by the 
planning of activities within firms and less so by market 
competition. Says Salaman, (1979:123), tJust as 
organ i sat i ona 1 emp 1 oyees vary in type and amount of reward 
they rece i ve, so they vary in the ways . in wh i ch they are 
contro 11 ed' or, to quote Storey (1983: 155), t work contro 1 is 
characterised not by its uniformity .but by its variety'. 
Writers like Friedman (1978), Edwards (1975; 1979), Nichols 
(1975; 1980) and Hill (1983) have identified various control 
strategies all of which have been thoroughly discussed and 
debated elsewhere. Some of these strateg i es (notab 1 y those 
suggested by Edwards and Friedman) follow from an texcessive 
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intarest in contr6l as it appears in methods and techniques 
as they' ·effect. the worker at the point of' production' 
(Littler.& Salaman 1982:264-265). The latter for example, 
poi nts out that contro 1 of work and the workforce can be 
achieved away from the point of production when multi-
nationals prefer to site production in countries 
characterised by a tcongenial' labour history and government 
attitudes and philosophies. A cheap and compliant labour 
force thus mi n i mi ses the issue of 'cohtro 1 substant i all y. 
This argument links with Storey's (1983) i.e. that 
employees, to the extent that they can retain a degree of 
autonomy in negotiations, operate within the limits set by 
technical, economic and organisational contexts - a point 
explicitly made in pre~ious chapters. Furthermore, the 
Japanese form of employment relations also point to the fact 
that control mechanisms developed by management, may also be 
part of this relationship itself. Employees are in a 
position of dependency with regard to employers and whi le 
trade unions' action c'an alleviate this situation. up to a 
point, restricted possibilities of alternative employment 
operate as a major constraint (Lever 1983b:13). 
While variability in control systems is often attributed to 
certain contradictions within existing control structures, 
it may also be attributed to resistance of workers to 
management control and unilateral decision-making within 
work organisations. Burawoy (1979:180-184) for example, 
argues that the variety of control strategies between and 
within organisations may result from management's 
accommodation tas a consequence of shopfloor struggle'. Hill 
in effect supports this view when he states: 
The exper i ence of many firms is that ex i st i ng contro 1 
promote technical inefficiencies whi 1e rel iance on the 
cash nexus creates poor industrial relations. Worker 
opposition to the denial of autonomy inherent in 
conventional work organisations and to the direction of 
business enterprises in the interests of outside 
capital is a fur'ther pressure for change. This is 
manifest in the variety of shopfloor. resistance to 
existing. control systems, a growing number of 
experiments in communal ownership and self management, 
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and tr~de" union demands for changes in the work 
organisation "and the 60ntrol of firms (1983:69). 
Management thus has to choose a particular strategy or even 
more likely, a combination of strategies in the face of 
worker" resistance and opposition. Choices have to be 
interpreted within the dynamic contexts of resistance and 
opposition, fierceness of competition and product markets, 
capitalisation levels etc. These features are not static or 
given but all contemporary products of earlier social action 
(Store"y 1983). 
9.2.3 management control and worker consent 
An important question fol lowing from an analysis of 
management as control systems, is whether workers in fact 
accept and submit to domination by management within work 
organisations. The post-Braverman debate has given important 
insights into this issue by examining ways in which workers' 
consent to their subordinate position and management's 
control is generated. The psychological processes through 
which the subordination of workers to control is partially 
established is the issue here. In the words of Thompson, the 
fobjective fact of control ultimately depends on the 
existence of subjective consent' (1983:152). In partially 
granting consent to the exercise of control, workers, to an 
extent, co-operate with management in tasks to oe performed 
and "goals to be achieved, thereby diminishing the potential 
degree of confl ict of interests. Confl ict and co-operation 
are omn i present and i nev i tab 1 y co-ex i stent in soc i all i fe 
(Watson 1980: 226). Management cannot re ly "on sanct ions in 
order to secure comp 1 i ance and consent by workers. 
Management, in fact; needs 'active' co~operation, ingenuity 
and initiative from workers especially when the latter 
possess special skills or are responsible for costly 
equipment and machinery in the work place. Management 
control based on blatant exercise of economic power of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
269 
owners, is necessarily erosive of employee co-operation 
(1980:311-313). 
Consent· to managerial control is generated at different 
1 eve 1 s predomi naht 1 y through processes of 1 eg it i mat i on in 
the wider societal context· as well as in the work place 
itself. Examples are: the extent to which capitalism itself 
is regarded as legitimate or even inevitable; the ideologies 
of technocracy wi th its emphas is on the i nev i tabi 1 i ty and 
so-called neutrality of modern scientific and rational 
technologies; the. existence of cultural values and norms 
which legitimise property rights; the legitimation through 
ideologies of managerial control and functions in general as 
well' as the character of the tefficient' manager (Littler & 
Salaman 1982; Poole 1984(b) & 1986; Hill 1983; Kochan 1980). 
Regarding ideologies of 
the distinguishes between 
ideologies 
managerial 
development 
and that 
contro 1 , 
of the 
of 
Poole 
early 
tentr~preneural' 
ideologies. ·While the former were aimed 
t manageri a 1 ' 
at promoting 
industry within a relative hostile environment comprising a 
political dominant aristocracy and a t new ' 'industrial labour 
force, the latter developed out of problems of control .over 
1 abou r . Manage ria 1 i deol og i es are thus viewed as to 
facilitate control over tlabour resources' (1986:48). The 
general acceptance by workers of the legi·timacy of 
managerial authority thus underlies employe'r control in the 
work place and also reflects the dominant ideology of 
capitalism itself (Lumley 1983:305). Business ideology, in 
the words of Jenne r (1984: 44-45), t seeks to sanct i on or 
I 
legitimize the distribution of power, wealth and prestige' 
and may be defined as tthose ideas expressed by or on behalf 
of the business class with the manifest intent of creating 
attitudes favourable to private capitalism'. 
It is also suggested that the establishment of management as 
a 'separate function within' the enterprise with the divorce 
of ownership from control, represents a crucial first step 
in the exercise of control over workers. This is so because 
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'.:~ once ~heconception of management has been accepted by 
wor.kers" they have in effect abdicated from' any questioning 
of, or, resistance to many aspects of their domination. 
Resistance, when and if it occurs will be largely about 
details' (Littler & Salaman 1982:259). 
In other words, the hierarchical structuri ng' of the work 
locus of control and organisation, 
decision-making 
the 
is 
accumulation and 
fact that 
situated 
investments 
the 
with in management, cap ita 1 
are all perceived to be, 
accepted features of capitalist 
problem of order is thus replicated 
production. The whole 
at'the level of the work 
place qnd some common identified normative agreement is seen 
as a necessary basis for stable social relationships. In the 
process, support for the exercise of managerial control is 
provided by workers (Baldamus 1961). 
, 9.2.4 the incompleteness of management control 
In the discussion of management control strategies, the 
notion of management being challenged by workers was briefly 
touched upon. Control exercised by management over workers 
and labour processes is never quite complete for management 
decision-making control is subjected to two challenges: 
Firstly, the intervention of governments and centrally' 
organised unions constituting the so-called 'challenge from 
above'. Second 1 y, manage ria 1 control is cha 11 enged by I the 
penetration of factory-level representatives of labour into 
managerial decision-making and to the, existence of either 
unilateral regulated zones for labour or, perhaps more 
typically, a degree of power sharing via locally based 
substantive and procedural' rules'. This constitutes the 
'challenge from below' (Poole '1986:51). Thus, the almost 
'inevitable passivity' of the worker impl icit in the 
discussion of managerial control and worker consent, is 
never complete. Workers, through various means and 
strategies, have in the past, and still do, challenge 
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Emp l.oyee.s, as act i ve creatures, do not meek 1 y 
·being controlled and dominated. They actively 
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position. 
submi t to 
strive to 
!avoid' and !divert' control in order to maximi$e their own 
interests.and continually defend or try to advance their own 
area of contro 1 and autonomy. Organ i sat ions, says Sal aman 
(1979:145) are ... 
characterised by constant and continuing conflict. 
Despite major efforts of senior executives to 
legitimise the activities, structure and inequalities 
of the organ i sat i on and to des i gn and i nsta 11 
"foolproof" and reliable systems of surveillance and 
direct ion, there is always some d i ssens ion, some 
dissatisfacti~n, and some effort to achieve a degree of 
freedom from hierarchical control - some resistance to 
the organisation's domination and direction. 
This view is supported by Storey when he notes that '(r)eal 
subordination and complete formal 
established, they have always 
struggled over' (1983:125). 
domination are never fully 
to be strived for and 
Resistance 
nature as 
and cha 11 enge 
well as the 
by workers can vary inform or 
degree or extent of militancy. 
Resistance, it is suggested, results from the way in which 
workers are controlled as. perceived by them. This means that 
different types of demands and opposition result from 
different types and levels of control. Already in 1920 
Goodrich, in his classic work on control in British 
workshops, states that workers' demand for more control may 
bE! seen as !the demand not to be controlled disagreeably, 
the demand not to be controlled at all,· and the demand to 
take a hand in controlling' of which the first I runs through 
all trade union activity' (·1975:37). 
Salaman refers to Fox's suggestion that organisational 
members may respond in two distinct ways to perceptions of a 
divergence between the i r ; nterests and· the way that 
organisations treat them in forms of control over members. 
Members can withdraw by absen'teeism, labour turnover, 
sickness rates etc. or they can act i ve 1 y try and change 
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organisations or their position and treatment within it. The 
latt.er ··response is usually organised efforts through trade 
union action e.g. formal bargaining and strikes. Salaman, 
however, correctly points out that there exist varieties of 
organ i sed oppos it i on and res i stance in that not all g roup-
based conflict and resistance is organised. Here he has in 
mind group responses 'firmly founded in informal group 
cultures' (1979:155-15·6). Thus, while formal bargaining 
through institutionalised union structures and disputes 
procedures represent a significant challenge to managerial 
control and prerogatives, workers may, through 'informal' 
group-based action and bargaining, challenge managerial 
control at the point of production on the shopfloor. Thus, 
organised resistance and struggle should not necessarily be 
. equated with .YILi...Qo5.s.m. Informal organised 'counter-planning' 
e.g. plant-based activity, goes beyond unionism on the 
shopfloor and worker resistance extends well beyond the 
formal union structure. To a large extent, it is relatively 
independent of it and autonomous worker regu 1 at i on at the 
point of production means that workers retain a measure of 
. . 
control and autonomy (Storey 1983:167). A similar conclusion 
is reached by Watson (1980: 237-238) as ill ustrated by the 
following quote: 
Both to improve their market position and to defend 
themse 1 ves, emp 1 oyees tend to form var i ous coal it ions 
of interest to present the kind of group challenge 
wh i ch is necessary to have any effect in the face of 
the greater power of the employer (the exception here 
being where the individual employee has unique skills 
o~ knowledge on which the employer is dependent). Thus 
we get, within employing organisations, trade union 
organisation, 'professional' group mobilisation and 
'informal' office and shopfloor groupings. All of these 
present challenges to the managerial prerogative. 
It is thus argued here that local bargaining, be it formal 
through unions (or alternative structures) or informal work 
place organisation and bargaining as well as the 
establ i shment of custom and pract ice, represents oppos it ion 
to uni lateral managerial control· within a ~ingle-employer 
enterprise, plant or at shopfloor level. Local bargaining 
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represents a challenge through bargaining and interaction by 
work~rs with management. Furthermore, local bargaining will, 
as a form Qf challenge, usually centre on two main issues: 
the amount of material rewards available to the empioyee and 
the extent of control over employees conceded to the 
employer (1980:238). 
9.3 Local bargaining and managerial rights/ 
prerogatives 
9.3.1 the concept of rights and prerogatives 
Challenging unilateral management control usually evokes the 
notion of challenging so-called management 'prerogatives' 
and 'r i ghts ' .. For th i s reason it is necessary to have a 
closer look at these concepts as it:'per.tains to managerial 
power and control. Chamberlain (1963:185) clearly makes this 
point when he wrote that 
(e)very bit of progress the unions have made, every 
ach i·evement they have won, has been real i zed in the 
face of charges' that they were invading the 
prerogat i ves of others, that they were assumi ng 
authority whlch should be the proper 1 preserve of some 
other group, generally a managerial one. Unions have 
become somewhat inured to th is charge of i nvas i on of 
others' prerogatives. 
Management's unilateral regulation of work and employee~ has 
been steadily eroded over the past decades by workers 
d~spite the charges of invading managerial prerogatives. 
Apart from the law, the role that unions have played in this 
process has been substantial. The 'right' to manage has been 
viewed as 'those prerogatives or areas of enterprise 
de~ision-making wh~ch manag~ments consider to be exclusively 
theirs alone and hence not subject to joint negotiations or 
collective bargaining with trade union representatives' 
(Farnham & Pimlott 1983:319-320). As argued by these 
writers, the idea of managerial prerogatives impl ies that 
the re are areas of act i on so essent i a 1 to management that 
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'they are to~em~ih unilaterally in the hands and control of 
,management. 
Defining managerial prerogatives is highly problematic for 
it may denote different things to different people. Storey, 
in an earl ier article, suggests' that, the term be used 'to 
indicate an area of dicision-making over which management 
be 1i eves it shou 1 d have (and acts as if it does have) so 1 e 
and exclusive rights of determination and upon which it 
strenuously resists any interference' (1976/1977:41). A 
precise definition of prerogatives 'and rights is complicated 
by the fact that, to the extent that workers, through formal 
structures and informal bargaining, constrain areas of 
unilateral managerial control and thereby extend the 
'frontiers of joint regulation/contr01', the question arises 
as to whether there are any logical 1 imits to the extent in 
which, for example unions (and 
into the functions performed 
Pimlott 1983). The 'frontier of 
work gro~ps), can penetrate 
by management (Farnham & 
control' is a shifting 1 ine 
and is circumscribed according to particular situations and 
determi'led to a significant extent by the power relations 
between the relevant parties. All this makes it 
exceptionally difficult to give universal examples of 'the 
types of decisions falling, solely within the pale of 
/ managerial hegemony' (Storey 1976/1977:42). 
To the degree that workers, through unions or more 
autonomous, independent negot i at ions, strengthen co 11 ect i ve 
bargaining and succeed in widening the scope of such 
bargaining, the 'frontiers of control' shift in the 
interests of workers. The ri ght to manage, as Farnham and 
Pimlott justifiably point' out, can logically concern only 
those residual management functions within organisations 
which the unions themselves (and 'autonomous' shopfloor 
negotiations) do not directly challenge (1983:322). 
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9.3 .. 2 the'· j'ustif'ication of rights and prerogatives by 
management 
Mana~ers' attitudes to these so-called rights and 
prerogatives are often coloured by the following assumptions 
regarding modern-day industry as a 'voluntary' and 'co-
operative' activity with important implications for 
'prerogatives': 
(1) just as workers make contributions or perform certain 
funct ions, so do shareho 1 de rs and management's task is .to 
co-ordinate all these efforts for the so-called 'common 
good', (2) workers 'choose' to work at particular jobs and 
factories and are seen to enter into 'equal', freely 
negotiated contracts and (3) that management's power take on 
the form of author i ty based on workers' and other part i es' 
voluntary consent because functions performed by management 
are viewed as being legitimate and justified (Nichols 1980). 
'. 
The question of legitimation and justification has already 
been touched upon but needs further exploration here. 
Management prerogat i ves are usua 11 y based on the idea of 
management having certain rights and functions deriving from 
rights attached to ownership of property. As managers 
participate in industry as owners or agents of owners, 
control over assets e.g. capital, is seen to be exclusively 
their domain. It can also rest on statutory law of ownership 
responsibility rather than on Common Law of property as in 
the case immediately above (Storey 1983). It is also seen to 
be based on the so-ca 11 ed ' economi c eff i c i ency' argument 
i . e. that ; tis in everyone's interest that management be 
left to manage 'as they see fit'. As Aldridge (1976:32) 
notes, managers are assumed to be engaged in the 'sedu 1 ous 
pursuit of maximum profit' through the most efficient 
organisation of production and the doctrine of 'rights' is 
often defended by evoking national interests. Thus, he says, 
any attempt by a union or unofficial work group to trespass 
upon managerial functions, is likely to- be judged as 
endangering efficiency. Restrictions on managerial functions 
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are 'pred i cted to 
within the work 
and rights "by~ for example trade unions, 
result: in lo~er "economic performance 
organization' (Farnham & Pimlott 1983:321). 
A popular argument is based on the belief that some 
individuals are natural 'leaders' and that they tend to 
perform best when they are allowed to lead. In other words, 
some peop 1 e are seen to possess innate "personal i ty 
attributes which make them especially 'fit to manage'". This 
ideology is most often propagated by senior management. The 
natural 'leaders' can be expected to facilitate the 
~fficiency of the work organisation. A further basis for the 
legitimation of managerial rights is the possession of 
specialised skills and knowledge of management techniques of 
business administration. The resistance to, or struggle 
over, managerial prerogatives is thus a struggle for status 
and recognitid~ by the new managerial elite. The elite 
status of t,his group is seen to be based less on property 
rights than on knowledge and skills (1983:321). The 
possess i on of sk ill s, educat i on and knowl edge funct ions as 
an important basis for viewing modern management as a 
distinct professional group in modern industry and 
represents an element of the doctrine of 'managerial 
revolution' often encountered in literature. Management's 
, right' to manage and the ex i stence of I prerogat i ves' are 
thus justified by arguments centreing on issues of economic 
efficiency, environmental constraints and property rights or 
ownership responsibility. 
The difficulty encountered in trying to list those decisions 
which are to be exclusively management's prerogative and 
domain and prohibit or constrain workers' efforts to 
penetrate, has already been pointed out. However, Farnham and 
Pimlott think it likely that trade union penetration of 
former managerial rights is likely to be the greatest in" 
those areas most closely associated with personnel 
management e.g. pay, employment conditions, job security and 
work methods and it seems that 'on 1 y pract i ca 1 and 
ideological considerations place limits on trade union 
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interests in'· the more technical aspects of present-day 
manager'ial functions" (1983:322). 
9.3.3 does local bargaining imply a challenge to 
management ri~hts and prerogatives? 
Local bargaining, in all its manifestations, in· fact 
represents a means by wh i ch workers can oppose and res i st 
management within enterprises, plants and on the shopfloor. 
Especially work place bargaining (enterprise, plant, 
shopf 1 oor as we 11 as custom and pract ice) cha 11 emges the 
prerogatives and rights of management. Thus, local 
bargaining is not viewed here as merely supportive of the 
status quo or legitimating economic and political orders. 
Neither is it viewed as necessarily balancing the power of 
the bargaining parties, thereby benefiting tgood industrial 
relations'. Rather, is it seen to have been successful in 
safeguarding employees from unilateral managerial power and 
control under certain conditions (Burkitt 1985; Leijnse 
1980). To the degree that local bargaining is seen as being 
successful in this, it represents a ~orthwhile challenge and 
must therefore not be discounted or deemed part of a process 
of t i ncorporat ion'. The not i on of t negot'i at i on of 'order' is 
seen by Hyman to have significance and heuristic value in 
this context. The term indicates tthat where activities 
within an organization require the cooperation of 
individuals and groups with divergent attitudes and 
interests, there is a natural tendency for understandings, 
agreements and rules to emerge from processes of formal and 
informal negotiation'. Furthermore, tthrough the process of 
negotiation of order the "frontier of control" in each work 
place is set'. It is a fluid and shifting frontier: the 
1 i m its of management autho r i ty and emp 1 oyee obed i ence are 
imprecise and always open to negotiation' (1980:315). 
'Conflict and ne~otiation ove~ organisatjonal rules, work 
methods, technology and procedures, says Salaman, 
t .. character i se a 11 organ i sat ions', for such conf 1 i ct is a 
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"normal" andende'inic organisational feature. Even the rules 
themselves, introduced to reduce the recalcitrance of 
employees, are transformed, in organisational practice, into 
battlegrounds of adjustment and bargaining' (1979:148). 
Wh i 1 e the above represents the rna in thrust of the argument 
presented here, cognisanc.e is taken of certain constraints 
imposed on workers' ability to challenge managerial control 
and efforts to obtain some degree of control over their 
work- lives by means of local bargaining. One of the crucial 
constra i nts is the extent to wh i ch workers' consent, 
compliance and even co-operation is generated. Various 
levels at which this takes place were presented. While some 
mechanisms in this process operate at the point of 
production, consent was also seen to be generated within the 
wider societal context - predominantly by the ideological 
legitimation of managerial prerogatives and the capitalist 
system itself. 
Comparing 'contemporary' shopfloor movements to earlier 
movements, Topham (1967:154-155) claims that the former are 
both more powerful (in experience, extent and size} and more 
vulnerable since the 'real (though carefully calculated) 
price (in terms of money and leisure) which an advanced 
techno logy in the hands of i nte'" i gent monopo 1 y cap ita 1 ism 
can offer in return for control, can be used to make 
resistance and alternative demands appear "unreasonable" , 
All these constraints have led many observers to be quite 
pessimistic regardin~ the viability of workers' challenge in 
this respect. Salaman (1919) for example, argues that in the 
final analysis, workers are subject to threats of 
redundancies and dismissals in modern work organisations and 
thus questions the extent to which workers can rea}ly come 
to challenge managerial control and power. Also, Hyman 
(1980) reminds us that employee autonomy .. operates within 
certa in techno log i ca 1, economi c and organ i sat i ona 1 1 i mi ts 
and will persist as long as the employer is ~ble to realise 
profits. In the foreword to the 1975 edition of Goodrich's 
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classic work·.(19~O), he states that work place controls 
operate in· the context of a number of higher levels of 
decisitin-making i.e. detailed terms and conditions of 
employment; the structure and policies of labour force 
management; such other areas of managerial decision as 
investment programmes, product policy, financial 
arrangements, division of labour and job design; the 
character and orientation of ownership and authority in 
industry and f ina 11 y, the bas i c structures and dynami cs of 
society as a whole (xxi). These factors are bound to disrupt 
processes of 'negotiation of order' within the work place. 
Controls set by employees may thus be bypassed for example, 
by c los i ng . down an estab 1 i shment. The i neffect i veness of 
worker res i stance in the long run has also been argued by 
followers of Braverman i.e. Zimbalist (1979). His own study 
of the. American printing industry leads him to this 
conclusion as he cites the inability of the craft unions to 
mod i fy or halt techno log i ca 1 deve 1 opments resu 1 t i ng in the 
deskilling of work (Thompson 1983:106). 
Some of these arguments fol low from a particular view and 
interpretation of 'successful' challenges by workers to 
their subordination - a view that implies that success is 
determined or somehow measured, not by the extent to which 
workers gain control over their work-lives within existing 
industrial. orders, but rather by the extent to which the 
capitalist system itself is being eroded or even dismantled. 
9.4 
9.4.1 
Local bargaining and management power, control and 
prerogatives in the South African context 
recognition agreements and management prerogatives 
The rights of workers in South Africa have traditionally 
been protected by means of common 1 aw, statutory 1 aw and 
collective labour law. Since the 1970's, black workers have 
counteracted the power of employer and management parties 
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mainly through the conclusion of recognition, procedural and 
substantive agreements at the level of the factory and 
~lan~. They have in the process succeeded in steadily 
expandin~ the types and range of issues brought under joint 
regulation through bargaining with management. 
Through recognition agreements, unions gain the right to 
represent all or some of the employees within a particular 
establishment. These agreements reJate to the registration 
of unions, commitment to the industrial counci 1 where such 
agreements are in operation, support of the freedom of 
association, the position of works councils and other 
representative bodies, sole bargaining rights, degree of 
representation and sanctions for non-compliance (Piron 
1986:43-44). Unions similarly counteract employer and 
management power by negotiating procedures to be followed in 
such matters ~s discipline, dismissals, grievance 
'reso 1 ut ion, retrenchment, hea 1 th and safety etc. F ina 11 y, 
they increase their power in jointly. regulating with 
management, substant i ve issues usua 11 y wages and other 
financial matters .. Workers can now negotiate higher wage 
levels above minimum levels set at industry level. It was 
noted however, 
substantially 
that workers have been 
increasing wage levels 
economic climate. 
1 ess successfu 1 in 
within the present 
The concept of management prerogatives is often structurally 
incorporated into the recognition agreement by the preamble. 
The tenor of this clause is usually that tmanagement has the 
right to execute all the aspects of the company business as 
it sees fit, subject of course to any rights acquired by the 
union or its member's by law or in terms of the recognition 
agreement itself' (Piron 1986:37). Thus, the rights that 
workers and unions have acquired are confined to those 
issues and rights that unions have negotiated with 
management. A 11 those rights and issues not subj ected to 
joint regulation or unilateral worker control, remain for 
all intent and pu rpose, with in the doma in cif management's 
sole determination. 
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The 'mai n areas of, trad it i ona 1 management prorogat i ves that 
workers' have successfu 11 y penet'rated since the 1970' s, are 
thos~ bf disc i p 1 i ne and d ism i ssa 1 s , ret renchment and 
grievance settlements. The idea that certain issues or 
matters reg~rding workers and job control should be the sole 
concern of management, has been especially rife in the South 
African context, manifesting itself in the traditional 
unwillingness to cater for unions in the work place. 
Management's unitary view of their' establishments has only 
recently been substituted by a more pluralist oriented 
approach and the recognition that a ~asic conflict of 
interest exists between parties. 
Regard i ng disc i p 1 i ne and d i smi ssa 1, ,deve 1 opments in South 
Africa have been following world-wide trends in that, during 
the early stages of industrial isation and industrial 
capitalism, workers experiBhced extreme forms of constraint 
imposed by managemen.t. Inclu'ded were strict rules on time-
keeping, mai.ntaining job standards, regular job attendance 
and obeying orders, of management. Discipl ine was harsh and 
rigid and viewed as the sole right of management. It was 
accompanied by authoritarian or paternalistic management 
styles. With the growth in the size of firms, 'discipline 
came to res ide in the hands of the' foremen and f i rst-l i ne 
supervisors who had virtually absolute powers to hire and 
fire employers. The sources of, this disciplinary system were 
the twork rules' and were regarded as expressing terms 
within employment contracts. Infringements of these rules 
could result in various sanctions being applied e.g. fines, 
suspension from duty or instant dismissal. 
Disciplinary practices have since undergone important 
changes and are currently attached to wri ttenl oca 1 
agreements and/or full-time employees have statutory rights 
not to be unfairly dismissed. Of significance is the fact 
that un ions have seve re 1 y cu rta i 1 ed un i 1 atera 1 r:nanagement 
dec is i on-mak i ng by cha 11 eng i ng these rights., Un ions have, 
where recognised, gained the right to represent their 
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memb.er.s in inst'ances of disciplinary action. Under these 
coridfti.ons, 'the managerial right to discipline offending 
employees is no longer possible' (Farnham & Pimlott 
1983:324). Presently, work rules and collective agreements 
constitute the formal sources of management's right to 
discipline. But apart from this, management's reaction to 
disciplinary action is also influenced by custom and 
practice in the work place leading management to employ 
preventative and, corrective measures to improve discipline 
in the work place. The latter is seen to be more common in 
contemporary work p4aces and entails a whole range of 
warnings and progressively more severe penalties in cases of 
repeated infringement of rules. This may result in a formal 
disciplinary procedure being developed. These disciplinary 
procedures comprise two elements i.e. enforcement of 
discipline (the administrative procedure) and allowing 
employees ·recourie to appeal against disciplinary action 
taken against them (appeals procedure). The latter often 
take~ the form' of the grievance procedure. While 
disciplinary procedures concern management complaints 
against employees, the grievance procedure deals with 
employees' complaints against the company and management. 
Retrenchment involves dismissal on a collective basis 
assoc i ated wi th, or due to the economi cpos it i on of the 
company. In the present economic climate job security and 
negot i at i ng retrenchment procedures have become major 
concerns of unions catering mainly for unski lled and semi-
skilled members. The sections usually dealt with in 
recognition agreements are (1) duties that the company 
undertakes to pe rform before retrenchment takes place; (2 ) 
the procedure to be followed by the company fn dismissing 
redundant workers and (3) what the company proposes to do to 
alleviate the situation of those workers that are retrenched 
(P iron 1986). Un ions negot i at,e with management to ensure 
that the minimum number of workers are retrenched resulting 
in a greater need for management to disclose financial 
information to unions. In general, unioh initiatives 
regal-di ng the negot i at i on of retrenchment procedures arose 
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from arbi trary --retrenchment procedures and ' 1 ack of 
constraints on mana~erial prerogative' (Jaffee 1984:126). 
Recent pul?lications on the state of South African labour 
relations all point to the increasing importance of health 
and safety issues on the bargaining agenda between workers 
and management. There is also a trend to move from the more 
procedural to the more sUbstantive aspects of this issue. In 
1983, unions have initiated important steps to get health 
and safety agreements negotiated with management. Referring 
to the attitude of management, Myers and Steinberg 
(1984:149) note that management is especially concerned that 
such issues may increasingly become part of negotiation with 
their workers as 'past failings might then result in 
expensive private compensation deals'. Relevant here, is the 
fear that democratically elected safety representatives will 
exercise agreed-upon rights in the work place and 'encroach 
on what is seen as managerial prerogative'. 
In reviewing developments during the 1984-1985 period, 
Leger, Maller and Myers (1986:79) report that unions have 
been 'consolidating health and safety activities on the 
shopfloor and shop stewards have won significant rights 
through negotiating with managements'. The National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) has taken important initiatives by 
confronting management with demands for recognition of 
safety stewards and commi ttees and the ri ght to negot i ate 
health and safety (Leger 1987). In this, they have 
concentrated on Anglo American mines. During 1986, unions 
with a history of concern with these issues, have 
consolidated prior gains and the first two agreements in the 
country were signed by The Transport and _ Genera 1 Workers 
Union and The South African Allied Workers Union. Certain 
benefits follow from these agreements· e.g. binding both 
parties to a set of responsibilities and obligations and the 
principle of bargaining on such matters·; establishing a more 
acceptable framework for relations between the parties; 
fixing past gains .and raising the awareness' of workers of 
health and safety issues (Macun & Myers 1987:309-310). 
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9.4.2 the" rote ~f the Industrial Court in workers' 
challenge to management prerogatives 
In the case of discipline "and dismissal for example, 
management has retained wide powers. Despite the efforts to 
curtail this power through collective bargaining and the 
negot i at ions of agreements, management can st ill resort to 
decimating trade union membership and undercutting unions. 
The power of management is equally influenced by the nature 
of the labour process, the existence of an oversupply of 
labour and high rates of unemployment (Haysom 1984:113). The 
Industr i a 1 Cou rt has been a cr'uc i ali nstrument in workers' 
and unions' efforts to oppose the wide decision-making 
powers of management. This has been widely acknowledged. 
Since its introduction in 1979, the Industrial Court has 
catered for th~ power disparity between employers and 
employees to a significant degree. It has developed certain 
generally acceptable principles regarding collective 
bargaining and the individual employment contract. In this, 
says Albertyn (1984:8), the Court tries to 'bring into line 
those employers whose unilateral and wrongful conduct serves 
to promote 
because it 
acceptable 
labour unrest and industrial strife precisely 
is out of line with what is regarded as 
behavior by employers generally'. Whi le civi 1 
courts have traditionally determined conflict of rights, 
industrial councils and other forms of collective bargaining 
have catered for conflict of interests and determined 
management powers. The Industrial Court has jurisdiction 
over both these concerns wh i ch, in effect, means that the 
discretion and rights of management is now subjected to the 
superv i s i on of a 1 ega 1 agency pos it i oned outs i de of the" 
co 11 ect i ve bargain i ng system" (Haysom 1984). The means by 
which this "is made possible is through the unfair labour 
practice jurisdiction. The Court is to identify unfair 
labour practices and remedy such practices. An unfair labour 
practice is essentially 'any practice that prejudices 
industrial peace, the welfare of job security or 
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'opportunities'~f employees or the business of an employer'. 
The notion of the unfair labour practice has, for obvious 
reasbns,··been highly attractive to unions for it creates the 
potential of 'penetrating the legal wall created by 
mana~ement's right to rule on its own terms and the power to 
dismiss at will' (1984:14). 
Reviewing the increased use of the Industrial Court by 
unions over the past few years, Benjamin (1987) outlines the 
main areas in which the Court has obtained rights for 
workers vis-a-vis employera these being discipline, 
dismissal and retrenchment and the protection of strikers 
through reinstatement. These areas pertain to the individual 
emp 1 oyment contract and it is genera 11 y acknowl edged that 
the Court has succeeded in being fairly consistent and 
co~erent in its judeements and in providing relatively clear 
guidelines for the relevant parties. In the Metal & Allied 
Workers Union v Transvaal Presses Nuts, Bolts & Rivets (Pty) 
Ltd (ILJ 9 1988) for example, the Court determined that the 
employer's refusal to negotiate rules and regulations on 
~iscipline and health and safety with the union, constituted 
an unfair labour practice. In the Court's opinion, it was 
clear that the employer had no intention to negotiate such 
matters as it considered them .to· be management's 
prerogat i ve. Thus, the Court has the potent i a 1 to protect 
jobs and enforce collective' bargaining and this has been 
reflected in the number of cases brought before the Court. 
Regarding collective bargaining, the Court has similarly 
developed broad guidelines in promoting unions and 
collective bargaining. In developing such guidelines, it has 
accepted the following rights: employees have the right to 
join the trade union of their choice without interference QY 
emciloyers;' employers are not·to favour a particular union if 
trade union rivalry exi.sts;- unions representing a majority 
of workers are to be recognised as collective bargaining 
representations of such workers by employers; in cases of 
redundancy or retrenchment the emp 1 oyer . must consu 1 t 
employees or a representative union because such action may 
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be detrimental ~o workers and their 
ne96tiate ~ith the r~presentative 
unions; 
union 
employers must 
in respect of 
changes to conditions of employment and reach an agreement; 
industrial action is not to be taken before dispute_s 
procedures are exhausted and lastly, elementary trade union 
rights are to be granted to a representative union including 
payment of dues by stop order, access to employer's premises 
to meet with members and the recognition of shop stewards as 
the immediate collective bargaining representatives of trade 
union members (Albertyn 1984:6-7). 
9.4.3 bargaining levels and the Industrial Court 
Given that workers have succeeded in penetrating traditional 
areas of management prerogatives by bargaining at the local 
level, an important question regarding the role of the 
Industrial Court remains i.e. can the Court enforce a 
particular. bargaining level on the parties to a dispute? 
More to the' point, can the Court force employers for 
example, to bargain with workers at the local level in those 
instances where they have refused to do so? This question 
is; mportant g; ven management's trad; tiona 1 re 1 uctance to 
accept workers' collective power and presence ·in the work 
place. As Douwes Dekker (1988a) correctly argues, the 1973 
strikes did not immediately result in shifting the frame of 
reference of management towards accepting the ex i stence of 
different interest groups in the organisation. Instead, the 
paternalistic attitude of management led to the offering of 
greater scope for social security and the establ ishment of 
management initiated and -dominated liaison committees. 
It seems that the Industrial Court's decisions as to 
bargaining levels have been less clear and coherent 
although, the basic principle seemingly being upheld is that 
the Court cannot determine bargaining levels. The following 
cases illustrate the. Court's attitude towards this matter, 
the first of which concerns Metal and Allied Workers Union v 
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Hart Ltd (19~5) '.6ILJ 478 (IC). In 1983 MAWU joined the 
country's largest. Industrial Council i.e. the Industrial 
Council for the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical 
Industries mainly because it felt that parties to the 
Council were hijacking its demands and that Council 
negotiations would be instrumental to its power and unity. 
The union subsequently pressed for plant level bargaining on 
wages and funeral benefit allowance which were strongly 
resisted by employers. The union argued that the employer's 
ref usa 1 to negot i ate on these two issues at plant 1 eve 1 
constituted an unfai r labour practice in as much as: (1) it 
unfairly affects weekly-paid employees; (2) it prejudices 
the economi c we 1 fare of the emp 1 oyees; (3) it has created 
serious labour unrest-and (4) it detrimentally affects the 
relationship between the parties. Regarding negotiation of 
wages at plant 1 eve 1, the un i on's case was based on the 
argument that the Industrial Council bargained minimum wages 
whi 1 e actual wages were to be barga i ned at the 1 oca 1 1 eve 1 . 
In the absence of plant level bargaining, employers who were 
actually in a p6sition to pay higher wages, were free to set 
wages unilaterally. In response to this demand, the employer 
argued that it would be against the best interests of both 
part i es in the industry to introduce 1 ega 1 compu 1 s ion into 
the bargaining process, that industrial council bargaining 
on both issues had taken place and additional bargaining 
should be on a voluntary basis, without legal compulsion. It 
interpreted the institution of legal proceedings by the 
union to compel the employer to bargain as, in itself, an 
unfair labour practice. The employer argued that, in fact, 
maximum wages were established at Council level and that 
house agreements would become an alternative method because 
employers would not wish to bargain on the same issue at two 
separate levels. The Court found that in South Africa, 
employers have no duty to bargain in good faith with uni6ns, 
and that barga in i ng shou 1 d be vo 1 untary. As to the 
feasibility of plant level bargaining, the Court stated that 
while plant bargaining should be encouraged as much as 
possible, negotiations should always assume a voluntary 
character to be effective. The Court's arguments have been 
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interpreted as -being in -the interest of employers seeing 
th~t the latter prefer voluntary bargaining, primarily 
because they are opposed to bargaining at plant level 
(Benjamin 1987:261-262). 
The second case refers to United African Motor & Allied 
Workers Union vs S Thomson (pty) Ltd t/a Thomson Sheet Metal 
Workers (1988) 9ILJ 266(IC). The union alleged that the 
refusal of the employer to negotiate wages and conditions of 
employment at plant rather at Industrial -Council level, 
constituted an unfair labour practice. Refusal to bargain at 
plant level with the union was tantamount to excluding the 
workers from the collective bargaining process given that 
the un i on was representat i ve of the workers but was not 
party to the existing Industrial Council. The employer 
argued that the un i on had refused to j 0 in the I ndustr i a 1 
Council and therefore could not participate directly in 
negotiating minimum wages and employment conditions at this 
level. Thus the dispute did not concern a refusal to bargain 
but concerned the appropriate bargaining forum. Furthermore, 
there was in the opinion of the employer no suggestion that 
the wages and corid it ions negot i ated at Counc ill eve 1, were 
unfair or exploitative of the workers. The Court ruled that 
the emp 1 oyer's stance was not contrary to accepted 1 abour 
practices and principles and declined to find the employer's 
conduct to be one of unfair labour practice. The Court 
affirmed that the determination of the bargaining level was 
a matter that should be left to the discretion of the 
parties. 
The last case i.e. Black Allied \"'orkers' Union & Others v 
Palm Beach Hotel (1988) 9ILJ 1016(IC), also sheds- some light 
on this particular issue. While the employer belonged to the 
Industrial Counci 1, BAWU, an unregistered union, was not a 
party to the ex i st i ng Counc i 1 although it had sought to 
represent its members in wage negotiatipns at Council level. 
The union proposed bargaining at local level while the 
emp 1 oyer argued that it had a 1 ready negot i a'ted at Counc i 1 
level. The workers were dismissed by the employer after 
288 
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ca 1 ling an.i 11 ega'l str ike wh i ch they thought to have been 
1 ega l .. The Court determi ned that wh i 1 e, the str ike was in 
fact illegal, it had to. assist illegal strikers where the 
employees believed that they were engaging in a legal 
strike. The Court also found no fault with the desire to -
negotiate actual wages ~ith individual .employers even where 
an Industrial Counc'il agreement makes provision for minimum 
wages. Minimum wages are not intended to reflect what a fair 
wage is as between a particular employer and his employees., 
The Court subsequently ruled in favour of the reinstatement 
of the workers as well as negotiations at local level. The 
Court upheld the principle that it could not enforce 
bargaining or bargaining levels. It had the duty however, to 
protect . workers from the consequences of a wrongful 
dismissal. In this partic~lar case, the Court had in effect 
determined the bargaining level although in an indirect 
manner. 
9.5 Conclusion 
In terms of the arguments put forward in this chapter, local 
bargaining has been shown to be a crucial way in which 
workers can penetrate traditional areas of management rights 
and prerogatives i.e. ar~as mainly concerned with personnel 
management. This h~s been predominantly the case with black 
,industrial workers in the South African labour context. The 
role of 'the Industrial Court in the process of eroding 
management rights has been argued as we 11. I n the 1 i ght of 
the new Labour Relations Amendment Act, the future role of 
the Court in aiding workers and their unions in this 
process, is presently seriously questioned and debated 
within certain quarters. In Chapter 7, it was suggested that~ 
the amended Act has in effect shifted the power balance in 
favour of emp 1 oyers especially in its more restricted 
definition of the unfair labour practice. This has seemingly 
manifested itself in the trend of employers increasingly 
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"making use of th~ Co~rt while unions are-seen to be finding 
ways of" not using the Court. The call for not using the 
Court has been explicitly stated by COSATU in March 
(Financial Mail 29:9:1989). The increasing use of outside 
arbitration and mediation by unions have duely manifested 
itself. The Court is thus interpreted as being faced with a 
crisis of legitimation on the part of black unions within a 
context of the absence of black pol itical rights. Union 
federations COSATU and NACTU as well as employer 
organisation Saccola (South African Coordinating Committee 
on Labour Affai rs), have subsequently also cal led boycotts 
and the overtime ban. The Minister 9f Manpower has respond~d 
by inviting interested parties to make submissions to the 
National Manpower Commision about the Labour Relations 
Amendment Act. The Mi ni ster foresees the Act being 
'modernised' and 'simplified' rather than scrapped (Sunday 
Times 22:10:1989). Unions are thus being successful in using 
their industrial and social power to counter labour 
legislation. " 
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CHAPTER 10 
LOCAL BARGAINING: WORKER PARTICIPATION AND INDUSTRIAL 
DEMOCRACY 
10.1 Introduction 
If the arguments set out in Chapter 9 are accepted i.e. that 
bargaining conducted between management and workers within a 
work organisation represents an important challenge to 
management control and prerogatives, then it logically 
follows that such bargaining has important implications for 
the position of workers within those organisations or 
establishments in which bargaining is conducted. 
It is suggested here that local bargaining represents a 
means by which .workers come 'to participate in' management 
de~ision-making and, can~rary to generally hald views, 
represents a form of industrial democracy. Bargaining 
< 
between management and workers, or their representatives 
has, by the same token, imp 1 i cat ions for worker 
organisations notably, unions. The manner in which 
, 
barga in i ng is conducted, and espec i a 11 y the re 1 at i ve power 
of the worker representatives, means that the role and 
structure of unions must be reassessed. 
10.2.1 
Loca 1 barga in i ng as 
management? 
worker participation 
the concept of worker participation 
in 
Proponents of worker participation have based thei r case 
primarily on a widespread commitment in industrial societies 
td democratic ideals grounded in certain fundamental values 
commonly held and sanctioned (Poole 1975:3). As pointed out 
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by Rosenstein (1977), the idea is widespread today in many 
countries even if they differ in terms of degree of ~conomic, 
develop~eht. Some observers view it as not to have evolved 
out of ,the 'humanization of capitalism' but as appearing 
cyclically, . corresponding to periods when management 
authority is felt to be challenged by workers and as a means 
of attempting to secure labour's compliance (Ramsay 1977). 
Those propagating the extension of worker participation in 
,management, view it as desirable for the following reasons: 
it constitutes a means of promoting the satisfaction and 
, . 
personal development of the individual worker; that through 
participation worke~s would have a greater say in decision-
making processes thereby extending industrial democracy as a 
t 
means of improving industrial relations and a means of 
increasing efficiency (Farnham & Pimlott 422:423). 
Referring to the concept of industrial democracy, Hirszowicz 
writes... 'The variety' of interests and expectations 
surrounding the practice of industrial democracy accounts 
for ~he confusion about the concept itself' (1981:235). This 
could very well apply to the concept of, participation. Thus 
participation means 'all things to all people'. For some 
trade unionists, it implies, the possibility of greater 
control over the running of industry, for others, the 
i ncorporat i on i nt6 management systems that wi 11 render an 
effective,opposition impotent, and for yet others, a chance 
to be informed by policy changes'. For managers or employers 
'it tends to be 'related to efficiency' (Marchington & 
Loveri dge 1979: 174). It must be noted however, that these 
authors usually exclude collective bargaining in their 
discussion of participation. 
Various attempts at defining workers' participation in a 
precise and generally acceptable way have been made - not 
always with a great amount of success. An ov~rview of such 
efforts is given by Marchington (1980:9-10) by classifying 
definitions according to their central concept. Some 
definitions focus on 'taking part' or 'having a share' in 
mak i ng dec is ions wh i 1 e other focus. on the 'i nf 1 uence ' that 
\)xJrcJ.de-
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
293 
the re 1 evant'·· part i €is have on one another., The rna in 
c 
. . 
shortcofuings of. the~e definitions have been the problem of 
quantiffcationand the 'direction' in which, for example, 
influ~nc~ is exercised. More successful have been thos~ 
attempts at 
(Tannenbaum 
defining participation in 
1966, Poole 1975, Guest & 
terms of 
Fatchett 
control 
1974). 
Contro 1 ; s here understood, in terms of Tannenbaum's 
definition presented earlier in this chapter, as denoting 
'any process through which a person or a group of persons 
determi nes (i. e. intent i ona 11 y effects) what another person 
or group of persons wi 11 do'. Defi.ning participation in 
terms of control is particularly useful in any attempt to 
study worker participation in an objective way (Farnham & 
Pimlott 1983). 
While Poole defines it as a 'means of obtaining greater 
control by workers over several aspects of their working 
lives and in so doing augmenting their power vis-a-vis that 
of management' (1975:24), the definition proposed by Farnh~m 
and Pimlott (1983) wi 11 be accepted here. Thus, 
participation will be viewed as referring to those processes 
( 
by which subordinates are able to display a countervailing 
a~d upward exertion of control. 'Subordinates'. is here 
def i ned as 'those who do' not have recogn i zed author i ty in 
any particular relationship'. The nature of the relationship 
th~s determines the potential participant (Guest & Fatchett 
1974:12): 
Not only is participation a manifestation of power but it is 
the right to share power with manqgement through joint 
decision-making .. By becoming involved in one or more aspects 
of organisational deciiion-making within the enterpri.se, 
'employees inevitably claim the right to share the power to 
make decisions with management in their work organi~ation' 
(Farnham & Pimlott 1983:421-422). Participation defined in 
terms of control thus includes a whole spectrum of potential 
workers' power ranging from information-sharing to workers' 
contro 1 or workers' determi nat i on a 1 though 'the extent to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
294 
which information-sharing denotes participation, is 
seriously questioned. 
10.2.2 classifying types of participation 
It is more helpful to classify types of participation, in 
terms of certain key variables (Poole 1975, Marchington 
1980, Guest & Fatchett 1974) of which the scheme proposed by 
the latter writers seems to be the most useful. Their 
classification is based on the following variables: 
1. form of participation: a distinction is made between 
direct and indirect forms. In direct participation, 
each worker can ta~c:rec;-si ons ana exert contro I; wi th 
i nd 1 rect par'Ll c 1 pa'Li on, th is is, done on 'tile worker-"s 
behalf by a representative 
2. content/level of participation: participation can be 
concerned Wl En ownershl p and government of the 
enterprise. It can generally focus upon eitner 
legislative deC1Slons concerning terms and employment 
corditions or leglslat;veaecisions relatlng to day-to=-
day running of, the enterprlse and 
3. purpose of participation: this relates to a distinction 
dr-awn between those who adopt a aiStr16utlve or an 
i ntegrati ve ori enta'El on. T~former vi ews-co,rfi-;-c;t-a-s 
i nev i tab 1 e ana aemands for a more ,even aTsuf6ut-i on of 
po~-· between management' ana worRer. Tl're---.atcer 
mi'ninfises 'Ene s igni-ri cance of conrll ct ana-
participation is seen as a means to increase JIOO--
satisfaction and productivity. 
Regarding form's of participation, important differences 
exist between direct and indirect participation. Direct 
participation is essentially- described as being task-based 
with its focus on the individual worker or work group, and 
on decisions affecting the worker's immediate job task. This 
takes place in the case of job enlargement and job 
enr;~hment as well as in the introduction of semi-autonomous 
work groups. Indirect forms of participation is seen to be 
power-based and 'its main methods are more collective 
barga in i ng and more 
(Farnham &Pimlott 
representative machinery in industry' 
1983:425) and is by its very nature 
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representativ·e .. It is seen to include all those methods of 
participati6nthr6ugh which employee 'representatives 
usually at its decislon-making, inf1uen6~ organisational 
intermediate or highest 
concerned. While Farnham 
levels, 
and 
on beha 1 f of the workers 
Pimlott suggest that shop 
steward representation, joint shop steward committees, 
collective bargaining, joint consultation, works'councils of 
the European type and representation on boards of directors 
be classified as indirect participation forms, Poole (1975) 
furthermore suggests classifying indirect participation in 
terms of whether it is management initiated, worker 
~.~-------------------------------------------------------------initiated or iniated by governments and the law. 
, 
In terms of the distinctions made in the foregoing 
paragraphs, local bargaining is defined as one form of 
indirect worker participation. It is viewed as power-based 
and is more legislative in nature as well as distributive in 
intent in that it functions to protect workers' collective 
interests through representation at single enterprise and 
work place 1 eve 1. It,S aim is to protect these interests by 
affecting managerial decisions and p~erogatives by the ( . 
exertion of control through joint negotiations and decision-
.< c_,~. __ .c .... '''.0. __ .... " •... n'. '"''.''' •. ".c ... ".". '"_. . __ ._.:.... .. _ ..... __________ _ 
making. 'By sharing decision-making power with management, 
the unilateral prerogatives and rights of managers are 
challenged. Bargaining is conducted over pay, conditions of 
employment and all those aspects that affect employers in 
general (Farnham & Pimlott 1~83:425-426). The view of 
collective bargaining and thus local bargaining - as a 
form of i nd i rect worker part i c i pat ion, . is not accepted by 
all commentators for example Marchington (1980), Hyman 
(1975) and Bendix (1981). They differentiate between 
collective bargaining and other forms of participation on 
various grounds although predominantly along the 
integrative/distributive distinction or who initiates 
participation. Bendix (1981 :36) argues that trade unions and 
workers' committees (councils) are distinctly different 
institutions with separate operational bases and 
functionality. In his words, 
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( t ) h e .t~r...g.¢.! .. e. . .:.:._ .. _y.oj .. .Qn=.e. . .mpJ.Q.Y..e. .. r:. r e 1 at ion s hip i sap ower 
relationship. expressing itself in the .9._Q .. ll~.c. .. t.j.y".e. . 
. P.g,r. .. 9.gj .. n...i .. n9_ .................... P .. r. .. Q .. c. .. e. .. $. .. $... It is based on the 
i nst i tut i ona 1 i sat i on of conf 1 i ct i ng j .. n.t..e. .. c~.§.t.S. The 
power of a trade union in this relationship stems from 
its degree of organisation, that is its me..rn.b .. e.LS who 
have f,,!.,L1J . .Y. assoc i ated for the same purpose· of formi ng a 
power basis for .ne..9.Q.tj .. g .. t..ing terms of employment. 
In contrast to the power relationship between trade 
unions and employers aiming at the equalisation of 
conf 1 i ct i ng i nte rests, the wo rkers' .. C_QJDJDj_t .. t.e..eLQ,Q .. Y.m;j .. L: . 
.e..mp..1Q.y' .. e...r.: relationship is one ba$ed on .. lgk{. Its purpose 
is not to grant the right to ne .. 9.Q..t.,iJa.t..e., but the 
realisation of rights created and already granted by 
the law. 
Furthermore ... 
the· duty to maintain industrial peace has been imposed 
on this relationship since any dispute arising from it 
stems necessarily from different interpretations of 
rights stipulated in and gra'nted by the law which has 
to be referred to a court of law in the last instance. 
employee representative bodies formed on the 
grounds of universal rights enshrined in legislation do 
not comply with the principles of the freedom of 
association and thus do not qualify for collective 
bargaining and industrial action in the conventional 
sense. 
That workers councils in Germany for example, occupy a 
central position as to bargaining and negotiating at plant 
level has been argued in Chapters 3 and 4. Of relevance is 
that they indeed do negotiate with management at local level 
illustrati~g that bargaining can be conducted through 
representative bodies other than trade unions. In the 
process, councils challenge managerial rights and through 
joint negotiations and decision-making, in fact participate 
in management, irrespective of whether rights to bargaining 
are granted by law or not. Whether local bargaining 
(including more autonomous and informal negotiations and 
interactions) is interpreted as a form of worker 
. participation, is clearly a function of the criteria being 
applied. 
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'10.3. 1 
As in 
Local bargaining' as 
democracy?' 
a form or industrial 
the concept of industrial democracy 
the case of worker participation, vagueness 
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characterises the concept of industrial democracy. From 
trade unionists' side, there eiist two conceptions or 
interpretations of participation (Farnham & Pimlott 1983). 
( 
The first conception is proposed by those unionists who have 
as their aim, the replacement of the existing industrial 
order and g i vi ng workers comp 1 ete contro lover industry. 
Thi~ view constitutes so-called workers' control. The second 
view is advocated by those who aim to seek greater control' 
for workers over their jobs and work lives within the 
existing system representing so-called industrial democracy. 
, 
Acknowledging that the ter.m industrial democracy denotes 
different meanings and usages, Farnham and Pimlott 
( 1983: 432) argue that essent i a 1, 1 y tit can be app 1 i ed to any 
theory or scheme of worker participation so long as it is 
based on a genu i ne concern for the' d ghts of workers in 
industry, part i cu 1 ar 1 y the i r ri ght to share in the contro 1 
of industrial decisions'. Achieving a greater degr,ee of 
i ndustr i a 1 democracy thus means t the ach i evement by 
workpeople collectively of a greater control over their work 
situation'. This interpretation of industrial democracy is 
supported by Abell (1985:50) when he defines this concept as 
'participation in control and management' as distinct from 
economic d~mocracy defined as 'participation in ownership'. 
In so far as local bargaining was depicted as participation 
i'n management control and decision-making, it follows that 
it impl ies a form of industrial democracy in terms of the 
above. The TUC (Trade Union Congress) in Britain for 
examp 1 e, propagates the strengthen i ng of trade 'un ion 
organ i sat ion in industry and the widen i ng of the scope of 
collective bargaining as the principal means by which 
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'workers can extend their collective control over their day-
to-day'working lives (Farnham & Pimlott 1983:432~433). 
Local 'bargaining in its different manifestations is 
exceptionally well suited for the attainment of the latter 
objective, especially given the fact that it usually extends 
the range and scope of issues over which bargaining is 
conducted within the work place (Guest & Fatchett 1974:44). 
Attaining or extending collective control within the work 
place, clearly does not necessari ly imply full 'worker 
control'. In other. words, whether local bargaining is 
interpreted as an end in i tse 1 f or a means to full worker 
control (participation in ownership), depends in the final 
analysis, on ideological considerations. Furthermore, in 
referring to the contemporary relevance of Goodrich's work, 
Hyman (1975: vi i i) argues that the boundary between worker 
control (understood to be typically reactive or protective 
in intent and a means to defend spec if i c interests at the 
time) as a 'means and as an end is by no means inflexible: 
actions and strategies which are primari ly defens;ve- may 
spillover into demands for positive control over the 
direct; on of industry an obj ect i ve then, as now, professed 
by only a tiny minority of workers' 
10.4 Local bargaining and unions 
In Chapter 4, it was suggested that local bargaining does 
not necessarily imply or require a strong union presence in 
the plant or enterprise. Agreements can be concluded through 
alternative structures e.g. works councils - especially in 
the absence of strong un ions. When un ions do succeed in 
establishing themselves at the local level, chances of 
alternative bargaining structures developing are somewhat 
remote e.g. in the British, American -and Japanese cases. 
Un ions, in order to ma i nta in the i r pos it ion, must resonate 
the needs and interests of the members they represent. This 
highlights the significance of upholding democratic 
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principles. in the· stiucturing and functioning of unions and 
shop steward committees. If unions should fail in this, 
worker representatives may gain independent powers to 
nego:tiate in a relative autonomous way. In such instances, 
or, where· powerful work groups engage in informal shopfloor 
bargaining, unions and their officials are presented with a 
challenge from such members. 
Referring to American fractional bargaining, kuhn (1961) 
caut ions us to the cha 11 enge that such barga in i ng presents 
to unions and their officials. This is similarly recognised 
by Roberts and Rothwell (1972:547) in the British context 
when they note that t •• str i kes call ed by the stewards in 
support of their demands were directed as much against their 
union leaders as against their employers'. The union, says 
Kuhn (1961 :127), 
seeks to organise the workers' discontent and to 
direct it through the union's own channels of activity. 
If workers act on thei r own in the shop, i gnori ng the 
promise given management by union leaders to settle 
shop grievances peacefully and choosing shop leaders to 
direct their negotiations and tactics, unions are put 
in a difficult position. 
The presence of work place organ i sat i on and shop stewards 
have led to the development of a power centre within, though 
not necessar i 1 Y of, the 1 oca 1 un i on. ·1 tis thus on the 
internal power relations within trade unionism that work> 
place organisation impinges (Hyman 1975:159). This relative 
independence and autonomous source of power relates tb 
I 
problems of internal democracy characterising most larg~ 
. , 
trade union organisations. Ordinary members often perceiv~ 
. I 
the union and its officials as far removed from day-to-day 
experiences in the work situation. Inputs by members toward 
union politics and official decisions are often non-
existent, constituting the disjunction between general and 
local representation referred to in Chapter 4. 
Representation issues are often exacerbated by sectionalism 
in the work place and result in more complicated shop 
steward organisation, for example in Britain. Of course, 
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·this could, a~ was shown, foster management's preference for 
formal ising bargaining in terms of formal plant and 
enterprise agreements. It is often the interests of the 
weaker workers that are at stake in the case of i nforma 1 
shopfloor bargaining. While their interests may be 
adequately represented by unions as far as wages and working 
cond it ions are concerned, representat; on on spec; f i c issues 
may be 'intolerable' (Kuhn 1961:187-188). 
A general concern has deve loped over the so-called 
, i ncreas i ng bureaucrat; sat i on' of ·un ions. The rna in reasons 
for this are the growing size of unions and consequently 
growing administrative apparatus; increasing complexity of 
functions; the weight of centralised decision-making; 
pressures from state officials to deal with competent and 
organ ised un i on apparatus and of course, 01 i garch i c 
tendencies as suggested.by Michels (1959). All of the above 
point to potential apathy on the part of ordinary union 
members. In Hill's (1983) opinion, this somewhat pessimistic 
view of union democracy, or rather the lack thereof, could 
be an exaggeration for the displacement of members' goals is 
not inevitable. Turner's (1962) classification of union 
administrations based on the relationship between full-time 
officials, lay activists ;.e. shop stewards and normal rank-
and-file members, leads him to differentiate between 
exclusive democracies (few officials and high membership 
participation); aristocracies (one occupational group having 
more part i c i pat i on than othe rs) and popu lar bossdoms (1 arge 
unions where members' participation is very low and 
officials control the union). 
The above classification suggests that unions differ to the 
extent that they function 'democratically' depending on the 
nature of the members' occupations. With the aim of 
constructing a theory of union democracy, 
defines democracy in terms of the status 
Martin (1986) 
of oppos it ion. 
Union democracy exists, he says, when union executives-
tolerate organised opposition by factions. He· proceeds to 
identify constraints upon leaders to tolerate faction 
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assuming that the existence of any opposition 1 imits the 
range of· opt ions open to such 1 eaders. A theory of un i on 
democracy thus entails a classification and integration of 
such constra i nts. Wh i1 e admi tti ng to. the wi deness of the 
range of constraints and the var i ab i 1 i ty of the i r re 1 at i ve 
importance for different unions and even officials, he 
identifies twelve categories of constraints. These. include, 
inter al ia, government attitudes and behaviour, pol itical 
culture, .patterns of membership distribution, the industrial 
environment (which includes the attitude of employers), the 
economi c env ironment, techno 1 og i ca 1 
characteristics and so on. 
factors, membership 
Thus, one has to support Maree (1982:45) when he concludes 
that. tendencies towards democracy and 01 igarchy are both 
present in trade unions. Jhe relationship between tendencies 
towards one or the other 'unfolds in a historical context'. 
Neither 01 igarchy nor democracy establ ishes a perman·ent or 
decisive hegemony although either can dominate for a 
considerable time, depending on the forces either external 
or internal. to the unions. However, even if, as Hill 
suggests, unions cannot coerce its members or exercise power 
over them because power ultimately resides at the bottom 
rather than the top of the un i on, the representat i on of 
members' interests in large, open and general unions remains 
a potential and serious problem. 
It is within this context that informal bargaini~g between 
workers and management· (foremen) and the presence of 
powerful work place representatives can play a crucial role 
in representing ordinary members' interests. In other words, 
the establishment of independent work place organisation and 
informal bargaining activities, constitute a significant 
counterbalance to the bureaucratic tendencies of formal 
union structures. This has been especially the case in 
Britain and to a lesser degree , in America. In the case of 
the latter, 'day by day the workers participat~ little in 
union affairs, except through the grievance' process' and 
fractional bargaining allows group members to lassert their 
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and ~g~in a real measure of control over their conditions of 
work' (Kuhn 1961: 184-185). 
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The reaction of official unions to independent informal 
bargaining in these two countries is significant. In 
Britain, as noted, the formalisation of domestic industrial 
relations has led to unions formally incorporating shop 
steward$· into their respective official hierarchies. Local 
bargaining was 'officially' handed to these representatives 
thereby recognising the credibility of shop f190r bargaining 
and membe rs ' i nte rests. The formal i sat i on of i nforma 1 
practices has however not, as previously noted, led to the 
total disappearance thereof mainly due to the 'inevitability. 
of informality'. Despite their formal incorporation, shop 
stewards have remained re 1 at i ve 1 y independent due to the 
fact that they r~main workers regardless of fulfilling union 
related functions. Shop stewards can be voted out and this 
threat of being disposed of, often leads to a strong 
commitment to the ordinary members. Pressure from unions can 
thus be defied to a. significant extent .. 
Batstone et al (1977) has found that shop stewards have 
considerable freedom to define their role and in this, their 
relative independence of unions are enforced as wel·l as 
their potential participation in 'informality'. We are, 
however, reminded by Storey (1976/1977:45) that excessive 
attention to the challenge from below as being independent 
and autonomous from unions, is dangerous and biased. Much of 
shopfloor action and bargaining owes a debt to trade 
unionism for the 'whole exercise of workplace power is made 
the securer because of the trade union culture and 
environment in which it occurs'. 
In the American case, shop stewards have always been part of 
the official union structure. The challenge of fractional 
b~rgaining to local and national unions entails keeping 
strong work groups sens it i ve to the needs 'of all workers 
while at the same time satisfying the claims of the stronger 
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group. Those members belonging to the weaker groups, are 
th~s hel~ed to maintain the rights and terms of coll·ective 
agreements and to at least participate in some of the 
decisions influencing their work lives. 
In the final analysis, the existence and stabil ity of the 
union remains threatened in that unions are often reluctant 
to give the necessary recognition ,to work groups as a 
legitimate agent of the union." This may result in groups 
resorting to overt action in order to receive recognition 
and acceptance. As Kuhn (1961) notes, unions in the American 
case must give credit to fractional bargaining through the 
grievance process because it remains a meaningful way for 
workers to establish some control over their work and 
employment conditions. 
Both the British and American cases illustrate the 
significance of the recognition by unions of 
independent work place organ i sat i on and barga in i ng 
1979). The acceptance and recognition thereof not 
fosters union stability but it also ensures 
more 
(Clegg 
only 
the 
representation of the interests of the ordinary workers on 
the shopfloor and ensures some measure of control in 
opposition to management control and rights i.e. industrial 
democracy. Also, management and unions must 
recognise the inevitability of informality, 
accept 
despite 
and 
the 
encroachment it may signify on these structures' autonomy~ 
10.5 local bargaining as indirect worker participation 
and a form of industrial democracy in South Africa 
In terms of the arguments presented in Chapter 9 and 
par.10.2 above, the negotiation and conclusion of 
recognition, procedural and substantive agreements since the 
1970's, have given black workers in South Africa a 
s~gnificant share in management decisio~-making by 
challenging management's unilateral prerogatives and rights. 
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In other words" these agreements prov i de for workers a form 
of indirect worker participation based on conflictual 
? 
oriehtati6ns. It similarly presehts a means by which workers 
can attain the right to share in or gain control over their 
work '1 ives. In this, it represents a form of industrial 
democracy as defined in par. 10.3 above i.e., it sets limits 
o~ mitigates decision-making capabilities of management, __ 
reduces management control and circumscribes managerial 
.' 
power within existing industrial orders. 
Management ,control, it has been suggested encompasses 
control over mainly two broad areas within organisations 
i .e. control over the workforce and employment conditions 
and secondly, control over work processes. By concluding 
agreemen~s at local level, clack workers have mainly come to 
indirectly participate in management's control over the 
former area. Webster's (1986) study of the changing form of 
job control in seven companies selected from different 
industrial sectors, presents informative material on black 
workers' gains in this area. Following Edwards (1979), he 
distinguishes between three elements of job control i.e. 
mechanisms by which employers direct tasks; procedures 
whereby they supervise and evaluate performance in 
production and the apparatus of discipl ine and reward. He 
then, by means of questionnaires and interviews, ,examines 
~the extent to which black workers are able to influence the 
way management exercises control over black labour in the 
workp 1 ace' ( 1986: 4). Comment i ng on the post-Wi ehahn per i od, 
he argues that most black workers joined unions in order ,to 
defend their rights against management's arbitrary and 
unfa i r treatment. Th is they have accomp 1 i shed, he says, by 
gaining the right to organise within establ ishments, 1 imit 
management's power to dismiss workers during a strike and 
challenge management's right to dismiss or retrench. In 
Webster's view, workers had the greatest success in 
encroaching upon management's right to unilaterally dismiss 
- a point argued in Chapter 9 as well. In the remaining two 
areas, i.e. direction of tasks and the supervision and 
evaluation of performance in production, relatively little 
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succ:ess 'has been forthcomi ng. In the text i 1 e case-study shop. 
stewards' have had some success in allocating overtime and 
manning .levels indirectly through challenging· retrenchment 
proposal's by managements. 
Webster's study confirms that workers' challenge of 
management control is largely defensive in nature and often, 
as Sa 1 aman conc 1 udes, t apparent 1 y conce rned with cond it ions 
and rewards rather than control and structure .. ' due to 
union representatives' .. texposure t~ ideological, political 
and organisational pressures'(1979:156-15?). Nevertheless, 
in so far as local bargaining is successful in setting ~ 
1 imits to, or mitigating decision-making capabi 1 ities of 
management, it reduces management control and circumscribes 
management· power within the existing industrial context. In 
the words of Storey, tauthority is divisable'. 
(1976/1977:54). 
.J 
Local bargaining by means'. of 'recognition and other 
agreements negotiated and concluded. has its' origin and 
roots in strong .union presence through democratically 
elected shop stewards and structures within the work place. 
This strategy follows predominantly from being traditionally 
excluded from centralised statutory bargaining structures. 
For this reason, one can expect oligarchic and bureaucratic 
tendencies to be less of an obstacle to unions in resonating 
the needs and interests of workers as wou 1 d have been the 
case with .more central ised bargaining. The power of the 
black uniohs is located at the work place and their 
potential growth is depet:ldent on democratically 
accommodat i ng ord i nary membe rs' needs. To the extent that 
thjs is i~ fact so - ~nions obviously differ in the extent 
to which they uphold these principles - the probabi 1 ity of 
shop stewards deve lop i ng autonomous powers comparab 1 e wi th 
their British counterparts, is diminished. 
It has been noted in an earlier chapter that there are some 
i nd i cat ions of a move towards more centr-a 1 i sed wage 
bargaining within the present economic dispensation. Another 
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reason was suggested in accounting for this trend i.e. 
insufficient resources for effective negotiations by union 
off-icials at those plants where they are represented. This 
may have significant consequences for the relationship 
between workers (and their shop stewards) in the work place 
and the officialdom of the unions in that it may prove to be 
detrimental to the internal democratic functioning of the 
union. There have been reports of union members not 
complying with the wishes of the union leaders- (Rapport 
30.7.1989); indicating a possible disjunction between union 
officialdom and ordinary members. During the stayaway 
organised by COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) 
during June 1988, mine workers' almost unanimous refusal to 
adhere to the call of COSATU and NUM (National Union of 
Mineworkers), illustrates the point. During 1988, members of 
Sarhwu (S A Rai lway and Harbours Workers' Union) in the 
Transvaa 1 refused to partake ina sympathy stri ke after 
union leaders had requested this. Numsa (National Union of 
Metalworkers' of SA) also experienced defiance by its 
members when the latter, opposing the union, insisted on the 
repayments of cash benef i ts by emp 1 oyers. Regard i ng Esop 
(Employee share-ownership plans), 64% of NUM's members took 
up Anglo American's offer against the wishes of the union 
officials. 
To conc 1 ude the arguments presented in th is sect i on as to 
the implications of local bargaining for management and 
workers, local bargaining has been presented as: 
( 1) a cha 11 enge to un i 1 ate ra 1 management ri ghts and 
prerogatives witl1in establ ;sl1ment~s::--,-------------
---
(2) a form of indirect worker participation in management 
by sharing managerial decision-making through the 
process of-jofilt reguTa:t:"ion ana ru le maKing and 
(3) a form of industrial democracy in that it presents 
workers a degree of control over the; r jobs and work 
lives within the existing industrial order. 
Interpreting and presenting local bargaining. in these te,rms 
means that essentially, local bargaining is interpreted as 
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simultaneously constituting the marketing, governmental and 
managementiindustrial relations concepts as suggested by 
Chambe~lain and Kuhn and outlined in Chapter 2. 
10.6 Conclusion 
An eva 1 uat i on of the exact extent to wh i ch black workers 
have penetrated management's domain and gained control over 
their work lives in the process, requires more extensive 
empirical research. The research undertaken by Storey (1981) 
in Britain provides valuable material for such ~n endeavour: 
Referring to previous studies which have focussed mainly on 
either the average shop steward's activity in the work place 
( 'range of dut i es') or management's response to workers' 
participation in decision-making, he proceeds to 'probe the 
range and type of issues wh i ch are subj ected to workp 1 ace 
bargaining' over a period" of seven years (1981:128). 
Conventional bargaining issues e.g. wages were excluded and 
only marginal items found to be area? of contention, were 
included as well as a range of decision-making areas 
common 1 y assumed to rema in with in the rea 1 m of manage ria 1 
pr~rogative. This resulted in a 25~item list of issues. 
This study enabled Storey to assess: 
(1) the trend in the range of work place bargaining between 
1971 and 1978, 
(2) the types of issues negot i ated or 
unilateral control by either side and 
(3) to draw comparisons between industries. 
ret a i ned for 
Results showed that despite an unfavourable economic 
c 1 i rna te , the scope of barga in i ng on non-wage areas had in 
fact widened. The survey also revealed that the most 
frequently negotiated areas were shifts, manning, overtime, 
job content, disc i p 1 i ne and speed of work. Thus, issues 
related to jobs were of most concern to workers and stewards 
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at the work ¢lac~~ The areas least negotiated were type and 
price· of product· and service and 'ownership. Areas 
.uniiater.a:ll y controlled by workers concerned manning, 
demarcat i on and 1 ess frequent 1 y, speed of work. Compar i ng 
different industries i.e. engineering, transport, brewing, 
production of man-made fibres and spinning and weaving, . he 
is able to determine the percentage of respondents from each 
industry negotiating 11 or more of the 25 items. Industries 
were also compared overall as regards to the following 
areas: joint regulation, joint consultation, unilateral 
control by management and un; 1 atera 1 control by workers or 
subject to custom and practice. 
Storey's research clear 1 y funct ions as a warn i ng aga i nst 
uncritical generalisations regarding the relative fsuccess' 
or ffailure' that particularly black workers in South 
African industrial relations have had in matters such as 
participation, control and penetrating the areas of 
·management prerogatives through local bargaihing. For this 
very reason, the case study by Webster has been valuable and 
timely in providing material for future research into this 
area. 
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CONCLUSION· 
In terms of the definition presented, local bargaining has 
been shown to encompass formal as we 11 as i nforma 1 
negotiations between employers/management and 
employees/labour within an enterpris:e, .p1ant or at shop,f100r 
level. Such negotiations usually result in formal agreements 
as well as informal and tacit'agreements and ·understandings. 
Local bargaining was interpreted as essentially a rule-
making process involving control over work relations. 
Local bargaining was shown to be the predominant bargaining 
level iri a number of countries e.g. the United States of 
America and Japan. In some countries notably Britain. and 
not the p redom i nant West Germany, local bargaining, while 
1 eve 1 at wh i ch barga in i ng takes place, 
existing s.ignificant position within 
occupies a 
bargaining 
arrangements. The bargaining structure of a country tends to 
be relatively stable. However, in a number of Western 
European countries - traditionally noted for their highly 
centralised bargaining structures 
gaining increasing prominence. 
local bargaining is 
Vario~s structures' through which local bargaining takes 
place, have been identified in different countries' 
bargaining arrangements,. ranging from shop steward 
structures to various forms of committee and council systems 
as well as worker representatives on" the shopfloor. While 
not identical, these structures all function as mechanisms 
through which management and workers 'can bargain and 
negotiate with one another in the work place. 
The South African bargaining structure has traditionally 
been highly centralised - bargaining being conducted through 
the 'industrial council system by so-called established, 
mainly white, unions and employers' associations. Given the 
i nst i tut i ona 1 i sed nature of industry 1 eve 1 barga in i ng and 
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the privi le'ged position occupied by white workers within a 
racially stratified society and 'labour market, there was no 
need for these unions to be active in tHe work place. While 
managers determined wages unilaterally usually above 
levels set at industrial council level - individual artisans 
engaged in wage bargaining given their highly specialised 
skills. This practice, however, was by no means the norm. 
Prior to 1979, some black unions existed but did not receive 
legal recognition and were therefore not entitled to bargain 
at industrial counci 1 level. In the absence of rights to 
collective bargaining for blacks, ,the government devised 
different structu res and mechan isms in order to structure 
work place relations between black workers and management at 
the establishment level. While these structures were 
initially and, in essence, consultative in nature, they did 
eventually obtain bargaining rights during the 1970's. The 
development and establishment of these structures were 
mainly a result of government policies and labour 
,legislation aimed at keeping black unions out of the work 
place. These policies and legislation were fundamentally 
grounded in the socio-economic and cultural history of South 
Africa. 
During the 1970's, black workers came to devise their own 
mechanisms and work place structures in order to establ ish 
union presence and engage in bargaining with management i.e. 
I 
through negot i at i ng recogn i t i on and other plant-based 
agreements. The work place presented black industrial 
workers with a footh61d for building powerful black unions. 
While the exclusion of black workers from statutory 
bargaining arrangements made this option the most viable 
one, the ability to establish local bargaining was primarily 
a result of black workers' changing status and power within 
the South African economic structure. 
The extension of local bargaining by governm~nt through the 
establishment of multi-racial works councils after 1979 has, 
for the first time, provided white worl<ers formal channels 
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for bargaining in the work place. Given their statutory 
natura and histo~ical link with previously management-
~ominated work place structures, these co~ncils do not 
represent viable bargaining structures for black workers in 
establishments in which unions function. In most cases, 
unions tend to hijack these councils. 
The deve 1 opment and extens i on of 1 oca 1 bargain i ng in South 
African industrial relations primarily through 
recognition and other agreements - has contributed to the 
fact that collective bargaining in South Africa is 
increasingly conforming to those features characterising 
collective bargaining in industrialised countries elsewhere. 
These features have been identified by C6rdova (1978) and 
presented in Part Two i.e. (1) the enduring nature, 
adaptability and strength of collective bargaining, (2) the 
deve 1 opment of new and more soph i st i cated forms of 
bargaining, (3) an increase in bargaining levels, (4) the 
gradual development of a set of ground rules and procedure~, 
(5) changes regarding the content of agreements e.g. from 
wage and effort bargain i ng to that of work organ i sat ion, 
we 1 fare arrangements, health and safety as we 11 as other 
trad it i ona 1 management areas and (6) changes regard i ng the 
conduct of collective bargaining under conditions of 
recession and inflation resulting in potentially greater 
i ntervent i on by government. The i ncreas i ng focus on work 
place bargaining in South Africa has resulted, as in 
Britain, in collective bargaining becoming 'a more complex 
activity in terms of the roles of the two parties, of its 
structural characteristics and of its relationship to other 
forms of representation and the evolving pattern of 
collective and individual legal regulation' (Roberts 1987 
commenting on collective bargaining in Britain). 
But, the nature and development of local bargaining has also 
contributed to the uniqueness of South African industrial 
relations and bargaining arrangements. firstly, local 
bargaining has always been reserved for a particular section 
of the workforce i.e. black industrial workers. Secondly, 
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the" non-participation of blacks in central political 
dec;: is i on-mak i ng processes (and thus of po 1 it i ca 1 
representation to secure their political and economic 
interests) within South Africa, has meant that the black 
union movement has acquired broader political aims and 
become part of the black liberation movement. These broader 
aims have strengthened the position of black u"nions within 
the work place relative to, not only white unions, but" also 
unions in work places elsewhere. In a very real sense, the 
work place has for black workers become the main (i f not 
only) avenue through which, not only economic aspirations 
are channe 11 ed, but also those issues" trad it i ona 1 1 y 
accommodated by pol itical structures. It is perhaps in the 
i nf 1 uence of the above two factors that the d i st i nct i ve 
nature of South African local bargaining may be located. 
J 
The distinctive nature of local bargaining has had, "and 
still has, significant implications for management in that 
the latter is confronted with work place relations and 
bargaining activities involving much wider societal and 
political issues. ihrough local bargaining and the extension 
of bargaining areas, management may-increasingly experience 
pressure to act as an ally of black workers against 
government pol icy and legislation - thereby securing the 
economic and political interests of such workers. The future 
political role of black unions in South Africa is, however, 
only to be surmised at this stage. Should these unions come 
to play an essentially political role, and possibly function 
as an extension of a future government, one can expect their" 
more traditional trade union role to eventually disappear. 
Regard i ng future trends in co 11 ect i ve barga in i ng and the 
role of local bargaining, it was argued that wage bargaining 
is beco~ing increasingly centralised in the light of present 
economic realities. But, even if this was to happen, one can 
predict with a fair amount of certainty that the bargaining 
structure will never again resort back to that of" the pre-
1970's era with bargaining almost exclusively conducted at 
the industrial council level. Local bargaining can be 
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expected to r'ema i"n an i nst i tut i ona 1 i sed featu reo of futu re 
bargain.irig arrangements in the South African industrial 
relation system. A wide range of issues m'ay be expected to 
remain within the orbit of local bargaining. The range may 
even in future be extended by local bargaining (i .e. joint 
regulation involving aspects of control by workers) to 
inc 1 ude issues in the areas of, fo 11 owi ng Webster (1986), 
direction of tasks and the supervision and evaluation of 
performance in production. As Storey's research into British 
work place industrial relations illustrates, issues may 
possibly come to include the following: speed of work, lay 
out of equipment, shifts, rest periods, contracting work 
out, _ job content, type and p rice of product, schedu 1 i ng of 
operations, purchase of plants and materials, transfer of 
emp 1 oyees, prolTlot ions, demarcat i on and poss i b 1 y, investment 
poli,cy. 
, 
The simultaneous existence of centralised and company 
barga in i ng in many sectors reported on by .recent rese'arch 
u'ndertaken into collective bargaining levels in the Eastern 
Cape (Anstey 1989) , ill ustrates the 1 ike 1 y future 
developm~nt of a two-tier bargaining system in South African 
industrial relations. 
The analysis of local bargaining, especially in the South 
African industrial relations context, has at various moments 
been hampered by the insufficiency of available empirical 
information. This can be seen as to indicate possible areas 
for future research. Suggested areas that need to be 
explored more exten~ively, are the following: 
( 1) The re 1 at i onsh i p between management/emp 1 oyer att i tude 
towards local .. bargaining within different industrial 
sectors and the following variables: changing 
production and labour market conditions, labour 
/technology ratio and the degree of worker mi 1 itancy 
within an establishment. 
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"variables such as: the power of work groups and 
shopfloor representatives, the nature of management 
structures and control systems, the nature of payment 
systems; the role of the foreman and middle "management 
and their participation in informal shopfloor 
bargaining with workers; the type of issues involved in 
informal bargaining. 
(3) The generation of custom and practice rules within work 
places. 
(4) The" penetration by workers of areas of management 
prerogatives i.e. type and range of issues being 
bargained over in the work place over a specific period 
of time within different industrial settings. 
(5) The role of the shop steward in local bargaining. 
(6) Followi~g Clegg's suggestion, the relationship between 
various elements or dimensions of South Africa's 
bargaining structure and the manner in which these 
elements relate to various aspects of union behaviour. 
The latter aspects refer to union densitYJ union 
structure, union government, work place organisation 
and collective action, for example, strikes. 
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